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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

Has this always been a thing?

To a degree, but you're conflating correlation versus causation here.

Many of the country-vs-country conflicts you would be tracking/aware of involve exceptionally personalist regimes, whether that's more objective (Putin's Russia as a individual-centric system) or more part of the propaganda narrative (Russian claims that Ukraine is led by Nazis, but that the rest of the country can be salvaged/liberated with a different government). Since regime change was an explicit goal of the Russians in the invasion leadup, but not the Palestinians on 7OCT, the conflict-propaganda reflects the initial rationales for conflict, even as the Hamas conflict is more categorical (Israel/Jews regardless of leader) in nature. At the same time, when it comes to their own allies, no one has a reason to characterize their allies as personalist autocrats as opposed to an alliance with a general nation, so Russia has no real incentive to characterize it's relationship with the leader of Belarus rather than Belarus in general.

Your rebuttal is approaching this as a purely economic issue, but the previous argument was a national security access issue.

The point is not that petroleum will become so rare that it will no longer be affordable- the point is that petroleum may still be available at the source, but not available to you, because the geopolitical situation has changed to such a degree that it can no longer get from the ground to your shores.

This could be a matter of non-ecological changes, like how the Ukraine War has greatly disrupted the Russia-European natural gas connections. It could be a matter of supply chain monopolization, such as how the Chinese have used economic coercion in the past- and how the US and/or China might try to shape resource trade flows in a war over Taiwan. It could be because of an organized embargo (the OPEC embargo against the US in the Cold War), or a functional blockade (North Korea nuclear sanctions). It could just disrupted by returns to historical norms of piracy (Horn of Africa) or maritime harassment (Houthis in the Red Sea). It could even be a consequence of civil war (the recent Libyan oil production shutdown). It could come in the form of new and hard to resist technologies, such as relatively cheap drones shutting down major infrastructure (Russia-Ukraine war), threatening naval commerce (Russia-Ukraine), cyberattacks against critical infrastructure (Russia-Ukraine), destruction of underwater import infrastructure (Russia-Ukraine), targeted destruction of export infrastructure (Russia-Ukraine), targeted destruction of centralized power grid infrastructure (Russia-Ukraine)...

Access to external resources is not just a matter of money and the existence of the product, and the fragmentation of the world security order means many of the geo-political obstacles to energy imports is going to get worse, not better.

But geopolitical turmoil can also be in response to, or a consequence of, weather and climate factors. Haiti has been a mess for a long time, but the current situation of gang control of the capital can track to the 2010 Haiti earthquake that broke the state's (relative) monopoly of violence. Egypt and Ethiopia were conceivably near war over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam's construction and being filled- interstate conflict involving the controlling power of the Suez Canal could well reflare depending on water inflows shaped by drought conditions and rate of evaporation at upstream reservoirs. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 killed nearly 7000 Hondurans and caused regional catastrophic flooding, and was a direct contributor to a regional migration exodus event. This doesn't even approach how climate volatility of these types can feed into the above geopolitical tensions: the Arab Spring's triggering event was in the context of high bread prices, tensions between upstream and downstream states over water ways, social responses to migration driving government policies and changes in political status quos with less experienced leaders with different foreign sympathies, and so on. Even when climate isn't a direct cause, it can be a contributing cause that makes other instigating factors

You are arguing in terms of jumping the gun because of a frame of reference over the next 100 years or so, but you are living in a world where you not only face potential major economic input disruptions in the next 10 years, but in some cases for some countries have already occurred.

To go to your hypothetical of building out a copper telephone network in the 90s- this is only a self-evident bad idea if you assume the historical conclusion, that the later 90s and 2000s would be a relatively peaceful, open, globally-interconnected era in which not only would better alternatives exist, but they could be resourced and people wouldn't be deliberatly trying to break them. The moral of the example would reverse itself if the available choice were instead a copper telephone network or no network at all because of global instability limiting factors.

Did you know that 8% of global carbon emissions come from the production of concrete, the same amount produced by all private passenger automobiles? Fantasies about electric cars solving global warming are just that.

Solving global warming is the bailey. Being more resilient when the effects of global warming occur is the motte.

While it's been a long-time frustration of mine that mass-public opinion and policy has fixated on avoiding global warming rather than dealing with the consequences of it happening, and non-trivial parts of the environmental policy structure has been lobbiest-donor feedback loops married with protectionism greenwashing, there is a point to be made that many of the major investments in the name of the green movement may be better at enduring global warming than avoiding it... and that is a point in and of itself.

On a technical / engineering level, many of the savior-technologies just will not pan out in terms of meeting the need of avoiding global warming. Just in terms of the volume of raw materials and rare earths needed to produce the amount of electric vehicles / solar panels / etc., there won't be enough produced by the various tipping points. Many things are not only locked in, but have been for functionally decades.

However, one of the anciliary arguments for / justifications of green technology is aggregate resiliency. Renewables are not reliable enough to cover the energy demands of industrial economics, but they can greatly reduce the amounts of hydrocarbons required to sustain less-intense economic levels. Brownouts are bad, but they're not impossible to muddle through either, and are much better than black outs. Installed solar panel farms aren't going to suddenly stop working if there's a mass embargo or blackade of major naval trade routes. Distributed production grids may / may not be safer from targetted cyber attacks than singular centralized power plants. Maybe not everyone can get an EV-powered cybertruck... but not everyone in a nation needs a vehicle for the state to survive in times of energy-import duress.

When you start to frame it in these terms, a lot of investments that are 'stupid' in economic/global warming evasion terms can start to make a bit more sense in a 'how do we endure global disruption' sense. No one is quite clear what that will mean in practice, but if you subscribe that there is a time limit, then there are advantages to getting invested early as possible. Things may be inefficient now, but there may be far greater demand and competition for critical inputs later. Getting supply chains established now may help secure them for later. Transitioning away from fossil fuels sooner may provide critical diplomatic leverage later when/if global opinion moves sharply against the last ones still using it when popular patience is untenable.

I would never go as far as to say 'this is all according to plan,' and there's a lot of greed and incompetence and ideology mixed in to that sort of coalition of interests, but you can believe both that global warming is a thing and that it is unavoidable, and that green-tech investments are a way to endure it. This isn't 'fixing' the problem, but it is a form of dealing with it.

If the hypothetical manager of company A cannot, then said hypothetical manager is replaced by hypothetical manager of company B, unless you believe there are no industries that can find use for low-skill labor in 21st century America.

I don't think discussions of state capacity are very fruitful. It's too ambiguous of a term that it can mean practically anything. It's like a somewhat more intellectual version of talking about "bullshit jobs" or "strong men create good times, etc". You're not getting any actual rigorous analysis, you're just getting people grinding whatever axes they think apply, which will be quite varied due to the provocative ambiguity.

I would agree with the limits of the term as you describe them, and add to this that 'capacity' is a measure of potential, not utilization. You can have capacity, and be inefficient in doing so. You can have capacity, and choose not to utilize it. You could change capacity by reallocating resources from other competing priorities- and this just broadens the question of what capacity specifically refers to in terms of 'capacity for what?' You can reassign personnel between organizations, but a skilled chemist is probably not going to make for a skilled software engineer even though 'capacity to analyze bioterrorism risks' and 'capacity to counter intercontinental missiles' are both functions of state capacity.

There's also a point that a lot of effective utilization of state capacity is, well, invisible by design and citizen preference. A voting (or non-voting) public doesn't particularly want to be accosted on the streets by policemen doing random searches. A state with sufficient state surveillance capacity doesn't need to- they can just monitor surveillance cameras / communications / informants, and tailor interventions to a narrower degree so that law-abiding people have less to notice. This takes a lot more capacity, and produces far fewer observables.

In a sense, it's comparable to people who complain online that no one builds impressive feats of engineering anymore. On cell phones with more computing power than Cold War space programs, over an internet that reaches over half the global population despite being mostly theoretical 50 years ago, and conveyed on ocean-spanning cable networks hidden beneath the waves. Just because you can walk through or over engineering feats without noticing them doesn't mean they aren't there. The same principle can apply to state capacity.

I'll note that 'want' also obscures factors of strategy and consideration of other factors.

If, for example, the US has sent categories of aid in advance of it's allies willingness to do the same, then there was a risk that the countries that felt their concerns were bypassed would refuse to send similar aid. The example that comes to mind is tanks- before the Germans objected to sending tanks on grounds that the US hadn't sent any, there was a more general German consensus that tanks were too escalatory. It wasn't until internal german political dynamics had changed that 'we won't send tanks before the US' replaced 'no one should send tanks because tanks are too escalatory, and if you do we won't.' Given the risk was that doing so would prompt the Germans to not do the same, and the German military aid value substantially outweighs the value of individual systems sent without German assent (in the case of Germany-derived tanks) or over German objections (US-derived tanks), and this creates a circumstance of actors wanting to send aid but not wanting to send aid because they want to send more aid overall but doing what they want gets in the way of what they want for what they want.

Which is a heck of a mess of wants, and complicates an over-simplified analysis.

When it comes to the pro-Ukraine coalition in general, I sincerely believe an underappreciated part of the Western war strategy is how the strategy has prioritized building and maintaining the coalition of donors, particularly Germany, over immediate deliveries of on-hand assets. This has been apparent since 2022, but rarely remarked upon, even though the difference of approaching something as a short-term versus long-term problem have considerably different implications. For example, how one views this year's Russian advances in the Donbass; the implications change considerably depending on whether you believe the war ends if the Russians take all the administrative boundaries of the Donbas (a short term paradigm), despite the Donbas not being particularly important to Ukraine's ability to continue fighting (a long-term paradigm).

But to bring this back to political capacity- this sort of perspective does challenge the state capacity in a different way, since the capacity of individual states is being subordinated to the capacity of a coalition as a whole, which makes this a coordination-issue rather than a matter of just beuracratic capacity.

This is a start- now look to where some of these are overlapping points that could be consolidated, but without relying on commas. The point of this exercise is not to have the shortest sentence possible for final presentation, but to break what you're trying to say into its constituent parts.

For example

I ramble. My sentences are long.

Can combine without a comma or 'and' by

My sentences are too long because I ramble.

While the later half of this-

In person I modulate. So sentences don't feel long.

-isn't actually a sentence, and breaking it apart isn't required to avoid the 'and' or ,.

In person I modulate my voice so sentences don't feel long.

Meanwhile, these-

I've come to hate my writing. My elevator pitches lack punch. The sharp edge of a well-made point gets lost in verbose filler.

I want to improve at conciseness. Where I can start ?

These are better. They could be improved- a general point of good communication is to avoid vague figures of speech ('lack punch') because they don't mean a specific connotation and they often don't translate- but these are all distinct thoughts that can be distinct sentence.

Consider use of linking words beyond 'and,' which may be a different word or just using a necessary word in a different form.

For consideration-

I've come to hate my writing.

Do you hate you writing, or do you hate something about your writing? If the later, this could be

I've come to hate my writing's [characteristic you hate]

My elevator pitches lack punch.

Punch is a figure of speech which may be appropriate, but also doesn't imply a specific issue. Maybe this is a case where a different word would help, whether the effect your pitches lack, or the effect.

My elevator pitches take too long.

My elevator pitches aren't persuasive.

I am not satisfied with my elevator pitches.

Finally, these?

I want to improve at conciseness. Where I can start ?

These aren't just better- these are good. Distinct thoughts, no fluff words, no unnecessary clauses.

Back to the recommendation for you-

Do this exercise again. Iterate on what you just did and produce a third version. Put the first and third version side by side. A powerpoint works well here since you can put the posts in two different text blocks.

Then print it out and take it to a mentor you trust and ask for help finding a writing coach. Or even ask a boss. Believe it or not, bosses often love to receive better-written reports, and will happily help someone who wants to make their lives easier.

If your job has some form of structured 'train yourself' time, make this a project for a period (a month, a quarter), and use either company resources or online resources. Depending on how your job does its evaluation system, you could even build this sort of thing into your personal training / assessment plan as an annual objective. 'In 2025, I will spend at least one training session a month working on my writing skills' is both a target and a quantifiable performance objective.

Finally, just some rules to think on.

Crutch vs Utility Words

'And' and commas are often crutches to insert more clauses that wouldn't be needed if you chose better words the first time. That does not mean they should never be used. A good rule of thumb is 'it is okay to make the sentence a little longer if it makes the paragraph shorter.'

[Demonstration: This allows the commas to be used for lists. This allows for the 'ands' to be used for sentences that would otherwise begin the same way. This allows for commas and ands to be used for lists and sentences that would otherwise begin the same way. ]

Alternate Linking Words

One way to minimize the unnecessary 'ands' to improve the use of other linking words. 'Because', 'although,' 'or,' and similar words can be used to mitigate needs for 'and' or even commas. They should only be used once per sentence to limit clause growth.

[Demonstration: You may want to use a comma or 'and' because you don't realize an 'or' creates a two-element list that doesn't need either although they aren't necessary for a three-part sentence either.

Clause Order

Rather than starting a first sentence, and then using a comma to create a second sentence that itself needs a transition, you may be able to make a better flowing sentence that doesn't need the comma if you just reorder the clauses. By reordering the clauses you can improve sentence flow from the start in ways that doesn't need a comma in the first place.

[Demonstration: See above]

Remember the Rule of Three

As in humor, so in writing, keep a three-part structure whenever possible. Focus on three key themes a writing, limit to three clauses a sentence, make lists of three as able. This isn't always possible, but when you can, this helps prioritize your efforts, limit scope creep, and keep a steady cadence.

[Demonstration: Note how the last sentence was three sections, with the third section itself being a list of three.] (Note- there is a term in management sometimes called the span of control, which refers to how many people someone can effectively directly supervise. This number is... three to five.

Recognize When It's a Rule (And Not a Choice) There are cases where a comma or and is appropriate and even necessary: when you are making a list, and every part needs to be separated by a comma, and the last element needs an 'and' to indicate that it's the end of the list. However, there's no requirement for an 'and' within those list elements. An 'and' can sometimes be replaced by a comma to create another list element and sometimes the and can replace a comma, but question if you need both.

Hope some of these help.

What do you consider a strength or weakness of a democratic system? Does the voter knowing the coalition that would come into power before the election matter? Does a leader having a majority of affirmation votes matter as a matter of legitimacy or political influence? Do party platforms that are harder to abandon on grounds of coalition negotiations count as a strength or weakness?

Different systems do different things, and the nature of the vote-counting is just part of it, as is the nature of the party structure itself. British FPP is based on a parliamentary party system in which there are strong parties and weak ministers who depend on the party to run on the ticket, which is a stark contrast to American FPP where the candidates are far more independent of party control.

Ultimately there is no 'best' system because any system has grounds for being criticized as flawed and illegitimate. Legitimacy is what people make of it, but there's no counter-argument if faith is lost.

Kill commas and and's.

Seriously. Comma splicing caveats is common. Interspacing additional phrases is natural. Doing so is often unnecessary compared to just shortening one sentence to make two or using a single adjective. Don't ask how to be concise and punchy. Being concise is the punch. Adding 'and punchy' was what made it less so.

Obviously you don't need to always write like that, and commas can help merge things together, but it's a crutch habit that leads to weaker writing.

To answer your question- the way to becoming a better writer is by writing. You can start by trying to rewrite your post with as few 'and' and commas as possible.

(No, seriously. Try it and reply with your rework.)

I'm not sure whether I'm more amused by the conflation of correlation and causation in an inversion, or the unironic use of budgetary PR in a budget year that was nearly half continuing resolution.

Edit for elaboration, since it may come-

I find the claim that the Ukraine War escalated enormously under the Biden Administration laughable in a 'that is actually amusing' way, given the evolution of many dynamics since 2022.

In 2022, the Ukraine War was a war of national elimination by a Russia waged on three different fronts that threatened to collapse the Ukrainian state, multiple major population centers changed hands with a routine use of artillery against population centers, European countries were to supposedly facing mass freezing death in the winter and total economic deindustrialization for lack of gas, and Very Serious People and Motte Posters were warning that the specter of nuclear escalation was right around the corner if Ukraine received military supplies or tried to retake cities that the Russians had not only conquered but formally annexed. 'Plausible' peace terms included a unilateral disarmament to a scale where Ukraine would have fewer tanks to begin the next war with than it has lost since this war began, a great risk factor for a fourth continuation war. Western discussions on Ukraine included whether there would be an armed intervention, ranging from a No Fly zone to special forces advisors or 'volunteer' military formations.

In 2024, the Ukraine War has largely narrowed to one front, the scale of territory changes and civilian deaths has dropped precipitously to a degree that zoomed-in maps are required to assess relative changes that are hard to recognize from a country-wide scale, the Europeans are far from freezing and no longer operating under the previous economic sword of damoclese, and nuclear threats are so passe that the Russians themselves are downplaying the first invasion and occupation of Russian territory since WW2. 'Plausible' peace terms now adays no longer pretend to rest on Ukrainian disarmament, but hinge on how many years it will take the Russians to re-build themselves out of a Soviet-era military and whether they would really try another attempt at Ukraine and thus does Ukraine have a reasonable need for western security alliances. Western discussions on Ukraine now includes routine criticisms that the lack of Western presence on the ground to die is an immoral policy of treating the Ukrainians as canon fodder.

The stakes, the risks, and even the rate of loss of the Ukraine War have decreased considerably since 2022. It is strategic de-escalation in nearly every sense of the word.

As for bankrupting the nation in the support of the Ukraine War, that would be somewhere between factually inaccurate and glossing over many other more relevant contexts that prevent one's preferred policies from being funded.

Thank you. The compliment is returned, and I appreciate reading your posts even when I disagree.

To the topic-

The point on Iran is that even when enforcement is done by a regime willing to brutalize the public, it's not feasible to keep satellite dishes out. Brazil is much able to do that, and that's before you hit the point that the more authorized satellite dish variants you have on the market, the easier it is to just hide your dish within the mess (or just out of easily inspectable sight). If someone is using the same technology base, this would be like trying to regulate cars by demanding distinctive tailpipes.

It takes a huge, system-defining prioritization to do a Chinese-style surveilance state to do such a thing... and as you note, even that is not enough to keep information out.

Which then comes back to 'what are you spending so much money and political costs for, exactly?'

Which applies to both the Starlink-suppression, and the Starlink-'competitor'.

The value of starlink as a commercial service is the internet access without having to build/have infrastructure on that part of the planet. If you are on that part of the planet, it is in many respects more profitable / sensible to just... build the infrastructure on that part of the planet. Which is what China already does through companies like Huawei and 5G networks, which produce separate geopolitical benefits that come from having your fingers on all the data. Brazil paying China to build a Sino-link to provide Brazilian internet is directly competing with money to just, well, paying China less per network capacity to build better Brazilian internet that can be physically overseen by Brazil. Corruption on such a scale isn't impossible, but it is stupid.

(Especially since the only cost-competitive space agency able to launch the satellites in the foreseeable future is... SpaceX.)

It also doesn't address the issue of ideological interest of the Americans to back Starlink on this. Starlink won't go out of business if there's business competition, because part of Starlink's value to the American government is expanding the information sphere, and it (or things like it) can practically be guaranteed funding regardless of competiting power states. You may even see the US subsidize Starlink (or equivalent) satellite-internet at a global scale in the future, just to undercut the businness of others. Providing American-media-sphere access across the globe is an interest in and of itself, no matter how many strategic competitors set up their own, and especially if they do.

At that point, limiting Starlink is just a matter of banning its terrestrial assets in the country, which is easy enough.

That's the very hard part. The terrestrial asset of starlink is basically a satellite dish that goes for a few hundred USD, and will generally be indistinguishable from other generic satellite dishes. From the consumer end, the biggest difficulty is to establish a payment link, and there are long established market methods to enable that in ways that avoid general financial system monitoring, such as buying pre-pay cards with cash. And that's if anything is charged at all. There's nothing preventing, say, a government from broadcasting for free.

For a frame of reference, Iran in 1994 banned satelite dishes in general, and actively jams attempts to broadcast into the country. In 2011, BBC Persia was reportedly having around 7.2 million weekly Iranian viewers, which was about 10% of the population. As of 2023, that number is reportedly around 18 million 'in Iran and around the world'.

In short, even in an authoritarian theocracy with extremely intrusive and abusive human rights conditions and active jamming, you're still looking at significant information penetration. Countries with less resourcing of the suppression-aparatus and less will to suppress will do even worse.

How long before authoritarian or neutral countries have their own version of Starlink?

You don't satellite-based internet to access the partions of the internet- you can legally access the Great Firewall of China from across the world already. Even North Koreans can access the internet, if they use the proper protocols / minder programs / etc. Regulatory internet barriers are for keeping people in, and it's the information they want to keep out.

Which brings the question of 'what is the point?' / 'why would you bring a lot of outsiders in?'

A Sino-link that exists to keep law-abiding Chinese in the Sino-web is unnecessary for anyone except the most remote / unconnected people. A Sino-link that brings in any Mandarin-typing outsider is an ideological contamination hazard.

Granted, this might not apply to the current situation, but Musk is playing a dangerous game here by directly incentivizing the creation of competitors.

The creation of competitors is a boon, not a malus, for stopping / rolling back internet partition. If everyone has access to all the different internet broadcasters, and if everyone defends their right to ignore the regulatory pressures of other countries, then no one can enact a regulatory monopoly even as everyone has enhanced access to non-approved media.

The balkanization of the internet will continue, and has been since before the arab spring when it became clear social media censorship / influence was a security threat to autocrats, an influence vector for the west, and a basis for competition between the Americans and Europeans when the Europeans identified legislative / regulatory influence over American media companies as both an economic interest (see the attempts by national regulators to charge google news linking to country media groups) and a political influence interest (see the attempts to suppress the right / require political commentary in the name of counter-misinformation). Ever since the Chinese government enforced its own geographic regulatory zone over western internet providers during the early 2000s in the buildup of the great firewall, the ability and interest to construct similar regulator sub-divisions of the internet has been a growing interest across the world.

That said, I think X will 'win' this one, in so much that I don't expect Brazil to effectively cut off access to VPNs or Satellite internet needed to actually block Twitter from the Brazilian information sphere. In addition to Musk being able to write off the loss, Musk is both providing an internet service (X) but is also an internet service provider via Starlink, and even if the current US administration doesn't like Musk politically, it really, really likes the premise of Starlink, which allows access to X, and nothing Brazil will do will outweigh the Americans' interest in bypassing the regulatory firewalls via space network capacity.

Starlink (and the military extension starshield) have direct national security implications for the US government. You can see the direct military application implications in Ukraine, where it has given the Ukrainian substantial network access and military advantages the Russians struggle to degrade, and these are generalizable anywhere the US either wants to operate or wants partners or allies to be able to operate. These capabilities have non-kinetic implications either, such as natural disaster functions when land-based networks may be knocked down, critical infrastructure integration if a cyber-attack takes down land-based network connections, and so on. Starlink's resiliency and ability to survive / mitigate common disruption vectors is much of the point.

But Starlink also counters that balkanization of the internet, as a space-based, US-based, internet provider counters many of those balkanization efforts of regulatory enforcement in a way that the US government wants to happen to other internet-balkanization countries.

Regional internet regulation largely worked against internet service providers when the companies had to be working within infrastructure in the countries doing the regulating. When the company and the country disagreed, it was the company that bore the cost of enforcement, since it could be fined / have its critical infrastructure seized if it was found to violate laws. This is central to, say, the regulatory demands to keep personal data in-country (as opposed to the US)- where the infrastructure is matters. And regional internet regulation makes the companies pay the cost for stepping out of line, either in fees or losing access to the infrastructure.

But Starlink reverses the enforcement cost. Beyond freezing Starlink assets in a country itself, Starlink satellites are literally in outer space. Unless Brazil intends to literally launch a satellite to take down a starlink satellite, it's going to stay in space... and if Brazil were to try that, SpaceX- again owned by Musk- could throw up many more satellites for a fraction of the cost.

That leaves a general country two main avenues.

One is to try and take Starlink to court in the US and have the US enforce a shut-off to the country. This would almost certainly fail because this is the exact sort of scenario of maintaining access to the US internet that the US government wants anti-US countries to be unable to stop. While there are opportunities for the knives to come out for Musk, the ability of anyone in the world to access the US internet regardless of what their own national government wants is something the US has very, very strong incentives to maintain for strategic interest and ideological reasons. The same regulatory logic that allowed other countries to pressure US companies to regulate speech in their own countries is what protects US regulatory pre-eminence in its own market, which just so happens to happens to include it's satellites.

The other option is to go after Starlink / X-VPN users in the country itself. Which is where the enforcement cost starts to add up. Far more intrusive, suppressive, and aggressive governments than Brazil have tried to block satellite dishes and access to global comms, and the costs of doing so are non-trivial both economically and in social-political costs, especially when Starlink offers a service that is exceptionally useful the further away from government-infrastructure you are.

And this is without the internal politics of Brazil coming into play. The Supreme Court judge can ban X and demand fines on people who use VPNs on it, but that's a separate matter from an electorally-sensitive administration actually enforcing such things. It turns out that voters in relatively free democracies tend not to like governments who have huge poverty and crime issues instead sending the police in to check what sort of satellite dish you have. The Brazilian government's electoral margins aren't that strong, and the laxer enforcement is, the more effective X remains at functionally skirting the ban.

New week, so new cultural war post- this time for Germany. As you may have seen in your morning news feeds, the German far right wins first major election since WW2 on last Sunday.

Or rather, the German AfD won a plurality of votes in the German state of Thuringia, came very close to doing so in Saxony, and did very well in the formerly communist East Germany. While they did not win a majority in any state, this wouldn't be expected in a more parliamentary-style system either, and by coming up to nearly 1/3rd of the votes it represents the further normalization of the German- and by extension European- far right. While I'll be the first to say I find the labeling of the European right as 'far right' more indicative of European peculiarities and attempts to stigmatize political opponents than objective, it certainly is an increase in anti-Establishment sentiment expressed by parties with views counter to the European political elite consensus. Notably, and in a change from 2019 elections, the 2024 election also saw the rise of the far(ther)-left BSW party, whose rise took votes from established-left parties. While BSW is of the 'refuse to cooperate with AfD' direction, they are also notable for stated opposition to supporting Ukraine with more military aid, though how hard they hold that view / what they might trade it away for in coalition-negotiation remains to be seen.

Politically, this complicates the coalition-formation capacity of the remaining German parties, which have seen efforts at maintaining a non-cooperation cordon of 'any coalition but one with AfD' crack over time. It also raises the typical post-election question of 'what topic of discontent matters most'- as there are your typical breadbasket issues of economics and cost of living, and especially immigration. AfD/BSW appear to be where the anti-Ukraine support politics go as well, though how central that is to the party voters will be subject to the normal democratic post-election shift analysis, which everyone will try to boost their favored topic and diminish others. These are all the more relevant as this leads to the German federal elections next year, which matters due to the fragility of the current government coalition, whose coalition has kept the AfD out of what would be a normal government involvement for cycles now.

Culture implications here are many, from the continued normalization of the European right, to the rise of East Germany as a political spoiler in politics that have been dominated by the western-German political center since unification, to the role of immigration as a 'we're willing to ignore the party stigma for the sake of this issue' issue.

There are also the geopolitical implications, such as how the German election results may shape the Ukraine War. The early take might be that the election foreshadows the decreased chance of future German military aid to Ukraine, but that in turn could drive the current government to 'lock in' support mechanisms in a way a government with less flexibility couldn't pass/reverse, as well as the incentives this public potential struggle could have on actors in peace negotiations to consider whether they are more likely to get a better position after the next Federal election (and thus less reason to make/signal concessions before then).

Overall, interesting if not surprising times.

I hope the levity came across clearly, rather than as slanderous, and if it didn't I will apologize.

You can go back well before Trump or modern era. The Rural Purge was a deliberate removal of still-popular and still-profitable television shows that cut not just rural media in general in favor of urban, but also greatly reduced regional representation. The nominal justification was in pursuit of younger audiences, but the executives also reportedly hated the format/genre of rural-representation, and given that this was during the era tv-centralization in the United States, that was the ultimate sort of cancellation.

One of these days, I want to write a 'What the Quality Contribution Report Really Means' parody (in the spirit of old Paradox Patch note memes), and just have a gander making these selections sound worse (or better) than they really are.

Like

"2D3D says Chinese pop culture was ruined by women writing gay fanfiction."

or

"WhiningCoil goes into exhaustive depth on the many ways he handled his wood to the delight of his wife."

It would never work, since too many are too serious to poke too much fun at / humor doesn't translate to diverse audiences that well, but there were more amusing ones than I was expecting this time around.

And the answer is the same- it's not like you'll be banned / doxed / pursued for such a stance here, as long you're not insulting other posters too much in the process.

Since this is a contrast to large parts of the 'normal' internet, the places you can simultaneously openly express such views without being in an ideological echo chamber are limited. Hence, the Motte gets a lot more of those sort of people than places that actively weed them out.

Why not? It's not like you'll be banned / doxed / pursued for being pro-Russian here, as long as you're not insulting other posters too much in the process.

Which goes for most positions here.

Not particularly surprising, coming in both the context of the recent French move against Telegram and Musk's ongoing spats with the Biden administration, both of which provide diplomatic cover for Brazil to do something similar.

It's not exactly unique to this either. Brazil has a bit of a... I don't want to say habit, but leverages a trope of using western political rheotorical tropes in the course of its own actions, and/or encouraging others to do the same. The promoted coverage of the post-Bolsonaro crackdown on Bolsonaro has heavy thematic overlap with the European far-right and American Jan 6 partisan rhetoric favorable to the current administrations on either side of the Atlantic.

pomerium

Huh. I learned a word today.

The way you described that mirrors the perception I have had in a number of countries on a number of social / political evolutions. Things that people might not have minded so much in abstract or in small amounts, being suddenly irreversible, with a sense of both lack of control and a lack of prospects of future control. Some conflate that with 'conservative' thinking, but I've seen the same dynamic in different parts of the political spectrum in different parts of the world, whether it's American liberals uncomfortable with the takeover of progressives of once-liberal institutions, European centrists at the post-financial system collapse of the European political center and rise of the right, older Koreans at the generational collapse of pan-Korean identity, and so on. The loss of a feeling of agency / control, of being replaced, and is unsettling, and normal, as is the sort of compensatory movements to try and re-establish a sense of control whether it can be or not.

For Canada specifically, I suspect the demographic transition will lead to a cultural transition with geopolitical ramifications that will be felt in a generation or two away. A significant part of Candian culture and identity was a distinction from, but also kinship with, the US on various historical / cultural grounds, which helped underpin the general stability of the bilateral relationship. If/as Canadian historical identity shifts away from a sense of kindship, it's hardly impossible to see a rise of a Canadian political identity that not only emphasizes the distinction / separation away from the US far more, but also is more willing to entertain geopolitical alignment separation as well, which introduces the possibility of interesting times that would previously have been inconceivable... or the inverse, a destruction of Canadian cultural identity as distinct but separate from the American cultural identity, and thus lead to an even closer alignment / political integration than would have been previously thinkable.

Regardless of what, with cultural change will come the increased potential for divergence from the previously dominant policies. Whether that's bad or good is a matter of viewpoint on the status quo, but as they say the only inevitabilities are death, taxes, and change.

And that's for no reason other than because it's inconvenient to your argument.

Or that your categorization scheme is structurally unsound and anachronistically selective.

You either haven't internalized that there is no meaningful difference between war and diplomacy, or you have and you're lying.

Or you failed the lesson on spectrums. The expression that war is the extension of politics by other means is that they are related and interconnecting, not that they are the same thing with no meaningful differences in their conduct or in the decisions or decision makers that are involved in them.

Whether you believe there is no meaningful difference between war and diplomacy or not, there are very substantial differences in who leads the efforts organized under them and who is lead of who at any given time and what their intent for them is, and this is without circumstances changing in the passage of time.

You think the US strategic position would be better if the Islamic State was still straddling the Syria-Iraq Border,

The Islamic State was literally created by specific decisions the Americans made in Gulf 2 and Syria. If they didn't have this silly belief that the middle east can be democratic and US aligned, none of this would have happened.

'None of this matters because different people should have made different circumstances in a different decade' is an evasion, not an answer.

The Obama-era elites were not the elites who could choose Gulf 2, nor were they even the same nationality of elites who chose to make southeastern Syria an insurgency supply line. They weren't even the decisive elites for supporting anti-Assad rebels in Syria, which was practically a regional orgy of interventions.

Korea had to be fought, but the US stalled as soon as China got involved.

And?

Setting aside that the Korea War did not have to be fought, you have yet to make the case that the US being stalled by China in Korea is a inferior strategic output than the choices and consequences that would have been required to push the Chinese military out of North Korea into China by an expeditionary military force of a power still recovering from WW2 over-extension and needing to prepare for a potential European conflict- a preference that can claim historical validation because the US demonstratably did not get so bogged down in an Asia conflict that it was unable to maintain deterence or its alliance networks in Europe.

Which goes back to categorically excluding successes. The US stalling as soon as China got involved is presented as a failure, rather than US policy makers making an appropriate decision in the face of a Chinese intervention on the appropriate scope of the war and war goals to pursue.

This most of all is a complete failure of American diplomacy. They controlled Iraq militarily and we're kicked out of institutions they themselves created.

I was actually referring to the Iran-Iraq War, not the post-war, but I concede I forgot the time clarification and muddled the topic.

All in all, if there's strategic competence at play here, I don't see it.

Sure- because you gerrymander categories to dismiss successes and then conflate decisions and consequences decades apart to disqualify decisions without regarding their own circumstances and purposes.

As for the claim that Europe is a better ally now than before the war, it is the most ridiculous of all. The US had to shoot German industry in the kneecap to ensure its loyalty and France, Britain and Germany are experiencing levels of political instability unheard of since the 50s right now because of it. Not to mention they now have insignificant military capacity and would be unable to help even if they are utterly loyal to NATO.

This is a particularly inept series of characterizations. The US did not shoot the German industry in the knee cap, the current dominant causes of European instability (migration, demographic age-out, post-financial crisis stagnation, Covid aftershocks, rise of the far right) well predate the war in Ukraine, as did their military insignificance in a China scenario.

Yes I believe either your eyes are closed or you're a sophist.

Whatever makes you feel self-assured, I suppose.

I agree with the later, but would disagree(?) that there was a consistent long-term strategy involving Russia and Ukraine.

From my perspective of having watched EU eastern expansion from the 2000s onward, Ukraine has been far less a US-strategy point and more a context of German post-cold-war strategy that reached a point the Americans supported but the Germans were unprepared / unwilling to lead, and then it transitioned into an American national security premise post-2014 Crimea invasion when Russia interjected a military rather than economic-political issue.

It's generally forgotten / glossed over now, but post-Cold War Germany not only had a major focus on re-integrating Eastern Germany, but all of Eastern Europe. Germany took relatively systemic efforts to execute influence-expanding investments across the region, ranging from the overwhelming ownership of Polish media to Baltic incorporation into German supply chains to Russian energy. These efforts were general and broad, aligned with the European (and especially French) efforts at trying to integrate eastern europe and even Russia into the European Union economize zone (where Russia was a potential counter-balance to the Americans), and Ukraine was not exempted even as it was fertile soil. While the Americans generally supported the Europeans in EU expansion (for a variety of reasons, from the ideological benefits of spreading democracy to the willing to economic interest to strategy in watering down German/French influence over the EU), the cultural dynamics of EU-positivity and democratic liberalism that sparked Maidan was fundamentally EU, and German, driven and funded.

The strategic handoff came with that while the Germans were interest in the eastern expansion in general, they weren't interested in doing so at the expense of their Russian economic relations under Merkel, and so Putin made Russia EU/Eurasian Union alignment a massive issue, Germany entered a strategic paralysis as the factors it had encouraged and sympathized and in some cases funded grew, but the government's interest was not to lead. So the Germans didn't, and without the Germans who had been the institutional leaders the EUropeans floundered, and into that western power vacuum stepped the US. Many forget now due to the Nuland conspiracy theory that Nuland debating opposition members for inclusion into Yanukovich's government after his invitation for such was proof of a coup against Yanukovich, but Nuland's infamous transcript was initially a scandal for its impolitic language on the Europeans.

The transitions have faded with time and popular memory, but US/western military interest in Ukraine was never a consistent interest, and in many respects quite late. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, you had the Clinton Era in the 90s where there was no particular interet beyond nuclear proliferation, you had the Bush era in which NATO expansion was an interest as a part of general NATO expansion sympathies but Bush was decisively curtailed by the 2006 European vetos, and then you had the Obama era in which Ukrainian NATO was not a topic of pursuit. US military aid / training / assistance to Ukraine only started after the occupation of Crimea and the Russian intervention after the failed Nova Russia campaign, which was also the first time the Ukrainian body politic started to come to a military security consensus on Russia being the threat.

Sure there is. Survival of the Ukrainian nation, not only in this war but in the prospects of the next.

The invasion of 2022 was the third continuation war in a decade launched by Russia against Ukraine, and done on the basis including the belief that there was no Ukrainian nation and that the Ukrainians should be disabused of this by conquest, systemic killings, and re-russification of the rest. This was, has been, and remains, in a very real sense, an existential struggle of which the current moment of Russian inability to deliver upon its intent was not guaranteed and cannot be guaranteed in the future absent further changes to the Russian belief and capabilities. That includes not only the belief and capability of Russia's ability to prevail in this war, but the potential to prevail in a fourth continuation war- a prospect that the Russians have already signalled an intent to prepare for via their demands in the 2022 ceasefire talks, when Russian demands included levels of Ukrainian disarmament that would have left Ukraine with fewer tanks than they've since lost in this war.

You say that we're past the point that we can reasonably expect a Ukrainian collapse regardless of levels of Western aid flowing into Ukraine, and many others will frankly disagree. You may disagree with that, but that justification remains, and in any utilitarian 'worth the costs' comparison existential risk is the categorical trump card.