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Culture War Roundup for the week of September 19, 2022

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In my view, Putin's decision to invade has utterly wrecked his own medium-term objectives.

In hindsight, I was wrong to guess in February that Russia wouldn't be foolish enough to invade. I can see how, with Ukraine drifting toward the West, this might have been their best shot at returning them to the fold. Perhaps if the thunder run on Kyiv had gone differently, or Zelenskyy had fled, defenses might have collapsed. But I don't see any real scenarios where, failing to accomplish regime change within about a week, continuing to press would do anything except start the meat grinder and drive irreconcilable wedges between Russian and Ukrainian identities. I'm not a gambling man, but I can see how that might make sense to one. Retreating after 72 hours claiming troops "got lost" or something still seemed possible, and probably would have held off the firehose of Western materiel that they're unable to counter.

Since then, I've realized that my understanding of Putin's goals and methods was flawed, although I'm not sure what they should be. The current situation seems fairly unwinnable to Russia (and I don't see mobilization changing that -- there's pretty good photographic evidence that they've been scraping near the bottom of the Soviet stockpile for a while), and I can't personally explain any action other than an orderly retreat with their tail between their legs (compare the US retreat out of Afghanistan or Vietnam)

In hindsight, I was wrong to guess in February that Russia wouldn't be foolish enough to invade.

Oh, I was completely wrong on this point as well. After Putin's adventures in Georgia and Crimea, I expected that we'd see a repeat, salami-slicing a good chunk of the Donbass, but stopping there. I was stuck in the mental mode of "the previous tactics worked, let's repeat," while it seems obvious in hindsight that Putin's thinking was more "the previous probing tactics revealed Western weakness, let's escalate" and we got the thunder run on Kyiv.

Perhaps if the thunder run on Kyiv had gone differently, or Zelenskyy had fled, defenses might have collapsed.

I think you're right that this alternate timeline gets closest to a win for Putin. The Western response in reality was a panicked economic cancellation of Russia. In the alternate "quick Russian military victory" timeline, what changes when the West is presented with the fait accompli? What's the likelihood that the West simply accepts the result, maybe with a militarized border in Poland?

There are countervailing pressures in the alternate timeline--maybe a quick Russian victory makes Putin more of a threat, accelerating the economic/diplomatic responses in the same direction, but with more urgency. Alternatively, maybe the real timeline where Russia got bogged down, showing weakness, allowed for a more vigorous economic/diplomatic response, and full economic cancellation would be seen as too risky in the "stronger Russia" timeline.

Setting aside the details of the military situation within Ukraine, I think there are two big points that Putin has hard lost in the context of European politics. The first is diplomatic, with Sweden and Finland set to join NATO. The Finnish border was never friendly, but going full NATO is a stark rejection of Putin's publicly declared preferences. The second is more cultural/economic, with the collapse of the European Green movement, and in particular German efforts to figure out an energy strategy that is reliable and diminishes Russian influence.

I do not think that the European Green movement will collapse.

Apart from total collapse, the core of the Greens are insulated middle-upper class, academics and feminists. They were not massively popular from the beginning, but they can decide on policy thanks to the support of Washington and of media-friendly popular culture.

For instance, from the beginning of the war, the popularity of the Greens in Germany only grew.

I think there are two big points that Putin has hard lost in the context of European politics

Maybe it is not much but for me reading news about polls measuring approval of Russia was hilarious. In Poland it dropped to 3%.