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Culture War Roundup for the week of February 24, 2025

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I have had an evolving set of view on the conflict in Ukraine that seems to annoy just about everyone. With the news today about Trump and Zelenskyy it's even more relevant.

I’m going to start with the present state of the conflict. This is, for this exercise, going to be called…

Option A - Stalemate and Attrition

Where we are now is an attritional battle with relatively static front lines. What I’ve observed is that there are many “red lines” that the supporters of Ukraine have. This leads to aid being sent simply to preserve the status quo. Ukraine, as much as it would want to win, is prohibited from actually winning because that might give Russia a sad and lead to world war 3.

This is a similar position we were in while in Vietnam. We were fighting for the same hills over and over again. There was no effort to actually win. Unlike Vietnam, where the U.S. faced a guerrilla insurgency, Ukraine’s conflict involves a nuclear-armed Russia, raising the stakes and complicating any path to outright victory.

In my mind, this is the worst option. Unless you get Russia to capitulate, Ukraine will not get enough concessions to maintain her previous borders. This war can go on as long as both sides have men to throw into the meat grinder. Simply because providing enough support for Ukraine to win is off the table.

Clearly both sides will continue to fight on mostly static lines indefinitely.

This isn’t just from a US perspective, all of the arms donations that were given to Ukraine up to this point by basically everyone includes clauses to not attack Russia. We, as a world, are telling the Ukrainian people to fight with one arm behind their proverbial backs. It’s a scenario that they can’t win with.

This option might eventually weaken Putin internally if Russia’s economy or morale crumbles, but banking on that is a gamble with long odds. They seem to have a deep bench of people who share the same values and motivations as Putin himself. Based on surveys and polls I’ve seen, this conflict still has much popular support from the people of Russia.

One has to ask, who is the winner in this scenario? The only plausible answer I have is only the military-industrial complex. Ukraine isn’t winning. Russia isn’t winning. Arms manufacturers are winning. With static front lines fueling endless demand for weapons, defense contractors profit while neither Ukraine nor Russia gains ground.

A prolonged stalemate, which is what this leads to, could erode NATO’s credibility, leave Ukraine a fractured state, and embolden other aggressors watching the West’s indecision.

This leads to…

Option B - Full Commitment

Here’s where we would treat Ukraine as the ally that they should be. This is where you own up to the Budapest Memorandum that was signed by Yeltsin and Clinton to provide security guarantees for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. (The 1994 Budapest Memorandum saw Ukraine give up nukes for security guarantees from Russia, the U.S., and others—guarantees now in tatters.)

To be clear, this has been my position since basically day 1 of the conflict. Day 1, for me, is Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, not just the 2022 escalation, per the Budapest Memorandum’s promises. A direct conflict between nuclear powers is historically unprecedented. Sometimes, the correct moral choice entails risks.

Russia’s 2022 invasion, unlike 2014, exposed Putin’s broader ambitions, forcing the West to rethink its hesitation.

This option would entail actual support from allied nations, not just good wishes and materiel, but boots on the ground. Short of that, Option B could include bolder support, like unrestricted use of Western weapons, though even this risks Russian retaliation.

Here’s the thing, you have two options, either Russia is an existential threat or it’s not. If they are a real threat, then the answer should always be to support the morally right answer. If that leads to a broader conflict, then so be it — it’s a just war based on the reality. If they are not an actual threat… and Ukraine isn’t really an ally, why are we even talking?

Winding back a bit to option A, to put things into perspective, what we’re presently doing is pretty much what led to WW2. Chamberlain and the rest of the west were in a stance of appeasement. By not actually fighting evil, we let it grow. Just as appeasement emboldened Hitler to push further, letting Russia keep gains now might signal to Putin—and others—that aggression pays.

The broad statement here is that you can’t simply spend your way to victory. No amount of donations of money or supplies will get Ukraine back without Russia losing the conflict they started.

This option is, for all intents and purposes, completely off the table.

So…

Option C - Negotiated Settlement

Here’s the unpopular one. Negotiated peace to end the conflict. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is happy with this. With this Ukraine will lose territory and some level of autonomy.

Given that we, as a world, can’t seem to stomach the concept of Russia losing, which takes Option B out as a solution, you’re left with Option A or C.

Since Option A does nothing but throw more men into the meat-grinder for no gains by either side, I think it’s the worst outcome. I don’t like Option C in any way, but it seems fare less bad than having the same outcome, but more death.

That said, a negotiated peace ceding territory might end the fighting but could set a precedent that territorial conquest pays off, weakening the global order.

Option C feels like a bitter pill; it’s pragmatic but forces Ukraine to sacrifice land and pride, a tough ask for a nation fighting for its survival. Some might say a negotiated peace stabilizes the region short-term, but history—like Munich in 1938—warns that rewarding conquest invites more.

…but wait, a surprise…

Option B’ - Two-Front War Risk

Ok, let’s pretend that we actually have the balls to go fight Russia and curb-stomp them out of Ukraine (including, of course, Crimea). Does the US and her allies really have the ability to fight a two-theater war? I would question this.

If the U.S. commits fully to fighting Russia in Ukraine, it might leave Taiwan exposed to China. This would be the ideal time for China to do what they’ve been threatening to do for decades — invade and annex Taiwan.

We have to be really careful with how we’re throwing around our might.

A decisive victory could reshape Europe’s security landscape, but a two-theater war might strain U.S. and allied resources, leaving vulnerabilities elsewhere. If the U.S. goes all-in on Ukraine, China might see a green light to hit Taiwan, stretching allied forces thin across two continents.


Some historical context for a moment. When Russia attacked and annexed Crimea in 2014, the world’s reaction was an annoyed “tut tut.” Nothing happened. Russia shot down a commercial airliners and the sentiment was echoed again.

Nothing happened. Russia’s takeover was internationally condemned — tut tut — but met with limited Western response at the time.

Why is that?

Well, Obama was coming off a victory two years prior against Mitt Romney. All of the rhetoric was that Russia was not a threat.

“The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back” in response to Romney saying that Russia is the biggest existent threat to the US and the world.

It would come off as almost comical to have the Obama administration immediately walk that back.

In Europe, Russia was also the supplier of natural gas to power the industrial nations there. Germany was committed to the absurd tactic of closing down their nuclear generation facilities so they were also against any action against Russia.

Tut tut.


Beyond these options, could intensified sanctions, diplomatic isolation, or mediation by neutral parties shift the dynamic? These might pressure Russia without the risks of Option B. Personally, I doubt it. Putin is in too deep to risk pulling out without something that can be claimed as a victory — and any victory would invariably put the scenario into Option C.

There are no good answers.

A continuation of the status quo, Option A, is, in my mind the worst outcome of all. It maximizes human suffering while having the same outcome as Option C.

Option B, my simple-minded “best” option, isn’t on the table because Russia has nukes. By the way, this shows that simply having nuclear weapons makes you unable to lose in the eyes of the world. It’s a non-ideal precedent in my mind.

Option B could also easily lead to B’ as well. That would also be a very not good outcome.

The one that disgusts me the least is Option C.

There are no good answers. Option A drags out the suffering with no end, Option B courts global chaos, and Option C trades Ukraine’s dreams for peace. I lean toward C as the least awful. It sucks. Royally.

Honestly, I would still lean towards B as the correct and moral choice, but I'm very much not in control of any of this.

Here’s where we would treat Ukraine as the ally that they should be. This is where you own up to the Budapest Memorandum that was signed by Yeltsin and Clinton to provide security guarantees for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. (The 1994 Budapest Memorandum saw Ukraine give up nukes for security guarantees from Russia, the U.S., and others—guarantees now in tatters.)

I know I bang on and on about this, but this is just entirely wrong:

  1. The Budapest Memorandum does not provide security guarantees.
  2. Ukraine happened to have nuclear weapons on its soil. It never had operational control of the weapons.
  3. The Budapest Memorandum is not legally binding, as per the US State Department.

I mean, the Budapest Memorandum could have been made a real paper (just as 'protector of Orthodox Christians' was a thin excuse to meddle in the Ottoman Empire) but Obama chose to not pick it up, and Biden after him. The Monroe doctrine doesn't exist on any formal treaty or legislation but if any European decided to invade a South American country Uncle Sam would magically appear regardless of the lack of justification to do so.

'Law' in this case was just the pretense of legality: if the Americans really wanted to go down to the mat for Ukraine, they'd have manufactured a reason to do so. They didn't, so they fell on the 'do nothing' side of strategic ambiguity.

Nowhere does the Budapest Memorandum suggest that the United States would intervene on Ukraine's behalf outside of complaining to the UN about it (which, I suppose, could in theory lead to US involvement – but of course guess who has veto power on the security council?)

Now, as you say, the US could manufacture a reason. They could invoke the Russian violation of the memorandum as a cause for war (although by that logic US violations of the memorandum would also be a valid casus belli for Russia to declare war on the United States). But I think Americans really do not want to go down to the mat for Ukraine because we would prefer not to see Rammstein nuked and thousands of Americans dead, even as a merely "plausible" outcome.

And, on that note, do you know who else would prefer not to see Rammstein nuked? Germany! Supposing the US went to the mat for Ukraine – we might not be able to get all of NATO onboard and could even see a situation where places like Germany deny the US overflight rights like France has in the past. Do you know how difficult it would be to support Ukraine if continental NATO balked? Without Turkey's participation our ships would be barred from the Black Sea, our land access would be cut off if Eastern European states decided not to play ball (to be fair, Poland seems one of the states most likely to cooperate in this scenario) and Denmark could probably also shut off US access to the Baltics.

I'm not sure what's exactly the most likely outcome here, but while Europe now is talking a big game about helping Zelensky, I remember when Germany had to be browbeaten to send Leopards. I'm not sure what the other NATO states would do if the US had decided to go to war in 2022, but I doubt they would all have lined up to join.

Ukraine happened to have nuclear weapons on its soil. It never had operational control of the weapons.

Does that mean they were missing critical technology needed to use the weapons? Or something like on paper the people authorized to use them were all in Russia?

In the absence of the Budapest Memorandum, could Ukraine have become a nuclear state in its own right?

Does that mean they were missing critical technology needed to use the weapons? Or something like on paper the people authorized to use them were all in Russia?

Basically, the troops manning the nuclear weapons were not loyal to Ukraine, and the permissive action links needed to authorize use were not in Ukrainian hands. So "Ukraine" did not have the launch codes, and they also didn't have the guys who would launch the missiles.

In the absence of the Budapest Memorandum, could Ukraine have become a nuclear state in its own right?

Technically, it's not very hard to build a nuclear weapon. If they had wanted, I think they probably could have become a nuclear state relatively easily (even after giving up the nuclear weapons), barring intervention from the US or Russia.

Worryingly, they could pretty easily become a nuclear weapons state now by cannibalizing their nuclear reactors. Zelensky has threatened to do that. And that’s assuming none of the fifty or so Soviet nuclear warheads that went missing aren’t in Ukraine’a possession. Which puts their constant demand for delivery systems that can hit Moscow in a rather ominous light.

You cannot use commercial reactor fuel for weapons (except some kind of dirty bomb). It would be easier to make weapons material from scratch.

Yes, and in fact Zelensky suggested that "all the package decision of 1994 are in doubt" less than a week before Putin declared the "Special Military Operation," and the Russians claimed that Ukraine was looking to acquire them, one of their justifications for the 2022 invasion. Now, maybe Zelensky wasn't thinking of nuclear weapons when he gave that speech (although he hardly could be ignorant of the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum!), but he certainly is now.

ETA – I'm just going to post the full Zelensky quote from 2022 for a bit of extra context:

Since 2014, Ukraine has tried three times to convene consultations with the guarantor states of the Budapest Memorandum. Three times without success. Today Ukraine will do it for the fourth time. I, as President, will do this for the first time. But both Ukraine and I are doing this for the last time. I am initiating consultations in the framework of the Budapest Memorandum. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was commissioned to convene them. If they do not happen again or their results do not guarantee security for our country, Ukraine will have every right to believe that the Budapest Memorandum is not working and all the package decisions of 1994 are in doubt.

Basically, the troops manning the nuclear weapons were not loyal to Ukraine

I am rather curious to whom the troops of the crumbling nominally-Soviet empire were, or were expected, to be loyal to. It may well be that the nuclear folks were distinctly Russian, but more broadly I can't see everyone swearing fealty to Moscow when their families now live in independent nations.

Well, I dunno, if Puerto Rico declared independence I would not expect the US troops stationed there to suddenly have fealty to Puerto Rico.

However, as it happens, we know the answer to your question – they specifically avoided swearing fealty to Ukraine and swore fealty to the Commonwealth of Independent States instead.

See page 25 of this DTRA report.

Moscow. The Ukrainian and Russian militaries didn't disentangle for over a decade after the 1994 memorandum. There really wasn't even a question about this who the soldiers had loyalty towards.

And even if that wasn't true; if Ukraine had moved to capture and possess those weapons, the Soviet tanks would have rolled across the border right there, maybe even with American support.