Dean
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User ID: 430
To revisit the question and break it apart-
The new conflict that broke out in Sudan - anyone have a good low down on what is happening there, and why? Is this truly a proxy-war between the US and Russia (Rapid Support Forces being Russian proxy, I guess? And Sudan Armed Forces would be US allies..?), or is there something else to this?
The new conflict that broke out in Sudan - anyone have a good low down on what is happening there, and why?
The proximal cause is a breakdown of negotiations over the integration of the paramilitary RSF under the SAF. The SAF wanted this in a short time frame, within years. The RSF wanted a longer time frame, like a decade, but practically never.
These negotiations have been western backed, and in a sense western pushed, since the 2019 but especially the 2021 coup, as a sort of condition for international legitimacy / foreign support. One of the key western interests / some background reasons for their role is the negotiation is the context of Darfur. On top of being a massive humanitarian tragedy in and of itself, it's humanitarian crisis like this that can drive regional instability to collapse governments and see migration flows from Africa towards Europe. Consolidating control of all the military forces under a single military, and that military under the civilian government, is a key point in reigning in warlordism that fuels these conflicts, where profit-maximizing warlords continue their wars without state backing.
In practice, however, Hemetti and the RSF are the warlord being reigned in, since the paramilitary militia are more of a threat to stability than the formal military, and the consolidation of the RSF under the SAF would have decisively subordinated control of his personal economic interests (the RSF-controlled gold and other things) under Burhan and the SAF.
This is the fundamental crux of the current coup / civil war: the RSF Warlord had his interests under threat. A coup attempt makes sense here, because if it succeeds, Hemetti gets even more power and wealth, and if it stalls, then in the negotiations that follow Hemetti can secure concessions that protect his interests.
IF you want to frame this as the west's fault, then having negotiations that put Hemetti's interests at risk is the western contribution to the crisis. The inevitable tankie framing will be that the US forced Hemetti's hand, and that the US drove the crisis, and that the crisis would end if the US used it's great power and influence to force a ceasefire for the good of the people, and only American/western greed and amorality prevents it.
This is generally where I tell people to stop being cultural chauvinists and thinking it's all about the West.
The West was not issuing ultimatums. The West does not control the military autocrat who couped the previous military junta who couped the previous military junta. All negotiations put people's interests at stake- that's what negotiatiosn are. But Hemetti and the RSF were not in a 'coup or die' situation. There was no ticking clock or irreversible end to negoations. Burhan was not, to my knowledge, actually about to militarily move against his Deputy. This is a conflict of choice between two men with their own motives and interests. There is an ambitious warlord who made his wealth and power inflicting great misery and suffering who wanted to not just protect, but expand, his personal power and wealth, in a conflict with another ambitious warlord who made his wealth and power inflicting great misery and suffering in the process of expanding his personal power and wealth.
Neither is an American puppet. They are their own men. And they are causing a mountain of misery in the foreseeable future, as they have supported in the past to varying degrees. They are both quite willing to inflict more for their own advantage, and the logic of the conflict- and factors in it to date- suggest a sustained civil war, not the ever-optimistic 'we can compel negotiations that will end the conflict in our favor' that the RSF seems to have been betting on.
I have, many times, said I have a dim view of any war strategy that rests on the premise of 'and then the enemy will lose the will to fight.' Nothing I see from the SAF suggests that Burhan intends to give up, or that other powers can make him. Multiple announced cease fires have failed, and each failure decreases the chance for the next.
The coup will likely continue into a civil war. There are factors that could limit it, and with the grace of god may they prevail, but if the SAF can retake the capital, the obvious next step for them is to take the gold mines and RSF economic interests, and those interests can pay for a lot of mercenaries and such to resist that. It will be bloody and expensive, but that's a cost both men are likely willing to pay, over American objection.
Is this truly a proxy-war between the US and Russia (Rapid Support Forces being Russian proxy, I guess?
The russian-gold connection, and reported Wagner ties, are not central / drivers of western policy in Sudan. That is a red herring.
There are certainly RSF-Russian ties that the US and the West does not like, but there are many things about the SAF and its ties that the West does not like. The SAF-junta is not a US-backed government in the sense that any alternative to it is a zero-sum loss of American interests. The SAF is a US-backed government in that it is the government, effectively, and in negotiations with the US and other international parties for international acceptance. The US is not Sudan's political/military/economic guarantor. If anything, Egypt is- and while Egypt is a US ally, it's not a Russian foe.
There are some definite RSF-Russian elements that are worth noting here- the RSF opening phase of the conflict has some obvious (though not exclusively) Russian strategic thinking influences, from the role of opening misinformation for information space disruption, the opening targetting/capture of Egyptian forces to create a decision paralysis to delay/disrupt/prevent external intervention, and the overarching strategy of a smaller military power trying to use first-mover advantage and a selective call for negotiations/cease fire from a position of advantage. The RSF timing, down to the point of the Eid Holiday at the end of the first week of fighting, when the pre-planned operations would climax, but the counter-attacks wouldn't have time to marshal, and the foreign diplomatic pressure and religious Eid holiday would increase chance for a natural compellence of cease fire, are all characteristic of how the Russians hybrid warfare theory suggest things should go, and the Wagner ties are absolutely a vector to support that.
But at this time, there's no real indication the Russians, or Wagner, or directly involved or orchestrating or anything else. Framing this as a Russia-US proxy war overestimates the relevance of both sides.
It also overstates the attachment other parties have to either side. If the SAF wins, the US continues relations with the military junta that launched a coup. If the RSF wins, the US would... likely continue relations with the military junta that launched a coup. The US, and western, interest isn't in who rules the country, it's what who rules the country does, and Hemetti would quite likely continue the charade of a military-backed transitionary government in indefinite negotiations for an eventual transition to civilian government that patriotic military leader would oh-so-happily lead.
Whether that person is Hemetti or Burhan really doesn't matter to the west, though Hemetti's personal ties to Russia might be an irritant, and the RSF is a bit more detestable to western sensitivities than the SAF due to the involvement in Darfur and the ill-discipline with how western diplomats have been treated. However, the west cares far more that Sudan doesn't generate a humanitarian crisis that causes regional instability and migration flows.
And Sudan Armed Forces would be US allies..?), or is there something else to this?
Sudan is generating a humanitarian crisis that will cause regional instability and migration flows.
The immediate Western and most foreign nation priorities priorities is getting diplomats and citizens out of what is rapidly becoming a humanitarian disaster zone. Fighters (allegedly, but not necessarily exclusively, from RSF) have been robbing diplomats or attacking refugee convoys as the leave the capital. Diplomatic evacuations have been in the scale of hundreds; thousands to tens of thousands of foreign nationals are in the country. Diplomatic evacuations are ongoing, but the risk to thousands of citizens is quite possibly going to generate calls for foreign intervention in some form.
And risk is real, because infrastructure is contested or failing. The Khartoum capital airport has been shut by fighting since the coup, and it's a 800km / 500 mile drive to the port, which means if you don't have the gas for that there's a good chance you're escaping the war-torn capital on foot. Internet is failing across the country, and foreign aid groups already in the country say they're not able to get humanitarian supplies in, which means there's both less to feed people AND less ability to coordinate it.
And, of course, there's that minor thing about the civil war, where one side was THE designated force for organizing militia to terrorize the country side and steal everything of value. Including, allegedly, robbing evacuating diplomats, kidnapping non-involved soldiers of foreign militaries, and other charming examples of care.
It's liable to be bad. Really, really bad. And I have no faith or confidence in the ability of the West to compel a ceasefire and return to negotiations, and every fear that failure to do so will see the SAF grind the RSF out of the capital and then go for the RSF's economic heart, even if it takes them years of humanitarian crisis to do so.
In the Small-Scale Question threat, user @sickamore raised a question about Sudan. Given that it's more global news, but also tangential to culture war narratives, I figured I might raise it here. sickamore did ask for a good low down. Sadly, please accept a bad one because bad news is the easiest to quibble over, and sharing my newest reason to be depressed is supposed to be helpful or something.
Also, forgive the inconsistent citations, these are intended to be handy, not authoritative.
To start with sickamore's question:
The new conflict that broke out in Sudan - anyone have a good low down on what is happening there, and why? Is this truly a proxy-war between the US and Russia (Rapid Support Forces being Russian proxy, I guess? And Sudan Armed Forces would be US allies..?), or is there something else to this?
To start- this is not a bad question, but it is the wrong question, for a pretty basic reason: this is not about you. Or the US. Or Russia.
What is going in Sudan is a practical demonstration that being a global power does not mean that everything going on in the world is secretly about you. When I've raised in the past in other contexts that a certain sort of American cultural chauvenism that sees everything as an extension of American politics, this is what I refer to. The Sudan crisis has foreign actors and influences, yes, but it is fundamentally an internal political crisis driven by internal actors, with their own interests, their own agency... and their own lack of self-control, because you tend not to shoot at the French diplomatic convoy you already said you were willing to help leave if you have actually good control of your forces.
They don't, because this is Sudan, and Sudan is experiencing the sort of 'the government is the internationally recognized warlords, and the warlords are fighting again' conflict that bedevils foreign policy.
First, to set the context...
For the Americans and others who couldn't find Sudan on a map if they didn't know where to look: Sudan is in Northeast the country between Egypt and Ethiopia at the Horn of Africa, across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. It's part of the not-great part of Africa.
Sudan has basically been a military junta in one form or another since the 90s, and not the western-backed sort, though over the last few years there's been a detente of sort since a new military junta came to power and more or less offered to help normalize relations.
Here's a wiki summary, but the super high level feel free to quibble is-
In 1989, the political system of Sudan was "rigorously restructured" following a military coup when Omar al-Bashir, then a brigadier in the Sudanese Army, led a group of officers and ousted the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Under al-Bashir's leadership, the new military government suspended political parties and introduced an Islamic legal code on the national level.
In the 2000s and 2010s, there was a war in Darfur you might have heard about due to the various crimes against humanity and horrific humanitarian crisis and stuff. The militia that fought on the Sudanese government side are broadly grouped/affiliated with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and are accused of war crimes. 'Crimes against Humanity' war crimes.
What you might not have known is that there is gold in those killing fields, and naturally the side with the militia to control the gold gets to profit. The RSF starts to take off as a political force, and an economic force, due to control of the gold. It also branches off to other profitable ventures, like mercenary work. Anyone familiar with the international overlap of gold interests and mercenary work may recognize some similarities with certain Russian interest groups. Yes, there is a Russian connection. But back to history.
On April 11, 2019, al-Bashir and his government were overthrown in a military coup led by his first vice president and defense minister, who then established the now ruling military junta, led by Lt. General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan. The RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, often known as Hemetti, supported Burhan in the coup and suppressing post-coup protests, including the Khartoum massacre.
After the 2019 coup, Sudan’s government was led by the Sovereign Council, a military-civilian body that is the highest power in the transitional government. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is the civilian leader of the cabinet. This means he is not actually the leader. The Chairman of the Sovereignty Council is General Abdel Fattah Burhan of the SAF, who is backed by Hemetti, leader of the RSF.
In October 2020, Sudan made an agreement to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, as part of the agreement the United States removed Sudan from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On 25 October 2021, the Sovereignty Council and the Sudanese government were immensely dissolved after being overthrown in the 2021 Sudan coup.
Surprise surprise, the leader to come out on top again is... General Burhan of the SAF, backed by Hemetti and the RSF.
Which brings us closer to present. As part of broader western normalization and diplomatic rehabilitation, the premise of Sudan politics is that it isn't an indefinite permanent military junta, but a transition government that will, eventually, place the military under civilian rule.
This will naturally be a long and arduous process, but western support actually does demand the military itself to be consolidated, so that things like the Darfure crisis and the humanitarian castrophe that supports mass migration not happen. Which means that the Sudan Armed Forces would need to reign in and control the paramilitary militia of the Rapid Support Forces, who have a nasty history of suppressing. Which means that the RSF, rather than being an autonomous power broker with great autonomy, would be controlled by the Sudanese military, and General Burhan. Who- if he controls the RSF- would also control what the RSF controls. Like, say, gold mines.
Naturally, RSF Commander Hemetti is a patriot and a self-admitted supporter of civilian government rule, which is why earlier this month he allegedly* attempted to coup General Burhan.
I say allegedly here, because Hemetti claimed it was really Burhan and the SAF who did dirty first, but I will note that the RSF took a couple hundred Egyptian soldiers prisoner in the first day(s) of the war, which tends not to be the sort of thing that you do on accident if you're just responding.
(It does, however, make quite a sense if you have pre-meditated intent to coup the close ally/partner of the regional military partner, and thus throw one of the few military powers capable of intervening against you into a decision paralysis that keeps them from intervening against you.).
Note that this is all very western centric, and doesn't include things like how Egypt and Sudan are oriented against the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, only mentioned the gold and russian connection when I went off script, and doesn't even touch the various arab world implications. This is just a really, really ugly history.
Here's the Dean Summary:
In 1989, there was a coup. The military junta styled itself in islamic theocracy.
In the 2000s/2010s, Sudan was a pariah state that made itself infamous in the Darfur conflict, where the RSF was a tool of suppression and humanitarian atrocities using paramilitary militia.
In the 2010s, the RSF got rich and powerful off of using its paramilitary militia to seize control of gold and other economic interests in Darfur.
In 2019, there was a new military coup led by General Burhan of the SAF, who was supported by Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary RSF. The new government ingratiates itself with the west by relaxing from the pariah policies.
In 2021, General Burhan of the SAF launches another coup, again with the support of Dagalo and the RSF. The new new government sustains western toleration/acceptance by going through negotiations of a transition to civilian government.
In 2022, western attention / negotiations for negotiation focus on consolidating the military under future civilian control. This includes consolidating the RSF under SAF control, which in turn means control of the gold and economic interests Hemetti had built up.
In April 2023, a week and a half ago, Hemetti and the RSF attempted a coup against General Burhan and the SAF with an attempted takeover of the capital of Khartoum. It failed to oust him, and the conflict looks ready to go into a sustained civil war with massive humanitarian implications.
That was an ugly history. I'll give an even worse response to the original question next.
So, is it feasible? Could it work?
As with all proposals that requires a vast diversity of people to adhere to already have such a strong consensus that they are willing to submit to hand extreme governmental power to their rivals, no.
For American vassalization, at this point I just chalk it up to cultural chauvinism and American-centricism, even when it's not done by Americans or by people who'd recoil at the thought.
For nord stream, it makes as much sense as anything else I've seen, which is to say I've seen and heard of nothing that could be considered authoritative. Then again, I've also said that I find it credible for anyone to have done it, and that there are reasonable reasons for the Baltic powers that might know to keep quiet regardless of who actually did it, be it overly patriotic types of western powers or Russian types. Any official acknowledgement might comes with political pressures to Do Something they'd rather not do, regardless of who did it.
I will maintain that the Seymour Hersh story was laughably weak, and has been damned by how little weight it carries even amongst the sort who would usually applaud.
I don't disagree (with you).
Munition shortfalls is one of the reasons why stormtrooper detachments have been reintroduced, and stormtrooper tactics require a constant influx of mobilized troops to replenish the losses.
I'd disagree that these are actually stormtrooper tactics, though this could be the pedantic in me.
WW1 stormtroopers depended on heavy artillery support to suppress enemy forces so that the stormtrooper detachments could approach, fix, bypass, and then clear the enveloped positions, and it was extremely high attrition on higher-quality troops even when 'successful.' The Russian adoption seems to invert this- it's being done because of a shortage of the pre-requisite (suppressive fire munitions), and it's being done with inferior rather than higher quality forces (ie. those least able to carry the momentum). If you take away what made stormtroopers effective, you get less storm and more Somme.
Rather than a countermeasure for artillery shrotages, my read is that this is the Russian army trying to adopt what seemed to work from the Wagner approach with prisoners as part of pushing out Wagner in the ongoing turf battle, but what Wagner did wasn't stormtrooper strategy as much as turn-based strategy micromanagement. Hyper-focused individual infiltration and attack plans against specific battle position attacks would be planned, surveilled, suppressed, attacked, and re-suppressed at a squad level. This did indeed get results over time... but these results were the Wagner casualty ratios that the Russians dismissed because, well, prisoners.
My feeling is that there's a bit of a political disconnect between the Russian army, the Wagner 'stormtroopers', and Putin. Wagner got 'results' because it was willing to spend huge numbers of casualties doing so. Putin was willing to accept the prisoner casualty rates because it was politically low cost due to being 'Wagner' and 'prisoners,' not 'conscripts' or 'good Russians.' The Russian army won't get equivalent results without equivalent casualties, but they can't endure equivalent casualties with equivalent political cost.
I'm not saying Putin sincerely cares about the casualties, but he does care about the political costs of various mobilization actions, hence the various efforts to skirt around mobilization the first place, and transitioning the entire Russian Army to Wagner tactics is neither going to produce great victories or keep the political costs below the level of increased mobilization.
The new electronic mobilization law is a way to avoid attention-drawing mobilization waves. With a push of a button, you can summon as many men to the draft stations as you need, and if they don't present themselves, they get slapped with a whole roster of restrictions: their driving license is suspended, they can't buy a train or plane ticket, their business license is suspended etc.
This I fully agree with, and I think it's going to serve as a case study of what digitized governance can do to try and coerce people into supporting the state... and the limits thereof.
I think the correct explanation here is that the 'American empire' and 'American vassal' meme is just that- a meme- and people think that the Americans run other countries out of the local US embassy. Yes, the US has interests in knowing how countries are internally considering things. But the overwhelming way countries do this is by telling eachother directly in meetings. Countries by and large don't maintain comprehensive summaries of their political and military positions on centralized databases to be scooped up all at once.
I think the easiest explanation for most to swallow, however, would be the point that any method the Americans could use to spy on Ukrainian systems, the Russians could as well, and both the US and Ukraine have a strong interest in Ukraine defending from the later. For all that Snowden leaked so much about American signal intelligence, that doesn't change you need, well, a signal to intercept. The sort of things the Ukrainians don't share, probably aren't easy to collect, and also likely judged not worth the cost per see. The US doesn't need to spy on the Ukrainians to prevent them from using American long-range weapons against Russia- they just don't provide them. And if you're not providing certain things, you don't need to press for the intelligence about said things either.
No, but the Dean who has worked with Americans before can be.
I don't have much to say- someone leaks a trove of American classified documents every decade or so, and has been since the Vietnam war, and even earlier. The modern size and scale is an expected and established consequence of the post-9-11 reforms to increase the flow of classified information within the US government. I suppose the evidence that the information continues to flow does put to rest Julian Assange's theory of government by conspiracy that could be paralyzed into incapacity by leaking. At this point, you don't give the Americans something you're not willing to have stolen and leaked in global media... but that's not actually that many things, really, and the benefits of trading intel with the Americans are often enough that things like this are the cost of doing business. Governments will pretend to be shocked, shocked they tell you, that the Americans have an intelligence aparatus that reports on them.
The Nybbler has the right of it for the most important things, and a lot of the leaked material is boring precisely because most intelligence is things that already are known from unclassified sources, but just with a stamp of authenticity / endorsement / credibility boosting. (Sometimes.) I'm not really surprised by anything I've heard come up, but then again I was admittedly surprised that anyone was surprised by the Snowden leaks, which was overwhelmingly in the 'well, obviously you could be doing that' to anyone with a computer-related degree.
What interests me more is the role that mental health seems to play in the alleged leaker. Once upon a time there were a shorthand for why people betrayed their countries that went by MICE- Money, Ideology, Conscience, Ego- with most motives/rationals for defections/leaking falling into one or the other. This one... 'Ego' might be closest, but that's usually about someone being incredibly Proud and retaliating for an offense given, or trying to prove themselves right and be validated. Here, the validation seems to have been of the sort of a lonely, likely isolated socially and politically, young adult just coming through the Pandemic and whose social hangout was an obscure discord server. We'll see what rational they provide, if any, but the fact that this was allegedly circulating for some time, rather than raced to the presses, and yet they were still in their position / in country, suggests their motivation wasn't based on expecting release.
A final point, and why I didn't raise this topic last week, is I'm not clear on how much misinformation has been slipped in, and not just by Russia but possibly others. Obvious casualty edits being obvious doesn't mean that other documents without obvious edits aren't edited- and as a trick to draw attention away from other things, that would be an obvious technique if agencies are involved. It's also quite possible that other sources of misinformation may come up- by the sounds of it the documents were circulating for some time, meaning there's a window where someone could make a call that a leak was likely iminent, but suppression impossible, but adding things into the intel-ball might have been possible to spotlight and use later. Who knows, we'll see, or probably won't.
Does that answer your interest?
The Russians have a major advantage in firepower, they've been firing at least 4x more shells than Ukraine and they're still on their first wave of mobilization.
This later part isn't quite correct, as the the Russians are still doing their normal conscription cycles, as well as attempting what some have called 'stealth mobilization' efforts. The conscription cycle is more relevant to your point, since the war started at the first normal conscription levels, and the 'first wave' was more about replacing losses than actually expanding the force... which makes it more or less equivalent to the normal conscription waves once you implement stop-loss measures like the Russians have.
Russia is currently entering it's normal spring conscription cycle, which is yet another mobilization wave in practice, and will likely consider the need for another out-of-cycle mobilization based on the Ukrainian spring offensive (if there is one).
It's possible that the Russians don't implement a 'mobilization wave', but stick to their lower-level efforts, not out of a manpower concern, but mutual munition shortfalls. While Russia has been firing more shells than Ukraine, both have reportedly been extremely constrained, and Russia's scope for offensive capacity via artillery lessened with the generally failed offensive of he last two months.
We already threaten nuclear war if Russian troops invade Latvia, a country that was part of the Soviet Union a mere 32 years ago.
You might, but NATO states don't. Nuclear retaliation is reserved for nuclear attacks, while conventional forces for conventional attacks, the conflation of which ignores how MAD interacts, and doesn't interact, with conventional deterence.
We already invade countries that we suspect of violating nuclear non-proliferation (Iraq).
The United States also does not invade countries known to be violating nuclear proliferation, and suspected of violating nuclear proliferation, and of course those actually having nuclear weapon. Because, again, MAD.
The whole (non-cynical) point of the giant globe-spanning American military is to deter and destroy threats to the civilizational order.
No, the point of the globe-spanning American military is to advance American security interests for the American alliance network. The Americans do not generally invade their allies, or their enemies when the cost to the Americans is too high, or when their domestic political order has higher priorities than destroying other people.
I also think people are underestimating the willingness of rival powers to agree to this. You think Russia and China like their odds in an AI arms race?
Them not liking their odds in an AI arms race is why they would offer a treaty, and cheat, for the same reason they (and most major powers) cheat to very degrees on other limitation agreements.
Cheating is the expectation in genuinely limiting international agreements, whether it be loophole abuse, redefinition of contested items, or blanket denial.
If USG made a credible offer of “AI non-proliferation,” how do we know it wouldn’t be accepted?
Because we know many of the American's own citizens don't find the US Government credible, let alone many other countries, and especially the geopolitical adversaries.
Because, of course, the US has many means to cheat, and would have an even greater incentive to cheat the more other parties genuinely gave up on a potential competitive advantage / competitive parity.
I thought it was a good move as well, but more from a White Elephant gift perspective. In costs DeSantis little/nothing if Trump voluntarily goes to New York, since he said he was willing to help, it costs DeSantis personally little if Trump 'accepts' the help because the person breaking the law by not going to New York is Trump not Destanis, but it lets Trump incur huge costs (legal/political) if Trump is 'on the run' by taking the offer even as it puts Trump in debt to DeSantis. In the context of Trump vs DeSantis, all of these work to DeSantis's own advantage, as either it frames Trump as either willingly going to New York, or Trump in debt to DeSantis while dealing with the fallout of not going to New York.
Not enough agency to the Europeans in this, IMO.
Aside from German government incompetence, more than the Americans, I'd give credit to the French on any planning to profit at German expense. The Paris Climate Accords were structured in such a way that enabled the key global economic blocks (EU/US/China) to justify protectionism on environmental grounds, but it was Paris who was leading the European Union's legislative phase-out of internal combustion engine cars, which have been a key part of the German economic model. This is classic French economic-advantage-by-legislation, a natural extension of the Paris Climate Accords themselves and was negotiated in the twilight of the Merkel era. The EU combustion engine ban is one of those 'the people who write the rules can write the rules to advantage themselves,' but whereas the French have reliable nuclear baseload power for their auto-industry, the Germans were betting on the Russian energy over repeated and decades-long American objections.
When what was functionally a Russian energy subsidy to German industry went away, so did the viability of the EV market leader, hence why the Germans threw the wrench and blocked the EU internal combustion ban from going forward this month.
Thank ye
In the interest of reflecting position better, may I request a re-titling of the link from
...thoroughly doubts that the US wrecked the Nord Stream Pipeline.
To
...thoroughly doubts the Seymour Hersh article claiming that the US wrecked the Nord Stream Pipeline
?
My position for some time that I consider the US among the potential candidates. I do not find Seymour Hersh's claims credible evidence for reasons raised, but it doesn't change the position that I find all the regional actors as credible culprits between motive and capability.
Separately, I'll just add a note that an additional basis of doubt for the Hersh account only now available with a few weeks of retrospect is a lack of corroborating findings driven by the claimed reveal.
When new-and-true leak reports come out, it generally drives follow-on inquiries and reporting by interested/motivated parties who were not previously aware of the revealed information, and in the process validating the claims made in the reveal. Even when the official coverup is maintained, other motivated actors (activists, independent investigators, external government interests) are cued into where to look, and have access to publication channels where the new information is publicized and signal-boosted beyond the influence of the conspiracy. The nature of unraveling a conspiracy is that it unravels it becomes easier to unravel further, as more threads are identified to be pulled upon. With the numerous threads in the Hersh thesis- from the Norwegian complicity, the potential witnesses during the NATO exercise, regional airspace monitoring for the command detonation flgiht, or even Hersh's alleged source providing follow-on information- there should be things that interested parties would find, and there are plenty of people interested in validating Hersh's claims that the US was to blame.
Instead of generating substantiating reporting, however, the dissident-west reporting cycle never really moved past the phase of reporting on Hersh's story. The expected sort of signal boosting occurred, and Hersh attempted a media tour to try and keep visiblity alive and well, and the expected media ecosystem of pushback against pushback occurred with people decrying a coverup, but none of Hersh's supporting media ecosystem found or developed any meaningful new reporting. There were no new reporting or signal boosting of Norwegian media identifying potential Norwegian acting agencies / organizations in the conspiracy, no new interviews by Seymour's alleged source to any other media actor to validate his existence, not even counter-rebuttals to things like the aircraft discrepency issues that were identified in in the initial pushback. Rather than identify and signal boost the sort of reporting that might have justified further reporting, even the pro-Hersh media ecosystem has basically moved on rather than any sort of drip-drip-drip method of new reveals and expansions. This would be bad in and of itself, but is critical given that the immediate counter-Hershe claims regarding things like aircraft flight claims should- but haven't- been debunked themselves by identifying/validating Hersh's claims on the command-detonation flight timeline. This functionally left the media-cycle on expanding the story ending with the rebuttal, with weaker counter-rebuttals such as 'well, the data could be falsified' being utterly non-verifiable and requiring a buy-in to the conspiracy. As is, the media cycle has devolved into just variations of repeating the same initial claims- maybe with the addition of 'this is being suppressed!'- but without actually expanding it.
A conspiratorially-minded sort might point to this as proof of the effectiveness of the conspiracy, that records have been altered and dissident reporting repressed, but this is also the sort of media dynamic we'd expect with a dud story. Given the lack of any supporting follow-on reporting on the key Norwegian connections, including a lack of substantiating reporting to signal-boost to defend against the OSINT claims of the claimed flights not matching up, I wouldn't expect anything significant in the future either.
US has been monetising its debt heavily during the covid era, with now about a fifth of US debt having been purchased with nonexisting money, that is, the federal reserve created the money for that purpose. US spends about double its GDP % of defense, yet the Navy is still worried Chinese military shipbuilding is outpacing the US. The only consolation is China doesn't have that many carriers or nuclear submarines, but why would they need them ? They most likely have a weapon that denies the US use of its carriers within ~3000 km of China.
This is indeed a new argument, but it is also still not the argument you started with. The American debates about default remain congressional politics, not the ability to service.
Chinese will likely never be stupid enough to repeat American mistakes in belligerence, or crap up 3/4 of the world with their bases. They seem strictly strategically minded and their bases are almost exclusively found around important east hemisphere naval trade routes.
Then congratulations- the US recruitment issues, by forcing an abandonment of unproductive bases, will improve their effeciency and effectiveness rather than expending manpower and resources on 'crap' bases.
This is an improvement of the US position, not a weakneing.
Nor is the US military recruitment issue a particularly relevant comparison when (a) China is a conscription model,
Only technically. It's a volunteer force in practice, so no different from the US.
Not quite.
The US had at least 100,000 death due to non-alcohol drug overdoses in 2021, up 29% from the year before.
I doubt by this time Russia has a higher per capita mortality from drugs legal and illegal than the US on these metrics, even allowing for difference in what counts.
US is completely anomalous, with its overdose deaths being 20-25x higher per capita than in the EU thanks mostly to the fentanyl.
And yet your argument wasn't a comparison to the EU, or even relative drug dose deaths compared to Russia which you have not explored in like-to-like- it was a comparison to the Russian war in Ukraine, which remains magnitudes off.
I do indeed appear to have mis-read the context and caveat. Thank you for the correction.
As for the idea that China's numbers are all fake - I suppose many of them are but they are succeeding at many impossible to fake things. China is the #1 trade partner of most countries in the world. This cannot be faked. And its no secret that they are by far the world's #1 manufacturer. We import (going by memory) 4 times as much from China as we export to them. Maybe the numbers are faked a little. This is cold comfort to me. China's capacity to produce physical goods dwarfs the U.S. by so much that it doesn't change the story much.
But of course. You're buying into the argument that not only the numbers mostly correct rather than compounding differences over decades, but the numbers you're choosing are even relevant.
Numbers can be both really big for real, and still not surpass the US in relevant metrics, because as the expression goes the US is really, really, really stupid-big in relevant numbers... and so when you want to make your own country look good, choose a different number. Trade export partner numbers is one of them. This is not really a relevant metric of how the US and China compare, because the US is not configured as an external export economy, and China is not configured as an internal continental economy. Then there's dynamics such as the value-added chain, or the export/import dependence levels, and so on. Some of these exact basis of comparison have been memes of the American electorate for years- like the idea that as manufacturing declined as a share of employment that the US manufacturing base was declining.
There certainly are arguments that China is beating the US in critical areas- I'd argue that east china sea anti-ship cruise missiles is relevant- but these aren't the macroeconomic arguments being pointed at for growth.
Or, alternatively, 'Mao' already prevented this, and the global evaluation has been erroneously calculating compounding Chinese economic and demographic claims for decades now despite known systemic data integrity issues.
It's not exactly new news that Chinese data is unreliably optimistic. China has admitted as much internally and internationally for over a decade now. What's less common knowledge is that this isn't just economic growth claims, which allow for compounding growth estimates, but the demographic data as well. Chinese demographic data is suspect for many of the same reasons as the economic data- because regional administrators have incentives to over-estimate their numbers in exchange for resources from the central government, and repeated because it serves the national governments geopolitical / national pride purposes to maintain it's claim. Being the largest country in the world (especially vis-a-vis India) assumed its own national prestige purpose just as the 4% growth figure became like a talisman for showing that the party was maintaining real growth.
Estimates on when China is going to overtake the US are inevitably going to depend on when you believe China started over-reporting its numbers, and by how much. I've seen little to indicate that China hasn't been overestimating for decades, and even fewer attempts to recreate estimate comparisons retroactively factoring such in. That was bad enough when it was just economic growth numbers- demographics just compounds the compounding discrepancy of future economic potential. The UN, which is far from the most bear-ish observer of China, moved it's estimate of China's demographic peak forward by almost a decade to last year between 2019 and 2022, and that's not even the most bearish estimate on demographic over-counting. Yi Fuxian, as the most easily searchable, has estimated that China demographically peaked almost half a decade ago, in 2018.
It's not merely that the economic size is based on over-estimated growth resulting from over-estimating growth, but that it's been projected on the basis of over-estimated fertility rates based on people who never existed. It doesn't take much until you're losing an entire United State's worth of population over the next 80 years.
The demographic over-estimation is part of why the middle income trap is as significant as it is for China in modern analysis. It's not simply that China's economic growth will slow down more sharply than predicted, but also earlier, and also with greater burdens than expected. We've vaguely known for some time the sort of population size China will need to take care of as the population ages out of the work force- we haven't been thinking in terms of the population to not only replace them, but support them. This would already be a substantial headwind, and it doesn't factor in real looming threats to the Chinese economic system, such as the still-unresolved debt issues that have been a significant part of the government fueling bubbles that help support those prior GDP figures.
In military metrics, US is plummeting next to China. It's always on the verge of default, with a yearly debt ceiling dance, its military can't found enough people willing to serve.
This conflates multiple different issues, none of which are applicable to a military metric comparison. The American 'default' is based around political willingness to raise debt ceilings and assume new debt, not a financial ability to afford new debt (or, on established history, willingness to asssum more). Nor is the US military recruitment issue a particularly relevant comparison when (a) China is a conscription model, and (b) the result of American military retention issues will be... the downscaling over expeditionary commitments, which China doesn't have equivalent to.
This is an apples to oranges comparison on multiple levels, without even addressing what amount of strategic orientation of the US 'should' be. If the argument is that the US is in decline because it will have to pare back overseas efforts, that does not even imply a relative decline if it's still orders of magnitude more than what China engages in.
American yearly drug overdose deaths each outstrip the best efforts of Russian army in Ukraine by a factor of 4 if you believe Ukrainian government numbers.
Factual accuracy aside, is this supposed to surprise or alarm to anyone who's familiar with the scale of the US population compared to the Russian military in Ukraine?
In 2020, for example, the number of estimated US drug deaths rounds up at two significant figures to 69,000*, out of a population rounding to 330,000,000. This is compared to an estimated 40,000 killed across all Russian forces in the 2022 (including the annexed territories and Wagner), of a military whose size size estimate in 2020 of 1,150,000 active service members.
**Edit- picked the wrong numbers of drug deaths. Error doesn't change the magnitudes. https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
This is over two magnitudes more intense for the Russian casualties compared to their 'normal' army compared to the US. This is also unsurprising- the US population is demographically large- the Russian military is only large in comparison to other national militaries. A population pool over three hundred times the size is going to have a number of much higher statistics in absolute terms that are still much lower in relative terms. Conflating absolute numbers without respect to context is statistical illiteracy.
Moreover, this is again an apples or oranges comparison, since a more relevant metric in trying to do a social comparison would of course be Russian drug deaths. This does admittedly come with its own difficulties of comparing like to like metrics- what is factored into drug deaths has a number of counfounders (such as the drugs of choice) and category differences across countries as well as the integrity of statistics. But if you want to pick one category- say alcohol- then you might have a like-to-like comparison, in which Russia had over 50,000 alcohol-related deaths in 2020 compared to the US which reported 52,000... despite Russia having less than half the total population.
In addition to actual spy balloons (of which there are some) it does look like NORAD also shot down at least one hobbyist radio balloon that cost <$300 to send out, which were registered with the FAA and whose owners tried in vain to contact the proper authorities.
If that's not decline - a nation's air force not being able to check what has been reported to them by civilian authorities, and not being able to verify what it's shooting at despite the existence of optic pods (telescopes,. basically).. then what is 'decline' ?
Not much, apparently, or else far more significant issues than you raise.
In before "No Submission statement, not reading."
But also lacking a basis of comparison. Subjective impression comparisons to things the observer wasn't around to experience kind of lacks a basis for contrast. You can't compare your own impression of the current media environment to previous responses when not only were you not there for the earlier ones, but the entire (social)media ecosystem that shapes your perception wasn't present.
So, the fact that US failed to act on what were likely spy blimps flying overhead for years undermines my claim that they'd be too incompetent to have a program that'd correlate flight radar data and actual radar data ?
Yes. It's the difference between ability and willingness. The argument that no one would notice is based on inability, even as the pipeline provides a willingness.
Do I have it right ? The fact of demonstrated incompetence* undermines my claim of their incompetence?
Since you claimed a different sort of incomptence not implied by the first, yes.
*there's a statement by Mattis claiming they 'knew about the balloons' but didn't tell Trump because his reaction could've been 'too combative'. Honestly have no clue why airforce intercepting unmanned suspicious manmade objects would ever require presidential authorisation so it seems like bullshit.
If you have no clue it would probably not make sense, sure.
Not like anyone's getting hurt, so why even ask ?
Allegedly, a risk of hurting people from falling debris was the basis for shooting down the balloon over the east coast, and not over the mid-west.
Do you actually believe that the US government's actions abroad are motivated by a principled desire to be good and moral? I cannot possibly understand how you could given the history of the US and specifically their military adventures over the past few decades. When I look at the actual actions and even the statements that come out of the US military, the idea that they base their decisions on morality as opposed to the hard calculations and strategic gameplaying of empire is utterly farcical.
There is no singular 'they' or 'their' to execute a single decisionmaking framework.
As the saying goes, organizations don't make decisions, people make decisions, and organizations as large and complex as the United States have a lot of people who make their decisions for a lot of reasons. There are absolutely times when the government's decisionmaking is driven by people motivated by principles they view as good and moral- and simultaneously driven by people whose interests are strategic, and by people whose interests are tangential but they're making a compromise, and by people just phoning it in while they focus on another areas like their domestic political interests, and by people who are making quid-pro-quos, and so on. These are not contradictory, these are simultaneous, and a dirty secret is that people in government don't all share the same ethic systems or valuation of specific information.
The US has not achieved their goals,
The depends on what you believe their goals and the expected timeframes are expected to be. The American government by and large hasn't been among those arguing that the Russians would collapse within months under sanctions or that this would be anything but a long war.
and the blowback/second-order consequences from the sanctions they placed on Russia are only beginning to come back around. Cutting off a major energy supplier like Russia is going to cause, and already is causing, severe issues in energy markets.
This depends on you believing this is a bug, and not a feature or means to advance other goals (such as transition to green energy, or forcing European divestment from Russian energy dependence, or advantaging American industrial investment attractiveness versus other regions), or just an acceptable cost achieving other objectives.
The current conflict and the US response to it is playing a large part in the massive inflation we're seeing all over the western world,
'Large' in absolute or relative terms? Likely no for either- both as a % of spending but also in relation to other macroeconomic pressures (especially the still-translating implications of COVID policies), the war is a correlation to issues with deeper causations. COVID stimulus spending and Biden's ironically named inflation reduction act and ongoing investment changes around the world as well as demographic-shift driven investment and consumption dynamics are all independent of the Russian invasion.
and these things are continuing to get worse, not better.
Certainly, but irrelevant unless they would be better for a change of policy, which is not at all obvious would be the case if, say, the western coalition had collapsed in infighting or if the Russians were to win or various other potential alternatives.
Which 19th century are you thinking about?
Many would argue that the US absolutely did engage in bloody imperial conflicts in 19th century, ranging from the support of the Texas succession against Mexico, the Mexican-American war which was a major war of territorial expansion, the civil war against separatist, the various Latin American interventions, and of course the buildup to the Spanish-American war, which saw the US become a formal empire right at the end of the century.
Moreover, the 19th and then pre-WW2 20th century was absolutely a period of repeated American anti-imperialist actions to thwart, counter, or militarily defeat imperialist actions. The Monroe Doctrine, hypocritical as it was, was generated as a way to deny imperial conquests to those who would have otherwise been able to enforce them. American China policy was not only about getting American access to the China market, but preventing and rolling back other empires from exclusive market and political control. The Spanish-American War was driven in the leadup on a wave of anti-Spanish Empire yellow press and fervor. This doesn't even go to the influences those born in the 19th century had in the mid-20th, where the US even threatened to militarily intervene against the British and the French empires over the Suez Crisis.
If you want to appeal to the 19th century US, it's kind of important to remember that the post-Civil War reconstruction was an aberation, not a norm of pacifism. When the US had the ability, it absolutely was the sort to get involved to defend its interests... and regularly framed those interests in opposition to imperialist efforts.
But why do we want that? The U.S. had a clear interest in preventing this when the spread of Communism was a real threat. But that's not the case any longer. What interest do we have in guaranteeing the rights of the weak everywhere against the strong?
Interest? Easy- by guaranteeing the rights of the weak against the strong, you can prevent the strong from becoming stronger, and eventually strong enough to deprive you of your rights/sovereignty. In any framework which acknowledges conquest as a benefit to strength (more ressources to conquer more resources), the best way to prevent someone from ever being able to conquer you is to keep them from conquering others- or, failing that, to maximize the costs of doing so to the extent that the rate of return is diminished as much as possible.
Additionally, since the invention of the telegraph history indicates that the US public will be willing to intervene to defend allies or those they sympathize enough with or when someone attempts to seize such leverage that could be used against the United States. Unless you posit that this historic norm will go away, if you expect there to be interventions it's best to do it when it's cheapest (before conquerors conquer a mighty empire) and easiest (when a norm against conquest enables cooperation against would-be conquerors).
Some countries, perhaps, are Too Big to Fail. Is Ukraine really one of them?
Arguably, given the effects that could be expected of food export collapse. Or rather, keeping Ukraine free of Russia can arguably keep Russia from being too big to fail as a global agricultural exporter, and thus denying Russia leverage over the global food supply when they have already demonstrated intent, willingness, and actual efforts to use economic livelihood inputs to pressure, punish, or attempt to coerce other states.
Is preservation of the status quo worth any amount of blood or treasure?
Who says any net amount of blood or treasure is on the line?
There is a linguistic motte and bailey here about the different meanings of 'any mount'- which could be miniscule or massive. Arguments that massive amounts of blood or treasure are being spent rely on selective use of absolute vs relative metrics , categorization overlap (Ukrainian casualties versus American casualties), and of course the general issues of accounting (the treasure spent on a munition slated for decomissioning or a vehicle in cold war storage is not the the replacement cost used to make aid announcements more impressive).
There's also the general lack of consideration of the alternatives. A common criticism of western aid over the last many months has been that 'the West is running out of ammo and systems to give, and needs it for its own defense instead.' But this runs into the point that the only threat most NATO systems are credibly on hand for is... destroying the Russian equipment they would be destroying in Ukraine. Whereas if you give the systems to Ukraine, you not only pay a lower cost in blood and treasure for attriting the Russians via a proxy conflict rather than a direct conflict, but you also reduce the amount of weapons / ammo you need to keep on hand at all times going forward. NATO needs considerably less defensive capabilities now, in 2023 when something like 70-90% of Russian combat capability is committed to Ukraine, compared to the systems and bodies needed two years ago when Russia wasn't in Ukraine.
I'm not persuaded of the automatic moral duty of bystanders to intervene when one country consumes another any more than when one wild animal consumes another. In terms of international relations, the world is a jungle and jungle rules and ethics apply.
Amoral international realism is one of the strongest arguments for the Americans supporting Ukraine, not for refusing to provide aid. The objections to aid generally rely on morality to the neglect of the benefits of alliance management and denying the advent of rivals of sufficient mass or credibility.
Because the American public, with its default prioritization interest in domestic rather than international politics, is most easily moved to care about international politics on the basis of sympathy for an victim or moral offense, and Russia, China, and Iran give plenty of reasons to be offended. Russia acts like a steotypical drunk abusive wife-beater, Iran still chants 'Death to America' and had a non-negligable role in helping bomb Americans (and other people) abroad, and China was gradually seen as both a cheat and threatening a more sympathetic underdog.

I'd lean towards that the initial seizures of personnel froze any immediate response ability, and while that was resolving the impetus to support / enable foreign diplomatic evacuations and the imminent refugee crisis took priority. At this point, the capital seems undecided, and so the way the conflict will shift within a month is unclear, and so focusing on the refugees streaming towards the border is an easier effort than an unclear intervention.
As with the west as a whole, Egypt is less invested in the man than in what the man-in-charge is willing to do. The RSF is liable to be as willing to keep supporting Egypt vis-a-vis Ethiopia as the SAF.
I'm less convinced about the Gulf Arab argument. There is various reporting that the UAE in particular is connected, but the quality varies, Egypt is funded more by Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi's aren't as clearly involved/interested. That's not saying you can't find connections, but in this part of the world you will always find connections, especially when the RSF was the literal gold dealer.
Military juntas don't dominate the state for 30+ years by lacking internal espionage services. While the RSF is a rich bunch of militia groups it's still a bunch of militia groups, with poor discipline already on show, and while the SAF may be a poor army it's still an army with heavy equipment and the resources of the state. The RSF seems to be focusing extremely heavily on the capital, and the movement of RSF forces from their usual areas to the capital would have been pretty noticeable.
Once the Hemedti actually failed to take out Burhan in the first 24 hours, most of what we're seeing was predictable.
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