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Culture War Roundup for the week of September 19, 2022

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Some of my friends have gone back to Russia (many others never left in the first place). I really hope they're not going to be mobilized, so that may bias my reasoning (in what direction, though?).

In short, yours is a reasonable approach, but

A. despite the unexpected cohesiveness of the regime in the face of many grave setbacks, we still need to ask whether the «collective Putin» is collectively deluded; and that matters a lot. Aside from Putin, there are two names most associated with personal agency and most shilled in Russia these days: Prigozhin and Kadyrov. I can't believe that either is remotely as optimistic as Putin about the outcome of the war; both had exposure to major shit in life, and learn about the frontline from battle-tested allies, unlike Putin with his «folders» full of sycophantic nonsense. It may be that their displays of belligerent enthusiasm are in line with a long-term aim to build personal armies and survive as warlords; in that case, the subordination mechanic can begin to unravel without any watershed event like a coup, both in ways of creatively fulfilling orders and creatively dodging them, and that'll determine more than Putin's opinions from now on (there are other signals for this tendency too). It is also plausible that people closer to the First Body are aware of the state of affairs, and we will not see Putin's speech tomorrow, or we'll see him reading someone else's script.

The biggest argument against that is that we have a great deal of mostly intact interior army, and that's the backbone of the system. The Interior Ministry (cops, many of them militarized) – 830 thousand; National Guard – roughly 400k (most are literal guards, as in, non-departmental security service, glorified watchmen, but still); FSB – 200...350k. Assorted departmental security that's not subordinated to the National Guard – something like 100k (+some in the Army). Federal Penitentiary Service - maybe 300k. Federal Security Service – about 50k. And the list goes on. In total, Russia has over a million somewhat combat-trained men, 1% of the total population, who are not in the regular Armed Forces, and (almost) all of them are in structures directly controlled by Putin's loyalists such as Zolotov (off topic, both him and Putin remind me of the main character of the incredible short Polish animation Fallen Art; as does this entire situation).

Russia really is not committing fully to the war, just like Z-patriots assert, because the true existential war is civil; framing Ukraine as the breakaway province doesn't change the fact that the dominant threat model is internationally recognized provinces telling Moscow midget to go pound sand. Still, it is possible to mobilize some among those and reinvigorate the occupation force, while limiting exit options for reservists and also maintaining sufficient deterrent against wannabe warlords.

B. Putin is not a strategist. He's an amateur, an armchair geopolitician, doing things for his own personal immature satisfaction. My favorite analogy is an out-of-shape guy who watches soccer and comments disdainfully on skills of people on the field (is this a universal type?), only to end up transported there. He cares a hell of a lot whether Macron or Scholz «respect him as an equal», he gets hurt by words and can throw a fit. He can LARP as a wise leader with some long-term outlook but that, too, is done for immediate impressions. What I mean to say is that Putin may be driven entirely by his spite and unwillingness to lose face, rather than any specific belief about the game board, and can do things that only make sense narratively, not militarily, including a limited nuclear strike.

All in all, if Putin lives, I expect some mobilization-that-is-not-mobilization, copes about our successes at protecting the people of Kherson, patting oneself on the back about referenda, maybe snark about NATO-Turkey-Azeribaijan-Armenia, stern warning to traitors who think that they can exploit the war for their own gains – nothing decisive; and more consternation from patriotic bloggers.

I may be severely mistaken.

What would I have done in his place, while holding his stipulated beliefs? Heck if I know.

P.S. Girkin is quite aware that the war may be strictly unwinnable but, like many others in that camp, he's fully committed to the idea that failure = death (and it most likely is for him!), so calls for maximum effort and doesn't much care about the odds.