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PaperclipPerfector
2d ago
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Notes -
So I just finished the second book in Ian W. Toll's Pacific War Trilogy: Conquering Tide. This book begins with the battle for Guadalcanal, which takes up a third of the book and culminates in the disastrous (for the Japanese) battle of the Philippine Sea. I liked this one even more than Pacific Crucible, because it filled in many of the gaps that I saw in that book (submarine war, army/navy conflict), although the series continues to be very Navy and American-centric. This is not a problem for me as I'm trying to read this series to help me understand my country's history and don't mind reading another book to learn about ANZAC, Burma, and China. More thoughts listed in roughly chronological order below.
Submarines were absolutely vital for the American effort in the Pacific, and were responsible for sinking something like 60% of the enemy tonnage throughout the course of the war. My favorite chapter in the book was one in which we followed the submarine crew of the Wahoo and its crazy Skipper "Mush" Morton throughout most of 1943. Unlike the Allies in the Atlantic, the Japanese didn't really give much of an effort in developing anti-submarine tactics, because of the "low prestige" of the job, nor did they really ramp up their own submarine attacks on American shipping. This seems like a huge oversight.
Guadalcanal seems like it absolutely fucking sucked for everyone. Swampy malarial jungle, poor supply situation, and constant aerial bombardments meant neither the Japanese nor the Americans got much rest when they weren't fighting.
American strategy at Guadalcanal seemed extremely smart to me: contest the islands just enough to continuously bleed Japanese air and sea power from bases further up the Solomons/Bismarks (mainly Rabaul). Kind of like the original plan for Verdun.
Japanese leadership in general seemed extremely bad. A lot of decisions seemed to be made for ego-stroking reasons, rather than around any kind of grand strategy to win the war. Of course if Japan had had competent leadership, it never would have bombed Pearl Harbor, or even invaded China in the first place, but even so, there were many things that the Japanese leadership could have done to improve their performance in the war. More careful shepherding of human resources, above all pilots, more extensive aviation training programs, strategic giving up of territory, better cooperation between the army and navy all would have turned many of Japan's most catastrophic losses into victories, or at least less bloody retreats. The two worst examples of this were lack of pilot rotations, meaning almost all experienced pilots were killed in 1942-early 1943, and the army's repeated use of Banzai tactics against US marines. It's not the 19th century anymore folks! In contrast the US leadership, especially Nimitz, seemed to me to be extremely high caliber. Maybe this was because the US military actually had some oversight from the civilian government so incompetents and fanatics could be removed?
Ideas like Elan, Warrior Spirit, and Bushido seem to be total bullshit in modern war. Time and time again Japanese troops and pilots make extremely brave and daring calls, but these aren't enough to overcome, and sometimes reinforce tactical stupidity. In contrast, the Americans are much more on a bell curve of bravery, but win the day because of better leadership and equipment. Of course the war was ultimately decided by American material might, but early in the book around Guadalcanal, Americans won engagements that they shouldn't have on paper because of far superior leadership and planning, despite maybe lower overall "quality" in the enlisted men.
At the same time, American tolerance for causalities is super low. In the first island hopping campaign in the Marshalls, Toll makes a big deal about Americans losing ~2k dead taking Tarawa. Casualties are similarly low for much of the rest of the action of the book, including on Saipan and Guam. Even on Iwo Jima and Okinawa had only about 12k dead each. Compared to the Eastern Front, WW1, or even the Civil War, these are pathetic numbers that the media made a storm about. I don't mean to take these deaths lightly, but proportionally this is nothing. This attitude has only gotten worse (Vietnam, Iraq, Afganistan, current Iran war), and I think it makes it increasingly difficult to accomplish our geopolitical goals.
Battle of the Philippine Sea (the biggest carrier battle ever apparently) was kind of sad and anticlimactic. The Japanese pilots were so undertrained that they were shot out of the sky like turkeys by American aces. Earlier in the war, better pilots might have taken down quite a bit of the American Navy.
Complete and utter failure of Japanese intelligence and reconnaissance. The amount of times I read the words "surprisingly, the American fleet arrived undetected" was shocking, and indicates a lack of investment in code-breaking and reconnaissance by the Japanese leadership. Of course some of this was luck, but if something happens almost every time, it's not luck.
FWIW, I don't think this is exactly true, or at least I want to pick it apart a little. (Apologies in advance for the long tangent to your very interesting review, which I appreciate.)
At a minimum, I think physical courage is still important. However, I think that coolness under fire is an extremely important but less visible part of the virtue of courage, and recklessness has diminishing value in a modern war, while coolness has increasing value.
A sort of seemingly reckless courage could be pretty valuable in physical combat when rushing at someone with a pointed object could cause them to break and flee (this is why Surovov trained his troops on bayonet drills: at the time, troops rarely broke from gunfire alone, but bayonet charges usually resulted in one side or the other breaking before the lines made contact). However in modern warfare, instead of bayonets being "step 2" of a battle, they are more like "step 50" and the battle is usually decided before that point. Particularly in the naval and air category, reckless courage is not likely to "scare" the enemy due to the interpersonal nature of the conflict (although you might successfully bluff them), and it's likely to cause you to make a mistake while you are operating a complex piece of machinery. Whereas if you get rattled while operating a complex piece of machinery, you're going to operate less effectively.
Interestingly, naval air operations you mention in the book likely required more psychological resilience or courage than modern air combat (this is based on studies done during IIRC the Vietnam War that found that carrier landings caused more stress than taking enemy fire). So coolness is essential and being reckless means you'll wash out of the flight program or worse.
But coolness is less obvious an aspect of courage than conspicuous risk-taking. (Or, to put it another way, if you're in naval air operations or a submariner, the conspicuous risk-taking is already "baked in" - you're landing a plane on a boat! You're in a boat under the water!!)
I do think elan still has a place today. Something like the Maduro capture operation requires a certain amount of elan (literally, that means "dash," doesn't it?) and willingness to expose oneself to potentially hostile fire, and in certain circumstances (such as house-to-house combat) what seems like reckless courage can rise in value again: the guy who will actually charge you with a fixed bayonet in a crowded space may prevail against a dozen enemies where a more hesitant approach would fail.
I don't think "coolness" and "elan" are really opposites. (For instance, Taffy 3's actions off Samar I think seem like a good example of elan, but it also seems to me that it demonstrated considerable coolness under fire – but I'd be curious for your thoughts, since you're the one who's been reading the history, although I guess I'll have to wait until you read the next book?) I do think truly reckless bravery is simpler and perhaps more difficult than coolness under fire, because the latter requires more judgment. I think it's good that the idea of elan is still around, particularly in infantry units that are more likely to need to tap into that sort of tradition. I don't think elan is a replacement for strategy, doctrine, or proficiency – you cannot just decide that your collective path to victory is predicated on will alone. But sometimes it can be decisive for individuals. And I think the ideal warrior spirit would capture the essence of both, with the understand that sometimes right judgment might lead one to act with elan.
Overall I agree with everything you said. But I'd love to see a source for the following claim:
I really doubt this is true. I've been around naval aviators a bunch and never heard anyone say this. But there's a huge range of carrier landings (night, storm, low fuel) and a huge range of enemy fire (small arms, dog fight machine gun, SAM). I'm certain that an F8 landing on a carrier in a storm would be more stressful than the same pilot being shot at by an AK47 while on mission.
I haven't personally talked to anyone who could compare it to getting shot at. What I have heard firsthand is that night landings specifically are very stressful.
I was first exposed to it in the short Navy/Grumman recruiting piece/documentary "Sea Legs" which you'd probably enjoy (and isn't very long).
On a quick Google, you can also see it referenced here. Relevant excerpt:
I suspect part of the thing at play here might be that someone shooting a missile at you is both reasonably unexpected and something that is over fairly quickly – like a near-accident while driving. Landing on a carrier is something that you can anticipate (including, with reasonable precision, if it is going to be in e.g. low light conditions) and so you have more time to dread it.
Good to know, because you'd know better than me!
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