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Culture War Roundup for the week of August 26, 2024

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Have western elites ever been able to formulate a war plan?

I can definitely think of a few wars won by Western powers. Unless your claim is that those wars weren't run by elites?

People die and are replaced by other people.

What's the most recent you can think of that actually resulted in a strategic victory? Especially ones that involved another GP.

In my book you get the First Gulf War, a successful limited defensive operation, and that's about it. Then you have to go back almost a century to WW2.

I was about to say the Ukraine War, but then you said it had to involve another Great Power.

Cheek aside, this is just categorical gerrymandering. It's a subjective answer which hinges on the conception of a great power is (it would be definitionally impossible for western elites to win a great strategic victory against great powers if all the great powers are on the same team), what a strategic victory entails, and then adding a qualifier of power disparities that basically applies to no one (the Russians / Chinese haven't been in a war against a great power since WW2 either) but is treated as a mark of failure to only some (the lack of a victory over a GP is evidence of western elite failure) even though the same metric could be used as evidence of competence / succession (western elites successfully accomplished goals without needing a direct GP war).

If there is something I hate it's people who try to avoid answering real questions by showing how it's possible to game the answer.

I don't care if you're clever enough to make untrue things appear true Protagoras, what I care about is if Western Elites can produce strategic results when genuinely challenged.

Then stop trying to make true things appear untrue by introducing weasel words or dismissing challenges as genuine, Antigoras.

In the answer you hate on grounds of avoiding answering a real question, you had a real answer in Ukraine- a country with no right to be able to resist what a few years ago was believed to be a top-3-in-the world army. This was a war which started in the context of a Russian attempt to push back NATO and deepen Germany energy dependence... which has seen NATO expand and close a previously competitive theater, seen the Europeans execute real and expensive energy transition, and maintain a multi-national coalition of backers by parties that half a decade ago were actively selling arms to the Russians.

Is this to be dismissed because the Americans or Europeans aren't directly involved? Because Russia is not a great power? Because, three years after a three day special military operation, there may be some less-than-maximally-desirable ceasefire conditions for a country that demonstrated the military advantage of American aid against far stronger parties?

Strategic challenges aren't necessarily military threats either, so tying one to the other is begging the conclusion. You may take it for granted that ISIS's caliphate was crushed / the Korean DMZ is boring / that Iran limits itself to asymmetric and proxy groups rather than direct expansion / that the South China Sea remains a place of coast guard disputes rather than gunboat diplomacy, but these are all strategic challenges well beyond the capacity of most states, and these are all places where the status quo is an example of strategic results being achieved. In some of our lives, Iran in living memory had a very real expansionist potential of directly annexing parts of Iraq on co-religionist grounds- and now it's 'just' competing with the US for influence over local politicians.

I don't like using ongoing conflicts to judge the competence of leaders because the consequences of actions can take a while to play out. And people always seem to blinders on about the present.

You could have held the same triumph for Afghanistan in the 00s for instance. Some did, and we all know how that ended.

The only question that matter strategically speaking is whether or not the West is in a better position than before this war. Your listings of tactical victories are irrelevant.

I find success difficult to argue in terms of stockpiles, economic stability, political stability and diplomatic standing. If I had to pick between the western alliance before or after this war to fight China over Taiwan, I pick before every time.

I don't like using ongoing conflicts to judge the competence of leaders because the consequences of actions can take a while to play out. And people always seem to blinders on about the present.

Well, yes. Willfully ignoring the effects of the western powers on the first non-western great power war of the last quarter century while making a lack of effecting great power wars in the last quarter century a basis of criticism would be blinders.

You could have held the same triumph for Afghanistan in the 00s for instance. Some did, and we all know how that ended.

And we also all know that it didn't end due to the nature of the 01 invasion, but on two decades of nation-building failure after the military delivered initial effects, which are different types of issues that shouldn't be conflated (and do not disqualify 01 from meeting your requirements of strategic effect).

Unless you intend to argue that the nature of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan inevitably, inherently led to the 2021 withdrawal dynamic, and that the intervening 20-odd years had no opportunities / ability / responsibility to matter, appealing to 2021 would be an anachronistic way to dismissing 2001 regardless of whether 2001 was done well or wisely or not.

The only question that matter strategically speaking is whether or not the West is in a better position than before this war. Your listings of tactical victories are irrelevant.

You think the US strategic position would be better if the Islamic State was still straddling the Syria-Iraq Border, the Korean Peninsula was either ablaze or rebuilding from a catastrophic war that leveled Seoul and saw the Chinese the only power able to invest in the reconstruction at scale, the Iranians annexing much of Iraq and gain significantly more control and leverage over Gulf oil flows, and the Chinese were attempting direct military coercion of one of the main economic thoroughfares of the world?

Okay. Truly only tactical effects.

I find success difficult to argue in terms of stockpiles, economic stability, political stability and diplomatic standing. If I had to pick between the western alliance before or after this war to fight China over Taiwan, I pick before every time.

That would be a very stupid pick, given there was no western alliance to fight China over Taiwan, that multiple European leading states including both France and Germany were not-subtly signaling their disinterested in supporting Taiwan over China, that the Europeans were even more militarily incapable of contributing useful military aid to Taiwan even if they wanted to, and that the European Union was far more vulnerable to Russia-PRC economic lobbies and coercion that would be pressuring them to neutrality vis-a-vis participation with the US.

But okay. You are the Protagoras here.

which are different types of issues that shouldn't be conflated (and do not disqualify 01 from meeting your requirements of strategic effect).

And that's for no reason other than because it's inconvenient to your argument.

You either haven't internalized that there is no meaningful difference between war and diplomacy, or you have and you're lying.

You think the US strategic position would be better if the Islamic State was still straddling the Syria-Iraq Border,

The Islamic State was literally created by specific decisions the Americans made in Gulf 2 and Syria. If they didn't have this silly belief that the middle east can be democratic and US aligned, none of this would have happened.

the Korean Peninsula was either ablaze or rebuilding from a catastrophic war that leveled Seoul and saw the Chinese the only power able to invest in the reconstruction at scale

Korea had to be fought, but the US stalled as soon as China got involved.

the Iranians annexing much of Iraq and gain significantly more control and leverage over Gulf oil flows

This most of all is a complete failure of American diplomacy. They controlled Iraq militarily and we're kicked out of institutions they themselves created.

All in all, if there's strategic competence at play here, I don't see it.

As for the claim that Europe is a better ally now than before the war, it is the most ridiculous of all. The US had to shoot German industry in the kneecap to ensure its loyalty and France, Britain and Germany are experiencing levels of political instability unheard of since the 50s right now because of it. Not to mention they now have insignificant military capacity and would be unable to help even if they are utterly loyal to NATO.

Yes I believe either your eyes are closed or you're a sophist.

And that's for no reason other than because it's inconvenient to your argument.

Or that your categorization scheme is structurally unsound and anachronistically selective.

You either haven't internalized that there is no meaningful difference between war and diplomacy, or you have and you're lying.

Or you failed the lesson on spectrums. The expression that war is the extension of politics by other means is that they are related and interconnecting, not that they are the same thing with no meaningful differences in their conduct or in the decisions or decision makers that are involved in them.

Whether you believe there is no meaningful difference between war and diplomacy or not, there are very substantial differences in who leads the efforts organized under them and who is lead of who at any given time and what their intent for them is, and this is without circumstances changing in the passage of time.

You think the US strategic position would be better if the Islamic State was still straddling the Syria-Iraq Border,

The Islamic State was literally created by specific decisions the Americans made in Gulf 2 and Syria. If they didn't have this silly belief that the middle east can be democratic and US aligned, none of this would have happened.

'None of this matters because different people should have made different circumstances in a different decade' is an evasion, not an answer.

The Obama-era elites were not the elites who could choose Gulf 2, nor were they even the same nationality of elites who chose to make southeastern Syria an insurgency supply line. They weren't even the decisive elites for supporting anti-Assad rebels in Syria, which was practically a regional orgy of interventions.

Korea had to be fought, but the US stalled as soon as China got involved.

And?

Setting aside that the Korea War did not have to be fought, you have yet to make the case that the US being stalled by China in Korea is a inferior strategic output than the choices and consequences that would have been required to push the Chinese military out of North Korea into China by an expeditionary military force of a power still recovering from WW2 over-extension and needing to prepare for a potential European conflict- a preference that can claim historical validation because the US demonstratably did not get so bogged down in an Asia conflict that it was unable to maintain deterence or its alliance networks in Europe.

Which goes back to categorically excluding successes. The US stalling as soon as China got involved is presented as a failure, rather than US policy makers making an appropriate decision in the face of a Chinese intervention on the appropriate scope of the war and war goals to pursue.

This most of all is a complete failure of American diplomacy. They controlled Iraq militarily and we're kicked out of institutions they themselves created.

I was actually referring to the Iran-Iraq War, not the post-war, but I concede I forgot the time clarification and muddled the topic.

All in all, if there's strategic competence at play here, I don't see it.

Sure- because you gerrymander categories to dismiss successes and then conflate decisions and consequences decades apart to disqualify decisions without regarding their own circumstances and purposes.

As for the claim that Europe is a better ally now than before the war, it is the most ridiculous of all. The US had to shoot German industry in the kneecap to ensure its loyalty and France, Britain and Germany are experiencing levels of political instability unheard of since the 50s right now because of it. Not to mention they now have insignificant military capacity and would be unable to help even if they are utterly loyal to NATO.

This is a particularly inept series of characterizations. The US did not shoot the German industry in the knee cap, the current dominant causes of European instability (migration, demographic age-out, post-financial crisis stagnation, Covid aftershocks, rise of the far right) well predate the war in Ukraine, as did their military insignificance in a China scenario.

Yes I believe either your eyes are closed or you're a sophist.

Whatever makes you feel self-assured, I suppose.