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The relation of the humanities to "reality" varies so drastically from field to field, and even from paper to paper, that it's almost impossible to make generalizations. You have to just take things on a case by case basis, determine what the intent was, and how well that intent was executed upon.
If we're going to regard analytic philosophy as one of the humanities (as you seem to do), then the "reality anchor" is simply how well the argument in question describes, well, reality, in addition to its own internal logical coherence. You have previously shared your own philosophical views on machine consciousness and machine understanding. Presumably, you did think that these views of yours were well supported by the evidence and that they were grounded in "reality". So it's not that you devalue philosophy; it's just that you think your own philosophical views are obviously correct, and the views of your philosophical opponents are obviously incorrect, which is what every single philosopher has thought since the beginning of recorded history, so you're in good company there.
Literary studies can end up being quite empirically grounded. You'll get people who are doing things like a statistical analysis of the lexicon of a given book or a given set of books, counting up how many times X type of word appears in Y genres of novels from time period Z. Or it can turn into a sort of literary history, pulling together letters and diary entries to show that X author read Y author which is why they were influenced to do Z kind of writing. Even in more abstract matters of literary interpretation though, I think it's rash to say that they have no grounding in empirical fact. There's a classic problem in Shakespeare studies, for example, over whether Shakespeare intended Marcus's monologue in Titus Andronicus to be ironic and satirical. I believe that most people would agree by default that there is a fact of the matter over whether Shakespeare had a conscious intent or not to write the speech in an ironic fashion (this assumption of course reveals philosophical complexities if you poke at it enough, but, most people will not find it to be too troublesome of an assumption). Of course the possibility of actually confirming this fact once and for all is now forbidden to us, lost as it is to the sands of time. But, since we know that people's thoughts and emotions influence their words and actions, we can presumably make some headway on gathering evidence regarding Shakespeare's intent here, and make a reasoned argument for one position or the other.
One of the goals of psychoanalysis is to interrogate fundamental assumptions about what an "outcome" even is, which outcomes are desirable and worth pursuing in a given individual context, and what it means to actually "measure" a given "outcome". Presumably, empirical psychiatry does not take these questions to be its proper business, so it's unsurprising that there would be a divergence in perspective here. (If someone were to present with complaints of ritualistic OCD behaviors, for example, then psychoanalysis is theoretically neutral regarding whether the cessation of the behavior is the "proper" and desirable outcome. It certainly may very well be the desirable outcome in the majority of cases, but this cannot be taken as a given.)
I can't really ask for a better steelman for the positions I'm against, so thank you.
You accuse me of engaging in philosophy, and I can only plead guilty. But I suspect we are talking about two different things. I see a distinction between what we might call instrumental versus terminal philosophy. I use philosophy as a spade, a tool to dig into reality-anchored problems like the nature of consciousness or my ethical obligations to a patient. The goal is to get somewhere. For many professional philosophers I have encountered, philosophy is not a tool to be used but an object to be endlessly polished. They are not in it to dig, they're here to argue about the platonic ideal of a spade.
(In my case, I'm rather concerned that if we do instantiate a Machine God: we'd better teach it a definition of spade that doesn't mean our bones are used to dig our graves)
This is especially true in moral philosophy. I have a strong conviction that objective morality does not exist. The evidence against it is a vast, silent ocean; the evidence for it is a null set. I consider it as likely as finding a hidden integer between two and three that we've somehow missed. This makes moral arguments an interesting class of facts, but only facts about the people having them. Potentially facts about game theory and evolutionary processes, since many aspects of morality are conserved across species. Dogs and monkeys understand fairness, or have kin-group obligations.
I must strongly disagree, this doesn't represent my stance at all. In fact, I would say that this is a category error. The only way a philosophical conjecture can be "incorrect" is through logical error in its formulation, or outright self-contradiction.
My own stance is that I am both a moral relativist and a moral chauvinist, and I deny these claims are contradictory. My preference for my own brand of consequentialism is just that: a preference. I do not think a Kantian is wrong so much as I observe that they must constantly ignore their own imperatives to function in the world.
That makes philosophical arguments not that different to debating a favorite football team. Can be fun over a drink, often interesting, but usually not productive.
This brings me back to your defense of the humanities. You give excellent examples of how these fields can be anchored to reality, like the statistical analysis of a lexicon. I do not doubt these researchers exist, my ex did similar work.
My critique is about the center of gravity of these fields. For every scholar doing a careful statistical analysis, how many are writing another unfalsifiable post-structuralist critique by doing the equivalent of scrutinizing a takeout menu? My experience suggests the latter is far more representative of the field's culture and what is considered high status work. The exceptions, however laudable, do not disprove the rule about the field's dominant intellectual mode.
I am a Bayesian, so I am fully on board with probabilistic arguments. Yet, once again, in the humanities or in philosophy, consensus is rare or sometimes never reached. I find this farcical.
The core difference, as I see it, is the presence of a robust error correction mechanism. In my world, bad ideas have an expiration date because they fail to produce results. Phlogiston theory is dead. Lamarckian evolution is dead. They were falsified by reality (in the Bayesian, not Popperian sense). Can we say the same for the most influential ideas in the humanities? The continued influence of figures like Lacan, despite decades of withering critique, suggests the system is not structured to kill its darlings. It is designed to accumulate "perspectives," not to converge on truth.
(Even STEM rewards new discoveries, but someone conducting an experiment showing Einstein's model of gravity works/doesn't work in a new regime is doing something far more important and useful than someone arguing about feminist interpretations of underwater basket weaving)
My own field of psychiatry is a good case study here. We are in the aftermath of a replicability crisis. It is painful and embarrassing (but mostly in the softer aspects of psychology, the drugs usually work), but it is also a sign of institutional health. We are actively trying to discover where we have been wrong and hold ourselves to a higher standard. This is our Reality Anchor, however imperfect, pulling us back. I do not see an equivalent "interpretive crisis" in literary studies. I do not see a movement to discard theories that produce endless, unfalsifiable, and contradictory readings. The lack of such a crisis isn't a sign of stability. To me, it seems a sign the field may not have a reliable way to know when it is wrong. The Sokal Affair, or my own time in the Tate, shows that "earnest" productions are indistinguishable from parody.
This is not an accident. It flows directly from the incentive structure. In my field, discovering a new, effective treatment for depression grants you status because of its truth and utility. In literary studies, what is the reward for simply confirming the last fifty years of scholarship on Titus Andronicus? There is little to none. The incentive is to produce a novel interpretation, the more contrarian the better. This creates a centrifugal force, pushing the field away from stable consensus and towards ever more esoteric readings. The goal ceases to be understanding the text and becomes demonstrating the cleverness of the critic.
Regarding psychoanalysis and outcomes, I am a simple pragmatist. If a person with OCD is happy, I have no desire to treat them. If they are a paranoid schizophrenic setting parks on fire, the matter is out of my hands. In most cases, patients come to us because they believe they have a problem. We usually agree. That shared understanding of a problem in need of a solution is anchor enough.
This is why I believe the humanities are not a good target for limited public funds, at least at present. I have no objection to private donors funding this work. But most STEM and medical research has a far more obvious case for being a worthy investment of tax dollars. If we must make hard choices, I would fund the fields that have a mechanism for being wrong and a track record of correcting themselves, while also raising standards of living or technological progression.
It's rather ironic that your own choice of analogy willingly jumps into the thicket of the philosophy of mathematics. Perhaps you're just doing so unknowingly or just with a general lack of care, but that would indeed be apropos.
What sort of 'evidence' do you think one would gather to determine the status of mathematical objects? Is it empirical? Do you perform an experiment? Is that the means by which one 'finds' or, say, 'discovers' things like integers?
I hate to do this, but last time we did this, you were unable to even explain what it is that those terms meant. Would you like to take another go at it?
Thank you for reminding me of that rather unpleasant experience. I would actually not like to take another go at it. Anyone wanting elaboration is welcome to read the thread.
Fair enough on the positive claim concerning meta-ethics. If you'd prefer to leave that one in incoherence, you can leave that one in incoherence.
Would you like to take a shot at your negative claim with analogy to philosophy of mathematics? Any sort of clarity or argument there?
No, I showed that my point was coherent, it is beyond me why you don't see that. It's not really my problem at this point.
Not with you, I'm afraid. @Primaprimaprima is far more pleasant to talk to, hence I am more than happy to discuss that in detail with them. You're welcome to read that thread and make of it what you will.
We can just read the comments. You never told me what your terms meant, because you couldn't. Perhaps you missed my edit back then, even though I recall doing it quickly, so I'll repeat it here just in case:
I'm a pretty pleasant guy. What have I said that is not pleasant? I think you might be confusing a pleasant conversationalist with a pleasant conversation. Most people don't like conversations where large problems with their stated positions are brought to the fore. That's fair enough. But that's probably what you find displeasing, the clear and obvious feeling in your gut that you know your position has a problem, and that you don't know what to do about it. I sympathize; I've been there. Just a piece of advice, though; thinking that you're going to be able to avoid the problem by avoiding the person who points out the problem never works. Moreover, it's unMottely.
You know, I'm a person who has been described, in this very thread as:
Consider what that means when someone actually exhausts my patience. I think that says more about you than it does about me.
After all, even the most saintly are unlikely to like you very much if you say things along the lines of:
I'm sure you think you are very pleasant, and that you are a great conversationalist. I'm sure your mother thinks you're very handsome too.
I think it works great. If I didn't have a firm commitment to not blocking anyone on this site, I would have blocked you a long time back. The next best thing is to ignore you, which is what I'm doing from now on. Being "unMottley" doesn't come at the cost of my sanity.
Reported for antagonism.
Not because it's particularly bad (it obviously isn't), but because I hold you to higher standards! You are better than that.
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