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Culture War Roundup for the week of December 11, 2023

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One of the greatest questions of the Iraq War, and a question with significant implications for our understanding of the competence of the 'deep state', Pentagon and intelligence services in general, is this:

Why didn't the CIA fake evidence of WMDs in Iraq?

As time has passed since 2003, the 'mainstream' antiwar narrative, in which every important person supposedly 'knew' there were no WMDs but advocated for invasion anyway, has been shown to be largely ridiculous. It is likely, as discussed by Jervis and others who have done the most research into the cause of the intelligence failures in Iraq, that a substantial proportion of the intelligence establishment, including senior officials at the CIA and MI6, considered it highly likely that Saddam was, at the least, in posession of extensive chemical weapon stocks. The long since retired head of MI6 at the time said just this year that he was convinced they were there:

"Asked if he looks back on Iraq as an intelligence failure, Sir Richard's answer is simple: "No." He still believes Iraq had some kind of weapons programme and that elements may have been moved over the border to Syria. "

They weren't united about what to do, hence certain Cheney actions, and they didn't have much proof, thus the Office of Special Plans and intense efforts to convince Powell etc to act, but even many of those who didn't advocate invasion believed it was likely that he had these weapons. Most crucially, as Jervis argues, they overfocused on Saddam's refusal to allow international weapons inspectors as almost a guarantee that he was hiding WMDs, because why else would he refuse them? (Saddam ultimately claimed, under interrogation in 2004, that he refused to allow them because he didn't want Iran to find out how 'degraded' his weapon stocks were.)

So why, after it became clear weeks - and certainly months - into the invasion that there were no WMDs, did the US 'deep state' (including the intelligence services, perhaps with Pentagon assistance and/or with WH approval) not fake them? This anti-conspiracy is critically important for a few reasons:

  1. It would likely have been significantly easier to fake chemical and/or biological weapon stocks in Iraq than to commit many of the other conspiracies placed at the foot of Western Intelligence services or the 'deep state'. The US didn't destroy its own chemical weapon stocks until 2022, and anthrax would be a trivial process for a small, highly focused internal intelligence unit to acquire or manufacture. No 'Bush planned 9/11' tier conspiracy theory is required, this would have been a focused, limited program in the vein of countless mid-late 20th century US intelligence operations involving a small number of operatives. While the coalition alleged variably the existence of (official link) chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, the nuclear allegations were extremely vague and largely amounted to the idea that Iraq 'might' have started such a program, or that Saddam had 'met with' nuclear scientists or tried to acquire nuclear material.

    It was not, therefore, necessary to manufacture the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear material, for which a longer, riskier and more complex supply chain would be necessary. The presence of moderate stocks of chemical weapons, plus some anthrax, would have been sufficient to make the pre-war claims largely accurate, or at least accurate enough to be respectable.

  2. It's unlikely the international press would have trusted the denials of ex-Baathist officials or scientists around planted evidence, and in the event of requiring an eyewitness, only a few people would had to have been paid. Even if the fakes weren't universally believed, they would have sowed enough FUD that US motives for the war wouldn't have been thoroughly discredited. There was no need to 'prove' the full extent of the pre-war allegations, only to lend them broad credence. 'There were no WMDs in Iraq' served as a major argument used by people hostile to the policies of the Bush and Blair administrations after 2003, led to major protests and enquiries, and soured the popular perception of those governments extensively.

  3. The Iraq War led to a climate in which CIA regime change operations supported by boots-on-the-ground became substantially less easy to slip through the political process. Even if we assume that (a) the CIA was ambivalent about an invasion, thus the OSP and (b) that the CIA didn't particularly care to prop up the careers of neoconservative politicians who suffered if they didn't find WMDs, the number of US regime change ops, and the number of direct military interventions involving ground soldiers, have declined significantly since 2003, even relative to the 1990s. Military involvement was (beyond those existing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan) limited to Syria, Libya and some support for Yemen and Ukraine, civil involvement to Ukraine and a couple of others, and the Iraq War's intelligence failures have led to a political climate in which committing ground soldiers to foreign conflicts is extremely unpopular. The presence of WMDs would have made all this significantly easier. For example, the CIA's failed rebel training program in Syria was in part a consequence of the US' steadfast refusal under Obama and Trump to support their regime change operation with a substantial number of ground forces.

Categories of explanation:

  • Intelligence agencies were simply too incompetent to fake even a modest stockpile of WMDs in Iraq under US occupation, despite having free rein of the country, access to near-unlimited resources and the fact that sufficient chemical and biological weapons would not be difficult for them to acquire or manufacture. This scenario makes countless other conspiracy theories much less likely; if the CIA is so incompetent it can't even stash and then 'find' some anthrax in a Baghdad warehouse, clearly a lot of conspiracist allegations would strain their abilities far too much to be realistic. 'By the time they realized there were no WMDs, they couldn't fake it any longer' is also questionable and seems to lack coherent reasoning. It might even have been smart, if there was any doubt at all, to prepare some possible weapons for planting, 'just in case'.

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  • Intelligence agencies didn't care enough to fake them, or actively chose not to. This explanation also seems unlikely because of the predictable and dire consequences, as I cover above, for the CIA's operational reach, of the intelligence failure and the subsequent extreme reluctance by future administrations to commit ground forces to regime change operations. A strong case can be made that the Iraq War rationale being proved bullshit in front of the world prohibited regime change operations from Venezuela to Syria and beyond, where a US expeditionary force could have made the difference but politicians were worried about an Iraq / Afghanistan repeat. Even if the CIA didn't want war in Iraq, finding no WMDs in Iraq wasn't good for the US foreign intelligence ops in the future. Most people would never hear of the Office of Special Plans, if US foreign intelligence fails, it's "the CIA" at fault. A variant of this is the schizoposter classic "they did it to show how much they could get away with".

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  • The CIA prioritized the humiliation of Bush and Cheney, and the wider coalition effort, over the negative consequences for themselves. I don't think this scenario is impossible. You spend decades cultivating intelligence assets in a complex way, managing regional powers against each other, handling competing interests, a little propaganda here, a little assassination there, and then suddenly some PNAC moron comes in and wants to invade Iraq and demands you prove there are WMDs there. But still, many people in intelligence believed they were there, and again, the CIA arguably suffered when they didn't find them, and the "humiliation" of Bush and Cheney was limited and Bush (and Blair) won re-election in 2004/2005. It also suggests a degree of hostility toward neoconservatism that was more extreme than the reality in the CIA at the time.

What do you think?

supported by boots-on-the-ground

to commit ground forces to regime change operations

You seem to assume that the CIA actually wants this — that it is them, rather than politicians or the military, pushing for "boots on the ground."

I believe it was Jim Donald who, in speaking of rivalry between the State Department and the Defense Department, coined the phrases "blue empire of the consulates" and "red empire of the bases." He is far from alone in arguing that for Foggy Bottom, the foreign "enemy," — Al Qaeda, Saddam, the Taliban — is not the outgroup, but a fargroup, and their actual outgroup is the Pentagon. And now, I consider the connection between spies working overseas and embassies — how often the latter host and provide "diplomatic cover" for the former, and such. Thus, is it really inconceivable, then, that college-educated Langley boys might tend to prefer Foggy Bottom over the Pentagon, and thus not really want a bunch of uniformed rednecks trampling all over "their turf"? Particularly when, for the more military-friendly would-be spooks, there's the DIA to join instead of the CIA. That could add some selection effects into the mix as well.

(And now I'm reminded — yes, yes, fictional evidence — of multiple movies where the protagonists are some flavor of military special operations or such, and the villain is some shady CIA spook trying to screw them over for his own ends.)

The CIA prioritized the humiliation of Bush and Cheney, and the wider coalition effort,

I'm saying take this, and add the DoD on there as another target.