This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.
Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.
We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:
-
Shaming.
-
Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.
-
Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.
-
Recruiting for a cause.
-
Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.
In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:
-
Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.
-
Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.
-
Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.
-
Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.
On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
Since it seems that the situation has settled into another quite period while the sides sort their shit out, any other other DISGUSTING GEAR FUCKERS want to make predictions about the Special Operation?
Last time, I did better than most but still got blown the fuck out 'cause of shocking aggression from Ukraine and surprising incompetence from Russia, but Russia is running out of easy room to be incompetent and Ukraine is reaching the limits of easy aggression.
That said: Newest aid packages to Ukraine add capabilities that they did not have before, eg, a tank with a computer in it that was designed after the end of the cold war that doesn't explode if you sneeze on it, and Russia just dismissed the dude that organized the super clean double retreat across the dnipro (which was shocking; I wasn't sure it would happen but if it happened I thought it would be some combination of snafu and bloodbath).
None of this might matter given the fact that Russians are settles/behind a river.
Even with all this, it seems like the war will not end for the foreseeable future baring Putin dying of cancer and maybe not even then.
95% the war continues into 2024 in some regard
GIVEN PUTIN DIES in the next 5 months: 80% the war continues into 2024 in some regard
85% the war is HOT into 2024
90% no major territorial changes in the next 1 months
70% no major territorial changes in the next 3 months
40% no major territorial changes in the next 11 months
99% no nuclear action taken by Russia over the next 11 months.
60% Ukraine gets ATACMS in the next 3 months.
that seems quite high
unless you mean that 20% if for every single Russian soldier leaving Ukraine and avoiding even border accidents
I mean count Russia pulling back to 2013 and saying "The special operation has ended in glorious victory/ was a boondoggle of the last guy/ never happened" or complete collapse of Ukraine's organized armed resistance as the war being over.
Or a negotiated settlement, but I rate that as only slightly more likely than the nukes going off.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Something I never understood is why Russia hasn’t taken any nuclear action. Last year there seemed to be very serious concerns that Russia would do something nuclear and now they don’t even seem to threatening nearly as much or as loudly. What happened? I was strongly expecting them to preform a nuclear test or some other demonstration, I’m delighted that they didn’t, but find it hugely suspicious that this issue just seemed to evaporate over night.
Those (extremally specific!) fears were deeply unserious, form unserious people.
Russia has a doctrine that describes their planned use of nukes, with redlines at various stages which the special operation has not come close to reaching.
So, we are still in the general miasma of horrifying near apocalypse instead of at risk of any specific apocalypse.
More options
Context Copy link
The most relevant reason is that most 'serious concerns' about Russian nuclear use are Westerner media projections, not Russian claims or actual threats. Russia does have a nuclear use doctrine, and 'use in case of battlefield setbacks' isn't a part of it. Russian nuclear doctrine is far more of 'deterrence or survival of state' thresholds, which last year's defeats were nowhere close to.
Now, Russia has regularly tried to stoke / exploit such fears for diplomatic / negotiation leverage, and that was probably a consideration in the annexation announcement late last year, but in the Putin era Russia doesn't make nuclear threats or nuclear bluffs, it simply publicizes some nuclear alert level or nuclear-capable missile (ie, a missile) and let's the west project whatever it will. This sort of bluff-that-isn't-made is entirely dependent on the audience caring, however, and if they don't, then escalating threats- even a demonstration test- just underscores that your bluff has been called and you are not, in fact, nuking the other party.
At which point, escalating threats diminishes your position, and credibility. No one would be surprised if Russia could detonate a nuclear weapon on its own territory. They've had the ability to do that for generations. Nuking yourself instead of the enemy after they go 'we're not afraid of you' doesn't make them afraid of you.
Now, there are other aspects as well, such as 'why not do a demonstration test in Ukraine?' Aside from the above, foreign pressures applied as well. In so much that it would be an escalation, it's not an escalation any of Russia's key foreign partners is interested in supporting. The likes of China and India are already generally relating 'support' to 'not joining on the European sanctions', but they also have their own very real nuclear proliferation concerns in their neighborhood. If Russia WERE to attempt nuclear blackmail, actually succeeding would be very bad for the strategic interests of most of their partners- China could see Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan go nuclear within a year, India has always had Pakistan and it's regional proliferation risks, and even actual-supporter Iran could see Saudi go nuclear. No one for whom nuclear proliferation is a regional concern wants Russia to facilitate it.
There's also a less academic, but also less provable, third option, which was that the Americans and British threatened a conventional intervention in Ukraine if Russia used nukes in Ukraine.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Where do you get your information to form a guess of what is happening in the Russia-Ukraine war or inside Russia itself?
Blogs, reporting from dudes in Ukraine, Russian telegram, discussion of other autists like myself who love tanks way to much, etc.
Basically, the general zeitgeist of the security nerd crowd.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
I dislike percentages as a means of numeric false certainty, but I'll make a few predictions.
I expect the war to continue into 2024, barring a Putin death scenario leading to a Russian withdrawal. As long as Putin lives and the Russian army is not comprehensively destroyed in the field, I do not see him withdrawing from Ukraine before a fall of Crimea, which I do not see in 2024 barring major Russian conventional defeats in eastern Ukraine.
I expect both a Russian and Ukrainian this spring after the mud-season, with Russia's prioritizing the Donbas. Ukraine's will be aimed at advancing a southern corridor to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, though it may be also/instead intended to cut at the Russian southern supply lines for the Donbas offensive.
I expect this year's Russian strategic goal to secure the administrative boundaries of the Donbas and other eastern regions, with some additional buffer as possible, before transitioning to a posture of strategic defense and trying to present fully-occupied province annexations as fait accompli and basis for armistice lines while trying to exhaust European support. I do not expect the Russians to seriously press for all the claimed annex territories, ie. reclaim Kherson, and I expect that the Russians will be unable to sustain broad-front operations despite mobilization due to attrition of precision fires and modern maneuver equipment.
I expect this year's Ukrainian strategy to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, and as possible start of a logistical siege of Crimea by the end of the year while forcing Russia to relocate forces from mid-eastern Ukraine to south-eastern. The Ukrainian goal will be to continue to attrit Russian maneuver warfare capabilities, especially in modernized mechanized and precision fires, while developing their own maneuver warfare capability.
I expect the Russians will at least temporarily cancel the agriculture shipping deal, and attempt to use the disruption to agricultural exports to pressure Europeans to reduce support for Ukraine / end Russian sanctions. I do not expect this to succeed, even as I do expect middle eastern instability as a result. The russian disruption will likely be most relevant in the context of preventing Ukrainian agriculture from being planted, even if it allows a resumption of the deal.
I expect Russian economic resiliance to sharply deteriorate by mid-year as European energy and insurance sanctions take sharper bites and the short-term Russian economic controls are extended indefinitely. I think it is possible, but not necessarily likely, that China starts subsidizing the Russian economy to allow it to sustain a long-term war footing, including monetary loans and sale of ammunition. I expect Putin to continue the war regardless of economic deterioration, or Chinese (and other) terms of sale.
I expect European willingness to continue to support Ukraine economically to continue. Opportunistic actors like Orban will leverage vetos on Ukrainian aid to enable their position, but current political dynamics continue to make it easier for European states to leverage that for moderating sanctions for compromises than to simply block Ukrainian support. In key European nations (Germany, Italy, and France), pro-Russian political interests will remain easy political targets for domestic political rivals, meaning that pro-Russian coalition politics will continue to be undermined or sold out on case-by-case benefits.
I expect NATO countries to consider expanding aircraft support in earnest this summer, based on the results of the Spring offensives. I expect pressures and war economics will support drones over manned air-superiority fighters. If a fighter is sent, it will likely be in the role of a missile-bus for long-range fires.
I expect that Zelensky will continue to remain in power in Ukraine, barring an assassination. I expect Zelensky to use the context of the war, western pressures, and European Union ascession criteria to justify counter-corruption purges of the Ukrainian government. These will likely catch genuinely corrupt officials, but also have secondary effects of functionally purging suspected pro-Russian oligarchs, and undermine the formation of a counter-Zelensky oligarch coalition party. Opposition parties in the 2024 election will most likely form behind other war leaders/heroes on an anti-Russian axis, not in a pro-Russian fifth columnist, and direct criticism of Zelensky (barring personal scandal) will be muted.
I expect Zelensky to run for re-election, and to be the leading candidate bar personal involvement in corruption scandals. I expect end-of-year strategic priorities (during the next winter/mud season) to be the increased defense of, or attempt to liberate, a 'major' urban area in order to include it in the March 2024 election process.
I expect NATO weapon shipments to hit a qualitative and quantitative critical mass by late 2023 that makes Ukraine favored/expected to launch an offensive, in the early 2024, barring escalating Chinese support for Russia in the form of material.
I do not expect any nuclear weapon use.
I like numbers and no explanations because these predictions are mostly for myself, and I find that putting a number on something keeps me honest. I do it with other stuff also (How likely am I to finish X by Y, how much better is my most recent effort than my previous effort, etc.)
IN any case, I mostly agree with your views, excepting:
I don't think NATO aircraft support is that likely, due to A: possible escalation and B: lack of added capacity. Anything NATO could give Ukraine that would make a difference would by definition be capable of striking WAY to far into Russia to be given off the cuff.
I don't know if Ukraine will actually try to cut off Crimea, or just maintain enough of a posture in that regard as to force Russia to protect against the possibility.
I just can't figure out what the fuck Russia expects to get out of this, unless they are just hopping that opportunities will develop if they hold on for long enough. I can't imagine that Putin has such a vice grip on the entire elite of the country they are willing to let this go on for pure personal aggrandizement.
I provided a personal view on Putin's goal at this point, but in short Putin is doubling-down on a long-running effort to try and create a fundamental rift / break in the western alliance system aimed at getting Germany to break ranks with the west, while trying to fully occupy the administrative boundaries of the Donbas / the claimed areas he can to serve as basis for an armistice that Russia can start rebuilding after as the western alliance cracks over the response to Germany.
I don't think it will work, but I'd put it as something Putin would gamble on given his past many years of trying to engage or pressure Germany for various effects.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
I agree with your assessment of the Ukrainian goals. It's their only obvious angle of attack, barring insane stuff like invading Russia itself. What I don't expect is to guess this year's Russian strategic goal. The rumor mill keeps saying Putin's now making all the decisions himself, like Nicholas II at the Stavka, and I haven't been able to guess his next move since 2014. The most logical move would be to pre-empt the Ukrainian offensive on the southern front by an earlier offensive of his own. But this requires a better-trained army, which Putin doesn't really have.
Strictly speaking, they could try and sweep the eastern border before turning towards crimea, with the goal of prioritizing Donbas first and foremost. The issue here is that if the Ukrainians retook the Donbas, a lot European support would start to waver if they could get the 'back to February 2022 lines' as an armistice condition, and they might cut back support there in a way they wouldn't if Ukraine was still in a 'we're fighting to hold on!' narrative on the eastern front. Winning the east means ending the only likely European support that might make retaking crimea possible.
I am not arguing that Ukraine intended to let the Russians advance at Bahkmut, but the boomerang effect of 'the more you publicizing a heroic resistance, the more it hurts when it fails' only hurts you on the return if it actually hurts you. At this point, my read of European politics is that European support will increase, not decrease, if Russia makes advances in the Donbas, meaning the Ukrainians have a... not incentive, but silver-lining, to lean on to prioritize other efforts. While there are certainly some western advocates who would use any Ukrainian setback to argue for an armistice, these people were pretty discredited last year during the height of Russian advances, and that was before western categories of aid began to expand to heavy offensive weapon categories.
I hate to resort to Kreminology, but my read is that Putin has been doubling down on a bet that he can make the Europeans, but especially the Germans, stop supporting Ukraine / stop sanctioning Russia before the Russian economy starts consuming itself in earnest, or at least cause a fundamental political rift between Germany and the Atlanticist/NATO alliance.
A lot of not just last year, but the years before, suggests the Putin sees Europe, and especially Germany, as the political center of gravity for resolving Ukraine. As much as Putin's narrative has focused on NATO and the US, Putin caused the Maidan crisis as a result of German-led European influence in rising Ukraine, engaged in the Minsk talks with Germany and France, attempted to leverage Nord Stream 2 gas over Germany, threatened German government formation with the Polish-Belarus migrant crisis, tried to raise German advancement of Nord Stream 2 as the pre-war way to avoid war, attempted this winter's gas shortages to make Germany more than anyone else buckle, played to German fears to block arms shipments, and various other German-minded framings. Even the Ukrainian electricity grid targetting and the Ukrainian food disruption have arguable German-tailored narrative targeting- destroying the Ukrainian grid is a threat to the disproportionately German investments in Ukraine, a significant risk to a country whose government is as industry-interest-driven as Germany, while Ukrainian food shortage fan the flames of middle eastern migrant crisis that, well, have driven many years of German policy. This would provide a more meaningful political goal to the power grid attacks than 'hope to terrorize Ukraine into submission,' as while terror bombing has never really worked, frightening investors has.
In this read, Putin thinks he can win- or at least get a win worth continuing the pain- if he can break the German-Atlanticist alliance. If Germany and the pro-Ukraine coalition decisively split, it breaks the American-NATO alliance at a foundational level, breaks EU politics at a fundamental level, and presumably places Germany in a position to re-connect to Russia economically and break the counter-Russian alliance in the west as Germany turns from a cornerstone into a key problem who, by its mass, drags a lot of its most integrated neighbors along with it. Even if you accept you've already lost the military war, breaking your enemy coalition at least gives you time to lick your wounds.
I think this is a flawed and almost certain to fail, overestimating Russian ability to shape the perceptions of other countries, but then I have for many years said I believe Putin is a strategic mediocrity, not a strategic genius. (My expectation is that the route of pro-Russian interest groups in Europe will continue, with being 'soft on Russia' a political poison that coalition parties seek to use against eachother, and that German industrial interests will be more interested in maintaining European and American economic ties than Russian ties.)
Another line of effort for Putin, though this I'm less convinced on, is that Putin believe he can continue fighting with Chinese support. If he can frame the conflict as a major interest for China, then he might be able to get gradually progressing aid from China, to the point that he can counter the superior NATO industrial/economic support to Ukraine with industrial/economic support to Russia. This would presumably be in the form of Chinese ammunition and investments in the Russian industrial complex, not Chinese tanks, but hey, desperation.
(Again, I don't think this would work. China is pretty clearly already prioritizing European market ties over supporting Russian military success.)
Regardless, the Russian strategy since late last year, and at least the power grid attacks, has pretty clearly been political-based, not military-exclusive. The annexations were maximalist, but also a pretty clear framing device to shape subsequent negotiations, while the (lack of) Russian escalation-response following them would be a far better signal of flexibility for the negotiations than the decidedly less impressive alternative, that the Russians were seriously floating the prospect of tactical nuclear response and were shut down hard.
First of all, it would be as hard for Ukrainians to take Russia-controlled Donbass as it's hard for Russia to take Ukraine-controlled Donbass. It's a patchwork of towns and industrial zones with several well-established lines of defense. Second, if they somehow succeed, they'll have to dedicate more and more troops to guarding the border turned frontline. That's probably why they aren't really trying to retake the Starobelsk area.
I agree with you. I don't think a Donbas offensive by Ukraine over a drive to the coast would be a good idea, but it would certainly an idea some of their more reluctant backers would prefer over any attempt at Crimea.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Zelensky to run for re-election? What elections are we talking about, 90% of the parties have been banned
Martial law in Ukraine was declared on 24 February 2022. On 15 March 2022 the Parliament deprived Opposition MP Illia Kyva of his mandate.[9]
On 20 March 2022, several political parties were suspended by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine for the period of martial law:[10][11]
Opposition Platform — For Life
Derzhava
Left Opposition
Nashi
Opposition Bloc
Party of Shariy
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
Socialist Party of Ukraine
Socialists
Union of Left Forces
Volodymyr Saldo Bloc
The property of the party and all its branches were transferred to the state.[13] The decision was open to appeal at the Supreme Court of Ukraine within 20 days.[13] At the time Opposition Platform – For Life was one of two of the 20 March 2022 suspended parties that was subject to an attempt of getting banned in court, Opposition Platform – For Life was the only party to defend and participate in the case.[13] (The other party was the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine.[67]) On 15 September 2022 the final appeal against the party's ban was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine, meaning that the party was fully banned in Ukraine.[14]
Ukraine judiciary system is utterly broken and has become among other things, an active puppet of the U.S, see for example this fascinating video from Joe Biden, you'd believe it's too big and blatant to be true but no the man even brag about it, so potent!
https://youtube.com/watch?v=azLKK0xTOFI
Let's not forget "fuck EU" or the fact Biden personally said the night of the sponsored coup, to Yanukovich on the phone that it was over and he would get killed if he didn't flee to Russia.
Zelensky actively promoted the maintenance of the corruption by recently appointing a corrupt person at the top of the top anti-corruption organism of Ukraine.
IMHO It's hard to know what is the moral compass of Zelensky but he is at best utterly powerless.
Zelensky was elected for promising peace in the donbas but he quickly learnt the hardway that he was not the man in commands, it is the military that ruled and still rules Ukraine https://www.kyivpost.com/post/6652
https://youtube.com/watch?v=SIaTAnhgMT4
What kind of delusion is that? Even with the west support it will slow down but not at all reverse the attrition losses.
This will not favor Ukraine, whatever that means, Ukraine because of the extreme non-linearity of the effect of attrition losses on defense capabilities, should and will stay in a defensive position with a goal of 1) reducing hardware losses and 2) slowing down russia territorial expansion, in that order of priority.
Most of their tank/IFV/aircrafts/and anti-air (S300s) budget has been spent and we have no signal they have factories running making new hardware, IIRC the T80 factories are located in Kharkiv, too close to the front.
While russia also suffer from attrition, their existing reserves being considerably larger, they will obviously win this attritive war, unless the U.S sends tanks in the thousands at a minimum.
That's for the quantitative argument, as for the qualitative one, I have extensively debunked this ego-boosting myth in many of my past comments.
"The Opposition Bloc - For Life (OPZZh) was lead by Yuriy Boyko and had 25 members in the Verkhovna Rada. In order to comply with sanctions against Russia after the invasion, OPZZh had to dissolve itself and immediately reform as a new party with a different funding structure. The party is now called Platform for Life and Peace (PLP) and has the same members in the Verkhovna Rada as before, including Yuriy Boyko. The opposition politicians all still have their seats, nobody was banned."
https://old.reddit.com/r/NAFO/comments/101c3rw/how_to_respond_to_claims_that_zelensky_banned/
Yes that's a source with a clear anti-Russian bias, but you ban parties with funding from Russia but allow the same people in a formally different organization to have the same ideas, same structure, same leadership, same people in office, ext, and don't block then from running for office, you still can have free and fair elections, and the ideas and groups that were "banned" still get to participate in that election.
More options
Context Copy link
Only if you believe that 90% of the political parties in Ukraine were accused of being pro-Russian. Alas, this was not so, and other parties remain in place to fill their place and are interested in furthering their place in the 2024 election.
Ukrainian political parties are not static or slowly-changing alliances like in the United States or more established Western countries. Over the last decade they have functioned far more like east asian parliamentary parties, being alliances of various factions spear-headed by key influence leaders, aka oligarchs. The current 'Servant of the People' ruling party, which has 239 of the 450 seats, is not an institution like the Democratic Party, and it's not Zelensky's personal fiefdom either. It was a political alliance, the people of the alliance will, and continue to, politic for their advantage, and a way that they will engage in politics is through the maneuverings of elections, which will be used to break, shift, or reaffirm political alliances. Were it not for the war, I wouldn't have been surprised if it fractured into a dozen different parties- or gone through an incessant number of rebrandings, as most Ukraine parties have over the electoral cycles.
As stated, I believe the purges will affect pro-Russian parties (which many of your listed were associated with, accused or in fact), and that opposition will take the framework of an anti-Russian format that resists that labeling. For parties who made their pre-war reputation as being pro-Russian parties looking to improve or normalize relations with Russia, like the Opposition Platform - For Life, this was obviously a doomed sell when key members such as Rada representative Illia Kyva responded to the Russian invasion by... supporting the invasion. This was a political death sentence when the Russians were not, in fact, greeted as liberators.
But I am sure you are aware of it, just as you are aware you were citing the first month of Ukrainian politics after the invasion, and not the following ten.
Similarly, there's a reason why you're raising a scandal from before 2020. Which, yes, I would believe, because it was kind of a thing in the previous American presidential administration. Key word being, previous.
If you wanted to discuss more recent legal corruption dynamics in Ukraine, after all, you'd be hard pressed to raise one as more timely or relevant for the discussion as Zelensky shutting down the Kyiv District Court in December 2022 not even two months ago... a court that was notoriously corrupt, but whose closure could also, of course, be claimed to be an act of corruption.
That's an interesting claim, especially considering Yanukovich fled before he could be stripped of power by the legislature for supporting the live-firing on protestors, which is as antithetical to a coup as the meaningful definition of a coup can take it.
When your own personally appointed, Russian-educated, former communist functionary refuses to have the police shoot the protestors and sides with the elected parliament, you're facing many things but a coup is not one of them.
And...?
I make no claim that anti-corruption will be motivated by the goodness of the heart or by people of pure and innocent motive. I have a pretty established record of being suspicious of the sincerity of anti-corruption campaigns. It doesn't change that I expect counter-corruption campaigns to find corrupt people, while also purging the political system of pro-Russian interests and undermine anti-Zelensky coalitions.
The claim isn't really supported by either source, but okay.
Edit: And seems you edited in some elements since I loaded paged, or I just didn't see them.
I disagree, as the nature of attrition issues are different. Russian attrition has been diminishing it's most capable assets, to which resupply from stockpiles is bringing in less capable systems, while Ukrainian attrition has been diminishing it's least capable assets, to which resupply from western sources is bringing in more capable systems. Earlier in the war Russia had a qualitative and quantitative overmatch that was squandered in the initial offensive, but across last year the qualitiative edge has consistently dulled and quantitative advantages have decreased as well, even as the accessible Ukrainian equipment sets has expanded.
The dynamic I predict is that as the qualitative balance shifts against the Russians, their quantitative edge will give way to penetration capability by Ukrainian forces to commit specific breakthroughs, and then move in infantry with anti-armor systems more than capable of resisting counter-attacks by less capable Russian stocks.
And yet, last year's campaign season ended with two Ukrainian offenses, and progressive Russian withdrawals. 'And will' is disproven, while 'should' is the quibbling point.
The Russian lines have indeed stabilized since the mobilization, but the dynamic of shortages is changing. Last year, Russia had the kit, but not the manpower. This year, Russia has the manpower, but has already lost the operational precision munition capabilities and has been steadily losing the quality kit. How much quality kit will remain next year is a question, and the answer is what determines the ability of the Ukrainians to attack, and the political payoff for doing so.
And who's arguing on the strength of Ukrainian production?
This is why last year's increases in anti-air capability shipments, the new year's gift of tanks and IFVs, and the now-emerging discussions on aircraft is relevant. Ukraine's defensive capabilities don't derive from the Ukrainian budget- they derive from the NATO Cold War surplus, which has started opening up entirely new categories that were previously closed to them most of last year.
Thousands will be unnecessary, particularly since there's no need for Kursk 2.0. Russia can't supply all it's potential re-activated armor across the front, and Ukraine doesn't need to fight it.
What Ukrainian armor needs is the ability to penetrate Russian lines enough to compromise the artillery and allow exploitation forces to take strongpoints that infantry and precision munitions can use to defend against armor or mechanized counter-attack. Once breakthroughs are operationally possible, maneuver becomes the operational counter to artillery, and as Russian artillery precision degrades due to attrition or replacement by older and older systems, other forces become increasingly vulnerable in turn. There's a reason that the Russian advances since last april have been limited to the areas with overwhelming artillery concentration.
I'm sure you think so.
What happened in Ukraine is as if the January 6 protestors were much more numerous, armed, and violent; if the Capitol police decided to side with them instead of shooting Ashley Babbit; and if they successfully terrorized Congress into installing Trump while Biden fled.
When the democratically elected president is chased out of office by a violent mob of his political enemies, that is the central example of a coup.
Bar the being much more armed, much more violet, terrorizing Congress, or installing Trump-analog.
Only if you redefine a coup away from a "sudden, violent, and unlawful seizure of power from a government, often by the military" to a different space to cover "imminent legislature legal action against sudden, violent, and unlawful use of government power to kill citizens at foreign behest, which the military refused to participate in."
At the end of the day, it was the Ukrainian interior ministry that was deploying snipers even before they issued a decree to start shooting protestors in mass, and it wasn't the Rada that was supporting that escalation, but Russia. As far as own-goals, a pretty bad one by Putin in a series of own-goals, but that's what happens when you very publicly sanction the a country and play with aid-bribes to drive crackdown escalation.
We are citizens protesting. You are insurrectionists. They are rioting.
It's not up for debate whether the Maidan protesters were more armed and violent than the Capitol protesters. No one at the Capitol was throwing Molotov cocktails at police or throwing firebombs into the Capitol building.
For one, the 'more armed, more violent' is vis-a-vis the Ukrainian forces, not the Jan 6 protestors. For another, you seem to still be skipping over the context that the Maidan protestors were being shot at with live ammo.
The January 6 metaphor is bad in a number of ways.
The violence documented in the links I provided precedes the shooting and provides important context for why the "protesters" would be suppressed with live ammo.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Back in January of '22 when the Russian build-up of troops along the border I stated my belief that it was likely a feint and/or just more saber-rattling because it seemed pretty clear to me that any attempt to take western Ukraine by force was likely to end badly for the Russians, and I just kind of assumed that Putin and the rest of the Russian Government/Military would've arrived at a similar conclusion.
I subsequently predicted back in April that the Russians would not be able to hold on to any of their gains west of the Dnieper and that if the war ended before the year was out it would be with Kharkiv, Kherson, and Odessa all unquestionably in Ukrainian (Euromaidan Party) hands. This was subsequently dismissed by many users here as a "bold take".
While I may have gotten the initial invasion call wrong, Overall I feel like my priors have been pretty well vindicated. I also can't help but take a bit of perverse pride/schadenfreude in noticing that a lot of those users who were giving me shit for predicting anything less than total Russian victory back in March and April, IE Cimafara, Motteposting, Difficult_Ad, BearJew, april_6th_1488_bc (or whatever the exact date was) have all either deleted their accounts or been silent on the topic since.
Solely for the sake of balance, I was going to note that sansampersamp also had dropped off, but then here they are.
I do think an amount of this has more to do with the community migration from reddit than Ulterior Motives, but also general evaporative cooling. Things that might have been more justifiable to believe 7-8 months ago are less so now, and so people dropping their previous positions should, hopefully, be what we'd expect.
Overall, I think the Russia-skeptic takes from the early war have been most validated, and continue to be generally reliable. That's not the same as the Ukraine-uber-allies, but Russia Stronk memeplex has been thoroughly discredited to 'maybe Russia still wins, technically, by exhaustion' in most of the internet.
Ackowledging I suffer from epistemic learned helplessness, have you considered that western propaganda is just that good? It’s easy to dismiss obvious propaganda in the opening weeks and months of the war. But when you have the entire western media ecosystem singing the same pro Ukraine tune for a whole year, I think most people just shrug and say “I guess Russia is a joke after all”
I’m not even saying Russia is doing well. I’m just suggesting that a year long propaganda campaign can work on even the most skeptical people.
Russia is not a joke. People kept thinking that Russian supersoldiers are 3m high supergiants. Now some think that they are stunted 1.2m high mentally-disabled midgets.
Both are wrong, Russia continues to have more soldiers and overall more weaponry. If they manage to collect themselves - then they can attrit Ukrainian army at about 1:1 ration which is highly favorable to them.
Obviously, no war at all would be even better but...
And some correction was needed, but beware of overcorrection.
More options
Context Copy link
I think most of the, shall we say, war-watching types who were not out-and-out Russia Kool-Aid drinkers concluded "I guess Russia is a joke after all" (and, contrariwise, that Ukraine is not the joke it was during Crimea) quite shortly after the initial shock phase bogged down. I've personally tried to consciously adjust my reflective Russia-is-a-joke reaction to more "neutral" several times, which has led to me underpredicting Ukrainian advances in, say, Kharkiv and Herson. Generally speaking "Russia is a joke and the specific operations they are trying will probably fail or at most result to very minor victories" has been the safest prediction throughout the war.
More options
Context Copy link
Basically what @Dean said. As one of those "blob-adjacent boomer types with a Jane's subscription" I was skeptical that the Russian Army, which prior to 2022 had not concentrated and deployed in anything larger than division strength since the early 90s, had the personnel, infrastructure, and institutional knowledge needed to pacify a country of 45 million people. I remember a conversation where a pro-Russian poster was touting the effectiveness of the "filtration camp" model in Chechnya, and asking how exactly the Russian government planned to forcibly inter, and subsequently feed/house/transport 4 - 5 million people because that was the scale of the project he was suggesting if he wanted to achieve a proportional effect. I never got an answer.
Meanwhile on the Ukrainian side, my impression just following regional politics was that 2014 had lit a fire under the asses of the Ukrainian nationalists and that the Ukrainian Government/Military had put bunch of effort in the intervening years into tamping down corruption in the armed forces and generally "getting their shit together". Accordingly I predicted that the UAF were likely a lot more capable of and willing to put up a fight than many were giving them credit for.
Finally Ukraine's growing economic and cultural ties with Poland and Romania suggested to me that popular sentiment in Ukraine was genuinely on the side of further European integration, which in turn made me skeptical of Russian claims that their troops would be welcomed as liberators anywhere outside the regions they already de facto controlled (IE Crimea and the separatist regions of the Donbass).
Near as I can tell none of these impressions can were really based on "western propaganda" or assuming that "Russia was/is a joke" they were simply extrapolations based on a combination of available information and prior-experience
More options
Context Copy link
The flippant answer would be 'Sure, and then I watch American news media,' a more meta answer would be this is prone to non-falsifiability because 'have you ever considered that you're just wrong and being manipulated' is as much a framing question as 'have you considered not beating your wife?', and a temporal answer would be 'I'm not talking about positions after a year, but Russia-skeptic points from a year ago.' Points such as the military manning issues for occupying a country the size of Ukraine, the implications of NATO provision of weapons to those willing to resist, and the consequences of doing so for Russian positions and interests in Europe were all raised a year ago, and have stood the test of time.
I am not the entire western media ecosystem (thank god), nor have I been arguing that Russia is a joke. Doomed to failure, unable to achieve it's strategic ends, already having suffered a critical strategic defeat that it can't reverse into a meaningful triumph, yes. But not a joke.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
There was a bit of a discussion back then on how it was fairly difficult to simultaneously predict that:
Russia would imminently invade
It would go incredibly poorly for them
Though the people who were well calibrated against both these were perhaps unsurprisingly, the blob and blob-adjacent boomer types with the Janes subscriptions.
In terms of credibility signals, I hardly care about Getting It Wrong as much as I do the endless cope and dissembling, claiming that the eschaton is coming the next month or the next, and how much do we really know &c &c.
Hey now, I resemble that remark.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
From an American point of view, while I'm totally sucked into supporting Ukraine and hating Russia's invasion, it's pretty nice that Russia is bleeding itself on the other side of the world with all kinds of internal tension and dissent. I have Ukrainian friends, and while I'd love to see Russia expelled immediately and peace restored, that is only a temporary reprieve from Russia's imperial ambitions. So while a grinding stalemate is terrible for Ukraine, I don't mind seeing the greatest geopolitical blunder in my lifetime be extended indefinitely to Russia's detriment.
I had honestly hoped for greater ties and reconciliation with Russia in 2005ish era. I wonder if that was truly a possibility or just foolish.
Where do you get your information to form a guess of what is happening in the Russia-Ukraine war or inside Russia itself?
/r/credibledefense daily megathreads mostly. Also /r/combatfootage has a megathread
Then you suffer from a very potent information exposure black hole, thankfully you can see the other side of the coin on https://old.reddit.com/r/UkraineRussiaReport
example of great footage probably downvoted to hell and therefore hidden on combatfootage
https://old.reddit.com/r/UkraineRussiaReport/comments/10muegb/ru_pov_a_single_russian_t72b3_with_artillery/
IMO that's a very great footage to contemplate how inept war performance is in the real world.
(not saying that Ukraine soldiers are more inept than russian ones, but that all are, confused, maximizing their survival and fake firing in the general direction) This observation has major implications.
but this subreddit most potent usefulness is not showing ukrainian losses but that it allows to be much more informed about issues in Ukraine, including human rights abuses, accounts of government corruption, etc.
If staying up to date on both sides actually mattered for me, I would. While /r/credibledefense certainly has a majority western perspective and bias, there are plenty of pro russian viewpoints which, if expressed soberly and analytically, get upvoted. Mostly, I am interested in where the front lines are, what do the Ukrainian defensive strategies look like, what is the OSINT consensus on Russian buildup and activity. I have zero interest in consuming Russian propaganda, even though it would balance my information diet. I do like hearing analytical Russian perspectives when they don’t set off propaganda red flags.
Only ukrainerussiareport will show the true Ukrainian military hardware losses which is necessary to have predictive power and when/if its defense capabilities will break down.
Ukrainerussiareport is mostly not propaganda btw, much less so than are the other subs, especially since many commenters are pro-ukrainian which give a certain rare balance.
Individual videos are generally utterly useless for that. Or multiple individual videos without broader analysis. Except cases of extremely rare kills. For example Russia unable to show single attack on HIMARS is a good indicator of 100% survival rate. Or video of Moscov being towed to the port after sustaining damage in storm sinking after Ukrainian rocket attack. War is large and looking at biased sample of 100 videos showing attacks on something is not giving significant predictive power about overall defense capabilities of either side.
Only systematic collection of data on larger scale is useful for predictive power as far as tanks/IFV go. Ukrainian official data is propaganda a bit based on facts. Russian official data is useful only as jokes. Oryx is not ideal but at least reality adjacent. Other sources are not available for randos discussing on the internet.
More options
Context Copy link
Can you give specific numbers for what you think Ukrainian losses are? Numbers from the Kremlin are ridiculous to the point where they fall apart from you start to compare them to what we know Ukraine has. All other estimates I've seen favour Ukraine to some degree when comparing losses
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Thanks. I don't have any experience with those. I'll check them out.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
I really can't imagine what could've been a better geopolitical victory for America short of Putin reading John Locke and deciding to go all out on pushing democracy and individual rights then retiring.
For the record, the RAND think tank recently released a report talking about how the Ukraine conflict, which they originally proposed in 2019 as an effort to "extend" Russia, is now having the opposite effect (i.e. extending the US). Rather than a US geopolitical victory, the US military is actually now talking about how they're going to have to pull back out of the Ukraine in order to avoid becoming overextended and hence unable to deal with China in other theatres.
[citation needed]
Which US military would be even pulling out of Ukraine?
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Aligning with Russia to counter Chinese expansion by pressuring Ukraine to abide by the Minsk II accords would have been a better "geopolitical victory." The current strategy will lead to short-term gains and long term weakening of the GAE generally, although the strategy does ensure deeper American control over its Euro feifs. GAE runs on the dollar economy and it extracts large control and rent from that system; the insanity of the economic sanctions and seizures GAE instituted have ensured dedollarization will accelerate.
What do you form your opinion of Putin and his politics on?
I personally don't trust Russia to ever act as a loyal ally, so I don't think aligning with Russia was a real possibility, short of something like my example of Putin randomly undergoing a big personality shift to choose to align with the US at the expense of his own personal power.
I don't know a ton about Putin, but my basic model of him is that he enjoys having lots of power and likes being respected/feared, and doesn't particularly care about who he has to hurt or helping others. As opposed to someone like e.g George Washington, who stepped down and refused continued presidency even when people were begging him to continue to rule.
Why?
There are current US allies which have done more to undermine the USA than Russia, a non-ally. Putin's entire history from 2000 to now is him establishing Russian sovereignty and attempting to align his interests with that of Europe and NATO even as NATO and the US has expanded ever closer to their borders. Repeatedly. The USA has repeatedly been against any Euro-Russia friendliness because they want to maintain dominance over their Euro satropies. I think this is bad in the long-term for NATO (and the US).
Based on what? Do you think you've ever listened to Putin or consumed pro (or even neutral) putin sources?
Putin did step down and came back after the Clinton state department embarrassed the person Putin picked to take his place (Medvedev) over the NATO Libyan war.
Is this the same as Washington stepping down? No. Putin maintained significantly more control than Washington did after Washington's presidency, but never-the-less, he did step back from his absolute dominance established after the Chechen war.
I think Putin values his personal power too much to make for a good ally. Maybe he could be a crappy ally like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, but pretty much the definition of being that sort of ally is just not complaining when the US puts their military bases near you I think. Which he doesn't seem willing to do given the whole Ukraine thing.
How so?
Nope, that's why I said I don't know a ton about him.
It doesn't count for much when he came back and continued to be an almost-dictator. I don't know much about the NATO Libyan war, but I doubt whatever happened really forced Putin to take power back, I think Russia would've been fine if he just retired.
floating joining NATO, resource agreements with Germans, among others
you don't wonder if your entire belief about Putin (and Russia generally) is based on NATO stooges feeding you what they want you to think?
some dork being quoted in the NYT from RAND isn't some objective source
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Putin attacking China over an island on the Amur instead?
Too much risk of escalation, environmental fall-out etc.
Even China supporting Ukraine would have created a potential conflict of loyalties for Ukraine, just as Soviet-Chinese funding enabled the Vietnamese to take Chinese aid and then turn on them once the US left.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Who was that and why was he dismissed?
I guess he meant Gen. Surovikin, who was in charge of the whole theatre between August and January.
No, he didn't mean Surovikin.
Who did he mean?
General Colonel Mikhail Teplinsky.
They're having some sort of power struggle within the top brass, between Gerasimov and Surovikin.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
“Surely Russia has to regress to the mean at some point!”
Joking aside, I’m loosely in the nothing-dramatic-happens camp, too. I suppose from over here in the States even the transfer of entire regions could be written off as non-dramatic, so take that with a grain of salt.
Credit to you for actually giving percentages. I’m too lazy to flesh mine out so I will vaguely concur with yours.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link