Dean
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Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
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I know you were referring to options other than invasion. I just think you were exposing your lack of seriousness by doing so.
I am talking about invasions because Hamas already established what is functionally a revaunchist police state by literally throwing the previous regime off the roof and not facing notable civil resistance sense. It is not and was not going to be dislodged from political and civil control of the Gaza Strip absent military force, of which there was no viable domestic usurption base due to having shot or thrown the relevant competitors to their deaths, which leaves only external military intervention to seize control of the population and state aparatus that controls the population, meaning invasion.
While other international actors would have been happy to see Hamas eliminated, they notably weren't going to be doing it themselves, which brings back the direct question of 'who.'
Which you have still avoided answering.
Alternatively, the French response hasn't been a warning to the Israeli's, it's been a warning to Iran- in the sense of 'if Hezbollah gets involved, these APCs go to the other side of a potential Lebanese civil war.'
While the OP's framing is that the French position is a response to Israel, a lot of maneuverings going on in the region right now have been aimed at Iran, who reportedly was preparing to try and arrange basically a regional intifada that was supposed to have been called for by Hezbollah as the relevant proxy. There's been quite a bit of shuttle diplomacy in the region in the region, and depending on who you believe, there were direct threats that if other Iranian proxies got involved in earnest, it would be considered a formal act of war by Iran by the US. This allegedly occured right before Hezbollah did a significant announcement speach that had some potential groundwork for being the referenced call to arms, but ended up being an underwhelming 'we're staying out of it, mostly' and restriction to token efforts.
If you believe those framings- and I wouldn't discount them entirely- the French action isn't 'we will help Lebanese national army against Israel'- for which APCs would do little to no good- but 'we will help the Lebanese national army against Hezbollah,' in which the APCs would be directly relevant.
As always, it sometimes helps to review the text that media coverage gestures towards. Regarding the El Salvador Constitution, english translation linked here-
When media refer to the Constitution in a 'the Constitution prohibits re-election', they're generally referring to Article 152-
Article 152 [The following] shall not be candidates for the President of the Republic:
1st.—He who has filled the Presidency of the Republic for more than six months, consecutive or not, during the period immediately prior to or within the last six months prior to the beginning of the presidential period;
2nd. —The spouse and relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second of affinity of any of the persons who have exercised the Presidency in the cases [included in] the preceding ordinal;
3rd.—He who has been President of the Legislative Assembly or President of the Supreme Court of Justice during the year prior to the day that initiates the presidential period;
4th.—He who has been Minister, Vice Minister of State, or President of any Official Autonomous Institution, and the General Director of the National Civil Police, within the last year of the immediately previous presidential term;[28]
5th.—Professional military persons (militares) who were in active service or who have been so within the three years prior to the day of the beginning of the presidential period;
6th.—The Vice President or the Designate who when legally called to exercise the Presidency in the immediately preceding period, refused to fill it without just cause, meaning that this exists when the Vice President or the Designate manifests his intention to be a candidate to the Presidency of the Republic within the six months prior to the beginning of the presidential period;
7th.—The persons included in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th ordinals of Article 123 of this Constitution.
Article 154 is really, explicitly clear that a President cannot spend more than their full term-
Article 154 The presidential period shall be of five years, and shall begin and end on the first of June, without the person who exercised the Presidency being able to continue in his functions one day more.
Article 131 adds an obligation in ordinal 16,
Article 131 16th.—To obligatorily disavow the President of the Republic or his substitute if, when his constitutional term has ended, he continues in the exercise of his post. In this case, if no person has been legally summoned for the exercise of the Presidency, a Provisional President shall be designated;
HOWEVER... there is a certain... trifling... Article 155
Article 155 In default of the President of the Republic, due to death, resignation, removal or other cause, the Vice President shall substitute him; lacking the latter, one of the Designates in the order of their nomination, and if all these are lacking for any legal cause, the Assembly shall designate the person who shall substitute him. If the cause that incapacitates the President for the exercise of his position endures for more than six months, the person who substitutes him in conformance with the preceding paragraph, shall complete the presidential period.
Some rules lawyers may be recognizing why that might be important. Rest assured, Article 156 is quick to spot one potential loophole-
Article 156 The positions of the President and Vice President of the Republic and of the Designates are only resignable for a duly substantiated grave cause that shall be approved by the Assembly.
And later on, it's very, very clear that that on the constitutional amendment front, the framers were very clear that the most relevant principle can not be amended.
Article 248 Reformation of this Constitution may be decided by the Legislative Assembly, with the vote of one-half plus one of the elected Deputies.
For this amendment to be decreed, it must be ratified by the following Legislative Assembly by a vote of two-thirds of the elected Deputies. Thus ratified, the corresponding decree shall be issued and shall be published in the Official Gazette. Amendments may only be proposed by elected Deputies, by a number no less than ten.
**Under no circumstances, may the articles of this Constitution, which refer to the form and system of government, to the territory of the Republic, and to the principle that a President cannot succeed himself (alternabilidad), be amended. **
---RECORD SCRATCH---
Did you catch that? One of the key points of discrepancy in the coverage? Something previously referenced, but kind of relevant?
The El Salvador Constitution doesn't prohibit the election of former presidents. The El Salvador Constitution prohibits self-succession.
To quote-
Article 88 The principle that a President cannot succeed himself (alternabilidad) is indispensable for the maintenance of the established form of government and political system. Violation of this norm makes insurrection an obligation.
This is where the Constitutional rules-lawyering begins, which has not, shall we say, been an area where the Western media has been particularly clear on positions or, or weaknesses of, those involved.
The Constitutional principle involved for arguments against re-election is not that not actually about re-electing a former president. There are a half-dozen restrictions on who can run for President, but being a former president- or even a future former president- isn't one of them. There is only time frame defined derives from Ordinal 1 of Article 152, which is where the prohibitions on self-succession defines as-
1st.—He who has filled the Presidency of the Republic for more than six months, consecutive or not, during the period immediately prior to or within the last six months prior to the beginning of the presidential period;
The core of the Constitutional argument against Bukele boils down to claiming that being President 7-12 months before the presidential period- but not 0-6 months before- constitutes 'the period immediately prior to the beginning of the presidential period.'
The weakness of those who want to take that position is without an actual ban on former Presidents running for election, trying to claim 'more than half a year ago' is 'immediate' and not long enough obligates a standard on how long out of office would be enough. And the issue here is that the only hard number the Constitution provides in this context is... the 6-month window.
Bukele's maneuverings- and his supporting Constitutional argument- is that he will resign from being president more than 6 months out. It will not be his Presidential Period anymore- it will be whoever actually ends up replacing him as the interim, who will complete the Presidential Period (Article 155).
Article 156 does stipulate that a Presidential resignation should be accepted for a 'duly substantiated grave clause'- but there is no definition of what that would be, and the power to accept that is explicitly left to the Assembly. 'Duly substantiated grave clause' is in the same undefined space as the American 'impeachment-worthy' category, which is to say- whatever the Legislature wants it to be. And, of course, whether they accept it is not really in question.
At which point, once resignation is accepted, some of the key constitutional objections give way.
Is Bukele succeeding himself, the criteria for which insurrection is obligatory? Clearly not- he will have resigned.
Will Bukele be succeeding someone for whom he is too closely related to be a candidate again? Also no- the constitutional barriers are on familial relationship, not political relations.
Will Bukele's succeeding president be unconstitutional? Not if the Bukele's resignation is accepted by the appropriate constitutional body.
Should the Bukele's resignation be accepted? I would agree they should not. However, the judgement falls to the Assembly.
Will the Assembly's acceptance of the resignation unconstitutional? This isn't the case being made- and there is no standard for what they can / cannot accept.
And this is where we get into the space that Americans will be more familiar with, the sort of open-ended 'what is an Impeachable offense' standard where a Legislature has the ability to choose, but no obligation or enforcement arm to have a standard. In the U.S. American political context, this has generally been recognized as 'let the voters reward or punish,' where the worthiness of an Impeachment is based on whether voters reward or punish at the ballot box.
It's very hard to emphasize enough the point that Bukele is truly, genuinely popular in El Salvador. He is not going to need to cheat to win the election. This is not a case of 'unpopular minority incumbent corruptly rigs courts to steal votes,' or even 'incumbants use state of emergency to change voting laws to favor themselves by improving partisan constituent turnout.' Bukele is a wildly popular incumbant who is popular because he made major, discernable changes in people's quality of life through addressing real threats. The unpopular minority parties in this context are the ones trying to prevent the most popular candidate from running.
None of this is intended to imply that Bukele's ambitions for another term are good or just or appropriate, or even that you need to accept his position's Constitutional framing. The principle of self-succession was adopted for many, many good reasons.
But rule of law implies rules by the laws as written, not the rules as you wanted them to be, and conflating the two simply undermines the claimed sanctity of the former. Bukele is a classic letter-of-the-law versus spirit-of-the-law dispute, where the spirit and the letter are not the same thing, and 'Bukele packed the courts' isn't the only reason he could win that argument.
That's a not very subtle dodge to the direct question of 'Who?'
Unfortunately for the Palestinians, conventional militaries able and willing to invade a terrorist state already entrenched in an urban warfare setting don't magically appear from wishing. The regional Arab states weren't going, nor were the Americans or the Europeans, nor are the Chinese, nor are the Indians, nor are the Russians, nor nor nor...
My point is that might be another option other than going in and killing Palestinians.
Of course there are other options. The preferred one by most regional and external observors was for the Israelis to not go in, and let Hamas 1.0 keep trying to kill them. It just wasn't an option the Israelis were going to choose.
Huh. I've never met someone for whom the Israeli policy of nuclear non-acknowledgement actually worked so well.
The Crusader Kingdoms, after all, fell to conventional invasion by neighboring Kingdoms/Empires more interested in fighting them than eachother. Israel, by contrast, is generally believed to have nuclear weapons, and as such its neighboring Kingdoms who could conduct conventional invasions are not particularly interested in fighting them directly anymore.
Israel needs a good hard punch in order to learn to keep out of Palestinian territory.
You... really didn't learn from the Palestinian history for this one, lol.
That is an impressively coherent standard, at least compared to what I'm used to hearing. Kudos!
Utilitarianism in war : what are some under-explored tools of war that are effective but dismissed out of hand due to bad optics ?
Things aren't dismissed out of hand due to bad optics. Things that have particularly bad optics get dismissed after the operational and strategic consequences of said bad optics outweigh the benefits. It's raw Utilitarianism goes all the way down, not utilitarianism disrupted by bad optics.
I largely agree. Reading through it, it came across as a 'just-so' story in the same vein as the Trump-era 'how Trump could lead to a nuclear war with North Korea!' book rather than something from someone with actual experience on the subject matter. Far more of a mediocrity of geopolitical punditry by someone clearly not particularly familiar with the geopolitics, or just the regional national politics, involved.
I think that the distrust of experts on this site goes way too far.
How can it go way too far without any baseline-standard of how much distrust is appropriate?
You've not contested charges that various experts have lied, and lied for reasons of political and person self-interest. You've not countered the implications of the replication crisis which undermines the veracity of so much published research and the institutions behind it. You've only added examples of unreliability and bias undercutting grounds of deferrence, because if subject matter experts can't be rational in their chosen fields or are utterly unreliable in areas outside of them or compromised by ideology... it seems really, really significant that the dominant expert institutions have been heavily captured by ideological interests who select for ideological affiliation.
In other words, you've only provided more reasons to distrust Experts by default, factors that only further justify a starting position of distrust until veracity can be verified, without providing any standard of how much distrust is warranted as a starting point.
If there's no standard of 'this far is okay,' you lack the same standard to compare and say 'this much distrust goes way too far.'
What's the alternative to changing the basket of goods as consumer's change their behaviour. Or should we still have a Marconi Wireless and pipe tobacco in the basket?
Why do you think the answer to your question matters to the point the question is meant to rebut?
The lack of superior alternatives doesn't mean that current items are good. The answer can simply be 'they're both compromised.' There is no obligation- or even reason to expect- valid and bias-free data. It can all be unreliable.
(The alternative, by the way, is to execute but-for tracking so that people can see what the difference metrics would be but-for the substitutions. This means maintaining all models in parallel, with clearly delineated divergence points from old models and new models, such that models can be clearly monitored for divergence to catch points where substitution effects account for obvious differences in ratings. If you want to demonstrate that products are not simply being selected for more favorable comparisons, you must be able to compare it to what they diverged from.)
The unemployment thing doesn't matter as long as you compare like with like.
The point of the unemployment thing is that like isn't being compared to like.
Hence why the motte-claim is 'social unemployment is low!', and the bailey-caveat is 'if we ignore a lot of society.' Society, and society-bar-much-of-society, are not like things, even when they are purposely portrayed as such.
And this goes without various period changes to categorization counting that comes and go with administrations, at which point categorical definition differences are conflated with smuggled insinuations of continuity, which is a not-uncommon way for political actors to imply systemic changes when the primary change in a system is the measurment.
It's not irrelevant, but if we want to assess how people are doing why would we ever use it instead of real wages?
Because there are many, many more things that are used to assess how people are doing besides real wages, particularly in the context of not-terribly-distant economic history which considerably disrupted things like savings, regional economic systems, physical and mental health, and that's not even touching ongoing macroeconomic challenges.
We can avoid this whole question though if we just look at real wages.
We could avoid a whole lot of questions if we ignored most things to focus on the favored economic statistics of the people who want to push a particular point.
This is not a particularly compelling reason to avoid questions, even if it would be much simpler to do so.
I do appreciate that whatever I’m perceiving is unintentional. However, “reminders for truth and accuracy,” when I am here in good faith and you do not have a monopoly on those things, do rather rub the wrong way.
As does the accusation of condescension when none was intended... which is ironically demonstrative of part of the discussion, of the difference between perception by a victim and the purpose by a perpetrator.
I do appreciate the appreciation, and do wish to be clear that I appreciate your participation (in this discussion and in the forum more generally) as well.
Lynching was indisputably used as a form of social control during its peak era. The lingering and very human, understandable fear that it left, even two or three decades after it became extremely rare, made it easier to keep blacks subjugated. The threat of violence in the background makes other measures more effective. This seems pretty natural and obvious. Given that peaceful Civil Rights marches resulted in torched buses, beatings, murders, bombed churches, etc, the threat of violence was never that far away if black people stepped out of line. From the perspective of a black person: the lingering fear is part of what constrains you, and the fear is borne out just often enough to keep it alive.
The disagreement isn't on your broader point on the relevance of political violence to fear, but rather the timing of what lynching's 'peak era' is, and thus it's applicability to other times and places. This is where we get to anachronisms, the disparities between perceptions (especially politically-resonant perceptions more than a half-century after the facts) and realities, the conflations of different sorts of actions, and so on. I remain focused on lynchings and not other forms of violence not because other forms of violence weren't prevelant, but because they were even as lynching was not come the mid-century as it- far too belatedly- followed the trend of white lynchings by a quarter of a century. The socio-political dynamics of lynchings, as a specific sort of crime and cultural norm, are separate from other forms of racial discrimination and violence of the eras. I do not find them equivalent and interchangeable, for the same reasons I do not find other categories of crimes with different severities and political dynamics equivalent.
For a meta context, this is a more general tendency of mine as well. I tend towards disliking these conflations of events and purposes across decades and different actors in different contexts well, unless there is a generally strong continuity of points to justify the comparisons. I find it unhealthy for civil discussions (where historic grievances are re-raised and conflated with domestic disputes in innaccurate ways) and for understanding situations and histories that are often highly emotive in the present.
I think you’re absolutely right that the pressure of outside media affected the town’s response in the Till case. There was more, rather than less, condemnation before outsiders showed up to pass judgment. But acquitting the murderers of a 14 year old to save your in-group’s face is only psychologically possible if you find the murder at least somewhat understandable - if you still identify with the murderers and their motives.
And that ending is something I flatly disagree on. I'd even go so far as to say it's an out-group characterization of group-first loyalties by a principles-first alignment (as in, you value principles more than abstract group loyalty), and I say that as someone who prefers principle-first approaches to justice issues over tribalism. I take a position that when people prioritize groupings over values, it doesn not mean they suddenly adopt/identify with the values of the abberant members of the group- that would counter the premise of group-first overriding principles-first cultures, which is reflecting of trying to impose a principles-first paradigm on people who don't share it.
I fully agree that they identified with the murderers, yes, but identify with the motives, I disagree on. I disagree it was about saving the in-group's face, rather than defying the out-group, and I maintain that this distinction matters more than any commonality of the perpetrators motives across the grouping. This is without even discussing practicalities in specific contexts, such as key actor analysis of specific cases. This is a disagreement on social dynamics assessments, of group identities versus principles, which seems foundational enough that I doubt we will reconcile to a common position or characterization of what the dominant truth/factor in characterizing the situation is.
Since I suspect we'll just revolve around this well past the thread's expiration date, especially if foundational positions are divergent, I'll freely (and sincerely) offer you a last position point if you'd like, with a respect departure of ways.
Have a good day and week and rest of the year!
As I'm not intending to be condescending, I would not know, though I am aware that saying that can itself come across as condescending, which itself is a no-win situation. If I do not contest the characterization of myself, I implicitly concede the accusation, but if I try to contest on my own views, it can be perceived as condescending. Such is life.
My point of framing is that I dispute part of earlier claims (that lynching was used as policy tool of social control into the mid-century), dispute the relevance of a supporting argument to that claim (the fears of the afraid do not themselves support claims of any particular policy by the persecutors absent other evidence), and disagree of your analysis on social dynamics of norms and value (that the acquittal representing a norm for murder as opposed to an in-group/out-group conflict tribalism). Reminders for truth and accuracy matter for all of these, as subjectivity and emotion can compromise assessments, and an original point of my own is that common popular understandings of the crime, and the period, are significantly compromised by anachronisms born of modern emotive politics.
Why would we want to adjust for that with ECI?
Because it provides relevant, if less flattering, data that provides a another framework for understanding views besides 'public discontent over the economy is a result of Republican lies.'
Is workers retraining into better roles not part of an improving economy?
Given the failures of 'learn to code' neoliberalism that simultaneously had oversights in critical areas like regional disparate impacts, the emerging implications of AI technologies in many service/digital economic areas which might be more resilient to distance dynamics, American economic categorization that systemically ignores unemployed persons not actively seeking jobs, and the state of the American (re)education system given it's advancing degrees of political capture that have already affected various fields, whether American workers as a collective are actually retraining into better roles is entirely up for dispute.
Also relevant is how the selection of categories can be used to include- or exclude- relevant data to make certain category measurements more or less impressive for administration political purposes. Unemployment is a classic one, as the unemployment rate that gets fielded by political actors isn't actually the rate of unemployed adults in the population.
This is not only a non-falsifiable claim to dispute claims of skepticism with no limiting factors (it applies to all disputes over government claims if you do/cann not calculate alternatives), but it rests on the foundation being actualized- that the deviations between the official inflation or growth rate and reality is what is being claimed to be increasingly obvious by appearance.
Functionally, you've just said 'if they were lying, people would be noticing and saying something' to people who are saying 'I've noticed things that make me think they're lying.'
The fear itself was the social control.
The fear of lynching was not the social control in the 1950s, unless you want to diminish the concept of social control to a nothingism.
This is where we get back into anochronisms, and the difference between popular memory and actual policies, which we've already bantered on, particularly in relation to the original higher-level post, which was about fears cited in the 21st century.
I explicitly said that it was shocking because it was an outlier. However, the fact that the murderers were acquitted is strong evidence that this remained, in an important sense, a quietly-tolerated norm.
If we ignore banal insider-outsider cultural insularism dynamics, sure, but I'm not sure why we would if we're concerned about truth and accuracy.
It's not exactly hard to find societies or contexts who will disapprove of a behavior on their own terms, but simultaneously band together against a hostile outsider who points at the same thing. We're not even a month past one of the most notable examples of this in recent memory, and while I find the recent widespread support of Hamas disgusting, I'd be pretty unsupported to accuse, say, the average pro-Palestinian Ivy League student who insists we shouldn't judge how people fight against colonialism of having a social norm of killing jews. I'd have many well supported negative descriptors, but not that one.
Culturally insular communities circling the wagons against outsider attention and opinions in the face of known and acknowledged sins is incredibly common social behavior that can be found across geography and time periods when people prioritize group-affiliation over universal-level principles when the two conflict. But prioritizing group dynamics doesn't mean that the principle violation is in fact a norm- it just means that behaviors changed based on who is perceived to be watching/affecting the context. When the group-affiliation context subsides, the norms of the, well, normal society reassert themselves.
As ugly as 'I'm not going to conceed they're wrong to you' can be, it has relatively little to do with the specific sins at hand being socially acceptable, and far more to do with the fact that there isn't a shared sense of society between the insider and the outsider watching and accusing. Unsurprisingly, when outsiders come in significant numbers and profile to make a major media event, social dynamics may be different than after the leave and are no longer making a spectacle of it. Just as the expression 'you are what you do when no one else is looking' is a description of individual character norms, there is an inverse to it as well, where you are also what you do when the out-group you hate/who hates you is not looking.
When loathing to concede to the loathed outgroup outweighs moral consistency, I'd certainly agree that's a moral failing in and of itself, but in such contexts the specific immoral act is often irrelevant. The people who would reject in-group culpability for a murder would likewise reject in-group culpability for stealing candy from a child. This doesn't mean they also have a quietly-tolerated norm for stealing candy from babies- it means they have a very-strong norm of not conceeding moral faults to the outgroup(s).
While Mrs. Till almost certainly was not imagining such a depraved murder when she gave her warning, she would not have been irrational to imagine some lesser humiliation or beating.
Fortunately, our statements are not in conflict. Unfortunately, Emitt Till was murdered despite how rational expecting him to return home alive and well would have been.
It’s certainly worth pointing out that the terror campaigns had long passed their zenith by the time of the Civil Rights movement. But this might be an overstatement of how completely they, and the fear they inspired, had been extinguished by the 1950s.
There wasn't a statement that the fear was extinguished by the 1950s. There is a statement that lynchings were not happening as a social control measure in the 1950s, and hadn't been for decades, and wasn't living memory for much of the relevant generational cohort (including, sadly, Emitt Till).
When she sent her son to visit relatives in Mississippi, Mamie Till warned him to be extra deferential to white people down there. The fear was still alive, and obviously not unjustified.
That depends on what the fear was, precisely. If the fear was simply dangers from racism, sure, not unjustified. If the fear was specifically lynching, that would have been unjustified, even as that's what ended up happening, because the data did not (and does not, even with advantages of hindsight) support that specific fear at the time, and even less so since.
That Emitt Till was killed by lynching does not change that he was one of only 3 african americans lynched in a 5-year period (52-56), all three of them in the year of his own murder. It was shocking precisely because it was so abnormal, even for area and not just the era, not because it was even a quietly-tolerated norm. Emitt Till form of murderer was not some deliberate community act of social control- Emitt Till's murder was an asocial act even within the society that it occurred within, even one as unsympathetic and bigoted and fuck-the-outsiders as that town.
In the 1960s, the number of children kidnapped from parks or front yards was tiny compared to the number of carefree happy childhoods spent out in the sunshine. But the visceral horror this struck into the hearts of parents caused us to totally remake childhood into the supervised, indoor activity it is for too many Zoomers today. And that wasn’t even an intentional terror campaign! You really don’t have to torture-murder very many people before others drastically change their behavior in response.
Sure. And the proper course of action since the abduction panics has still been to have children go outside and touch grass, and for people consumed by visceral horror at the extremely unlikely to be disabused of the disproportionate focus and weight they assign to it. Likewise, the appropriate response to any other unsupported fear is to... not support it.
This is true regardless of whether it's fear of COVID, or fear of muslim extremists, or fear of germs. People absolutely have died from all of these- tens of thousands more than were ever lynched in the United States- but no matter how visceral the fear, it's not valid just because it's closely held and driving changes in behavior and perception. It's precisely because it drives changes in behavior and perception that it's so harmful to the people who hold such views, because despite what post-modernists theories imply, perceptions are not reality.
Not sure we disagree.
Not intended to be a disagreement! It was intended as more an elaboration/expansion, with a point of a personal pet peave (historical anachronisms).
There was a period when the fear being the point is true, but the anachronism is when that was- which was not mid-century Jim Crow as known or protested against in the mid-Century US. Fear of lynchings ceased to be a point when lynchings stopped being any sort of coordinated or even common point, which it hadn't been for the better part of a generation by the time the modern conception of Jim Crow south was cemented in popular memory. No one alive today has any living memory of lynching as an organized suppression policy in the American South (or anywhere else).
To draw back a few posts higher, the people deriving eliminationist intent in the current era are even further removed from a period when lynching was a point, and lynching as a means of social control wasn't even living memory for most of the US during the period most contemporary progressives are thinking off as the Jim Crowe South that the Civil Rights were against. Appealing to modern fears of Jim Crowe returning and/or lynchings as a means to subjugate blacks and/or eliminationist fears is as historically illiterate as trying to frame, oh, muslim immigration into Europe as related to the Crusades. The later may have been more generations ago, but it was generations ago, and is neither living memory or lived experience to justify current concerns.
Lynchings were also as much a cultural practice as anything else. For most of US history, most lynching victims were white. It's just that as the late-20th century cultural changes saw lynching as a whole decline, it declined last in the south and actually increased for blacks as overall numbers trended downwards, even as African Americans who went from being demographically-disproportionate victims to actual majority victims as lynching faded from common use.
I'll pass a relevant source that seems to be mostly in the middle-of-the-pack for year-by-year showings, but if you look at year-by-year breakdowns, black lynchings weren't as, well, consistently allocated as one would think for a 'maintaining control' policy. Civil War reconstruction generally ended in 1877, when federal troops were removed and local political dynamics re-asserted, but black lynchings were actually lower in the 80s (50-70) than they were in the 1910s.
In so much that lynching was a policy tool to cow and terrify into subservience, it was mostly a specific decade of about 1891-1901, where the only 9 years of triple-digit-a-year african-american lynchings occurred, most of that in the early 1890s. This certainly corresponds to the dismantling of the last of the reconstruction-era state governments and the imposition of disenfranchising Jim Crow, but this was far more about asserting control than maintaining control. Once control was taken, lynchings generally decreased over time to a point that they were more living memory than practical, following the white trend of generally declining numbers about 20-30 years late.
Lynchings gradually declined to in the 50s a year in 1920, to basically halving to the 20s or below in 1922, and dropping below 10 a year around 1936. By the time of the Civil Rights movement of the US in the 1950s-1960s, when the average American lifespan in 1960 was 60-70 but the average age was 30, for most people lynching had been a terror-policy in their parents or grand parents age, not in their lifespan.
While the history and use of lynching against African Americans is a real and terrible thing, it's often used anachronistically. Lynching-as-culture predated Jim Crow, and was in no way reserved for African Americans. Lynching-as-control-tactic was far more about establishing Jim Crowe than maintaining it, and absolutely did see African victims raise even as white victims declined as lynching in general became less accepted. By the time of the civil rights era in the 50s and 60s, lynching hadn't been any sort of meaningful policy for decades, which is to say since before the Baby Boomers were even born after WW2.
https://famous-trials.com/sheriffshipp/1084-lynchingsyear http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html
The obvious point would seem to be to speak out on how the choice is a false dilemma being proposed by the people predisposed to censor tick-tock, who are merely utilizing unrelated historical events to try and emotionally cludgeon people into accepting censorship as the lesser of two evils rather than an unrelated, and unnecessary, evil in and of itself.
While I agree with your point of 'that's different from the Palestinians,' I'd also point that- from my perspective- 'The Palestinians' as a coherent collective has been degrading over the last many years, at the very least since the 2007 Hamas-Fatah conflict in which Hamas notably publicly executed Fatah officials by throwing them off of tall buildings, which was then accompanied by the attacks on Israel that led to the Gaza blockade and the loss of Gaza-West Bank travel.
We're about 15 years into not just the political, but cultural divergence between Gaza and the West Bank. Different social services, different education systems, different lived experiences, and so on, with increasingly little interaction or cultural exchange between them to produce a meaningful 'average' Palestinian experience. Gaza and Westbank were already heavily divergent from the Palestinian experiences in regional refugee groups, where- for example- Jordanian-Palestinians had different degrees of 'authentically Palestinian experience' from the Kuwaiti-Palestinians (at least before their expulsion), and so on.
To a degree, 'Palestinian' is becoming less and less a meaningful political identity, and more of a sub-ethnic/social descriptor, whose meaning changes by geographic area.
I have a strong suspicion that the Americans and Europeans would happily help foot the bill in exchange for closing off various Israeli revenge options.
The real question is how the to deal with the tunnels themselves once detected. If you're going the landmine route, I've heard unironic advocacy for digging a moat around gaza from the Mediterranean. Not particularly well thought advocacy, probably, but unironic, with the premise of 'if tunnel detected, flood it.'

Well, that's certainly a novel theory, and given the longevity of the Crusader Kingdoms and rarity of total state collapse without external intervention, a generally non-falsifiable one that would outlast either of our time on the mortal coil.
I generally am not moved by conditionals that already failed to occur (Egypt was already ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood- it did not take the deal in a heartbeat), presumption of uninterupted trend lines that justify inevitable disaster without shaping (the othrodox population claim), or hypotheticals that run contrary to historical experience or macro trends (lol, said pan-Arabism, RIP), so as such I'll just leave that I find your failure to see how nukes would be useful in saving a country unconvincing as evidence that they don't have more relevance that historical metaphors with fundamentally different assumptions.
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