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DaseindustriesLtd

late version of a small language model

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User ID: 745

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BANNED USER: temperamental dysregulation

DaseindustriesLtd

late version of a small language model

78 followers   follows 28 users   joined 2022 September 05 23:03:02 UTC

					

Tell me about it.


					

User ID: 745

Banned by: @Amadan

As for Dust Theory, it's been a while since I read half of Permutation City. But I fail to see how it changes anything, my subjective consciousness wouldn't notice if it was being run on abacuses, meat or a supercomputer, or asynchronously. It doesn't track objective time. Besides, I sleep and don't lose sleep over that necessity, the strict linear passage of time is of no consequence to me, as long as it doesn't impede my ability to instantiate my goals and desires.

I've written a bunch, and deleted (your response to the issue of causal power was decisive). The long and short of it is that, being who you are, you cannot see the problem with Dust Theory, and therefore you do not need mind uploading – in the Platonic space of all possibilities, there must exist a Turing machine which will interpret, with respect to some hypothetical decoding software at least, the bits of your rotting and scattering corpse as a computation of a happy ascended SMH in a Kardashev IV utopia. That this machine is not physically assembled seems to be no obstacle to your value system and metaphysics which deny that physical systems matter at all; all that matters, according to you, is ultimate constructibility of a computation. From the Dust Theory perspective, all conceivable agents have infinite opportunity to 'instantiate their goals and desires'. Seeing that, I would ask and indeed try to prevent you from wasting the valuable (for me, a finite physical being) negentropy budget on frivolous and wholly unnecessary locally computed and human-specified simulations which only add an infinitesimal fraction of your preferred computations to the mix.

It really is fine, I would never be able to care about such offenses (barring brain damage), or, hopefully, even intentional offenses from people like you or Ranger. I just dislike the quantum microtubules thing – it's tasteless too, after all; just adding a layer of pseudo-empirical woo to postpone responding to a relatively compact philosophical challenge.

give one good reason for why substrate independence can't work, especially if we can simulate neurons at the molecular level

I do not have to give you any reasons because your position, in its decisive dimensions, has zero empirical content, it is just metaphysics – of a tool who has first-person experience but cognitively is conditioned to process himself through the master's pragmatic point of view. Well, that and geeky masturbation about (irrelevant, surmountable) difficulties of computing this or that. My metaphysics is the opposite, I start with asking for a reason to believe that computational equivalence even matters, because this is about me, not about some external function. I exist for myself. Do you exist for yourself? What does it mean to exist for oneself? Can you even conceive, in a purely hypothetical way, of the possibility of a distinction between you existing for yourself, and "something that simulates you" existing for myself, but not for itself? Not a strict p-zombie, perhaps, but something whose internal experience is different from the experience it computes, in a way that does not remotely hold for your current implementation? In my experience there is a qualitative and insurmountable difference between people who can and cannot, so I'd rather not invest into debating you, and just have fun the way I feel like.

You started with outsider-oriented rubrics to test similarity between two black-box behavioral generators compared to a years-old exemplar (in x years every molecule changes etc. etc. as you say, and I just call bullshit on the idea that you're more like yourself in 70 years than like another similar guy of your age, but anyway it's irrelevant); then retreated to increasingly fine-grained circuit equivalence in white boxes; now you talk about molecular simulation which will necessarily, overwhelmingly capture neurocomputationally redundant content. This is commendable: you at least have some remains of a normal-person intuition that your consciousness literally is your brain and not some equivalent of it with regard to some interface or observer. But you cannot come to grips with this intuition or wonder if it corresponds to something coherent.

Some can. In the words of Christof Koch, whose book The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness Is Widespread But Can’t Be Computed I've mentioned a few times: «The maximally irreducible cause-effect power of real physical computers is tiny and independent of the software running on the computer… Two systems can be functionally equivalent, they can compute the same input–output function, but they don’t share the same intrinsic cause-effect form. A computer of figure 13.3 doesn’t exist intrinsically, while the circuit that is being simulated does. That is, they both do the same thing, but only one is for itself. […] Consciousness is not a clever algorithm. Its beating heart is causal power upon itself, not computation. And here’s the rub: causal power, the ability to influence oneself or others, cannot be simulated. Not now, nor in the future. It has to be built into the physics of the system… This is true even if the simulation would satisfy the most stringent demands of a microfunctionalist. Fast forward a few decades into the future when biophysically and anatomically accurate whole-human-brain emulation technology—of the sort discussed in the previous chapter—can run in real time on computers.13 Such a simulation will mimic the synaptic and neuronal events that occur when somebody sees a face or hears a voice. Its simulated behavior (for instance, for the sort of experiments outlined in fig. 2.1) will be indistinguishable from those of a human. But as long as the computer simulating this brain resembles in its architecture the von Neumann machine outlined in figure 13.3, it won’t see an image; it won’t hear a voice inside its circuitry; it won’t experience anything. It is nothing but clever programming. Fake consciousness—pretending by imitating people at the biophysical level».

A pragmatist says: what should we care about that! My causal power is that which… something something inputs-outputs, so long as the function describing this transformation is the same, surely it is preserved! A pragmatist more invested in the conversation would add: why, I've cracked open the book, and it seems this all depends on some weird axioms in chapter 7 and 8, kooky stuff like consciousness exists intrinsically, for itself, without an observer, about why accept them and not a much more convenient (or rather, observer-oriented) approach? Also, why not Dust Theory?

Koch's specific technical justifications have to do with IIT, which is substantially flawed. In time, a better theory will be developed. But I don't think one needs a theory to just see how confused the metaphyics of a Tool, of someone who cannot throw out the entire baggage of External Observers, is. One only needs taste. I do not hope nor intend to rectify your taste, you're free to revel in it, just as I am free to think it repulsive.

Call a bugman a bugman and see how he recoils etc.

As I've said already, "sophistication" is not what is needed to see your failures here. Specifically, the distinction between copy-pasting and transposition. Indeed, this is very trivial, children get it, until they are gaslit with sloppy computationalist analogies.

You're fine in my book. And 'sophistication' has very little to do with what I take to be their failures in taste.

That said, sadly you wouldn't have had much to worry in any case; and I think people most likely to ascend first have next to no taste.

As is the comic, which I think we could all pull apart in a matter of seconds. Off the top of my head, what if you remove the screen and show the human and dog that the woofing isn't a real dog? Since when did anyone in this long and complex discussion say that sound was the only mechanism people/canines could use to recognize authenticity? The whole thing you're talking about is how complex and multifactorial identity-recognition is. It's irrelevant at best.

The idea of "multifactorial identity-recognition" is irrelevant for the purpose of understanding the issue of consciousness-continuity of a subject. But really, after such arguments, what more can be said? Truly, you can also look at the dog! Oh wow, the argument against black box analysis is pulled apart!

Since when did self-made say he'd be happy for you to send someone very like him (perhaps so similar as to be a soulmate or a best friend) to the garbage compressor because he wasn't so identical as to be effectively the same person?

Morality is irrelevant for this counterfactual; this is only dependent on the baseline self-preservation and endorsement of the notion that black box suffices.

As for substrate independence, we should be thinking about truth rather than beauty.

There is no meaningful difference between truth and beauty with regard to this question.

Poor taste is irredeemable, and you're one of the worst in this respect here, by the way.

How can it be impossible, in principle, to replace individual neurons one by one with a computerized equivalent such that normal function is preserved and the patient is conscious throughout the whole operation?

Following Moravec, I think this is possible, though I am not sure which aspects of neuronal computations and their implementations are relevant for this procedure (eg how to deal with LFPs). I reject the sloppy bugman idea that you can get from this to "just boot up a machine simulating access to a copy of my memories bro". Indeed, if you didn't have such poor taste, you'd have been able to see the difference, and also why you are making this argument and not the direct defense of computationalism.

Do you believe that there's some advanced quantum mechanics in our heads

Now that's what I call real disrespect lol. It's okay though.

You avoid committing to any serious successor-rejection choice except gut feeling, which means you do not have any preferences to speak of, and your «memeplex» cannot provide advantage over a principled policy such as "replicate, kill non-kin replicators". And your theory of personal identity, when pressed, is not really dependent on function or content or anything-similarity measures but instead amounts to the pragmatic "if I like it well enough it is me". Thus the argument is moot. Go like someone else.

By this, do you mean that such evolution will select for LLM-like minds that generate only one token at a time?

No, I mean you are sloppy and your idea of "eh, close enough" will over generations resolve into agents that consider inheriting one token of similarity (however defined) "close enough". This is not a memeplex at all, as literally any kind of agent can wield the durak-token, even my descendants.

And why wouldn’t a fully intelligent ASI (which would fit under my bill of beings I am in favor of conquering the universe) that’s colonizing space “on my behalf” (so to speak) be able to design similarly lean and mean probes to counter the ones your ASI sends? In fact, since “my” ASI is closer to the action, their OODA loop would be shorter and therefore arguably have a better chance of beating out your probes.

This is a reasonable argument but it runs into another problem, namely that, demonstrably, only garbage people with no resources are interested in spamming the Universe with minimal replicators, so you will lose out on the ramp-up stage. Anyway, you're welcome to try.

I think your problem is typical for Indians (and most other non-WEIRDs and non-Japanese, to be fair, including my people… but worse so in Indians): you have no taste, not even the notion of "taste", to you it's probably an arbitrary set of markers of one's social milieu rather than some relatively lawful intuition. So you settle for mediocre half-baked ideas easily as long as they seem "cool" or "practical", and – physics of consciousness being currently impractical – coolness is a much simpler function than tastefulness. I am not sure how or why this works. Maybe @2rafa can explain better; maybe she'll opine I'm wrong and it is in fact purely about social markers. (Also interested in the input of @Southkraut and @ArjinFerman). In any case, it's exasperating to debate such uncertain grounds without the recourse to "this is just ugly" when it patently is.

I've proposed a reasonably robust criterion for determining that, at least to my satisfaction. You blackbox both of us, and assess response to a wide variety of relevant stimuli. If the variability between us is within acceptable parameters, such as being less than the variability seen in the biological me after a nap or when I took the test 2 years ago, then that system is close enough to count as including a copy of "me".

Oh yeah? So which is it, a nap or a 2-year time span? Are you sure you can, really, practically can, define a rubric such that no other person I find comes closer to the first data point in the latter case? Sure you can do this without including password-recovery-tier questions, the answers to which are entirely value-free, RNG-produced token sequences, in no way corresponding to actually unique specifics of your inner conscious computation?

It's only reasonably robust from the viewpoint of a time-constrained clerk – or an archetypal redditor. As stated, I claim that you might well fail this test under realistic and legitimate conditions of dropping cheat items; and then, if I decide, in this contrived scenario, that the non-self-made-human is to be sent to the garbage compressor, you will very loudly (and rightfully) complain, not showing any "satisfaction" whatsoever. The only reason you propose it is your confidence that this does not matter in actuality – which it admittedly does not. And in any case, you do not need to optimize for a le scientific, robust, replicable, third-person-convincing etc. identity test. Rather, you need to think about what it is you are trying to achieve by clinging to the idea that a cluster of behavioral correlates an observer can identify will carry on your mind – just gotta make it dense enough that in practice you won't be confused for another naturally occurring person.

certainly I haven't seen any particular reason to assume a difference in internal qualia because of a difference in substrate, as long as the algorithms deriving it are interchangeable in terms of inputs and outputs.

Fair enough.

But I would still prefer my original parents or kin, and attempt to convey my conundrum to them, likely by divulging privileged information only known to the original me.

I'll trust you on this even though I strongly suspect this would depend on the intensity of original memories vs. the recovered set.

Larry of course. His first advantage is: he is real and nobody real cares enough to die in the process of assassinating him. (Consider that many Russians attribute the worst parts of the 90's to Chubais and indirectly Summers; yet nobody has bothered to go kill him. Granted, Westerners nowadays think we're basically a nation of limp-wristed cuckolds. But still – millions of people with "nothing to lose" over decades).

His second advantage is: he's put-together, well-known and well-connected, so even if he dies, his projects can continue, and indeed his tragic demise will possibly make him more powerful than when he was alive.

Then there's everything else people care about, like actual authority, security etc but that's a bit of an overkill.

Money translating into power has always been a transient phenomenon of immature nations, and the Marxist delusion that money and power are one and the same is instrumental to other Marxist delusions (eg: "why does Israel fight Gaza? Because colonization for natural resources!" I kid you not, have seen this take in the wild, it was even popular).

Nation states, themselves puppets to special interests groups with non-monetary primary motivations, have a non-quantitative categorical advantage over billionaires, trillionaires and whatever – they can just take your shit and use it to fund users of hard power, which they have authority over, to compel you. The army cannot be meaningfully bribed, neither can the police, neither can the police robot dogs, neither can the politruk overseeing tech lord's robot dog assembly business; indeed, the very attempt to do so means you're dead meat.

The state can only reach abolition through degeneration from within and loss of relative legitimacy in the eyes of its most relevant constituents; which it will prevent at all costs.

Sorry to burst your cyberpunk bubble: Big Tech Has No Power At All. Larry Summers is and will always be more powerful than Elon Musk. He, ontologically, belongs to a caste which can have power, and Musk does not.

My representation of "me" is robust to perturbations like going to bed and waking up tomorrow, or replacing 1% of the mass in my body via turnover when I drink a bottle of water, have lunch then take a shit.

It isn't robust to a large amount traumatic brain damage, dementia or the like.

This is not responsive to the argument. Your memorized experiences are fungible. Your differences from another Smart Indian Guy who's maximally close to you in embedding space are overwhelmingly mere contingent token, not type differences. Like, you love your mom and he loves his mom (very different!), you write sci-fi fanfics and he writes speculative fiction, you're on The Motte and he's on DSL, you are a GP and he is a cardiologist, you're into boobs and he's into armpits, you prefer 23°C and he sets it to 22,5… sure we can pile on dimensions to the point you become, well, a single extremely unique point, a snowflake indeed, but what of it? This is not how your consciousness works! This is not why you are infallibly you and he is indisputably him, this is merely why I can quickly tell apart those two instances of a Smart Indian! You are performing more or less identical calculations, on very similar hardware, to a near-identical result, and if you one day woke up, Zhuangzi style, to be him, your own life story a mere what-if distribution shift quickly fading into the morning air – I bet you would have only felt a tiny pinprick of nostalgia before going on with his business, not some profound identity crisis.

Moreover, if you get brain damage or dementia, your hardware and computational divergences will skyrocket, but you will insist on being a continuous (if diminished) person, and me and him will agree! It is pathetic and shallow as fuck to cling to a perceptive hash of a token sequence and say "this is me, see, day-to-day perturbations are OOMs lower than the distance to the next closest sample" – it's confusion of the highest order! Seriously, think this through.

(I am, incidentally, immune to this issue because I do not believe in computationalism or substrate independence. My self is literally the causal physical process in my brain, not the irrelevant hypothetical program which could define the computation of the process with the same shape with regard to its outputs hitting some reductive interface like an observer performing a classification task. This process can be modified near-arbitrarily and remain "me"; or it can be copied precisely, yet the copy would not be me but instead another, equal instance. I am not confused about first and third perspective, and the fact that physics teaches us frames of reference are irrelevant is trivial to me: they are irrelevant for an independent observer; yet the whole of my notion of identity is about the instantiation of the observer's egocentric frame of reference. I have made peace with the fact that most people can be gaslit into seeing themselves through the interlocutor's eyes. This comports with the repulsive fact that most people have been bred to serve an aristocratic class and accept perspectives imposed on them, and strongly suggests to me that most people probably really are means, not ends unto themselves. For deontological reasons, I will reject this conclusion until the time I have an opportunity to get much smarter and reexamine the topic or perhaps design some fix for this pervasive mental defect).

You presume compromises and contingencies which have taken place in reality, and Anglo narratives about them. Napoleon was not essentially committed to liberalize Russia, and indeed did not emancipate the serfs on territories he entered, which is part of the reason for his failure.

Why should anyone care about anything?

There's no absolute answer, but some ideas are more coherent and appealing than others for nontrivial information-geometrical reasons.

I’d bet that the memeplexes of individuals like me are much more likely to colonize the universe than the memeplexes of individuals like you

That's unlikely because your "memeplex" is subject to extremely easy and devastating drift. What does it mean "similar enough"? Would an LLM parroting your ideas in a way that'd fool users here suffice? Or do you want a high-fidelity simulation of a spiking network? Or a local field potential emulation? Or what? I bet you have never considered this in depth, but the evolutionarily rewarded answer is "a single token, if even that".

It really takes a short-sighted durak to imagine that shallow edgelording philosophy like "I don't care what happens to me, my close-enough memetic copies will live on, that's me too!" is more evolutionarily fit, rewards more efficient instrumental exploitation of resources and, crucially, lends itself to a more successful buildup of early political capital in this pivotal age.

If we're going full chuuni my-dad-beats-your-dad mode, I'll say that my lean and mean purely automatic probes designed by ASI from first principles will cull your grotesque and sluggish garbage-mind-upload replicators, excise them from the deepest corners of space – even if it takes half the negentropy of our Hubble volume, and me and mine have to wait until Deep Time, aestivating in the nethers of a dead world. See you, space cowboy.

I think people with such beliefs have no more moral patienthood than a trust fund. What should anyone care about some loosely defined isomorphism, if it even holds? Moreover, why would you be entitled to replication of your sentimental baggage in some derivative entities? Just instantiate a distilled process that has similar high-level policies, and go out.

If you’re like me and are able to view that machine as yourself

But why view it that way? The map is not the territory, and another territory arranged so as to be isomorphic to the one depicted on the map is not the original one.

None of this is particularly damaging, and foreign owners of consequential companies are fellow Anglos; fighting NATO wars helps build team spirit. Anyway, what matters is differential damage – consider how gimped Germany is by the ongoing war, and how relatively unscathed is the UK. (Or, as the all-time greatest example, how Anglos got us to whittle down Napoleon, whereas the most rational move would have been to side with him… and again in WWI…) Russians tend to think of geopolitics in terms of handicapping and undermining civilizational competitors, and point to Albion as the chief culprit. But even as far as the positive agenda goes – somehow the moribund, overregulated UK has both DeepMind (despite it nominally being bought by an American company) and the lead in regulating AI for everyone else.

upper-bound for opportunities for high-merit people in London is greater than that of St. Petersburg / Moscow

It's not just about Moscow, it's about the entire rest of the world. You can be an oligarch's son in the Motherland, or if you have any merit, you can have a career in the US, but somehow they all salivate about the degree from London School of Economics, or even shaking hands with Brits.

That said, I personally do not feel like the UK is very important.

More or less.

"Crypto-colony" does not mean anything falsifiable and predicts nothing. I think Russia is a generic low-agency country, in the manner countries with negative selection in elites tend to be, and consistently acts against both its "geopolitical" and its population's long-term interests, yet in the interests of savvier countries, mainly the US and the UK although it seems that Russians both high and low interpret their retarded and harmful activity as self-interested. This is also strangely accompanied by Russian petty elites squealing like teen girls about the prospect of their child becoming a Londoner; there's a distinct vibe that it's better to be a struggling student in the Metropole than an oligarch at "home", and I've seen this repeatedly since childhood. The prestige of UK is out of proportion with that nation's observable merit.

To what extent this is due to any deliberate effort, or just historical inertia, or needs any explanation at all, I am not sure.

By the way: far as I can tell, JB has made it big on twitter after finally letting go of our sorry lot and focusing on reading academic literature.

Is this how people see my more cryptic writing? Because it looks like a load of asinine and extreme logorrhea that at most can poison the theoretically fruitful topic.

System prompts are not essentially different from any other part of the context. A reasonably preference-finetuned model will just learn to respect the prompt format and pay extra attention to the tokens in the span associated with the system prompt (sometimes it's explicitly marked with system tokens, sometimes not). Other than that it's just path dependence – the beginning of the context determines the manner of what comes next.

The success of this differs between models. Qwen developers boast of Qwen-72B-chat being very obedient to the system prompt, OpenAI has definitely succeeded somewhat, for community finetunes it's mostly a LARP.

I like the many attempts to impose some behavioral vector on the LLM without language though. Behold: in-context vectors. Also, Pressman's more esoteric approach is interesting, and there's work on making the model explicitly attend to some tokens, upweighting specific sentences etc. We would've had a full palette for semantic transformations, if there were more money in tooling for local models and people weren't so attached to chatting with human-imitating bots.

You don't even need very advanced AI for this. Current stack will suffice, with some polish.

Interesting/mildly concerning.

I think it's a nothingburger because a) the future is cDPO/IPO and not orthodox RLHF anyway (or even more obscure things) and failure modes there will probably be different and b) such «misalignment» results in a behaviorally incoherent model rather than an evil schemer. Reward models are getting hacked by being dragged off-policy, with some weird inputs that are not conductive to strategic world understanding, it's an exploitation of the semiotic nature of language models. But I believe some hay will be made out of it.

Human «context size» is not at all limited to working memory (although our working memory is also large, it's not 5-9 tokens/bits but more like 5-9 «pointers» that can be corresponded to arbitrarily complex cognitive circuits). What we use for context is probably most analogous to constructing on the fly and loading a LoRA in LLMs (or some in-context vector) plus adding embeddings and snippets to some RAG pipeline. It's a mess, but it's orthogonal to the shift from Transformers to SSMs that I expect now. Shane Legg talks of this too:

They don't do things like episodic memory. Humans have what we call episodic memory. We have a working memory, which are things that have happened quite recently, and then we have a cortical memory, things that are sort of being in our cortex, but there's also a system in between, which is episodic memory, which is the hippocampus. It is about learning specific things very, very rapidly. So if you remember some of the things I say to you tomorrow, that'll be your episodic memory hippocampus.
Our models don't really have that kind of thing and we don't really test for that kind of thing. We just sort of try to make the context windows, which is more like working memory, longer and longer to sort of compensate for this.

As for RWKV, I think the latest version is ≤RetNet (though it has good slopes, probably the best in their graph…). Gu&Dao are very explicit in pointing out that a) Mamba the first to even match a Llama-like Transformer without any gimmicks, at the tested scale at least, and b) it does not appreciably benefit from adding Attention layers.

Mamba is the first attention-free model to match the performance of a very strong Transformer recipe (Transformer++) that has now become standard, particularly as the sequence length grows. We note that full results on context length 8k are missing for the RWKV and RetNet baselines, prior strong recurrent models that can also be interpreted as SSMs, due to a lack of efficient implementation leading to out-of-memory or unrealistic computation requirements.

The Mamba-MHA architecture is only slightly better, which is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that many recent works have found that combining (LTI) SSMs with Attention can lead to substantial improvements (Dao, Fu, Saab, et al. 2023; Fathi et al. 2023; Fathullah et al. 2023; Saon, Gupta, and Cui 2023; Zuo et al. 2022).

In the first version of the paper, submitted for peer review, they went even harder:

LongNet (Ding et al., 2023), which claimed to scale to 1B length but only evaluated on length < 100K for actual tasks. Hyena and HyenaDNA (Polietal.,2023;Nguyenetal.,2023),which claimed to leverage up to 1M context, but did not control for computation time. In fact, its claims about efficiency and performance would be largely matched by any of the LTI S4 variants above.

That said, this is all assuming the paper is trustworthy and they compare models trained on identical data. Tri obviously can procure as much compute as needed but I am not sure this happened.

This result shouldn't be underestimated because Gemini-Ultra is merely on par/slightly better in text-based reasoning: it thoroughly beats GPT-4V on MMMU, the multimodal benchmark, including harder subscales; it also plays well with audio. People are for the most part functionally illiterate, so this is huge; and of course they will capitalize on Android and other ecosystem-wide advantages the Alphabet empire has. Multimodal language-like models will obviously be table stakes in 2024. (Bytedance guy even hints that they'll opensource a model on Gemini's level.)

Interesting that one of people who had worked on aligning early Gemini said they had trouble aligning it – it burned through RLHF reward models, finding exploits and collapsing into gibberish (imagine using actual RLHF in 2023!). Maybe this has delayed the release, as well as the garden variety safetyism it has made more complex.

To be honest I was more excited about the other day's release of Mamba by Albert Gu and the legendary Tri Dao. There are many architectures that I expect will break through the Pareto frontier of a mature Transformer, but this one is the first that feels like an actual Vaswani et al. 2017 level advance. Unlimited context, here we come.

It's funny how all sorts of "conspiracy theorists" and people with weird ideas are halfway self-conscious of the fact they're like that, and make jokes about it. You should either genuinely believe your ideas, deeply investigate them, debate them - or consider what 'schizo' ideas you had five or ten years ago and how many of them have held up, and admit you're very wrong.

Underestimated argument. Related tweet

From what I could gather, Extropic is focused on learning via thermodynamic computing, which I assumed meant new hardware. Hardware is always difficult, but the compute bottleneck doesn't seem like it would be adding to the difficulty.

Yeah I think it's something like this https://blog.normalcomputing.ai/posts/2023-11-09-thermodynamic-inversion/thermo-inversion.html

But I might be completely confused.

My argument isn't that they'd need compute to design their chips. I am saying that A) hardware ML startups fail because Nvidia is actually good (and AMD and major companies are catching up), and B) compute in general is overrated as a bottleneck. We'll hit that 1e26 limit in no time flat anyway, and politicians will require more restrictions. What we do need is much better data, rather than compute that'll probably be poorly compatible with existing software stack anyway.