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ApplesauceIrishCream


				

				

				
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ApplesauceIrishCream


				
				
				

				
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User ID: 882

Mostly right. The first group of beings under Eru Iluvatar were the Ainur, some of whom migrated to Middle Earth. The greater powers among the Ainur in Middle Earth became known as the Valar, which included Melkor (later Morgoth), Manwe, Varda, Aule, Yavanna, etc. The lesser powers among the Ainur were the Maiar, which included the original versions of Sauron, Saruman, and Gandalf under other names (Meiron, Curunir, and Olorin, IIRC).

The Istari (aka Wizards) were a group of five Maiar who were incarnated into human guises and sent to Middle Earth as the representatives of the Valar in response to the evils of Sauron (Saruman and Gandalf are the narratively most important of the Istari). Saruman vs. Sauron heads-up is probably a Sauron-wins, unless Saruman has the Ring, though both would be operating at non-peak Maiar power for different reasons. (After all, Sauron without the Ring pretty clearly had the upper hand mind-to-mind across the Palantir connection, and neither party should have a native advantage in that environment.)

Why would Evangelicals support raising taxes and undermining freedom of conscience when a different policy choice is better? It's not about 'betraying allies'--though that's usually something to avoid when possible--but that Evangelicals actually have an array of moral and ideological preferences in addition to ending abortion, and should logically attempt to satisfy multiple preferences simultaneously first.

Yes, expanding access through OTC contraceptives is a more modest approach, but it should also accomplish much of the stated policy goal.

The central thesis of HBD is that differing selection pressures produce divergent results between populations, and intelligence is one of the features that vary in this way. It's a pretty straightforward example of evolution, broadly understood.

The very word evolution means "change." Why would anyone consider a process of evolution to be static, immutable, unchangeable?

HBD does not claim there is no path out of the conundrum you observe. I'm not saying there are easy fixes--though I believe there are a great number of small policy changes that might produce results on the margin--but I'm baffled by the take that "HBD = nothing can change."

The way for average black IQ to rise is for black women to choose intelligent black men to father their children. This is not impossible.

This may result in minor damage to Obama's influence within the Democratic Party, since he was very supportive of Gay throughout this process. (Alternatively, it may be evidence of his influence weakening.) I'd be curious as to whether the plagiarism or the anti-Semitism was the decisive factor, as there are significant examples of each that the Party does not consider to be disqualifying.

My guess--for what it's worth--is that a faction within the Party found Gay's defense of anti-Semitism to be seriously objectionable, and tried to get her ousted on that basis before she could do more damage to Harvard's institutional reputation with elite employers. When this failed, the considerable evidence of her plagiarism was leveraged instead. Plagiarism is considered the highest of high crimes within academia, in theory (and even occasionally, in practice!), so Harvard decided it could not weather the purely academic hit to its reputation as well.

I agree that reform/secession/revolution describe something of a continuum of severity in approach, but I think there are practical breakpoints between them that create distinct concepts. In particular, successful secession usually results in at least two distinct polities where only one existed previously. In theory, the line between reform and revolution might be more fuzzy, though in practice I think most cases are readily classifiable. (One oddball case is the creation of the American Constitution, which I'd call a full revolution, not just reform, since the entire federal tier of government was rewritten in a way not authorized by the Articles of Confederation.) So I would not say that secession and revolution are basically the same--in the former but not the latter, the original form of government still exists, if over less land area.

Legitimacy is a central example of a concept that is socially constructed, which is certainly path-dependent and contingent, but not arbitrary. There are many arguments of one form or another that can shore up the legitimacy of an institution, but they are only effective to the extent that they are persuasive--people are perfectly free to disagree with and dismiss claims that they find insufficient.

You probably saw my comment in the AAQC thread a couple of days ago, where I mentioned this situation and linked to my original post. This is the only time I've reposted the analysis above.

Thank you for the nomination, and congratulations to all of our quality contributors!

If you will forgive a bit of self-advertising, a couple of months ago I wrote another comment about the Declaration of Independence in the context of justifying secession. I'd hoped that people might find it interesting, but then I managed to post it in the old CW thread after the new one had just gone up.

Edit to add: I have reposted the comment here.

I think Hanania's characterization there (the +1 in caring) is definitely pointing at a thing that exists, but I'd phrase it more like "argues about ideas." There has been a longstanding trend in Jewish communities to engage in an especially lively debate about abstractions, and this has been handed down through the generations by (IMO) mutually-reinforcing genetics and culture. Politics is all about picking which ideas get resources, so this is one context where a tendency to ideological combativeness is a natural fit. (This argument extends to the scientific method and Anglo-American jurisprudence, both of which are formed around the core concept of ideas and advocacy in conflict. Jews have also tended to do particularly well in those areas.)

I think a related suggestion might be plausible, but there's a complication.

In the US, the bulk of the pro-life movement is religious, specifically Christian. There are certainly many individual exceptions, but the major organizing groups are either church-affiliated or formally secular but largely staffed by Christians. Where abortion is concerned, the Catholic part of the movement and the Evangelical Protestant part are entirely on the same page, but there is no similar agreement on birth control. Opposing birth control is part of Catholic dogma, while Evangelicals generally have no moral problem with contraceptives, so long as they are used within the context of otherwise proper sexual ethics.

That said, Evangelicals very much support the right of Catholics to follow their consciences on the issue, even if they differ on the object-level question. Catholic opposition to taxpayer-funded contraceptives is a given, and Evangelicals usually have other ideological reasons for opposing "free" stuff. So you'd likely have very minimal organized Christian support for taxpayer-funded contraceptives.

However, Evangelicals (and many American conservatives in general) have supported a related measure for pretty much the exact reasoning you lay out above--rescheduling oral contraceptives from prescription-based to over-the-counter. I would not expect Catholic support for this type of measure, but at least it doesn't raise the same conscience issues as direct subsidy.

“The happy life is thought to be one of excellence; now an excellent life requires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. If Eudaimonia, or happiness, is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us.”

— Aristotle, “Nichomachean Ethics”, Datalinks

The most specifically challenging point of "The Star Spangled Banner" is that there actually is one weird trick that makes it easier to sing--at least for a soloist--that most people don't know. The third note of the song (on "say") is the lowest note you'll sing, so you want to start the song near the bottom of your vocal range.

It's pretty common for people to assume that the first note of a song is generally near the middle-ish of the necessary range, and choose their starting pitch accordingly, but this is a big trap here, leading to "free" being unreachable for most, when they are trying to fit the entire range of the song in the upper half of their own vocal range. "Free" gets most of the attention, but "say" is the first domino in the cascade--the "big range" of the song is mostly an illusion.

The "pound of flesh" was from Merchant of Venice, not Othello.

I've remarked before that I think the American Revolution should be more properly understood as an example of secession, not revolution. After all, the most famous document promulgating and defending the American position is the Declaration of Independence, and the choice of title is appropriate.

The part that comes before the famous "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." is the following:

"The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."

This is a document about secession and self-determination. Next is the really famous bit (I'm adding numbers in brackets to highlight an internal list):

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, [1] that all men are created equal, [2] that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, [3] that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

A clear statement of fundamental principles, but one key point later on is that Jefferson isn't claiming that these principles are a departure from English tradition, but that the Crown has been egregiously violating English tradition. The list doesn't end at three items:

"[4]--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, [5] --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

"Alter or abolish" covers many potential approaches, from reform to secession to complete revolution. Which approach is justified in which cases?

"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.

This, I think, is the start of the answer to your question--the right of self-determination in terms of fully reforming/seceding/revolting must reach a threshold of severity in terms of provocation. The reasons matter, and the weight of tradition matters. "Light and transient causes" are not enough, and so:

"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."

When there is a longstanding pattern of abuse aimed at fundamental liberties, some variation of reform/secession/revolution is justified, and even morally compulsory. Note that Jefferson is not merely concerned with rejecting the old, abusive system, but also the necessity of replacing the old system with a new government that will properly "secure these rights." He is justifying a transition from a very bad system to a better system--tearing down the old and stopping at anarchy is not acceptable.

"--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world...."

What follows is a bill of particulars, listing the offenses of the British Crown according to Jefferson, which amount to "a long train of abuses and usurpations...evinc[ing] a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism...." The details of this list are instructive, but outside the scope of this comment. After the list, Jefferson argues that the leadership of the American States has done its due diligence, and tried to fix the situation by attempts at reform, before proceeding to secession:

"In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

"Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends."

We have appealed to both the Crown and the British People for redress; neither provided it. As a result, we're walking away from this toxic relationship, but we're not going to kill your cat out of spite--we just want to go our own way. Note that Jefferson doesn't merely say that the behavior of the British Crown has been grievously bad, but that the American representatives have been particularly patient and prudent--there's an implied standard of conduct for the secessionists that continues in the final paragraph:

"We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

Jefferson wraps up with the final requirement for secessionists who are doing things correctly--you need to make your case. Not just that the suffered abuses have been so terrible, but also that you've tried lesser means and are only escalating when those means have failed, and that your judgment and restraint are being offered for consideration to both "the Supreme Judge of the world" and "the opinions of mankind." Are your reasons sufficient, or just "light and transient causes"? Do you have a plan for self-government, such that you can responsibly join the community of "Independent States"? Have you "Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms" and are you confident in the "rectitude of [y]our intentions"?

Any secessionist or revolutionary worth their salt will answer yes to those questions with confidence--such is human nature. But Jefferson clearly isn't claiming that 'we've investigated our own motives, and found them acceptable,' he's appealing to God and man to be his judges.

In my view, Jefferson adequately makes his case as to the justice of the American secession from Britain. I think other secessionary movements are a mixed bag--some meet the various thresholds of behavior and others do not. In this framework, there isn't an unfettered "right to self determination" by a given identifiable subgroup of a larger political unit, but extreme cases may present a duty to reform an abusive government, or seceed from it, or overthrow it.

A central tension within the concept of communication is between efficiency and precision. Larger lexicons and more complex signifier structures are less efficient to parse, but are better able to capture fine distinctions of meaning.

Even within a given language, this trade-off may be handled differently in different contexts. Jargon--properly used--is an example of domain-specific terms that are mostly not used outside that domain (something like an optional DLC for the base language), but have high precision within the native context. (It's the mark of a corrupted field of knowledge when the 'jargon' is used to obfuscate meaning, rather than identify a relevant concept precisely.)

The other end of the spectrum would be practically undefined interjections like "dude" for a Californian surfer. Tone, volume, affect, etc. carry all of the communicative weight, but this is acceptable because the intended expression is an emotive reaction to the given context--most people find it easy to distinguish between a cheerful greeting, a surprised reaction, dismayed disbelief, or judging censure--and the finer details are either not important or may be further clarified with additional words.

There were several comments that made the starting assumption that the pro-life movement in the US was solidly against birth control generally as well. This is untrue, hence my explanation above.

Let me define a few terms more tightly, while recognizing that they are sometimes (IMO) misused.

"Birth control" covers all methods of preventing, interrupting, or otherwise regulating pregnancy. "Contraceptive" is any method that prevents conception--the union of sperm and egg into zygote. Condoms and other barrier methods are examples. "Abortifacient" is any method that ends a pregnancy after the zygote is formed, including any method that prevents implantation in the uterus.

I'm aware that some hormonal birth control operates as an abortifacient by preventing implantation (Plan B, etc.), but the most common types of regularly-administered hormones (via pills, patch, implant, etc.) prevent ovulation. This would be a contraceptive, not an abortifacient.

My first QC! Thank you for the nomination; I think Mead's framework does a good job of capturing the competing strains of thought that inform American foreign policy. Congratulations to all of the nominees!

The Democrats got to 60 in 2008; it was part of the drama surrounding Obamacare. The first draft got 60 votes in the Senate on a vote of cloture, with Ted Kennedy supplying the 60th vote on his deathbed. A special election was held to fill Kennedy's seat after he died--not the usual process for filling a Senate vacancy, but the result of a cascade of political maneuvers and especially large amounts of irony--and Massachusetts elected Scott Brown, a Republican (!), who explicitly ran on a platform of blocking Obamacare. This caused great consternation in DC, and quite a lot of emergency brainstorming as to how to get the final package passed. The details are fascinating, if you like political/procedural trainwrecks.

Note, though, that the Democrats only got to 60 following two successive wave elections in their favor (2006 and 2008; GWB was extremely unpopular towards the end of his presidency). In the modern day, it's hard to get to 60. The Republican party should have a marginal advantage in the Senate, based on state-by-state political tilt, but they have routinely underperformed across the last several cycles.

Both dissents and (except in unusual cases[1]) concurrences have zero legal weight as precedent, though this needs a little further unpacking.

Formally, the Opinion of the Court is binding on lower courts, and is precedent to be followed or rejected by future Supreme Courts. The wiggle room is that a lower court may argue that an existing Supreme Court decision is distinguishable from the current case because of [reasons]; that explanation may vary wildly in ingenuousness. The Supreme Court has a fancy legal doctrine called stare decisis, which means that it's more important to be consistent than correct, though some Justices (Roberts) are bigger fans of the doctrine than others (Thomas).

Every opinion of any type can affect future legal development to the extent that the arguments therein are persuasive to future Courts. If a Court decides that a prior decision was in error, it may overturn the precedent by a simple majority, just like every other decision. Often, the dissents in the original case may provide the rationale for a later reversal, though the Court tends to change its institutional mind by individual retirement and replacement, rather than a particular Justice reversing his earlier opinion (though that too has happened).

Also, there is no formal difference between a 9-0 decision and a 5-4 decision. Both carry the full authority of the Court, so a 5-4 decision may overturn a 9-0, hypothetically. Informally, though, every judge can do the most basic of math and realize that a 9-0 decision is less likely to be overturned in a future case than a 5-4.

[1] You can have a situation where the Court splits 4-2-3 or the like on a given case, where the 4 and the 2 may agree on the outcome of a case (and the 3 disagrees), but they do not agree on a reasoning. The case would be resolved as a 6-3 decision as to the outcome, but with no reasoning, as no opinion carried a majority. That said, the lower courts would treat the 4 opinion as a strong hint, since it's the closest to a majority, even though the logic is not formally binding. The Justices try to avoid this outcome, if possible.

There's so much "it gets worse." On the one hand, they slip in references to at least medium-deep lore with no show-internal explanation, so only fairly invested Tolkien fans will even recognize that a point was being made, but on the other hand, you've got major lore-breaking points shoved in your face right and left that are obvious to more casual fans. (Was that a bit of casual flirting between Galadriel and Elrond? Did I just throw up a bit in my mouth?)

Like introducing a fourth Silmaril to support the 'origin' of mithril through philosophical dualism that is completely anathema to Tolkien and his works...and never once mentioning Feanor. Or the famous motto of the Numenoreans, "The sea is always right." Or the infamous teleporting armies problem straight out of GoT S8. Or the greatest smith of the Second Age having to be handheld through the concept of "this is an alloy," and the importance of (fuck me) and I quote "coaxing" metals together instead of "forcing" them.

They actually have disguised-Sauron describe his little "alloy" tip to Celebrimbor as "a gift." That only lands if you know that Sauron is supposed to be disguised as Annatar, the Lord of Gifts, BUT HE ISN'T! Who is that for?! The only thing I'm left with is that the Easter eggs hidden in the show are intended as calculated insults to fans of Tolkien's actual work. No presumption of charity can or should stand against the mountain of contrary evidence.

@FarNearEverywhere is welcome to her claim on the blood of the showrunners, but I would at least like to watch.

Assuming every Senate seat is filled, present, and voting, conviction and expulsion requires 67 votes, not 60. I don't think either party can get to 67 without either a reasonable fraction of bipartisan support or a truly enormous political upheaval (60 is difficult, but possible). In Biden's case specifically, the only way he gets expelled is if a big chunk of Democratic leadership decides to remove him; even in that case, I strongly believe they would engineer his resignation instead.

So, the members of the Court vote at conference, and the senior member of the majority side gets to assign the opinion (Roberts, as Chief, automatically has seniority, which is relevant if he's in the majority). The justice so assigned then writes an opinion, and so does any other justice that wishes to. Those opinions are circulated, and each other justice signs on to whichever opinion they choose, in whole or in part. Often, these opinions--especially the assigned-majority opinion--go through multiple drafts, which generally affect how much the other justices are willing to endorse. Once the process works its way out, you get final drafts of the various opinions, each with a holding (A wins/B wins) on the outcome of the case, and with the full or partial endorsements of the other justices.

After all of this is done, you can evaluate which side won, and which opinion holds the authority of the Court. If a majority of the participating members of the Court vote that side A wins, then that side wins. If there's a tie (possible with recusals or other absent votes), then the lower court decision stands. In terms of reasoning that holds precedential effect, look for any section in any opinion that is endorsed by a majority of the Court voting in the case. In particularly split cases, there may not be a reasoning that commands a majority at all, in which case the precedent is "side A wins, no specific reasoning controls."

Hypothetical: a case is heard, and at conference the vote is 6-3, with the three liberal women in the minority. Roberts assigns the opinion to himself. Following the drafting process, the Chief's opinion (A wins) is joined by Kavanaugh; Sotomayor writes for herself, Kagan, and Jackson that B should win; and Gorsuch writes for himself, Thomas, Alito, and Barrett that A wins, but on a different rationale than Roberts. In this case, A wins; there is no controlling rationale; but lower courts would give the most weight to Gorsuch's opinion as it has the most support, even if it isn't binding precedent on them.

The justices usually try to make sure that the hypothetical above doesn't happen, because it's not very useful guidance to the lower courts. It can happen, though, if the split between Roberts/Kavanaugh and Gorsuch et al. is sharp enough. In most cases, you'd at least get (for instance) Kavanaugh endorsing Section IIIA of Gorsuch's opinion, in which case you'd read "GORSUCH delivers the opinion of the Court as to Section IIIA, joined by THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, and an opinion as to sections I, II, IIIB, IIIC, and IV, joined by THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT...etc." The key phrasing is "the opinion of the Court" vs. "an opinion."

It's true that all of the detail above is the product of centuries of tradition, but the core is rock solid--the Court is a body made of equal-voting members. A simple majority speaks for the whole. If the Chief cannot get four supporters, he's just another guy with an opinion, but if any member of the Court gets four others to agree, they speak for the Court itself.

(Roberts is rather famous for his Obamacare decision in which zero members of the Court joined his opinion in full. Four members joined part of it, and the other four joined the rest, so his full opinion had five votes in each part, but they weren't the same five votes.)

Ah! I was unaware--thanks for the link.

Says me, on the basis of a vast amount of American political history, and the knowledge of what happened in Massachusetts in the 2000s. The usual process for filling a Senate vacancy is the appointment of a replacement by the Governor, and that appointment lasts until the next even-year November election. This is the well-known procedure in most states, both now and for the past several decades at a minimum. There are exceptions; they are unusual.

In 2004, Massachusetts had a Republican Governor (Mitt Romney, as it happens) and a Democrat supermajority in the state legislature (an odd combination, but not unheard of in Massachusetts). Anticipating the vacancy of John Kerry's Senate seat if he won election to the Presidency that year, the legislature amended the procedures for filling a Senate vacancy over Romney's veto, stripping him of his appointment power, and calling for a special election to fill the vacancy temporarily. As far as I'm aware, the legislature definitely had the power to do exactly that, but it was also an obvious political power play, and calling such "(legal) shenanigans" is defensible.

This power play did not pan out as expected. First, Kerry lost the Presidential election in 2004, so no Senate vacancy was had. Second, Romney was succeeded by a Democrat, Deval Patrick, in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Third, Ted Kennedy provided the next vacancy by dying in office in 2009. Shortly before his death, Kennedy persuaded the Massachusetts legislature to re-empower the Governor to appoint a temporary replacement pending the results of the special election. While Patrick could (and did) appoint a Democrat to replace Kennedy, the people of Massachusetts picked a Republican, Scott Brown, in the special election. Brown's election dropped the Democrats' Senate majority from 60 to 59, triggering the next round of drama in DC.

Had Massachusetts followed the "usual process" in filling the Kennedy vacancy, Patrick's nominee would have continued in office for several more months until the next general election in 2010, maintaining the Democrats' 60-vote Senate majority for that period. That this did not occur was the ironic result of political gamesmanship on the part of the Massachusetts state legislature.

My expectation is that Jackson's jurisprudence will be most similar to Sotomayor's on the current Court, though with the usual caveat that this is a condensed model, and even justices that are close to each other will still come down on opposite sides of some cases. This sort of left-to-right mapping tends to be most predictive in high-profile cases where the issue is graspable by non-lawyers, but more obscure areas can produce lineups that appear to be almost random.

It's also important to note that the most common lineup has not changed--it is still 9-0.

Catwoman is a particularly interesting example of race-swapping, because her actresses were white, white, black, white, black, white, white, and mixed black/white. The first black Catwoman was Eartha Kitt, in the final season of the Adam West Batman TV show, taking over from Julie Newmar (TV) and Lee Meriwether (movie). Catwoman was white again when Michelle Pfeiffer played her in Batman Returns; then back in black when Halle Berry played her in Catwoman; white with Anne Hathaway in The Dark Knight Rises; still white with Camren Bicondova in Gotham; and most recently split the difference* with the mixed black/white Zoe Kravitz in The Batman.

In the live-action versions, Catwoman has firmly established a pattern of inconsistency on the question of her race. Eartha Kitt's portrayal was still part of the original live-action Batman franchise, and was long enough ago that if it was influenced by politics, it wasn't modern politics. (Plus, Kitt could chew the scenery with the best of them, and the Adam West era was extremely camp.) Berry and Kravitz can be fairly described as continuing the legacy of Kitt, rather than an appeal to Modern Audiences (/echo effect); there hasn't been a one-way racial ratchet, as Catwoman has switched back and forth multiple times; and given that Gotham is a major metropolis (no pun intended), any ethnicity is reasonably plausible.

*Technically, for the second time. Halle Berry is usually described as a black actress, but she's the daughter of an interracial black/white couple, like Zoe Kravitz.

Sadly, Christopher Tolkien died on Jan. 16th, 2020. The silver lining is that he never had to see Amazon's desecration of Middle Earth. RIP to JRRT's first and best editor.

The generation after Chris has been...less protective of their grandfather's literary estate.