site banner

Culture War Roundup for the week of March 10, 2025

This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.

Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.

We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:

  • Shaming.

  • Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.

  • Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.

  • Recruiting for a cause.

  • Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.

In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:

  • Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.

  • Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.

  • Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.

  • Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.

On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.

5
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

In 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the UK and the US signed the Budapest Memorandum. The short version is that Ukraine destroyed its Soviet nukes, and in return, the signatories pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine and support actions in the Security Council if it should ever be threatened by nukes.

In 1994, this seemed like a good deal. The cold war was over, Ukraine likely did have more urgent spending priorities than a nuclear weapon program and the rest of the world, both the nuclear powers and the others were glad to keep the number of nuclear powers limited. Wars of conquest seemed a thing of the past. While the US engaged in some regime change operations (most of which turned out rather terrible, tbh), in the 1990s the idea to expand your territory through war seemed basically dead.

The rule-based world order was a higher, better equilibrium, just like most people would prefer to live in a country where weapons of war are controlled only by a small group of mostly decent people to living in some failed state where many people carry an assault weapon for the simple reason that many other people carry an assault weapon.

Putin's invasion made some serious cracks in that vision of a rule-based world order (which was always perceived to be strong in Europe), but Trump II basically broke it. Under Trump, the US can not be relied to punish defectors from the rule based system, and might not even relied to provide nuclear retaliation for nuclear attacks on NATO members.

The best time for Ukraine to restart their nuclear weapons program would have been when Russia defected from the Budapest Memorandum by annexing Crimea in 2014, before Russia was ready for a full scale invasion. I think it would have been technically feasible. An experienced Soviet nuclear weapons engineer who was 40 in 1990 would have been 64 in 2014. Ukraine also runs a lot of civilian nuclear reactor and has its own Uranium deposits (which would come in handy once they quit the NPT, because this might make acquiring fuel on the world market difficult). WP claims they even have enrichment plants.

In general, figuring out how to make nuclear weapons is something which took a good fraction of the world's geniuses in the 1940s, but has become much simpler since then. Getting an implosion device to work just right is something which would likely be helped a lot by high speed cameras and microelectronics, and a few decades of Moore's law likely makes a hell of a difference for simulations. Delivery systems might be a bit harder, but at the end of the day you don't need 100% reliability for deterrence to work. Even if your enemy is 50% confident that they can intercept the delivery, that still leaves the expected outcome of a nuclear exchange highly negative for them. Attacking a launch site -- conventionally or otherwise -- is forcing your enemy to either use or lose his nukes, and few think it wise to do so.

On a more personal note, I really hate nuclear weapons, and very much prefer the rule-based world order. I very much preferred the 2010s when Putin was mostly known for riding topless, as well as the odd murder of a journalist or dissident, the US was fine playing world police (which included some ill-advised military adventures, but also providing nuclear deterrence for NATO) and I was comfortably regarding nukes, NATO and large scale wars with the same distant horror I might have for medieval healthcare.

Even besides Ukraine, in the future Europe can not rely on the US for defense, and the UK and France arsenals might not be judged sufficient for deterrence, and some EU nuke might be called for. I am not sure how it would work. Classical EU commission manner, where 27 member states have to push the launch button and Orban can veto if he feels like it? Or give Mrs van-der-Leyen launch authority? Or simply have a common weapon program and distribute the spoils to 27 members?

The problem with Team America: World Police is that it requires America to be vastly more powerful than anyone else, forever. Not only is playing world police unpopular in large chunks of America, but it's pretty unpopular with anyone who isn't in direct need of its protection because it requires that America stomp down any potential rivals.

  • The non-American western countries is well aware that the balance of power has shifted and that they are, at best, only nominal makers of the Rules. They resent being sidelined and are aware than American foreign policy is at least partly designed to make sure that none of them ever regain their former status as a Power.
  • Up-and-coming Powers like China are well aware that America will never willingly allow them to reach peer status unless America is absolutely sure they will be meek followers of the Rules as they stand. Which really just means submitting to American soft power instead of hard power.
  • All the little countries like American protection but don't have the power to help in any meaningful way.
  • The non-American western countries is well aware that the balance of power has shifted and that they are, at best, only nominal makers of the Rules. They resent being sidelined and are aware than American foreign policy is at least partly designed to make sure that none of them ever regain their former status as a Power.

Speaking as a (west) German here, the past eighty years under the hegemony of the US were by far the best we had in our history, anywhere in terms of peace and prosperity. Losing WW2 was the only good thing Hitler ever did for Germany. Anyone can see that large colonial empires have become a net negative. Sure, one requires resources such as rare earth elements for the tech stuff, but the real money is in building the tech, not in mining minerals.

I think that the other European former superpowers are mostly on the same page with us, there. "Hey, remember our glory days when we ruled a colonial empire and our men were always fighting in some war far away or even in Europe or dying of malaria so we could have cheap cotton and rum and tea?"

  • Up-and-coming Powers like China are well aware that America will never willingly allow them to reach peer status unless America is absolutely sure they will be meek followers of the Rules as they stand. Which really just means submitting to American soft power instead of hard power.

What exactly is the US doing to prevent China from becoming a peer power? The CHIPS act? Allying with other SE Asian countries to prevent China from invading? These seem strategies for delaying China becoming a peer power rather than preventing it, and don't seem very objectionable to me as far as side effects are concerned.

The strategies the US could employ to prevent them from becoming a peer power, such as invading or nuking them are thankfully far out of the Overton window (or at least were under Biden).

If your argument is that a unified German state, which has never existed before 1871, cannot be counted on to uphold peace and prosperity for her citizenry and European neighbours in the long term, what is your assessment of Berlin's current political line, namely that Germany should become the center of a new rearming European alliance which is decidedly anti-Russian and also freed from American influence? Because if my assumption is correct, you should be 100% against it.

I think that the idea of an Europe united under German military leadership has been tried and found wanting.

I also did not say that Germany can not be counted to uphold peace and prosperity for her citizenry, but merely pointed out the fact that the pax americana was better for the thriving of Western Europe (and large sways of Eastern Europe, after the fall of the Iron Curtain) than pretty much anything we had had before.

If the US is not willing to fill their role any more, then we should work with other European nations on a common defense strategy. Personally, I am not keen for us to become a de-facto leader in that role, though, and would much prefer an European army or the Brits or the French to lead this time. Their military forces have more combat experience than the Bundeswehr (though not as much as Ukraine).

I think that completely dissolving our military ties to the US would be premature until Trump invades Canada or Greenland (which I think unlikely), the US seems to have a knack for getting back on track even if you think this time they have finally gone completely off the rails. I am also deeply personally offended by Putin bringing large scale warfare back to Europe and forcing us to spend on defense. As Eisenhower pointed out, [e]very gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

While I am personally disgusted by nukes, I also recognize that their deterrence value is likely higher than that of conventional weapons. I have not done the math, but I think that the expected loss of QALYs from a nuclear defense strategy might be lower than that from a conventional defense strategy (because the former is more likely not to result in a war).

A conventional army, navy and air force require a ton of different weapon systems for all kind of circumstances, to deliver an appropriate tat for any tit the opponent might play. This is essential for offensive wars.

Think of some self defense enthusiast who knows multiple martial arts and techniques which widely vary in lethality, who could hold his own in a bar fight, a ring, a street fight or (possibly) a knife fight. I don't want to be that guy because I don't find fighting very purposeful. If I felt threatened, I would get a gun instead. This does not allow for a very nuanced response, but I don't really care too much to uphold bar fight culture. If you defect from the rules of civilization, I will not meet you at your chosen level of un-civilization. Instead, I will either tolerate your defection or escalate to the level where at least one of us will die.

Likewise, if you attack a country with conventional weapons, civilization is going to die. It does not matter to me much if it dies slowly in the trenches over the years as the QALY costs accumulate of if it dies in a few minutes of nuclear fire because my only tool is a big red button labeled "DEFECT". This branch of the decision tree is lost either way, the only thing it is fit now is to improve the prior probability of now counterfactual branches, so let's get it over with.

Germany should become the center of a new rearming European alliance

This is decidedly hard to credit though. Germany is, without hyperbole and measuring it by the standards of the US, France or Ukraine, militarily incompetent. Our military-industrial complex works mostly on the industry side, and that pretty much only because of the export market. The Bundeswehr is barely even a paper tiger and anything touched by the ministry of defence is a bottomless hole of graft.

The current rearmament rhetorics are driven by a political desire to capitalize on anti-Trump and pro-Ukraine sentiments, not by any desire to actually increase the ability of Germany or Europe to wage war. The politicians involved in this latest trend have no interest in, stomach for or indeed resources to spend on rearmament. To be sure they might shake loose a few billion euros in new debt to burn in the name of defence, but that'll be the end of it.

Most Germans still consider anything remotely military distasteful if not utterly immoral, and would rather sabotage rearmament than support it if ignoring the topic is no longer an option.

Germany cannot be relied on to handle defence; neither its own nor anybody elses.

The current rearmament rhetorics are driven by a political desire to capitalize on anti-Trump and pro-Ukraine sentiments, not by any desire to actually increase the ability of Germany or Europe to wage war.

So what if the Americans or the Ukrainians or the Russians call their bluff?

Americans and Ukrainians: We promise to shovel more money at the problem and maybe even do that, but without any determination to make a material difference.

Russians: We shrug and point at Poland. Their problem, if any. Russians are usually bluffing themselves.

cheap cotton and rum and tea

Sometimes I'm amused that many commodities that launched empires --- spices, tea, sugar --- are largely now available cheaply at my local grocery store. A box of tea bags is a couple bucks, and pepper is put out freely on restaurant tables. Sugar is abundant enough to cause health risks from excess!

Not the only things like this- Napoleon III gave his most important guests aluminum utensils while lesser ones had to be content with mere gold. Pineapples were so expensive in the 18th century that even quite wealthy people would rent them to display to guests. The modern world gives us such unimaginable affluence that going to all the effort of taking things when we could just buy them instead doesn’t seem worth it.

Losing WW2 was the only good thing Hitler ever did for Germany.

Its not clear how high the risks of communist takeover were without him, but that might count too.

Sure, one requires resources such as rare earth elements for the tech stuff, but the real money is in building the tech, not in mining minerals.

You dont need to mine them, but you do need to have control over your own supply. China, hardly known for environmentalism, invests significantly into solar, because having it increases your ability to tell both oil states and the global maritime power to suck it. I suspect this contributes to the US/Europe differences on green energy as well.

I think that the other European former superpowers are mostly on the same page with us, there.

Non. Absolument pas.

If anything, Germany's complacent servility towards the United States is viewed with deep incomprehension in Paris, because we have this delusion that the "Franco-German couple" has a unique relationship and every American fighter plane that the Germans buy is a personal slight to the French arms industry which reconfigured itself to avoid competing against the German one on small arms. Macron's constant saber rattling must be understood in that light.

With due respect, I don't think Germans understand how much of a loss in influence decolonization has been for the French and the English because you never really had a Colonial Empire to begin with.

And even saying that, France has never willingly given up any of it, it still tries to hang on to large parts of it through treaties and agreements and currency unions and other such artifice. We have silently continued to fight far away wars, which is how we managed to maintain a semi-decent military in the first place.