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not-guilty is not the same as innocent

felipec.substack.com

In many discussions I'm pulled back to the distinction between not-guilty and innocent as a way to demonstrate how the burden of proof works and what the true default position should be in any given argument. A lot of people seem to not have any problem seeing the distinction, but many intelligent people for some reason don't see it.

In this article I explain why the distinction exists and why it matters, in particular why it matters in real-life scenarios, especially when people try to shift the burden of proof.

Essentially, in my view the universe we are talking about is {uncertain,guilty,innocent}, therefore not-guilty is guilty', which is {uncertain,innocent}. Therefore innocent ⇒ not-guilty, but not-guilty ⇏ innocent.

When O. J. Simpson was acquitted, that doesn’t mean he was found innocent, it means the prosecution could not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He was found not-guilty, which is not the same as innocent. It very well could be that the jury found the truth of the matter uncertain.

This notion has implications in many real-life scenarios when people want to shift the burden of proof if you reject a claim when it's not substantiated. They wrongly assume you claim their claim is false (equivalent to innocent), when in truth all you are doing is staying in the default position (uncertain).

Rejecting the claim that a god exists is not the same as claim a god doesn't exist: it doesn't require a burden of proof because it's the default position. Agnosticism is the default position. The burden of proof is on the people making the claim.

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What about Bostrom's Simulation argument?

https://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.pdf

Either it's very difficult/impossible to reach a high level of civilizational achievement (controlling the resources of many star systems), or civilizations that do this totally shun simulating their ancestors, or we are in a simulation.

It should be trivial for a powerful civilization to simulate their ancestors, they ought to have billions of times more computing power than is necessary, billions of years to have their fun. Even if they're just operating on the physics we know (which is a dubious assumption given that we take lots of shortcuts in our own simulations), planetary scale computers would do the trick very nicely. You wouldn't need something really advanced like a Matrioshka brain.

It seems very likely they would do this. A lot of people today play games simulating our history. Maybe if we have a certain kind of hostile AGI taking over every single time, that would prevent ancestor simulations. But would every single civilization fall to AGI? That seems unlikely. It only takes one powerful real civilization to create millions, billions of ancestor-simulations. We should conclude that most pre-singularity civilizations exist in simulation.

Thus it seems very reasonable to conclude that we are in a simulation and we are thus ruled by a deity. Unlike with traditional religions, we have empirical proof of how God's powers of creation could work based upon principles we already understand and observe. There's no need to justify prophets, miracles or other dubious functions. There is no need to justify a benevolent God ruling over a harsh universe - we can assume our simulators are not really interested in our welfare.

You can invert the burden of proof argument. If we take agnosticism as default, that's the same as saying we're not sure whether we live on the highest level of reality or any of the myriad lower levels of simulation. I reckon it's overwhelmingly more likely that we live in a simulation, likely a nested simulation. There's only one highest level, there are surely many many lower levels.

Thus it seems very reasonable to conclude that we are in a simulation and we are thus ruled by a deity.

I see people make this probabilistic fallacy very often. You can say X is very likely, so it's reasonable to conclude it's true, but winning Russian roulette is likely, do you think it's reasonable to conclude you will win? This doesn't change with higher values of X.

If you change the statement to "it's reasonable to conclude that we are likely in a simulation", then I would agree.

I don't believe rand() < 0.99 is true, because it could be false.

I think you're making an isolated demand for rigour here. You can't be 100% sure of anything except "there are thoughts" because the chance that a Cartesian Daemon is screwing with your thought process is not zero. So if you require 100% certainty to call anything "true", your set of "true statements" has one member.

I don't require 100% certainty to call anything true, but even if I did, I don't need to call absolutely anything true.