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ACX: Seems Like Targeting

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I don't believe that some of your items would be accepted as a definition of a woman by anyone not in the lizardman constant. Someone who's otherwise a woman but can't become pregnant would be described as "a woman who can't become pregnant", not as not literally being a woman. It doesn't work that way for transwomen either. Someone who doesn't want them in women's bathrooms but doesn't care too much about pronouns would never say "transwomen are women, but they are women who should be kept out of women's bathrooms". People don't make distinctions that way.

If you only like onions in soup, you aren't going to claim "I like all onions, but I define onions as a plant of genus Allium cepa that is located in a soup".

People do all sorts of weird things with words. To use two ancient examples: the Epicureans said that "pleasure" (hedone) was the highest good, and then said the height of pleasure was the absence of pain, and the Stoics said that the only truly good things were morally virtuous things and all other conventionally "good" things were really just "preferred indifferents."

The technical terminology of both of those philosophies differs quite a bit from standard usage in Greek, Latin and English. I think most people would say that "pleasure" and "absence of pain" are two different things entirely, and that having a wife and kids that you love isn't a "preferred indifferent" but a positive good in the life a person where it is desired. But I think in both cases, in redefining the terms (from a layman's perspective) the two philosophical schools are trying to make it psychologically easier to adopt each school's philosophical regimen.

I don't believe that some of your items would be accepted as a definition of a woman by anyone not in the lizardman constant.

My point was not that any of those was an unambiguous "best" definition, just that they were all possible definitions. I agree that in our society, as far as standard English usage goes, some of those are less plausible than others, but there's nothing in principle stopping us from having the following categories of sex: man, eunuch, woman, barreness (sic.) Eunuchs and barrenesses could be regarded as infertile males and females, and almost (but not quite) men and women. I think given the right society, those categories could easily be pertinent enough that they could emerge as real and strong divisions in people's minds. (Say, for example, a society where eunuchs are in widespread usage as singers, babysitters, escorts and government functionaries, and in which a girl is not considered a "woman" until she had born at least one child.)

There are possible constructions of those terms that would be bizarre to modern English speakers. For example, under Galen's single sex model almost 2000 years ago, women were "defective men with inverted sex organs", but no one in today's society would think that.

I think the shape of society often defines the limits of "plausible" word boundaries. Some Asian languages have single words for "older brother" and "younger brother" and "paternal uncle" and "maternal uncle" because the hierarchies of birth order and paternal vs maternal relatives is always important and pertinent information (at least historically.) It's not that English has no way of referring to those same distinctions, but for various historical and cultural reasons our language doesn't package those concepts as single words.

The whole point of using the word "women" for trans people is that using the word is supposed to go with treating them like regular women in all possible ways. That's the exact opposite of your examples. Trans supporters want to blur the distinction, using the term "woman" broadly. Using "woman" to mean only someone who's fertile, or borne a child, or married, etc. is the opposite of that; it narrows the category of "woman".