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So I just finished the second book in Ian W. Toll's Pacific War Trilogy: Conquering Tide. This book begins with the battle for Guadalcanal, which takes up a third of the book and culminates in the disastrous (for the Japanese) battle of the Philippine Sea. I liked this one even more than Pacific Crucible, because it filled in many of the gaps that I saw in that book (submarine war, army/navy conflict), although the series continues to be very Navy and American-centric. This is not a problem for me as I'm trying to read this series to help me understand my country's history and don't mind reading another book to learn about ANZAC, Burma, and China. More thoughts listed in roughly chronological order below.
Submarines were absolutely vital for the American effort in the Pacific, and were responsible for sinking something like 60% of the enemy tonnage throughout the course of the war. My favorite chapter in the book was one in which we followed the submarine crew of the Wahoo and its crazy Skipper "Mush" Morton throughout most of 1943. Unlike the Allies in the Atlantic, the Japanese didn't really give much of an effort in developing anti-submarine tactics, because of the "low prestige" of the job, nor did they really ramp up their own submarine attacks on American shipping. This seems like a huge oversight.
Guadalcanal seems like it absolutely fucking sucked for everyone. Swampy malarial jungle, poor supply situation, and constant aerial bombardments meant neither the Japanese nor the Americans got much rest when they weren't fighting.
American strategy at Guadalcanal seemed extremely smart to me: contest the islands just enough to continuously bleed Japanese air and sea power from bases further up the Solomons/Bismarks (mainly Rabaul). Kind of like the original plan for Verdun.
Japanese leadership in general seemed extremely bad. A lot of decisions seemed to be made for ego-stroking reasons, rather than around any kind of grand strategy to win the war. Of course if Japan had had competent leadership, it never would have bombed Pearl Harbor, or even invaded China in the first place, but even so, there were many things that the Japanese leadership could have done to improve their performance in the war. More careful shepherding of human resources, above all pilots, more extensive aviation training programs, strategic giving up of territory, better cooperation between the army and navy all would have turned many of Japan's most catastrophic losses into victories, or at least less bloody retreats. The two worst examples of this were lack of pilot rotations, meaning almost all experienced pilots were killed in 1942-early 1943, and the army's repeated use of Banzai tactics against US marines. It's not the 19th century anymore folks! In contrast the US leadership, especially Nimitz, seemed to me to be extremely high caliber. Maybe this was because the US military actually had some oversight from the civilian government so incompetents and fanatics could be removed?
Ideas like Elan, Warrior Spirit, and Bushido seem to be total bullshit in modern war. Time and time again Japanese troops and pilots make extremely brave and daring calls, but these aren't enough to overcome, and sometimes reinforce tactical stupidity. In contrast, the Americans are much more on a bell curve of bravery, but win the day because of better leadership and equipment. Of course the war was ultimately decided by American material might, but early in the book around Guadalcanal, Americans won engagements that they shouldn't have on paper because of far superior leadership and planning, despite maybe lower overall "quality" in the enlisted men.
At the same time, American tolerance for causalities is super low. In the first island hopping campaign in the Marshalls, Toll makes a big deal about Americans losing ~2k dead taking Tarawa. Casualties are similarly low for much of the rest of the action of the book, including on Saipan and Guam. Even on Iwo Jima and Okinawa had only about 12k dead each. Compared to the Eastern Front, WW1, or even the Civil War, these are pathetic numbers that the media made a storm about. I don't mean to take these deaths lightly, but proportionally this is nothing. This attitude has only gotten worse (Vietnam, Iraq, Afganistan, current Iran war), and I think it makes it increasingly difficult to accomplish our geopolitical goals.
Battle of the Philippine Sea (the biggest carrier battle ever apparently) was kind of sad and anticlimactic. The Japanese pilots were so undertrained that they were shot out of the sky like turkeys by American aces. Earlier in the war, better pilots might have taken down quite a bit of the American Navy.
Complete and utter failure of Japanese intelligence and reconnaissance. The amount of times I read the words "surprisingly, the American fleet arrived undetected" was shocking, and indicates a lack of investment in code-breaking and reconnaissance by the Japanese leadership. Of course some of this was luck, but if something happens almost every time, it's not luck.
If you're interested in a window to the Japanese perspective, I would highly recommend the book Memoirs of a Kamikaze. The author, Kazuo Odachi, was one of extremely few surviving kamikaze pilots (he was sent on a kamikaze mission, failed to find any American ships, and returned to base; literally while he was on the runway for a second attempt, the war ended). It's short, and just his personal story, but that story is a very interesting one. He talks a lot about what the Japanese leadership looked like "from the inside" and why/how the Japanese soldiers were so fanatical.
It also includes some very interesting stories of his life adjusting to US-occupied Japan after the war, and what the country was like at this time -- you can imagine that going from kamikaze pilot to a defeated subject living at peace is not the simplest transition.
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Whenever there was rough material parity, the Japanese usually won. They often won while outnumbered. The Allies never achieved a feat like the Malaya campaign where they steamrolled a Japanese force that outnumbered or outgunned them. You see battles like Guadalcanal and it's always the same story. Allies: 60,000+ men. Japan: 36,200 men. Not exactly an impressive feat of arms, winning with more men!
Warrior spirit and elan really is important. What happened in Korea? The Chinese soldiers really wanted to win and that apparently is enough to compensate for having no armour, airpower, motorized supply, just being a light infantry force... They put North Korea back on the map with elan.
Sufficient firepower can overwhelm warrior spirit of course, supplies are obviously needed... At the end of the day it doesn't matter how you win so long as you do.
But look at Afghanistan! What did the Taliban have, exactly? Money? Weapons? Training? Numbers? Or was it just elan and will to win, determination and confidence in their values? I doubt 1 in 10 of our soldiers would tolerate fighting like the Taliban did, without medivac, without armour, without sophisticated training, without airpower, without all our advanced technology.
Certainly not for Aghanistan.
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Integeration into the native population.
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FWIW, I don't think this is exactly true, or at least I want to pick it apart a little. (Apologies in advance for the long tangent to your very interesting review, which I appreciate.)
At a minimum, I think physical courage is still important. However, I think that coolness under fire is an extremely important but less visible part of the virtue of courage, and recklessness has diminishing value in a modern war, while coolness has increasing value.
A sort of seemingly reckless courage could be pretty valuable in physical combat when rushing at someone with a pointed object could cause them to break and flee (this is why Surovov trained his troops on bayonet drills: at the time, troops rarely broke from gunfire alone, but bayonet charges usually resulted in one side or the other breaking before the lines made contact). However in modern warfare, instead of bayonets being "step 2" of a battle, they are more like "step 50" and the battle is usually decided before that point. Particularly in the naval and air category, reckless courage is not likely to "scare" the enemy due to the interpersonal nature of the conflict (although you might successfully bluff them), and it's likely to cause you to make a mistake while you are operating a complex piece of machinery. Whereas if you get rattled while operating a complex piece of machinery, you're going to operate less effectively.
Interestingly, naval air operations you mention in the book likely required more psychological resilience or courage than modern air combat (this is based on studies done during IIRC the Vietnam War that found that carrier landings caused more stress than taking enemy fire). So coolness is essential and being reckless means you'll wash out of the flight program or worse.
But coolness is less obvious an aspect of courage than conspicuous risk-taking. (Or, to put it another way, if you're in naval air operations or a submariner, the conspicuous risk-taking is already "baked in" - you're landing a plane on a boat! You're in a boat under the water!!)
I do think elan still has a place today. Something like the Maduro capture operation requires a certain amount of elan (literally, that means "dash," doesn't it?) and willingness to expose oneself to potentially hostile fire, and in certain circumstances (such as house-to-house combat) what seems like reckless courage can rise in value again: the guy who will actually charge you with a fixed bayonet in a crowded space may prevail against a dozen enemies where a more hesitant approach would fail.
I don't think "coolness" and "elan" are really opposites. (For instance, Taffy 3's actions off Samar I think seem like a good example of elan, but it also seems to me that it demonstrated considerable coolness under fire – but I'd be curious for your thoughts, since you're the one who's been reading the history, although I guess I'll have to wait until you read the next book?) I do think truly reckless bravery is simpler and perhaps more difficult than coolness under fire, because the latter requires more judgment. I think it's good that the idea of elan is still around, particularly in infantry units that are more likely to need to tap into that sort of tradition. I don't think elan is a replacement for strategy, doctrine, or proficiency – you cannot just decide that your collective path to victory is predicated on will alone. But sometimes it can be decisive for individuals. And I think the ideal warrior spirit would capture the essence of both, with the understand that sometimes right judgment might lead one to act with elan.
Overall I agree with everything you said. But I'd love to see a source for the following claim:
I really doubt this is true. I've been around naval aviators a bunch and never heard anyone say this. But there's a huge range of carrier landings (night, storm, low fuel) and a huge range of enemy fire (small arms, dog fight machine gun, SAM). I'm certain that an F8 landing on a carrier in a storm would be more stressful than the same pilot being shot at by an AK47 while on mission.
I haven't personally talked to anyone who could compare it to getting shot at. What I have heard firsthand is that night landings specifically are very stressful.
I was first exposed to it in the short Navy/Grumman recruiting piece/documentary "Sea Legs" which you'd probably enjoy (and isn't very long).
On a quick Google, you can also see it referenced here. Relevant excerpt:
I suspect part of the thing at play here might be that someone shooting a missile at you is both reasonably unexpected and something that is over fairly quickly – like a near-accident while driving. Landing on a carrier is something that you can anticipate (including, with reasonable precision, if it is going to be in e.g. low light conditions) and so you have more time to dread it.
Good to know, because you'd know better than me!
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I sometimes want to write a cynical version of the American war in the Pacific. We often get the "heroic" view, of daring pilots and fearless marines raising flags. But the cynical view starts with Japan as basically a 3rd world economy, stretched to the breaking point on long-range shipping, completely dependent on resource imports. The US starts with the completely broken Mark 14 torpedo as a result of institutional incompetance, but once they finally get a working torpedo, they quickly sink the entirety of the Japanese transport fleet, which had no defense at all. The home islands are left starving and quickly surrender. The entire "island hopping" strategy was a wasted effort except for propaganda purposes.
I know this is conventional wisdom, but that one always rubbed me the wrong way. It was obvious (even at the time) that the Americans had vastly more material resources- if Japan was going to have any chance at all of winning, they needed to win quickly. Pulling back experienced pilots to train new ones seems like a very American-centric way of thinking, that they'd be able to sustain a very long war with heavy casualties. They needed to repeat something like Pearl Harbour or Tsushima rapidly, not keep up in a war of attrition.
Making elite pilots trainers instead of meat is the right call in any conflict longer than a couple months. C'mon.
Takes longer than a couple months to train elite pilots! Those guys who died in Midway all had years of experience. I dont see any realistic way for them to replace that. If anything, they should have switched to Kamikazes sooner.
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These casualties aren't really low, they are just lower compared to the totalitarian regimes the western Allies were pitted against (and allied with). Looking only at the dead is misleading too, especially when comparing with fighting elsewhere, as both non-combat and psychiatric casualties among American forces were much higher in the Pacific than elsewhere.
The other factor is that America had entered the war with a deliberate strategy to center its industrial might rather than its population wealth. They chose the 90 division army rather than the 200 division army. The American economy that was able to produce endless amounts of Liberty ships, aircraft carriers, tanks, munitions, fuel, food, etc. was made conscious with a deliberate decision to run as close to the wire as possible with the manpower put into the field. With Europe being the primary focus almost right until the war's conclusion there, the Pacific theater commanders did not have an endless supply of bodies to throw into operations against the Japanese.
Sort of.
Through [Lend-Lease], the US sent the 2026 equivalent of almost $700bn to allies, mostly USSR and Great Britain. To the USSR alone;
And, from a logistical standpoint;
link
The heuristic I've seen is that the U.S. provided the equipment for something like 50 to as much as 100 "divisions" of the Soviet Army. The quibbles here are on doctrinal definitions vs reality of divisional sizes and readiness. I think that's all besides the point. Lend-Lease was a colossal operation and did represent the shifting of national resources away from our own armed forces. The 90 divisions weren't a result of a short fall of men or material, but a deliberate policy move.
Here's the official U.S. Army history on "The 90 Division Gamble" -- link
Arguing over division size and our ability to equipment them isn't a nerdy armchair general exercise. The American way of war since WW2 has been to simply overwhelm the opposing force with MORE of everything. Through the 50s and 60s, there was real fear that we might not be able to do this toe-to-toe with the Russians in Europe. We never got to that point. The largest conflict we did engage in at that time, Vietnam, resulted in American forces losing precisely zero engagements over about a company sized magnitude. Even the Tet Offensive was, militarily, a pretty handy defeat. The problem, of course, is policy and politics.
The United States loves to fight with one hand behind it's back for a whole host of shitty political reasons. A lot of it can be grouped under the umbrella term "optics" -- screaming babies, women and children running away from a burning village / town / city, our own soldiers coming back maimed or shellshocked. War is ugly and bad and Washington has developed the idea that it can be "managed" with policy to make it less and ugly and bad and, somehow, also just as "effective" (whatever that means).
Another culprit is the relationship between Civilian and Military leadership. "No" isn't a word you use with a superior in the military and that culture translates over to how they (Military leadership) "work" with Congress. There's a lot of pants-on-head retarded requests from Congress and even the President - "Can we do this with half as many troops? Or, wait, what about special operations ONLY? No planes. No artillery. Just secret ninjas!" And very few senior military leaders have the elan to dissuade the policy maker or executive on the other side of the table from his or her harebrained plan. Having worked with a few retired generals / admirals in my GovCon days, many of them say that being a general in today's military is a colossal let down. You aren't actually training, equipping, and commanding a division (or ship, or air wing), you're lobbying about budgets and base renaming bullshit in D.C. much of the time.
There is some interesting historical foreshadowing of this. Famous, General Marshall was in D.C. for most of World War 2 despite being, perhaps, more qualified that many (most?) of the field commanders in Europe / Africa. The problem was he was too valuable in terms of political ability to have him away for any large length of time.
All of this ties to the discussion of "warrior spirit" here. Outside of infantry and special operations units, I would content it doesn't exist in the U.S. military and hasn't in quite some time. We run a managerial military and it's the best in the world because we just have so. much. more of everything. Remember the old joke; after the U.S. Air Force, who has the second largest air force in the world? The. U.S. Army. The third? The U.S. Navy. The fourth? The Marines (I don't know if this last one is true anymore). But, like many "managerial" things, much of military decision making has been captured in a consensus-driven, consultant-corporateese style thinking.
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Great writeup. And now you definitely need to read Thunder Below.
I want to point out that 12,000 dead is actually a lot. Gettysburg saw 3,100 Union soldiers killed and maybe 4,700 Confederates. You might be thinking of casualty numbers.
More commentary to follow, maybe, but in short I think aversion to casualties is more complicated.
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