Dean
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Is that so? If so, I misunderstood the comparison. Mea culpa.
A rumour being interesting if true is not enough to make it relevant.
No, but an allegation reported in different contexts over an extended period of time may be indiciative of a trend rather than a solitary reason. The plural of circumstantial evidence is still circumstantial evidence, but more of it is more relevant than less of it.
Orban said that the West needs to understand that Putin cannot afford to lose, and will not lose, because he’s up for re-election next year, and he cannot run as the president who lost a war.
I'll just note that none of these clauses logically flow from one to the other.
Putin could afford to lose even if he's up for re-election because he controls the election and domestic political apparatus.
Putin can lose the war regardless of his domestic interests, because Putin's domestic political needs aren't what determines military success. No one 'chooses' to win a conflict in order to win election.
Putin being up for re-election next year doesn't mean he has to run as the president who lost a war- Putin can claim he hasn't lost it, that whatever ending is actually a victory for some superficial reason, or even that the real war is ongoing.
At the end of the day, 'Putin can't afford to lose' arguments always ignore that Putin can shoot the protestors in the much the same way that 'Russia is at threat of NATO attack' always ignores nuclear deterrence. Putin isn't in power because he maintains a veneer of democracy; Putin maintains a veneer of democracy because he is in power. The inversion is only useful as a rhetorical technique to try and impose a problem on someone else.
It is, because wages alone do not a mercenary make, or else all professional militaries would be mercenaries, and yet the distinction between mercenaries and professional national militaries was the crux of the Napoleonic revolution. Money may be a fungible commodity but it does not imply contractual relationships with third parties made by the second party you gave money to.
A NATO mercenary is a relationship between NATO and the mercenary. A NATO-funded Ukrainian mercenary would be a mercenary employed by Ukraine with money provided by NATO. A Ukrainian soldier who draws pay is not a mercenary, even if NATO provides money to Ukraine, because there is no mercenary contract involved.
But I was hardly scratched while you are near death.
Bar the other person not being near death, and you being hardly scratched.
I mean, if we're taking this example as Russia, then 'you' have a very visibly broken nose, an eye and a half swollen shut, a hand already with mangled fingers, and are still banging 'your' head into the other guy's fist, even as the bystanders pass him another shiv while steadying him on his feet.
No one takes Russian claims about not being affected by the war seriously- Russia is going to be in recovery for over a decade, and it's not exactly standing over someone else kicking down anymore either. The war has destroyed Russia as a strategic competitor, let alone regional hegemon, for a generation, and the question is whether the Western support gets bored and goes away in the next few years.
Considering the Americans have made anaconda strategies something of a strategic art, press X to doubt.*
*Or, mea culpa, I missed the proper target of the metaphor.
Convincing who of what?
People who thought that the sanctions were meant to cripple Russia within months weren't paying attention when key parts of the Russian economy- such as energy sales to Europe, non-removal from SWIFT, non-targetting of third-party trade (ie. India and CHina)- were very clearly kept off the table in favor of different sorts of sanctions targeting different things. Similarly, people who thought that Russia would be unable to buy anything from anyone or build anything technological clearly weren't familiar with the practical impossibility. Maybe they believed propaganda hype, but they probably weren't paying attention that much of the hype was coming from the people lobbying for the carve-outs.
What the sanctions have done is considerable, and enough for anyone who dismisses them as being a paper tiger to not really understand what they have been structured to do- which are a number of political objectives targetting international relations of Russia, not a total collapse of the Russian system.
Long series of questions are rarely intended to actually be engaged in good faith, but here we go anyway.
If we can’t defend Ukraine, why would we be able to protect our Asian Allies in Korea or Japan?
Why do you think any American ally believes the Americans were trying to 'defend' Ukraine in the way they do treaty-allies?
Ukraine, after all, has and had no treaty with the Americans. It does not host American forces. Despite much diplomatic discussion, the Americans haven't even been the pre-eminent western diplomatic presence in Ukraine for the last decade- that's been mostly the Germans and the French. The US provided many years of low-key and occasionally mid-key diplomatic support, but not heavy weapons and never combat forces, nor the sort of security guarantees it openly states about others.
Why would allies think that America not having a defense alliance with another country means the US won't honor it's defense alliances with them?
...especially when what only a year ago was still being called 'the world's second strongest army' has been driven into a ditch thanks to American support without any sort of treaty-level involvement?
If we can’t actually protect Ukraine despite billions in sanctions and giving the most powerful weapons we have, what sane country is going to trust us to be their defense or to protect their trade or solve their disputes?
Why would any sane country think one has to do with the other?
Just start from what, exactly, 'defend' is supposed to mean in this context. Sanctions were a retaliation, not a shield- what do you think sane people thought they were supposed to do? Similarly, 'most powerful weapons' is, ahem, not what sane people would characterize a military support chain that, just the other week, finally consented to some modern tanks. Sane countries know that when the United States is very publicly saying it is NOT going to send it's most modern air force, ground force, missile force, other other forms of current kit, it's not a shock when it doesn't.
Meanwhile, people expect the US to protect their trade because the US routinely protects trade with counter-piracy patrols and sufficient pressure on states that might otherwise think of 'taxing' international waters that oil still ships through the strait of hormuz even when Iranian proxies attack Saudi oil infrastructure. They don't start forgetting that because the US didn't do something it didn't claim to be doing (ie. solving all their disputes).
And without that perception, we lose a lot of power.
Evidence that you ever had that perception from your allies.
If you’re not looking to NATO as much for defense and trade protection, why do you care what they say?
Probably because the Americans demonstrated that, without even being directly involved in a conflict, they can decisively ruin the day of one of the strongest military powers in the world with a super-power's worth of military surplus... with just a fraction of the American military surplus.
If you're a potential military aggressor, that's a heck of a lot of reason not to be an aggressor against any American client, or even states the Americans might feel sympathetic enough to support. If you're a potential military target, that's an overkill amount of potential support for your defense needs, and well worth trying to solicit sympathy to the American public.
Among other reasons, former Polish government officials alleged as early as 2014 that Russia extended feelers about partitioning Ukraine with Poland as far back as 2008.
There is, was, and remains reason to take that claim with much skepticism, but there were also (generally unsupported / long since lost in the wave of reporting) diplomatic media whispers that Russia tried to do the same in early 2022. If the Hungarian rumor is true, it'd be corroborating of an attempt by Russia to basically split the west by making the partition of Ukraine a regional affair. In practice, this would have gone a long way towards deflecting the international blame by Russia, as by giving up even small parts of Ukraine to other European countries it could easily equivocate the blame with other opportunists, split the west in a way to prevent meaningful sanctions, and underscore Ukraine's status as a fake country composed of other, 'real' nations retaking their rightful people.
Obviously that never played out,but Russia continues to maintain media campaigns alleging that Poland is planning to intervene and annex parts of Ukraine.
A Carnegie article from July of last year summarizes some of the points
And yet misses the most relevant factor of 'because Putin applied public and other forms of pressure, including monetary incentives, for Yanukovych to reverse policy and start shooting constituents of his new unity government.' The government formation of which was itself a framing context of your AP article.
Governments facing molotov cocktail protests do not, in fact, need to issue decrees without legislature support for the police to start shooting people they've been successfully holding off for months. And no, a Guardian article conflating support across 3 magnitudes (50,000 facebook members! Wow!), does not really drive that. The Ukrainian government of Yanukovych did not resort to lethal force decrees out of existential necessity, but as a policy choice, and government policies are always going to be prone to government review and sanction by other parts of the government in any system with meaningful separation of powers.
Yanukovych made a failed gamble that he could divide and conquer the opposition and drive them into infighting by inviting some into the government. When that failed- and this is the regular reminder that the leaded US embassy phone call from Euromaidan was a discussion of who and how to approach for inclusion to a stable government after Yanukovych's offer- Yanukovych then assented to Russian pressure (or, if you prefer, the pressure of his pro-Russian internal security minister, concurrent to Russian pressure including sanctions) to start shooting protestors.
At which point it became very quickly clear that 'shoot the protestors' was the minority position of the Ukrainian elite oligarchs. And one of the reasons oligarchies are oligarchies and not just emergent dictatorships, is precisely because oligarchic minorities don't get to unilaterally escalate state violence against others without consequence.
And the Jan 6 comparison remains bad, and even worse, for lacking these meaningful contexts.
For one, the 'more armed, more violent' is vis-a-vis the Ukrainian forces, not the Jan 6 protestors. For another, you seem to still be skipping over the context that the Maidan protestors were being shot at with live ammo.
The January 6 metaphor is bad in a number of ways.
The most relevant reason is that most 'serious concerns' about Russian nuclear use are Westerner media projections, not Russian claims or actual threats. Russia does have a nuclear use doctrine, and 'use in case of battlefield setbacks' isn't a part of it. Russian nuclear doctrine is far more of 'deterrence or survival of state' thresholds, which last year's defeats were nowhere close to.
Now, Russia has regularly tried to stoke / exploit such fears for diplomatic / negotiation leverage, and that was probably a consideration in the annexation announcement late last year, but in the Putin era Russia doesn't make nuclear threats or nuclear bluffs, it simply publicizes some nuclear alert level or nuclear-capable missile (ie, a missile) and let's the west project whatever it will. This sort of bluff-that-isn't-made is entirely dependent on the audience caring, however, and if they don't, then escalating threats- even a demonstration test- just underscores that your bluff has been called and you are not, in fact, nuking the other party.
At which point, escalating threats diminishes your position, and credibility. No one would be surprised if Russia could detonate a nuclear weapon on its own territory. They've had the ability to do that for generations. Nuking yourself instead of the enemy after they go 'we're not afraid of you' doesn't make them afraid of you.
Now, there are other aspects as well, such as 'why not do a demonstration test in Ukraine?' Aside from the above, foreign pressures applied as well. In so much that it would be an escalation, it's not an escalation any of Russia's key foreign partners is interested in supporting. The likes of China and India are already generally relating 'support' to 'not joining on the European sanctions', but they also have their own very real nuclear proliferation concerns in their neighborhood. If Russia WERE to attempt nuclear blackmail, actually succeeding would be very bad for the strategic interests of most of their partners- China could see Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan go nuclear within a year, India has always had Pakistan and it's regional proliferation risks, and even actual-supporter Iran could see Saudi go nuclear. No one for whom nuclear proliferation is a regional concern wants Russia to facilitate it.
There's also a less academic, but also less provable, third option, which was that the Americans and British threatened a conventional intervention in Ukraine if Russia used nukes in Ukraine.
What happened in Ukraine is as if the January 6 protestors were much more numerous, armed, and violent; if the Capitol police decided to side with them instead of shooting Ashley Babbit; and if they successfully terrorized Congress into installing Trump while Biden fled.
Bar the being much more armed, much more violet, terrorizing Congress, or installing Trump-analog.
When the democratically elected president is chased out of office by a violent mob of his political enemies, that is the central example of a coup.
Only if you redefine a coup away from a "sudden, violent, and unlawful seizure of power from a government, often by the military" to a different space to cover "imminent legislature legal action against sudden, violent, and unlawful use of government power to kill citizens at foreign behest, which the military refused to participate in."
At the end of the day, it was the Ukrainian interior ministry that was deploying snipers even before they issued a decree to start shooting protestors in mass, and it wasn't the Rada that was supporting that escalation, but Russia. As far as own-goals, a pretty bad one by Putin in a series of own-goals, but that's what happens when you very publicly sanction the a country and play with aid-bribes to drive crackdown escalation.
I provided a personal view on Putin's goal at this point, but in short Putin is doubling-down on a long-running effort to try and create a fundamental rift / break in the western alliance system aimed at getting Germany to break ranks with the west, while trying to fully occupy the administrative boundaries of the Donbas / the claimed areas he can to serve as basis for an armistice that Russia can start rebuilding after as the western alliance cracks over the response to Germany.
I don't think it will work, but I'd put it as something Putin would gamble on given his past many years of trying to engage or pressure Germany for various effects.
I agree with you. I don't think a Donbas offensive by Ukraine over a drive to the coast would be a good idea, but it would certainly an idea some of their more reluctant backers would prefer over any attempt at Crimea.
The Ukraine war will probably go down in military studies as an example of the power of American-led information warfare. Starting with the publicizing of the war plans to international distrust just to be validated tenfold in a repudiation of the Iraq War reputation, to the calling specific false-flag casus belli incidents before they happened, the pre-generated ghost of kyiv, the drip-drip-drip of Turkish drones hunting air defense systems that over time instead of at once, the silo-ing of Russian information space into select social media channels that could be both relatively isolated but also selectively accessed and signal boosted at will to re-represent Russian propaganda, the continuous operation of the Ukrainian information space via private satellite systems, the open recording and re-broadcasting of Russian comms, the use of satellite imagery to corroborate war crimes, the entire Ukrainian ministry of defense twitter channel...
A lot of these aren't strictly / just American efforts, and the Russians did their fair share of helping, but if some day I find out that Zelensky's 'I need ammo, not a ride' was scripted in advance, I will both not be terribly surprised and impressed by the level of foresight to script even that underdog story.
I agree with your assessment of the Ukrainian goals. It's their only obvious angle of attack, barring insane stuff like invading Russia itself.
Strictly speaking, they could try and sweep the eastern border before turning towards crimea, with the goal of prioritizing Donbas first and foremost. The issue here is that if the Ukrainians retook the Donbas, a lot European support would start to waver if they could get the 'back to February 2022 lines' as an armistice condition, and they might cut back support there in a way they wouldn't if Ukraine was still in a 'we're fighting to hold on!' narrative on the eastern front. Winning the east means ending the only likely European support that might make retaking crimea possible.
I am not arguing that Ukraine intended to let the Russians advance at Bahkmut, but the boomerang effect of 'the more you publicizing a heroic resistance, the more it hurts when it fails' only hurts you on the return if it actually hurts you. At this point, my read of European politics is that European support will increase, not decrease, if Russia makes advances in the Donbas, meaning the Ukrainians have a... not incentive, but silver-lining, to lean on to prioritize other efforts. While there are certainly some western advocates who would use any Ukrainian setback to argue for an armistice, these people were pretty discredited last year during the height of Russian advances, and that was before western categories of aid began to expand to heavy offensive weapon categories.
What I don't expect is to guess this year's Russian strategic goal. The rumor mill keeps saying Putin's now making all the decisions himself, like Nicholas II at the Stavka, and I haven't been able to guess his next move since 2014. The most logical move would be to pre-empt the Ukrainian offensive on the southern front by an earlier offensive of his own. But this requires a better-trained army, which Putin doesn't really have.
I hate to resort to Kreminology, but my read is that Putin has been doubling down on a bet that he can make the Europeans, but especially the Germans, stop supporting Ukraine / stop sanctioning Russia before the Russian economy starts consuming itself in earnest, or at least cause a fundamental political rift between Germany and the Atlanticist/NATO alliance.
A lot of not just last year, but the years before, suggests the Putin sees Europe, and especially Germany, as the political center of gravity for resolving Ukraine. As much as Putin's narrative has focused on NATO and the US, Putin caused the Maidan crisis as a result of German-led European influence in rising Ukraine, engaged in the Minsk talks with Germany and France, attempted to leverage Nord Stream 2 gas over Germany, threatened German government formation with the Polish-Belarus migrant crisis, tried to raise German advancement of Nord Stream 2 as the pre-war way to avoid war, attempted this winter's gas shortages to make Germany more than anyone else buckle, played to German fears to block arms shipments, and various other German-minded framings. Even the Ukrainian electricity grid targetting and the Ukrainian food disruption have arguable German-tailored narrative targeting- destroying the Ukrainian grid is a threat to the disproportionately German investments in Ukraine, a significant risk to a country whose government is as industry-interest-driven as Germany, while Ukrainian food shortage fan the flames of middle eastern migrant crisis that, well, have driven many years of German policy. This would provide a more meaningful political goal to the power grid attacks than 'hope to terrorize Ukraine into submission,' as while terror bombing has never really worked, frightening investors has.
In this read, Putin thinks he can win- or at least get a win worth continuing the pain- if he can break the German-Atlanticist alliance. If Germany and the pro-Ukraine coalition decisively split, it breaks the American-NATO alliance at a foundational level, breaks EU politics at a fundamental level, and presumably places Germany in a position to re-connect to Russia economically and break the counter-Russian alliance in the west as Germany turns from a cornerstone into a key problem who, by its mass, drags a lot of its most integrated neighbors along with it. Even if you accept you've already lost the military war, breaking your enemy coalition at least gives you time to lick your wounds.
I think this is a flawed and almost certain to fail, overestimating Russian ability to shape the perceptions of other countries, but then I have for many years said I believe Putin is a strategic mediocrity, not a strategic genius. (My expectation is that the route of pro-Russian interest groups in Europe will continue, with being 'soft on Russia' a political poison that coalition parties seek to use against eachother, and that German industrial interests will be more interested in maintaining European and American economic ties than Russian ties.)
Another line of effort for Putin, though this I'm less convinced on, is that Putin believe he can continue fighting with Chinese support. If he can frame the conflict as a major interest for China, then he might be able to get gradually progressing aid from China, to the point that he can counter the superior NATO industrial/economic support to Ukraine with industrial/economic support to Russia. This would presumably be in the form of Chinese ammunition and investments in the Russian industrial complex, not Chinese tanks, but hey, desperation.
(Again, I don't think this would work. China is pretty clearly already prioritizing European market ties over supporting Russian military success.)
Regardless, the Russian strategy since late last year, and at least the power grid attacks, has pretty clearly been political-based, not military-exclusive. The annexations were maximalist, but also a pretty clear framing device to shape subsequent negotiations, while the (lack of) Russian escalation-response following them would be a far better signal of flexibility for the negotiations than the decidedly less impressive alternative, that the Russians were seriously floating the prospect of tactical nuclear response and were shut down hard.
The flippant answer would be 'Sure, and then I watch American news media,' a more meta answer would be this is prone to non-falsifiability because 'have you ever considered that you're just wrong and being manipulated' is as much a framing question as 'have you considered not beating your wife?', and a temporal answer would be 'I'm not talking about positions after a year, but Russia-skeptic points from a year ago.' Points such as the military manning issues for occupying a country the size of Ukraine, the implications of NATO provision of weapons to those willing to resist, and the consequences of doing so for Russian positions and interests in Europe were all raised a year ago, and have stood the test of time.
I am not the entire western media ecosystem (thank god), nor have I been arguing that Russia is a joke. Doomed to failure, unable to achieve it's strategic ends, already having suffered a critical strategic defeat that it can't reverse into a meaningful triumph, yes. But not a joke.
Zelensky to run for re-election? What elections are we talking about, 90% of the parties have been banned
Only if you believe that 90% of the political parties in Ukraine were accused of being pro-Russian. Alas, this was not so, and other parties remain in place to fill their place and are interested in furthering their place in the 2024 election.
Ukrainian political parties are not static or slowly-changing alliances like in the United States or more established Western countries. Over the last decade they have functioned far more like east asian parliamentary parties, being alliances of various factions spear-headed by key influence leaders, aka oligarchs. The current 'Servant of the People' ruling party, which has 239 of the 450 seats, is not an institution like the Democratic Party, and it's not Zelensky's personal fiefdom either. It was a political alliance, the people of the alliance will, and continue to, politic for their advantage, and a way that they will engage in politics is through the maneuverings of elections, which will be used to break, shift, or reaffirm political alliances. Were it not for the war, I wouldn't have been surprised if it fractured into a dozen different parties- or gone through an incessant number of rebrandings, as most Ukraine parties have over the electoral cycles.
As stated, I believe the purges will affect pro-Russian parties (which many of your listed were associated with, accused or in fact), and that opposition will take the framework of an anti-Russian format that resists that labeling. For parties who made their pre-war reputation as being pro-Russian parties looking to improve or normalize relations with Russia, like the Opposition Platform - For Life, this was obviously a doomed sell when key members such as Rada representative Illia Kyva responded to the Russian invasion by... supporting the invasion. This was a political death sentence when the Russians were not, in fact, greeted as liberators.
But I am sure you are aware of it, just as you are aware you were citing the first month of Ukrainian politics after the invasion, and not the following ten.
Ukraine judiciary system is utterly broken and has become among other things, an active puppet of the U.S, see for example this fascinating video from Joe Biden, you'd believe it's too big and blatant to be true but no the man even brag about it, so potent!
Similarly, there's a reason why you're raising a scandal from before 2020. Which, yes, I would believe, because it was kind of a thing in the previous American presidential administration. Key word being, previous.
If you wanted to discuss more recent legal corruption dynamics in Ukraine, after all, you'd be hard pressed to raise one as more timely or relevant for the discussion as Zelensky shutting down the Kyiv District Court in December 2022 not even two months ago... a court that was notoriously corrupt, but whose closure could also, of course, be claimed to be an act of corruption.
Let's not forget "fuck EU" or the fact Biden personally said the night of the sponsored coup, to Yanukovich on the phone that it was over and he would get killed if he didn't flee to Russia.
That's an interesting claim, especially considering Yanukovich fled before he could be stripped of power by the legislature for supporting the live-firing on protestors, which is as antithetical to a coup as the meaningful definition of a coup can take it.
When your own personally appointed, Russian-educated, former communist functionary refuses to have the police shoot the protestors and sides with the elected parliament, you're facing many things but a coup is not one of them.
Zelensky actively promoted the maintenance of the corruption by recently appointing a corrupt person at the top of the top anti-corruption organism of Ukraine.
And...?
I make no claim that anti-corruption will be motivated by the goodness of the heart or by people of pure and innocent motive. I have a pretty established record of being suspicious of the sincerity of anti-corruption campaigns. It doesn't change that I expect counter-corruption campaigns to find corrupt people, while also purging the political system of pro-Russian interests and undermine anti-Zelensky coalitions.
Zelensky was elected for promising peace in the donbas but he quickly learnt the hardway that he was not the man in commands, it is the military that ruled and still rules Ukraine https://www.kyivpost.com/post/6652
The claim isn't really supported by either source, but okay.
Edit: And seems you edited in some elements since I loaded paged, or I just didn't see them.
What kind of delusion is that? Even with the west support it will slow down but not at all reverse the attrition losses.
I disagree, as the nature of attrition issues are different. Russian attrition has been diminishing it's most capable assets, to which resupply from stockpiles is bringing in less capable systems, while Ukrainian attrition has been diminishing it's least capable assets, to which resupply from western sources is bringing in more capable systems. Earlier in the war Russia had a qualitative and quantitative overmatch that was squandered in the initial offensive, but across last year the qualitiative edge has consistently dulled and quantitative advantages have decreased as well, even as the accessible Ukrainian equipment sets has expanded.
The dynamic I predict is that as the qualitative balance shifts against the Russians, their quantitative edge will give way to penetration capability by Ukrainian forces to commit specific breakthroughs, and then move in infantry with anti-armor systems more than capable of resisting counter-attacks by less capable Russian stocks.
This will not favor Ukraine, whatever that means, Ukraine because of the extreme non-linearity of the effect of attrition losses on defense capabilities, should and will stay in a defensive position with a goal of 1) reducing hardware losses and 2) slowing down russia territorial expansion, in that order of priority.
And yet, last year's campaign season ended with two Ukrainian offenses, and progressive Russian withdrawals. 'And will' is disproven, while 'should' is the quibbling point.
The Russian lines have indeed stabilized since the mobilization, but the dynamic of shortages is changing. Last year, Russia had the kit, but not the manpower. This year, Russia has the manpower, but has already lost the operational precision munition capabilities and has been steadily losing the quality kit. How much quality kit will remain next year is a question, and the answer is what determines the ability of the Ukrainians to attack, and the political payoff for doing so.
Most of their tank/IFV/aircrafts/and anti-air (S300s) budget has been spent and we have no signal they have factories running making new hardware, IIRC the T80 factories are located in Kharkiv, too close to the front.
And who's arguing on the strength of Ukrainian production?
This is why last year's increases in anti-air capability shipments, the new year's gift of tanks and IFVs, and the now-emerging discussions on aircraft is relevant. Ukraine's defensive capabilities don't derive from the Ukrainian budget- they derive from the NATO Cold War surplus, which has started opening up entirely new categories that were previously closed to them most of last year.
While russia also suffer from attrition, their existing reserves being considerably larger, they will obviously win this attritive war, unless the U.S sends tanks in the thousands at a minimum.
Thousands will be unnecessary, particularly since there's no need for Kursk 2.0. Russia can't supply all it's potential re-activated armor across the front, and Ukraine doesn't need to fight it.
What Ukrainian armor needs is the ability to penetrate Russian lines enough to compromise the artillery and allow exploitation forces to take strongpoints that infantry and precision munitions can use to defend against armor or mechanized counter-attack. Once breakthroughs are operationally possible, maneuver becomes the operational counter to artillery, and as Russian artillery precision degrades due to attrition or replacement by older and older systems, other forces become increasingly vulnerable in turn. There's a reason that the Russian advances since last april have been limited to the areas with overwhelming artillery concentration.
That's for the quantitative argument, as for the qualitative one, I have extensively debunked this ego-boosting myth in many of my past comments.
I'm sure you think so.
I dislike percentages as a means of numeric false certainty, but I'll make a few predictions.
I expect the war to continue into 2024, barring a Putin death scenario leading to a Russian withdrawal. As long as Putin lives and the Russian army is not comprehensively destroyed in the field, I do not see him withdrawing from Ukraine before a fall of Crimea, which I do not see in 2024 barring major Russian conventional defeats in eastern Ukraine.
I expect both a Russian and Ukrainian this spring after the mud-season, with Russia's prioritizing the Donbas. Ukraine's will be aimed at advancing a southern corridor to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, though it may be also/instead intended to cut at the Russian southern supply lines for the Donbas offensive.
I expect this year's Russian strategic goal to secure the administrative boundaries of the Donbas and other eastern regions, with some additional buffer as possible, before transitioning to a posture of strategic defense and trying to present fully-occupied province annexations as fait accompli and basis for armistice lines while trying to exhaust European support. I do not expect the Russians to seriously press for all the claimed annex territories, ie. reclaim Kherson, and I expect that the Russians will be unable to sustain broad-front operations despite mobilization due to attrition of precision fires and modern maneuver equipment.
I expect this year's Ukrainian strategy to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, and as possible start of a logistical siege of Crimea by the end of the year while forcing Russia to relocate forces from mid-eastern Ukraine to south-eastern. The Ukrainian goal will be to continue to attrit Russian maneuver warfare capabilities, especially in modernized mechanized and precision fires, while developing their own maneuver warfare capability.
I expect the Russians will at least temporarily cancel the agriculture shipping deal, and attempt to use the disruption to agricultural exports to pressure Europeans to reduce support for Ukraine / end Russian sanctions. I do not expect this to succeed, even as I do expect middle eastern instability as a result. The russian disruption will likely be most relevant in the context of preventing Ukrainian agriculture from being planted, even if it allows a resumption of the deal.
I expect Russian economic resiliance to sharply deteriorate by mid-year as European energy and insurance sanctions take sharper bites and the short-term Russian economic controls are extended indefinitely. I think it is possible, but not necessarily likely, that China starts subsidizing the Russian economy to allow it to sustain a long-term war footing, including monetary loans and sale of ammunition. I expect Putin to continue the war regardless of economic deterioration, or Chinese (and other) terms of sale.
I expect European willingness to continue to support Ukraine economically to continue. Opportunistic actors like Orban will leverage vetos on Ukrainian aid to enable their position, but current political dynamics continue to make it easier for European states to leverage that for moderating sanctions for compromises than to simply block Ukrainian support. In key European nations (Germany, Italy, and France), pro-Russian political interests will remain easy political targets for domestic political rivals, meaning that pro-Russian coalition politics will continue to be undermined or sold out on case-by-case benefits.
I expect NATO countries to consider expanding aircraft support in earnest this summer, based on the results of the Spring offensives. I expect pressures and war economics will support drones over manned air-superiority fighters. If a fighter is sent, it will likely be in the role of a missile-bus for long-range fires.
I expect that Zelensky will continue to remain in power in Ukraine, barring an assassination. I expect Zelensky to use the context of the war, western pressures, and European Union ascession criteria to justify counter-corruption purges of the Ukrainian government. These will likely catch genuinely corrupt officials, but also have secondary effects of functionally purging suspected pro-Russian oligarchs, and undermine the formation of a counter-Zelensky oligarch coalition party. Opposition parties in the 2024 election will most likely form behind other war leaders/heroes on an anti-Russian axis, not in a pro-Russian fifth columnist, and direct criticism of Zelensky (barring personal scandal) will be muted.
I expect Zelensky to run for re-election, and to be the leading candidate bar personal involvement in corruption scandals. I expect end-of-year strategic priorities (during the next winter/mud season) to be the increased defense of, or attempt to liberate, a 'major' urban area in order to include it in the March 2024 election process.
I expect NATO weapon shipments to hit a qualitative and quantitative critical mass by late 2023 that makes Ukraine favored/expected to launch an offensive, in the early 2024, barring escalating Chinese support for Russia in the form of material.
I do not expect any nuclear weapon use.
While I may have gotten the initial invasion call wrong, Overall I feel like my priors have been pretty well vindicated. I also can't help but take a bit of perverse pride/schadenfreude in noticing that a lot of those users who were giving me shit for predicting anything less than total Russian victory back in March and April, IE Cimafara, Motteposting, Difficult_Ad, BearJew, april_6th_1488_bc (or whatever the exact date was) have all either deleted their accounts or been silent on the topic since.
Solely for the sake of balance, I was going to note that sansampersamp also had dropped off, but then here they are.
I do think an amount of this has more to do with the community migration from reddit than Ulterior Motives, but also general evaporative cooling. Things that might have been more justifiable to believe 7-8 months ago are less so now, and so people dropping their previous positions should, hopefully, be what we'd expect.
Overall, I think the Russia-skeptic takes from the early war have been most validated, and continue to be generally reliable. That's not the same as the Ukraine-uber-allies, but Russia Stronk memeplex has been thoroughly discredited to 'maybe Russia still wins, technically, by exhaustion' in most of the internet.
I can tell you that the mod team, and I personally, have not intentionally chosen to prioritize retaining/growing membership over consistent rules enforcement. Believe me or do not, but I strive to be consistent and even-handed, and I believe the other mods do too. Maybe you think we're all terrible at it, but you are definitely mischaracterizing our motives.
I do believe you try to. I also believe you are fallible, and susceptible to the same sort of biases that people like to think themselves above. I also know that mods have regularly appealed to personal subjectivity towards those they moderate as they do.
I do believe you try to be even-handed, I challenge that even-handed is subordinated to other concerns, and I base this off of mod comments in ban-posts or kicks which elaborating why certain degrees are inflicted. The words to use them may change- 'not becoming an echo chamber' or 'don't want to drive away key counter-balances' or 'you were a good poster and we'd like to be again"- but past compromises compromise future credibility.
I am kind of curious in what way you think we do not enforce the rules consistently, but I fear it will boil down to "Ban the people I think should be banned, and don't ban the people I don't think should be banned," because it always does.
Of course it does, you made a truism of a generality. Nobody goes 'ban the people I don't think should be banned,' because it creates a paradox. This is what I mean by mods not being above logical failures when under their subjective presence.
But, if that feels too confrontational, let me ask a question in turn-
Amadan, how many times in all my years at the Motte have I ever reported someone asking for them to be banned?
There are people I think are bad faith actors and poisonous to the environment whom I would boot in a heartbeat if we took the more expeditious route you are suggesting. But I am fairly certain you'd find at least some of my choices objectionable.
Certainly. But the point of a legitimate justice system isn't being non-objectionable, it's being consistent/credible and legitimate. The conflation is why I believe there is a breakdown, and interjects the biases I was mentioning before.
Just to pick at this a bit, if I understand your argument here, it's basically that we let terrible people like Darwin and Julius (and ymeskhout, apparently)
Or me. I am well aware that geopolitics is a hobby horse.
run amok until they drive good posters away.
Not drive them away- drive them into not responding to them.
When you have a mix of 'good' posters (those who will only respond in accordance to the rules) and 'bad' posters (those who will respond emotionally, and at risk of the rules) facing a 'nasty' poster (who is not going to change or engage in good faith), the 'good' posters will avoid risk by disengaging. By ratios alone, that makes bad posters a larger share of the remainder, which in turn changes the dynamics of reporting and perception of bad posters, because rather than one bad poster against many good and a few bad, it becomes one bad against many bad and now even-handedness rears it's ugly head because what does 'even handed' mean in practice when dealing with one-vs-many? It certainly doesn't often mean joining in with the unsightly crowd.
This is the environment which drives people away- where dogpiling is very obviously occuring on unpopular positions by obstinant people, where the optics are of mods taking greater actions against those objecting to those in bad faith than against the actors they will eventually ban anyway, where good-faith engagement is hard to find because the good-faith opponents left and the remainder are the sort motivated by emotion, and where even-handedness struggles to handle two different sorts of 'bad'.
This is not the worst environment, or even a worse environment than alternatives, but is the climate of the motte when unmoving bad-faith arguments are raised time and time again.
There may be some truth to this (in that I'm sure that all those individuals have driven some people away, some of whom might have been good posters). On the other hand, the people often mentioned as "good posters who were driven away" are people like trannyporn (on one end of the spectrum) or Impassionata (on the other). Do you think any of the people complaining about all the people driven away by so many threads about HBD and Jews and progressives-are-cancer might have a point as well?
I absolutely think they have a point, and encourage them to make it- because I believe the mods have a point to, in that a key purpose of this forum is how to argue, not what to argue. This is not a curated garden of harmony, this is a moderated battleground. Siege warfare is our literal visual metaphor, and the motte is for defending points under challenge.
Points are not to be dismissed from consideration, they are to be defeated. Even if people are being driven away by HBD and Jews and progressives-are-cancer... so what? What would you do differently if that were true, that you would not do despite it being true?
Is this the "You give leftists extra slack to try to cultivate ideological diversity" argument again? Because I recall one time when Zorba said something like "Yes, we have a problem keeping leftists around and so we might sometimes go easier on a lefty who's taking a lot of flack," and for years since y'all have beaten that particular horse to death. I can tell you that at present, there is definitely no intentional extra slack given to left-leaning posters.
Whether there is an intention is irrelevant to whether there is, because, again, biases and other concerns and how subjective things get framed in the context of incentives other contextual priorities. And, of course, prior interest such an intention, even if it's not formal (or even informal) policy at the present.
His own litigative tactic here is more Julius-like, if anything. Actual failings of ymeskhout that are brought forth as evidence of the Julius pattern range from trivial (editing in and out some catty remarks), to highly contestable, to apparently disingenuous (everything about failures to engage with criticism in previous rounds).
To clarify the last for you, I made a judgement call around 2020 that direct topic exchanges with ymeskhout were unwarranted due to his habit of misrepresenting other people's positions and ignoring previously provided arguments. The topics at the time were cases involving the 2020 election, but the behavioral trend was more general. In a thread where multiple examples were pointed to of past examples of this (including by other posters), I wrote a long-form post explaining why I found further engagement with him (providing more engaged arguments and sources) pointless due to the faith demonstrated, and would no longer provide that level of engagement going forward. This followed up with another effort post elaborating the point on the more abstract level, and have referred to it since as to why I don't engage with ymeskhout on his post subjects anymore, but limit myself to discussion of his conduct.
The disingenuous charge against me comes from ymeskhout accuses me of not explaining my refusal to engage with him. The disingenuous charge by me is that I refer ymeskhout back to the effort post thread where I explained what I found lacking and why I found him to be acting in bad faith... which then comes to the next cycle, when ymekshout will claim for the audience that I've never provided him the reasons why.
Given that the 2020 posting was a (multi-post) effort explanation why, with both concerete and abstract reasons, and ymeskhout has repeatedly linked back to the post since (but in a way that hides the object-level objection trend from the later follow-on), I find the the accusation of not providing prior explanations why disengenuous, and demonstrative of the dishonesty (of both mis-representing positions and and the existence/nature of prior engagements) I maintain my stance of. At this point I know he knows where to find the previous position, he knows I know he knows where the previous position... and every iteration of this, he will complain that I still have not provided him my position, and I will counter that he is demonstrating the reason why I will not engage.
Me being the disingenuous one is certainly a credible enough charge to those unaware, and why I consider his objections performative at this point as part of the charge of misrepresenting other people's previous positions for current arguments, but this is also why I openly accuse him of lying, and have not recanted it despite mod warnings to not do so lightly.
Take viewpoint bias for what it is, of course, but from my position I've always been frank to the point of risking mod censure on why I will not engage ynekshout in a counter-argument form anymore- because I find him habitually dishonest when representing other people's arguments, present and past, ranging from their stance to their existence (and effort-spent) in previous engagements.
Okay, cool, so is your complaint that he's attacking Trump in an unprincipled fashion, or that he took a poke at nybbler in the process? Because I have some sympathy for the latter complaint (and believe me, it's hard for me to muster any sympathy where nybbler is concerned), but for the former, I have none, because whether or not I agree with your criticisms, this is exactly the kind of argument that is the Motte's bread and butter.
Solely Nybbler and the edit-trolling, and I have made no request or advocacy for mod action against even that.
As mentioned in a different post, I try to no longer engage ymeshkout on top-level post topics due to my judgement of him as a bad-faith actor in iterative engagements. I don't use block lists as a general principle, so the primary instances I respond are when he [insert potentially imprecise but generally negative action] other posters.
I'm trying to read and understand what you're writing to the best of my abilities. I'm just asking "what am I missing?" and it's not helpful for you to play a game of riddles.
What you are missing is the character qualities to acknowledge previous arguments provided to you without misrepresenting them or outright pretending they do not exist at a later argument.
This is not a riddle- this is a description of why I deem you to operate in bad faith.
It doesn't make sense why you'd waste so much time and energy evading questions with purportedly trivially obvious answers.
Because I deem you to operates in bad faith and as the sort of person who pretends previous engagements did not happen. You used to link to the long-form, which itself followed a thread in which characteristic examples were identified.

They may be nebulous, but they are nebulous concepts held by the allies, not the speaker. Which American ally has indicated they hold the view ascribed to them in the hypothetical?
As-is, no indication was given that any sane ally actually held the view, as opposed to a projection that 'sane allies' would agree with the speaker's framing. This is disputed, because the questions evidenced a lack of perspective that allies would consider relevant.
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