Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Dean
Flairless
20hr ago
But whatever-- there's no point in fighting about who started it.
If there wasn't a point of who started it, you wouldn't have made the claim that was a proof of a lack of care of norms. That you are retreating from defending it is less an indication that there is no point, and more that it was a indefensible bailey you are retreating to your motte from once challenged.
It may have been a disposable soldier of an argument, but it was still a soldier you were happy to have fighting for your framing.
Okay. No_one posted their case, and it was not the one I was originally thinking of but one I am aware of.
This is one of the case which Ivan Katchanovski likes to cite as proving his Euromaidan-culpability false-flag thesis that he's spend his last decade publishing on. His inclination to refer to parts of it is directly correlated to how the contents support his thesis that the government was falsely accused for shooting protestors. For example, Katchanovski likes to gloss over section seven, and particularly the Court's scope exclusions that begin on page 13 noting-
- all instructions about the alleged commission of criminal acts by other persons named in both indictments, who were not charged and whose guilt was not proven in a legal manner and was not established by a guilty verdict of the court, in particular, aimed at the commission of a terrorist attack combined with mass murders, to stop and violent dispersal of protest actions, planning, preparation, giving and execution of criminal orders, instructions and commissions for this purpose;
Aka, any action not found guilty in a Ukrainian court of law is excluded from the verdict.
Which, in a steelman, is defensible in the judicial process, but not necessarily in a truth-seeking process where whether something happened as opposed to whether it was proven in a court of law. Particularly when the court of law approach might be complicated by things such as known evidence destruction or defection of key witnesses / perpetrators to a country outside of the court's jurisdiction, like Russia.
As such, Ivan Katchanovski is inclined to ignore, not comment on, or push past the court record's acknowledgement of an unproven-but-not-disproven, but highly relevant claim, of-
- as an unproven reference to receiving in the period from February 18 to 20, 2014 PERSON_376 a task from the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare for the commission of a terrorist attack and mass intentional murders, giving his consent to perform such a task personally and by organizing its execution by RSP fighters;
- as an unproven reference to receipt in the period from 08 h. 30 min. until 9 a.m. 00 min. On February 20, 2014, PERSON_376 was charged with a criminal order by the RSP forces, who were on the street. Instytutska, to carry out intentional murders in a generally dangerous way of the maximum possible unspecified circle of activists with the aim of intimidating them in order to completely stop the protests, as well as the fact of prior coordination with the commander of the PMOP of the tactics of actions of the RSP fighters for this purpose, a reference to the execution by PERSON_31 of the specified order when he , started on February 20, 2014 at approximately 8:00 a.m. 50 min. coordinate the withdrawal of units and special vehicles;
- as an unproven indication that all the accused in the period of February 18, 19 and until 08:00 a.m. 30 min. On February 20, 2014, in fulfillment of a clearly criminal order, they exceeded their authority and official powers, participated in the commission of a terrorist attack, committed the intentional murders of two or more persons, attempted such murders, or prepared for such actions;
- as an unproven reference to the purpose of giving PERSON_376 a clearly criminal order on the morning of February 20, 2014 to the subordinate fighters of the RSP specifically to commit a terrorist act.
I.e., an alleged- but never proven and thus disregarded for this court's purposes- core thesis of the 'government false flag' theory.
Now, Person_376 is not one of the person-descriptors identified in no_one's document. But, in short, the RSP were one of the armed elements in the Maidan Protestors, who were generally in the back / the deterrence for the police to charge and clear the square by force. Their existence / presence is about as old as Euromaidan itself. One of the sniper attacks on the morning of 20 Feb came from a building they had a heavy presence in, which is what this court case is about, which is also old news.
The anti-Euromaidan propaganda narrative is that these RSP key actors were Euromaidan provocateurs / foreign agents (of western powers) who staged in waiting for orders to conduct a false flag attack against Euromaidan protestors to blame the Yanukovych government and escalate the situation, with the intent to bring about the consequence the collapse of Ukrainian government as ended up happening.
The pro-Euromaidan propaganda narrative is that these RSP key actors were Ministry of Interior provacateurs / agents who were staged in waiting for orders to conduct a false flag attack against Euromaidan protestors to blame the protestors and escalate the situation, with the intent of suppressing the protests as part of the broader Ministry of Interior crackdown buildup, but which had the unintended consequence of collapsing the Ukrainian government as ended up happening.
Both pro- and anti-Euromaidan narratives are largely in agreement that the RSP key actors at the center of this case were staged false flag elements waiting for orders to conduct a false flag attack against Euromaidan protestors to escalate the situation, with the consequence of collapsing the Ukrainian government as ended up happening.
The difference in whose false-flag agents they were, and the intended result of the orders.
The court case doesn't take a position on this distinction, but Ivan Katchanovski likes to insinuate it does, and he is one of the main Reputable Scholars (TM) for the Euromaidan Is To Blame propaganda narrative.
If this is the case I am thinking of, it doesn't actually attribute the maidan sniper who was behind the protestor lines to the right sector, but rather places the sniper in a building they (and a lot of other people, iirc) were in (and out of) regularly. Which is not new-news, and has been a part of both* false-flag-sniper theories for some time.
*As both police and protestors were reported shot by snipers during the 20 February violence the tipped Euromaidan crisis into its resolution, both the pro-Euromaidan and anti-Euromaidan narratives have their own variation of 'the other side used a false flag sniper to shoot their own side and the other in order to make them feel the victim and escalate the crisis to its tipping point.' This has included the long-known point that one of the sniper firing points was from a building on the protestor side, which Ukrainian forensics verfied shot into the protestors facing the security forces from the rear.
The pro-Euromaidan theory is that the shooter was part of a covert government sniper to shoot both protestors and some police to force and legitimize the government crackdown the SBU had been advocating and setting groundwork for. The anti-Euromaidan theory is that it was a protestor-aligned provacateur, and while they agree that it was to escalate the crisis, this line of argument over time has increasingly downplayed / ignored the shooting of the police as well, which was the initially the line of argument 'proving' it was protestor snipers and that police were just protecting themselves.
(As I said- both attributions more or less agree that a false-flag sniper attack to shoot both sides was planned and conducted to escalate the crisis. Few argue that both sides coincidentally carried out their sniper plans on the same day.)
The building's primary relevance to either argument is as an argument to incredulity of if a government covert effort could get into a protestor building, and then escape in the chaos of the escalating violence outside. Pro-Euromaidan narratives don't find that unreasonable, and anti-Euromaidan narratives view it as so unreasonable that protestor-provacateur is the only remaining option. It tends to be the same sort of incredulity argument that maintains to this day that the Americans bombed the Nord Stream pipeline.
I had a larger post discussing some of the context of the 20 Feb snipers and post-Maidan propaganda dynamics, but then I realized there was a chance he was speaking of another court case I wasn't thinking of.
Dean
Flairless
1d ago
Bernie would not have won regardless of what the DNC did.
Sure, though whether his wing would have won the nomination is besides the point to whether his wing would have won a stronger and more prominent place in the administration that followed. But there's losing a fair contest, and there's losing a rigged contest, and there's losing a contest the managers swear is fair but then get exposed for rigging. @FirmWeird recalls some additional shenanigans I'd forgotten of exposed DNC issues.
The issue isn't mitigated because 'well, the Bernie wing wouldn't have won the nomination anyway.' That's a results-focused paradigm that only cares about the winner. A large part of the point of democratic contests is to persuade the losers of the election of the legitimacy of their defeat, so that they can work together afterwards. A betrayal of trust that doesn't actually change the results is just as bad for the people it disillusions as a betrayal that does change the results, the only difference is the degree or number of people it disillusions.
Whether Sanders would have built momentum after a better super Tuesday is a fair question. But it was a question that could not be answered because of deliberate efforts to prevent it from being asked.
And preventing it from being asked had tangible and visible effects on the trajectory of the Democratic Party, upto and including how rather than increase the leverage and influence of the economic-left/populist wing of the Party (the Bernie wing), the Biden consolidation then led to Biden compromising with the culture-left wing of the party, such as on DEI and trans-issues. This included manning decisions such as his promise to have a woman as his vice president, which followed progressive stack logic which led to Harris, who was a disaster.
I'm not making a claim that if everyone else had stayed in but Warren dipped out for the good of the populist-left then Bernie Sanders might have become Vice President. But the nature of a proportional representation system is that the people with the bigger proportions of the voter base get more influence in forming the next government, and if you want a coalition of people bought into the premise, conspiracies that their efforts are being conspired against don't exactly lead to inter-party trust, and do lead to the sort of inter-party conflict that followed.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
Probably one of the worst short-term political play decisions in modern American politics on the part of the Democrats and their allies in the media.
Romney was, and probably will be remembered as, the last major Respectability candidates of the early 21st century Republican party. He was a compromise candidate who was about the best possible synthesis of red tribe considerations and blue tribe value, a Republican who was willing to accept the legitimacy in part of blue tribe framings, and cared about their opinions. He wasn't a perfect candidate for the Republican base, but a man that- outside of a specific election cycle- had a generally consistent reputation as virtuous, even if you disagreed. It was about as close to a synthesis of red tribe and blue tribe as you could hope for, even down to sincerely practicing affirmative action and having an adopted african-american grandson.
The character assassination of Mitt Romney- among which Democratic Senate Majority Harry Reid later defended with "We won, didn't we?"- was probably what I'd point to as the breaking moment where the Republican base revolt that became the Trump-MAGA movement began.
MAGA was in part a revolt against the Republican elite, including significant disatisfaction against Romney for not fighting back. The Republican party's commissioned autopsy that argued the party needed to move decisively to the left made that revolt worse. But almost as importantly the Obama '12 campaign discredited the argument by Republican centrists/moderates, and media commentators more generally, that what the red tribe needed to be treated with respect was to present a respectable candidate.
Romney was the candidate, and was still slandered and jeered. Virtue- and especially virtue as recognized by the media establishment that joined in the jeering- wouldn't be recognized when during an election cycle. And if virtue would not be recognized, nor would it be sufficient to win even if not recognizeed, then appeals to virtue were going to lose support compared to appeals to fight back.
Which, of course, Trump was happy to do... but Trump wouldn't have won without a disillusioned Republican base that no longer responded to appeals to respectability like Romney was willing to.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
If that song lives in my head from now on whenever I hear JFK, I'm blaming you.
Not in the way it did, but easily in a recognizably similar way.
The Arab Spring revealed systemic issues that were underway well before 9-11, and which would have remained primed for violent escalation even without the American invasion of Iraq. People like to focus on how ISIS had an Iraq power base, but are less inclined to note the series of uprisings against the Assad dynasty or Saddam regime, or how the fruitseller in Tunisia who figuratively and literally lit the match was responding to bog-standard petty tyrants common across the region. Names and places would have changed, but the Middle East would still be a tinder box primed to start major- or even larger- humanitarian crisis. Iraq-Iran alone could light Syria in a different way, if an fruit-seller riot spreading to Iraq led to crackdown on the Shia majority when the Iranian paramilitary capability is already present across the region.
In turn, nothing about the Arab Spring divergences would have really changed the African inflows, or the Russian incentive to use humanitarian border rushes via Belarus, or so on. Deviations might change election cycles, but not fundamental drivers.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
Ah, but he was sexy and had lots of sex. Women wanted him, and men wanted to be him.
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
The impression I got from the 2016 and 2020 primaries was that he lost because he wasn't popular enough with Democratic primary voters to win a national race
During the 2020 Democratic primaries, Bernie was positioned to pull a 'biggest minority in a divided field' win in the Super Tuesday primaries, where he was outpolling most competitors. This was after a strong early showing in contests, where to date Biden had been underperforming. This biggest-of-a-divided-field was notably the way Donald Trump started building momentum in the early 2016 Republican primary, where he never won a majority. The momentum-value of the primary win is what provided the growth opportunity in attention, endorsements, and so on that ultimately allowed Trump to win in 2016.
In 2020, things might have been different for Bernie since he was posed to do well on Super Tuesday, but do very poorly in later conferences where Biden had strong alliances with the southern black political machine Democratic parties. The Bernie party wing's bet was that they could leverage the momentum in early wins to build endurance and carry the campaign past this predictable barrier, where it might then open back up to a more even primary split once it went to more progressive regions.
The reason this didn't happen wasn't because Bernie's popularity dived, but because nearly all the major Democratic candidates at the time pulled out of the race and endorsed Biden, rather than split the field. Biden didn't get more popular as much as he had less competition for the centrist party vote, and so was able to win these early contests, and then cement victory with the Southern wing conferences, and thus cement the win. This was widely seen at the time as the Democratic establishment, which is to say Obama wing of the party that dominated at the time, pulling strings and applying pressure to the candidates who dropped out in favor of Obama's former VP.
Where the ass fuckery charge comes in is not only the Party establishment coordination in stage-managing the primary pool to shape primary outcomes, but also/especially the caveat of 'most' people pulling out. One of the main candidates who did not pull out at the time was the only one who was splitting Bernie's vote more than Biden's vote. Elizabeth Warren was also running on the progressive/left-wing track, despite herself having no chance to beat Biden either. This was likewise thought to be a quid-pro-quo of sorts between Warren and Biden, with Warren's network getting plenty of key postings in the administration. Had the left united behind Bernie, who was far less of a party man than Warren, it would have been the Bernie wing getting such posting potential during negotiations.
Combined, this was broadly seen as a two-part betrayal by the Bernie-left. It was a broader DNC betrayal of the Obama wing picking favorites to maintain its primacy in the party rather than letting voters pick via the nominal primary purpose, but it was also a betrayal by the more party-institutionalist Warren-left, who sabotaged a bigger left momentum in favor of selling out for postings and influence.
I'd submit an underlying root of the fear Trump inspires for many people is the fear of a lack of control.
This isn't a claim about what those people would claim as their cause of fear. This is more of a claim about a distinction between an artifact-level expression of something, which might have its own rational, and the underlying cultural dynamic that underpins such an expression. In the same way that people don't feel the monsters in horror movies as much as they fear the [primal fear of being hunted], where the monster is merely the artifact to express the underlying fear, people fear the sense of a [lack of control] more than actual policies they don't like.
It's not exactly a novel premise that the fear of losing control is associated with a variety of disorders that generally amount to various expressions of stress, anxiety, and (bad) attempts to compensate. Generalized anxiety disorder is characterized by a consistent state of worry, anxiety, and catastrophizing worst-case scenarios. Obsessive compulsive disorder is generally linked to constant intrusive thoughts and the corresponding efforts to mitigate them. Panic disorder goes with the fear of having another panic attack, and 'control' is re-asserted by trying to avoid the triggers that might lead to another panic attack... even though the existing psychological reference of overcoming trauma suggests that avoiding triggers can make issues worse.
Now, there are separate arguments/posts that could be made about whether [current society] dynamics make these sort of things worse. Whether dominant domestic political propaganda narratives by less-than-non-partisan mass media over the last decades might have accidentally encouraged anxieties, catastrophizing, or so on. Whether COVID pandemic policies and lockdown advocacy, which became partisan-coded in the US, might have had unintended consequences for the psychological health of large parts of the population. We've certainly had good effort posts by Motte posters in the past of how social contagion dynamics have shaped or propagated various cultural obsessions, and pathologies, associated with the worst of various culture war elements. Those arguments exist, but they aren't the argument here.
The argument here is that the fear of a loss of control is not just a real fear, but an underlying theme of a lot of fears, and that Trump rides that line in how he breaks people's world views of how the world works, and the sense of control it provides.
This part gets into the overlap of politics and psychology, which can come uncomfortably close to pathologizing your opponents, so please bear with me as I try to make more general points.
One of the individual human psychological needs is a sense of agency / autonomy, which require a degree of control. This is a pretty consistent theme research about how higher employee sense of autonomy correlates with job satisfaction, the esteem stage of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and the commercial applications/implications of player agency in video game design. Control is not the same thing as agency or even security, but they are overlapping dynamics. What it boils down to is simple: people don't like feeling helpless, and one of the aspects of being helpless is not having the power to control your context. It's the difference between having to stay put and take abuse, or being able to choose to walk away.
One of the less obvious aspects of this desire for a sense of control is that it does not have to be directly exercised by the individual, but can be 'outsourced' to other people or even other things. This is a function of what we call trust. A child does not need to be strong enough on their own to face the scary thing, but can cry for their parent, whose presence is reassuring despite the child's own agency not increasing. You can feel safer having a drink in public if you can trust that a friend, or even just a taxi driver, will get you home safer. Note this also can work in the inverse- whether you feel safe or uneasy in a neighborhood can come down to social trust.
Where this starts to interface with politics is the now often-underrecognized dynamic between citizens and chosen leaders who represent. This used to be much more explicit in the Roman patria system, which was a cornerstone of roman society and politics alike. Patria was a patron-client relationship in which reciprocal obligations linked the patron and the client, with client's support/subservience being in return for the patron representing their interests in issues ranging from legal courts to career prospects and so on. A key dynamic of this relationship, however, is that while it could be inherited, it could also be changed- the client who was not served by their patron could, in theory, shift to another patron. The reciprocal obligations of patria are long gone, and the premise is often downplayed or reframed in service of egalitarian cultural biases of western democracies, but you can see it in campaigns where candidate vows to fight for you on X issue. This is an appeal for outsourcing your sense of control to your chosen leader. You may not have the agency, but the politician does, and so a [sense of control] can still be maintained.
What is less obvious about this less-obvious political extension outsourcing the sense of control is that it can also extend to hostile actors.
There is plenty of research associating a conspiratorial mindset with a sense of control, which has a long and diverse history of exaggerating the influence and efforts of hated outgroups to frame them as far more powerful than they actually are. This has expressions in things like the joke about the Jew who reads the Nazi news paper to feel good about how powerful they are, but it also has less comical expressions in exaggerating elements of truth into absurdities. To pick an American-salient example, Russia certainly does spy on the US, and Russian troll farms do try to escalate the culture war, but it is more misleading than informative to claim that the Russians are the cause of American political polarization. Sometimes these are done for purposes of cynical deflection- it's easier for the Clinton wing of the Democratic Party to blame Russian interference for losing the 2016 election than Clinton's long history of doing Clinton-like things- but sometimes these sort of explanations go back to the psychological need for a sense of control even when it's clear you aren't the one with it.
Step back to the field of antisemitic conspiracies. This is a very old genre, and occasionally it gets very absurd. There is, for example, a reoccurring minor news story in the arab middle east of birds being detained (arrested, if you will) in rural areas on suspicion of being Israeli spies. While it is true that the Israelis have considerable espionage capabilities- that grain of truth referenced before- to date there is no reporting I am aware of that has ever validated the conspiracy as opposed to the far more mundane explanation. Israeli universities in Israel tag wild animals as part of research, and then release, and then the birds go where they will across the reason, carrying those tags. There is no reason for the birds to be in that particular country where it is detained.
One one hand, this conspiracy is silly. On the other, if we step back to the [sense of control] framing, it makes a fair deal more sense. The arabs in the broader levant are not exactly known for being high agency societies. Many are in uncontested monarchies or functional military dictatorships that are uncontested because of very established, and often very brutal, security apparatus that stamp on the sort of agency that goes against the state. Nor are they exactly in patria relationships with leaders who do have that sort of agency. There are certainly patronage relationships, but if the Arabs had the sort of regional agency and control they wanted, Israel wouldn't exist. They are people without direct or even delegated agency.
In this context, the [Israeli bird] is a demonstration of a lack of control. Despite their inability to impose upon the state of Israel, here is an artifact from Israel that is able to intrude upon them. They did not know it in advance. They were not able to stop it from occurring. And, well, everyone knows what the Israelis can get up to if they want. The [Israeli bird] could be such a thing. It's presence is a demonstration of helplessness and threat.
Except... by being an Israeli spy bird, a sense of control is being re-imposed via framing paradigm. The bird is not an aimless or chaotic event of chance, but an agent. That agent implies agency on the part of its jewish masters. One may not know the insidious jewish plan, but there can still be a plan. One may hate the control of the perfidious jew, but malign Jewish influence means that someone has some control over things. Even if control is held by a hated outgroup, it still validates the sense that there is control. It's just a contest/conflict of who has control, and how to wrest control back.
This is not a novel or Arab-specific issue. The conflict over the nature of the locus of control of society is a very longstanding paradigm conflict. Our departed Hlynka would occasionally write in his inferential difference series about how it manifested in the western enlightenment as part of the philosophical difference of enlightenment thinkers. The distinction between whether the loci of control of society is fundamentally internal or external, deriving from one's self or subject to imposition from outside context which could be controlled. This has longer arguments about how the [post-enlightenment left] tends towards the external locus of control theory which asserts you can control broader context, and the [post-enlightenment right] leans more towards an internal locus of control because you cannot control outside context, but that's non-central to this.
What I want to go back to is that other political conspiracy, and Trump specifically.
I made a point earlier that the Russian interference narrative could be cynically boosted as a means of blame deflection. Clinton and her wing of the party would rather attack her enemies / blame the Russians / hurt Trump than concede that she was a bad candidate. But cynical deflection isn't the only dynamic in play- it can also go back to the point of 'hostile control is better than no control.'
If Trump is an enemy of the nation, after all, by conspiring with Russia- something that the Democratic party convinced about half of Americans about- then control may have been usurped, but it fundamentally still exists and can be regained. Hence the resistance, the mass organized protests of the mostly peaceful variety, and of course The Secret History Of the Shadow Campaign That Saved The 2020 Election. The later was an actual conspiracy- or prospiracy if you will- of government officials, party officials, media interests, protest organizers, NGOs, activists, and more to coordinate efforts to change laws, manage protests, shape media coverage and all the other efforts done to Fortify Democracy and Save the Election. This very classic 'sense of control' mentality, and neatly aligns with the sort of world view that might sincerely believe that Trump conspired with Russia.
By contrast, if Trump did not conspire with Russia- if he literally came down that escalator and then proceeded to demolish a number of nation-dominating political dynasties who people felt had been in control- or nearly in control- for the better part of a quarter century, winning primarily because of how hated the party and political leaders were... and because no one operating within the rules could stop him... even as the Trump administration was an endless cycle of chaos and turnovers and a lack of organizational discipline...
Well, that's a victory of a lack of control.
But- for a time- the sense of control was restored. The election was Fortified. Covid was Locked Down. The Adults were Back in Charge. Trump was impeached (again), in court (again), and more reliable sense-of-control allies were being propped up in the Republican party. Liz Cheney was being set up to try and re-establish control of the Republican Party, so nothing like Trump could happen again, and the experienced hand of Biden meant the US was back in control.
And then everything stopped being under control, and Trump came back and smashed the 2024 election beyond a shadow of a doubt, and the sense of control was loss even more than it was with Trump 2016.
And if there's something people fear in general, it's a lack of control.
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
Dean:
"Male audiences might not want modern Hollywood female lead character because Hollywood writers often insinuate the woman of the show doesn't [want] them in her life."
Oomph. I'm glad that post resonated with someone, but shamed I had such a bad gap in the opening statement. Shamed!
(I fixed it.)
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
You are grammatically confused. The statement you quoted is referring to the RSP, in the section of the Euromaidan protest area they were associated with, not the police and the government area of control.
The court case also establishes that the RSP person of interest, suspected of leading the RSP shooting from areas not under control of the police, has been accused of- though not proven to be in an Ukrainian court of law- having been secretly under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.
Shooting from areas not under the control of the police is what is implied by an accusation that shooters were presenting themselves as protestors, from positions within the protestor areas of control, having been serving a nominal role for the protestors within the protestor area for some time, until directed into action by the Ministry of the Interior to conduct a terror attack for anti-protestor purposes.
There is no requirement that the executors of a false flag terrorist attack in service of the government have to walk outside of the protestor area of control, to the government area of control, before they begin shooting.
Thank you for identifying nationalism as a motive you consider acceptable for shooting the protestors. I will even agree with you that it was probably easier for the Ministry of Interior to find fanatics in Ukraine, even if the nationalistic fanatics for a MOI-conspiracy would probably be nationalists more associating national interest with Russia than the Europeans. This is a motive compatible with the allegations of that elements of a far-right movement were secretly responsive to the Ukrainian security state aligned with Russia and opposed to geopolitical alignment with the decadent euro-liberals.
The translated excerpts also show what these people were doing in the days before that 5:30 AM shootings, which is what you quoted and appear to be trying to framing a rebuttal to was referring to.
That is rather the heart of the point. The other part of the point is that these same words, word for word, apply to both conspiracies, as does the data of the court case.
The court documents you yourself pointed to as evidence of your framing do not prove, disprove, or try to address one false flag conspiracy theory over the other. The contents of the document are just as compatible with the anti-Euromaidan narrative false flag conspiracy theory (that the RSP were protestors unafiliated with the government, and wanted the government to be attributed as responsible in the chaos) as the yare with the other pro-Euromaidan narrative false flag conspiracy theory (that the RSP were protestors who were secretly affiliated with the government, who wanted the protestors to be attributed as responsible in the chaos).
The court documents do not provide distinguishing evidence. It does not provide differentiation between long-standing competing hypothesis. They raise data on how a false-flag attack was carried out, not why a false flag was carried out or in whose service.
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