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Culture War Roundup for the week of January 30, 2023

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Since it seems that the situation has settled into another quite period while the sides sort their shit out, any other other DISGUSTING GEAR FUCKERS want to make predictions about the Special Operation?

Last time, I did better than most but still got blown the fuck out 'cause of shocking aggression from Ukraine and surprising incompetence from Russia, but Russia is running out of easy room to be incompetent and Ukraine is reaching the limits of easy aggression.

That said: Newest aid packages to Ukraine add capabilities that they did not have before, eg, a tank with a computer in it that was designed after the end of the cold war that doesn't explode if you sneeze on it, and Russia just dismissed the dude that organized the super clean double retreat across the dnipro (which was shocking; I wasn't sure it would happen but if it happened I thought it would be some combination of snafu and bloodbath).

None of this might matter given the fact that Russians are settles/behind a river.

Even with all this, it seems like the war will not end for the foreseeable future baring Putin dying of cancer and maybe not even then.

95% the war continues into 2024 in some regard

GIVEN PUTIN DIES in the next 5 months: 80% the war continues into 2024 in some regard

85% the war is HOT into 2024

90% no major territorial changes in the next 1 months

70% no major territorial changes in the next 3 months

40% no major territorial changes in the next 11 months

99% no nuclear action taken by Russia over the next 11 months.

60% Ukraine gets ATACMS in the next 3 months.

I dislike percentages as a means of numeric false certainty, but I'll make a few predictions.

I expect the war to continue into 2024, barring a Putin death scenario leading to a Russian withdrawal. As long as Putin lives and the Russian army is not comprehensively destroyed in the field, I do not see him withdrawing from Ukraine before a fall of Crimea, which I do not see in 2024 barring major Russian conventional defeats in eastern Ukraine.

I expect both a Russian and Ukrainian this spring after the mud-season, with Russia's prioritizing the Donbas. Ukraine's will be aimed at advancing a southern corridor to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, though it may be also/instead intended to cut at the Russian southern supply lines for the Donbas offensive.

I expect this year's Russian strategic goal to secure the administrative boundaries of the Donbas and other eastern regions, with some additional buffer as possible, before transitioning to a posture of strategic defense and trying to present fully-occupied province annexations as fait accompli and basis for armistice lines while trying to exhaust European support. I do not expect the Russians to seriously press for all the claimed annex territories, ie. reclaim Kherson, and I expect that the Russians will be unable to sustain broad-front operations despite mobilization due to attrition of precision fires and modern maneuver equipment.

I expect this year's Ukrainian strategy to cut the land-bridge to Crimea, and as possible start of a logistical siege of Crimea by the end of the year while forcing Russia to relocate forces from mid-eastern Ukraine to south-eastern. The Ukrainian goal will be to continue to attrit Russian maneuver warfare capabilities, especially in modernized mechanized and precision fires, while developing their own maneuver warfare capability.

I expect the Russians will at least temporarily cancel the agriculture shipping deal, and attempt to use the disruption to agricultural exports to pressure Europeans to reduce support for Ukraine / end Russian sanctions. I do not expect this to succeed, even as I do expect middle eastern instability as a result. The russian disruption will likely be most relevant in the context of preventing Ukrainian agriculture from being planted, even if it allows a resumption of the deal.

I expect Russian economic resiliance to sharply deteriorate by mid-year as European energy and insurance sanctions take sharper bites and the short-term Russian economic controls are extended indefinitely. I think it is possible, but not necessarily likely, that China starts subsidizing the Russian economy to allow it to sustain a long-term war footing, including monetary loans and sale of ammunition. I expect Putin to continue the war regardless of economic deterioration, or Chinese (and other) terms of sale.

I expect European willingness to continue to support Ukraine economically to continue. Opportunistic actors like Orban will leverage vetos on Ukrainian aid to enable their position, but current political dynamics continue to make it easier for European states to leverage that for moderating sanctions for compromises than to simply block Ukrainian support. In key European nations (Germany, Italy, and France), pro-Russian political interests will remain easy political targets for domestic political rivals, meaning that pro-Russian coalition politics will continue to be undermined or sold out on case-by-case benefits.

I expect NATO countries to consider expanding aircraft support in earnest this summer, based on the results of the Spring offensives. I expect pressures and war economics will support drones over manned air-superiority fighters. If a fighter is sent, it will likely be in the role of a missile-bus for long-range fires.

I expect that Zelensky will continue to remain in power in Ukraine, barring an assassination. I expect Zelensky to use the context of the war, western pressures, and European Union ascession criteria to justify counter-corruption purges of the Ukrainian government. These will likely catch genuinely corrupt officials, but also have secondary effects of functionally purging suspected pro-Russian oligarchs, and undermine the formation of a counter-Zelensky oligarch coalition party. Opposition parties in the 2024 election will most likely form behind other war leaders/heroes on an anti-Russian axis, not in a pro-Russian fifth columnist, and direct criticism of Zelensky (barring personal scandal) will be muted.

I expect Zelensky to run for re-election, and to be the leading candidate bar personal involvement in corruption scandals. I expect end-of-year strategic priorities (during the next winter/mud season) to be the increased defense of, or attempt to liberate, a 'major' urban area in order to include it in the March 2024 election process.

I expect NATO weapon shipments to hit a qualitative and quantitative critical mass by late 2023 that makes Ukraine favored/expected to launch an offensive, in the early 2024, barring escalating Chinese support for Russia in the form of material.

I do not expect any nuclear weapon use.

I like numbers and no explanations because these predictions are mostly for myself, and I find that putting a number on something keeps me honest. I do it with other stuff also (How likely am I to finish X by Y, how much better is my most recent effort than my previous effort, etc.)

IN any case, I mostly agree with your views, excepting:

I don't think NATO aircraft support is that likely, due to A: possible escalation and B: lack of added capacity. Anything NATO could give Ukraine that would make a difference would by definition be capable of striking WAY to far into Russia to be given off the cuff.

I don't know if Ukraine will actually try to cut off Crimea, or just maintain enough of a posture in that regard as to force Russia to protect against the possibility.

I just can't figure out what the fuck Russia expects to get out of this, unless they are just hopping that opportunities will develop if they hold on for long enough. I can't imagine that Putin has such a vice grip on the entire elite of the country they are willing to let this go on for pure personal aggrandizement.

I provided a personal view on Putin's goal at this point, but in short Putin is doubling-down on a long-running effort to try and create a fundamental rift / break in the western alliance system aimed at getting Germany to break ranks with the west, while trying to fully occupy the administrative boundaries of the Donbas / the claimed areas he can to serve as basis for an armistice that Russia can start rebuilding after as the western alliance cracks over the response to Germany.

I don't think it will work, but I'd put it as something Putin would gamble on given his past many years of trying to engage or pressure Germany for various effects.