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Since it seems that the situation has settled into another quite period while the sides sort their shit out, any other other DISGUSTING GEAR FUCKERS want to make predictions about the Special Operation?
Last time, I did better than most but still got blown the fuck out 'cause of shocking aggression from Ukraine and surprising incompetence from Russia, but Russia is running out of easy room to be incompetent and Ukraine is reaching the limits of easy aggression.
That said: Newest aid packages to Ukraine add capabilities that they did not have before, eg, a tank with a computer in it that was designed after the end of the cold war that doesn't explode if you sneeze on it, and Russia just dismissed the dude that organized the super clean double retreat across the dnipro (which was shocking; I wasn't sure it would happen but if it happened I thought it would be some combination of snafu and bloodbath).
None of this might matter given the fact that Russians are settles/behind a river.
Even with all this, it seems like the war will not end for the foreseeable future baring Putin dying of cancer and maybe not even then.
95% the war continues into 2024 in some regard
GIVEN PUTIN DIES in the next 5 months: 80% the war continues into 2024 in some regard
85% the war is HOT into 2024
90% no major territorial changes in the next 1 months
70% no major territorial changes in the next 3 months
40% no major territorial changes in the next 11 months
99% no nuclear action taken by Russia over the next 11 months.
60% Ukraine gets ATACMS in the next 3 months.
I dislike percentages as a means of numeric false certainty, but I'll make a few predictions.
I expect the war to continue into 2024, barring a Putin death scenario leading to a Russian withdrawal. As long as Putin lives and the Russian army is not comprehensively destroyed in the field, I do not see him withdrawing from Ukraine before a fall of Crimea, which I do not see in 2024 barring major Russian conventional defeats in eastern Ukraine.
I expect both a Russian and Ukrainian this spring after the mud-season, with Russia's prioritizing the Donbas. Ukraine's will be aimed at advancing a southern corridor to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, though it may be also/instead intended to cut at the Russian southern supply lines for the Donbas offensive.
I expect this year's Russian strategic goal to secure the administrative boundaries of the Donbas and other eastern regions, with some additional buffer as possible, before transitioning to a posture of strategic defense and trying to present fully-occupied province annexations as fait accompli and basis for armistice lines while trying to exhaust European support. I do not expect the Russians to seriously press for all the claimed annex territories, ie. reclaim Kherson, and I expect that the Russians will be unable to sustain broad-front operations despite mobilization due to attrition of precision fires and modern maneuver equipment.
I expect this year's Ukrainian strategy to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, and as possible start of a logistical siege of Crimea by the end of the year while forcing Russia to relocate forces from mid-eastern Ukraine to south-eastern. The Ukrainian goal will be to continue to attrit Russian maneuver warfare capabilities, especially in modernized mechanized and precision fires, while developing their own maneuver warfare capability.
I expect the Russians will at least temporarily cancel the agriculture shipping deal, and attempt to use the disruption to agricultural exports to pressure Europeans to reduce support for Ukraine / end Russian sanctions. I do not expect this to succeed, even as I do expect middle eastern instability as a result. The russian disruption will likely be most relevant in the context of preventing Ukrainian agriculture from being planted, even if it allows a resumption of the deal.
I expect Russian economic resiliance to sharply deteriorate by mid-year as European energy and insurance sanctions take sharper bites and the short-term Russian economic controls are extended indefinitely. I think it is possible, but not necessarily likely, that China starts subsidizing the Russian economy to allow it to sustain a long-term war footing, including monetary loans and sale of ammunition. I expect Putin to continue the war regardless of economic deterioration, or Chinese (and other) terms of sale.
I expect European willingness to continue to support Ukraine economically to continue. Opportunistic actors like Orban will leverage vetos on Ukrainian aid to enable their position, but current political dynamics continue to make it easier for European states to leverage that for moderating sanctions for compromises than to simply block Ukrainian support. In key European nations (Germany, Italy, and France), pro-Russian political interests will remain easy political targets for domestic political rivals, meaning that pro-Russian coalition politics will continue to be undermined or sold out on case-by-case benefits.
I expect NATO countries to consider expanding aircraft support in earnest this summer, based on the results of the Spring offensives. I expect pressures and war economics will support drones over manned air-superiority fighters. If a fighter is sent, it will likely be in the role of a missile-bus for long-range fires.
I expect that Zelensky will continue to remain in power in Ukraine, barring an assassination. I expect Zelensky to use the context of the war, western pressures, and European Union ascession criteria to justify counter-corruption purges of the Ukrainian government. These will likely catch genuinely corrupt officials, but also have secondary effects of functionally purging suspected pro-Russian oligarchs, and undermine the formation of a counter-Zelensky oligarch coalition party. Opposition parties in the 2024 election will most likely form behind other war leaders/heroes on an anti-Russian axis, not in a pro-Russian fifth columnist, and direct criticism of Zelensky (barring personal scandal) will be muted.
I expect Zelensky to run for re-election, and to be the leading candidate bar personal involvement in corruption scandals. I expect end-of-year strategic priorities (during the next winter/mud season) to be the increased defense of, or attempt to liberate, a 'major' urban area in order to include it in the March 2024 election process.
I expect NATO weapon shipments to hit a qualitative and quantitative critical mass by late 2023 that makes Ukraine favored/expected to launch an offensive, in the early 2024, barring escalating Chinese support for Russia in the form of material.
I do not expect any nuclear weapon use.
I like numbers and no explanations because these predictions are mostly for myself, and I find that putting a number on something keeps me honest. I do it with other stuff also (How likely am I to finish X by Y, how much better is my most recent effort than my previous effort, etc.)
IN any case, I mostly agree with your views, excepting:
I don't think NATO aircraft support is that likely, due to A: possible escalation and B: lack of added capacity. Anything NATO could give Ukraine that would make a difference would by definition be capable of striking WAY to far into Russia to be given off the cuff.
I don't know if Ukraine will actually try to cut off Crimea, or just maintain enough of a posture in that regard as to force Russia to protect against the possibility.
I just can't figure out what the fuck Russia expects to get out of this, unless they are just hopping that opportunities will develop if they hold on for long enough. I can't imagine that Putin has such a vice grip on the entire elite of the country they are willing to let this go on for pure personal aggrandizement.
I provided a personal view on Putin's goal at this point, but in short Putin is doubling-down on a long-running effort to try and create a fundamental rift / break in the western alliance system aimed at getting Germany to break ranks with the west, while trying to fully occupy the administrative boundaries of the Donbas / the claimed areas he can to serve as basis for an armistice that Russia can start rebuilding after as the western alliance cracks over the response to Germany.
I don't think it will work, but I'd put it as something Putin would gamble on given his past many years of trying to engage or pressure Germany for various effects.
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I agree with your assessment of the Ukrainian goals. It's their only obvious angle of attack, barring insane stuff like invading Russia itself. What I don't expect is to guess this year's Russian strategic goal. The rumor mill keeps saying Putin's now making all the decisions himself, like Nicholas II at the Stavka, and I haven't been able to guess his next move since 2014. The most logical move would be to pre-empt the Ukrainian offensive on the southern front by an earlier offensive of his own. But this requires a better-trained army, which Putin doesn't really have.
Strictly speaking, they could try and sweep the eastern border before turning towards crimea, with the goal of prioritizing Donbas first and foremost. The issue here is that if the Ukrainians retook the Donbas, a lot European support would start to waver if they could get the 'back to February 2022 lines' as an armistice condition, and they might cut back support there in a way they wouldn't if Ukraine was still in a 'we're fighting to hold on!' narrative on the eastern front. Winning the east means ending the only likely European support that might make retaking crimea possible.
I am not arguing that Ukraine intended to let the Russians advance at Bahkmut, but the boomerang effect of 'the more you publicizing a heroic resistance, the more it hurts when it fails' only hurts you on the return if it actually hurts you. At this point, my read of European politics is that European support will increase, not decrease, if Russia makes advances in the Donbas, meaning the Ukrainians have a... not incentive, but silver-lining, to lean on to prioritize other efforts. While there are certainly some western advocates who would use any Ukrainian setback to argue for an armistice, these people were pretty discredited last year during the height of Russian advances, and that was before western categories of aid began to expand to heavy offensive weapon categories.
I hate to resort to Kreminology, but my read is that Putin has been doubling down on a bet that he can make the Europeans, but especially the Germans, stop supporting Ukraine / stop sanctioning Russia before the Russian economy starts consuming itself in earnest, or at least cause a fundamental political rift between Germany and the Atlanticist/NATO alliance.
A lot of not just last year, but the years before, suggests the Putin sees Europe, and especially Germany, as the political center of gravity for resolving Ukraine. As much as Putin's narrative has focused on NATO and the US, Putin caused the Maidan crisis as a result of German-led European influence in rising Ukraine, engaged in the Minsk talks with Germany and France, attempted to leverage Nord Stream 2 gas over Germany, threatened German government formation with the Polish-Belarus migrant crisis, tried to raise German advancement of Nord Stream 2 as the pre-war way to avoid war, attempted this winter's gas shortages to make Germany more than anyone else buckle, played to German fears to block arms shipments, and various other German-minded framings. Even the Ukrainian electricity grid targetting and the Ukrainian food disruption have arguable German-tailored narrative targeting- destroying the Ukrainian grid is a threat to the disproportionately German investments in Ukraine, a significant risk to a country whose government is as industry-interest-driven as Germany, while Ukrainian food shortage fan the flames of middle eastern migrant crisis that, well, have driven many years of German policy. This would provide a more meaningful political goal to the power grid attacks than 'hope to terrorize Ukraine into submission,' as while terror bombing has never really worked, frightening investors has.
In this read, Putin thinks he can win- or at least get a win worth continuing the pain- if he can break the German-Atlanticist alliance. If Germany and the pro-Ukraine coalition decisively split, it breaks the American-NATO alliance at a foundational level, breaks EU politics at a fundamental level, and presumably places Germany in a position to re-connect to Russia economically and break the counter-Russian alliance in the west as Germany turns from a cornerstone into a key problem who, by its mass, drags a lot of its most integrated neighbors along with it. Even if you accept you've already lost the military war, breaking your enemy coalition at least gives you time to lick your wounds.
I think this is a flawed and almost certain to fail, overestimating Russian ability to shape the perceptions of other countries, but then I have for many years said I believe Putin is a strategic mediocrity, not a strategic genius. (My expectation is that the route of pro-Russian interest groups in Europe will continue, with being 'soft on Russia' a political poison that coalition parties seek to use against eachother, and that German industrial interests will be more interested in maintaining European and American economic ties than Russian ties.)
Another line of effort for Putin, though this I'm less convinced on, is that Putin believe he can continue fighting with Chinese support. If he can frame the conflict as a major interest for China, then he might be able to get gradually progressing aid from China, to the point that he can counter the superior NATO industrial/economic support to Ukraine with industrial/economic support to Russia. This would presumably be in the form of Chinese ammunition and investments in the Russian industrial complex, not Chinese tanks, but hey, desperation.
(Again, I don't think this would work. China is pretty clearly already prioritizing European market ties over supporting Russian military success.)
Regardless, the Russian strategy since late last year, and at least the power grid attacks, has pretty clearly been political-based, not military-exclusive. The annexations were maximalist, but also a pretty clear framing device to shape subsequent negotiations, while the (lack of) Russian escalation-response following them would be a far better signal of flexibility for the negotiations than the decidedly less impressive alternative, that the Russians were seriously floating the prospect of tactical nuclear response and were shut down hard.
First of all, it would be as hard for Ukrainians to take Russia-controlled Donbass as it's hard for Russia to take Ukraine-controlled Donbass. It's a patchwork of towns and industrial zones with several well-established lines of defense. Second, if they somehow succeed, they'll have to dedicate more and more troops to guarding the border turned frontline. That's probably why they aren't really trying to retake the Starobelsk area.
I agree with you. I don't think a Donbas offensive by Ukraine over a drive to the coast would be a good idea, but it would certainly an idea some of their more reluctant backers would prefer over any attempt at Crimea.
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Zelensky to run for re-election? What elections are we talking about, 90% of the parties have been banned
Martial law in Ukraine was declared on 24 February 2022. On 15 March 2022 the Parliament deprived Opposition MP Illia Kyva of his mandate.[9]
On 20 March 2022, several political parties were suspended by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine for the period of martial law:[10][11]
Opposition Platform — For Life
Derzhava
Left Opposition
Nashi
Opposition Bloc
Party of Shariy
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
Socialist Party of Ukraine
Socialists
Union of Left Forces
Volodymyr Saldo Bloc
The property of the party and all its branches were transferred to the state.[13] The decision was open to appeal at the Supreme Court of Ukraine within 20 days.[13] At the time Opposition Platform – For Life was one of two of the 20 March 2022 suspended parties that was subject to an attempt of getting banned in court, Opposition Platform – For Life was the only party to defend and participate in the case.[13] (The other party was the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine.[67]) On 15 September 2022 the final appeal against the party's ban was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine, meaning that the party was fully banned in Ukraine.[14]
Ukraine judiciary system is utterly broken and has become among other things, an active puppet of the U.S, see for example this fascinating video from Joe Biden, you'd believe it's too big and blatant to be true but no the man even brag about it, so potent!
https://youtube.com/watch?v=azLKK0xTOFI
Let's not forget "fuck EU" or the fact Biden personally said the night of the sponsored coup, to Yanukovich on the phone that it was over and he would get killed if he didn't flee to Russia.
Zelensky actively promoted the maintenance of the corruption by recently appointing a corrupt person at the top of the top anti-corruption organism of Ukraine.
IMHO It's hard to know what is the moral compass of Zelensky but he is at best utterly powerless.
Zelensky was elected for promising peace in the donbas but he quickly learnt the hardway that he was not the man in commands, it is the military that ruled and still rules Ukraine https://www.kyivpost.com/post/6652
https://youtube.com/watch?v=SIaTAnhgMT4
What kind of delusion is that? Even with the west support it will slow down but not at all reverse the attrition losses.
This will not favor Ukraine, whatever that means, Ukraine because of the extreme non-linearity of the effect of attrition losses on defense capabilities, should and will stay in a defensive position with a goal of 1) reducing hardware losses and 2) slowing down russia territorial expansion, in that order of priority.
Most of their tank/IFV/aircrafts/and anti-air (S300s) budget has been spent and we have no signal they have factories running making new hardware, IIRC the T80 factories are located in Kharkiv, too close to the front.
While russia also suffer from attrition, their existing reserves being considerably larger, they will obviously win this attritive war, unless the U.S sends tanks in the thousands at a minimum.
That's for the quantitative argument, as for the qualitative one, I have extensively debunked this ego-boosting myth in many of my past comments.
"The Opposition Bloc - For Life (OPZZh) was lead by Yuriy Boyko and had 25 members in the Verkhovna Rada. In order to comply with sanctions against Russia after the invasion, OPZZh had to dissolve itself and immediately reform as a new party with a different funding structure. The party is now called Platform for Life and Peace (PLP) and has the same members in the Verkhovna Rada as before, including Yuriy Boyko. The opposition politicians all still have their seats, nobody was banned."
https://old.reddit.com/r/NAFO/comments/101c3rw/how_to_respond_to_claims_that_zelensky_banned/
Yes that's a source with a clear anti-Russian bias, but you ban parties with funding from Russia but allow the same people in a formally different organization to have the same ideas, same structure, same leadership, same people in office, ext, and don't block then from running for office, you still can have free and fair elections, and the ideas and groups that were "banned" still get to participate in that election.
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Only if you believe that 90% of the political parties in Ukraine were accused of being pro-Russian. Alas, this was not so, and other parties remain in place to fill their place and are interested in furthering their place in the 2024 election.
Ukrainian political parties are not static or slowly-changing alliances like in the United States or more established Western countries. Over the last decade they have functioned far more like east asian parliamentary parties, being alliances of various factions spear-headed by key influence leaders, aka oligarchs. The current 'Servant of the People' ruling party, which has 239 of the 450 seats, is not an institution like the Democratic Party, and it's not Zelensky's personal fiefdom either. It was a political alliance, the people of the alliance will, and continue to, politic for their advantage, and a way that they will engage in politics is through the maneuverings of elections, which will be used to break, shift, or reaffirm political alliances. Were it not for the war, I wouldn't have been surprised if it fractured into a dozen different parties- or gone through an incessant number of rebrandings, as most Ukraine parties have over the electoral cycles.
As stated, I believe the purges will affect pro-Russian parties (which many of your listed were associated with, accused or in fact), and that opposition will take the framework of an anti-Russian format that resists that labeling. For parties who made their pre-war reputation as being pro-Russian parties looking to improve or normalize relations with Russia, like the Opposition Platform - For Life, this was obviously a doomed sell when key members such as Rada representative Illia Kyva responded to the Russian invasion by... supporting the invasion. This was a political death sentence when the Russians were not, in fact, greeted as liberators.
But I am sure you are aware of it, just as you are aware you were citing the first month of Ukrainian politics after the invasion, and not the following ten.
Similarly, there's a reason why you're raising a scandal from before 2020. Which, yes, I would believe, because it was kind of a thing in the previous American presidential administration. Key word being, previous.
If you wanted to discuss more recent legal corruption dynamics in Ukraine, after all, you'd be hard pressed to raise one as more timely or relevant for the discussion as Zelensky shutting down the Kyiv District Court in December 2022 not even two months ago... a court that was notoriously corrupt, but whose closure could also, of course, be claimed to be an act of corruption.
That's an interesting claim, especially considering Yanukovich fled before he could be stripped of power by the legislature for supporting the live-firing on protestors, which is as antithetical to a coup as the meaningful definition of a coup can take it.
When your own personally appointed, Russian-educated, former communist functionary refuses to have the police shoot the protestors and sides with the elected parliament, you're facing many things but a coup is not one of them.
And...?
I make no claim that anti-corruption will be motivated by the goodness of the heart or by people of pure and innocent motive. I have a pretty established record of being suspicious of the sincerity of anti-corruption campaigns. It doesn't change that I expect counter-corruption campaigns to find corrupt people, while also purging the political system of pro-Russian interests and undermine anti-Zelensky coalitions.
The claim isn't really supported by either source, but okay.
Edit: And seems you edited in some elements since I loaded paged, or I just didn't see them.
I disagree, as the nature of attrition issues are different. Russian attrition has been diminishing it's most capable assets, to which resupply from stockpiles is bringing in less capable systems, while Ukrainian attrition has been diminishing it's least capable assets, to which resupply from western sources is bringing in more capable systems. Earlier in the war Russia had a qualitative and quantitative overmatch that was squandered in the initial offensive, but across last year the qualitiative edge has consistently dulled and quantitative advantages have decreased as well, even as the accessible Ukrainian equipment sets has expanded.
The dynamic I predict is that as the qualitative balance shifts against the Russians, their quantitative edge will give way to penetration capability by Ukrainian forces to commit specific breakthroughs, and then move in infantry with anti-armor systems more than capable of resisting counter-attacks by less capable Russian stocks.
And yet, last year's campaign season ended with two Ukrainian offenses, and progressive Russian withdrawals. 'And will' is disproven, while 'should' is the quibbling point.
The Russian lines have indeed stabilized since the mobilization, but the dynamic of shortages is changing. Last year, Russia had the kit, but not the manpower. This year, Russia has the manpower, but has already lost the operational precision munition capabilities and has been steadily losing the quality kit. How much quality kit will remain next year is a question, and the answer is what determines the ability of the Ukrainians to attack, and the political payoff for doing so.
And who's arguing on the strength of Ukrainian production?
This is why last year's increases in anti-air capability shipments, the new year's gift of tanks and IFVs, and the now-emerging discussions on aircraft is relevant. Ukraine's defensive capabilities don't derive from the Ukrainian budget- they derive from the NATO Cold War surplus, which has started opening up entirely new categories that were previously closed to them most of last year.
Thousands will be unnecessary, particularly since there's no need for Kursk 2.0. Russia can't supply all it's potential re-activated armor across the front, and Ukraine doesn't need to fight it.
What Ukrainian armor needs is the ability to penetrate Russian lines enough to compromise the artillery and allow exploitation forces to take strongpoints that infantry and precision munitions can use to defend against armor or mechanized counter-attack. Once breakthroughs are operationally possible, maneuver becomes the operational counter to artillery, and as Russian artillery precision degrades due to attrition or replacement by older and older systems, other forces become increasingly vulnerable in turn. There's a reason that the Russian advances since last april have been limited to the areas with overwhelming artillery concentration.
I'm sure you think so.
What happened in Ukraine is as if the January 6 protestors were much more numerous, armed, and violent; if the Capitol police decided to side with them instead of shooting Ashley Babbit; and if they successfully terrorized Congress into installing Trump while Biden fled.
When the democratically elected president is chased out of office by a violent mob of his political enemies, that is the central example of a coup.
Bar the being much more armed, much more violet, terrorizing Congress, or installing Trump-analog.
Only if you redefine a coup away from a "sudden, violent, and unlawful seizure of power from a government, often by the military" to a different space to cover "imminent legislature legal action against sudden, violent, and unlawful use of government power to kill citizens at foreign behest, which the military refused to participate in."
At the end of the day, it was the Ukrainian interior ministry that was deploying snipers even before they issued a decree to start shooting protestors in mass, and it wasn't the Rada that was supporting that escalation, but Russia. As far as own-goals, a pretty bad one by Putin in a series of own-goals, but that's what happens when you very publicly sanction the a country and play with aid-bribes to drive crackdown escalation.
We are citizens protesting. You are insurrectionists. They are rioting.
It's not up for debate whether the Maidan protesters were more armed and violent than the Capitol protesters. No one at the Capitol was throwing Molotov cocktails at police or throwing firebombs into the Capitol building.
For one, the 'more armed, more violent' is vis-a-vis the Ukrainian forces, not the Jan 6 protestors. For another, you seem to still be skipping over the context that the Maidan protestors were being shot at with live ammo.
The January 6 metaphor is bad in a number of ways.
The violence documented in the links I provided precedes the shooting and provides important context for why the "protesters" would be suppressed with live ammo.
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