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Culture War Roundup for the week of June 26, 2023

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What the hell is going on in Russia?

I've been following the Russo-Ukrainian war since the livestreaming of the first tank that spooked some poor border guard, and frankly speaking the whole affair has been great for calibrating my epistemics.

Did I expect the "3 days to Kiev" thing to work out? Yes. I thought Ukraine was fucked.

I was also wrong about the duration of the war, for reasons little more than vibes going off war exhaustion, I expected the fighting to wrap up in a year. Still going.

Did I expect the UA counteroffensive to be a success? Yes, I was sufficiently inundated with pro-Ukrainian memes and their anti-Russian counterparts that I thought the Russians would fold to a stiff breeze.

Turns out that attacking is a lot harder than defending, especially when the offensive was widely telegraphed and even your relatively incompetent adversary had plenty of time to prepare accordingly.

My takeaway from the above is that forecasting something as anti-inductive as war is incredibly difficult, and that's it far too easy to fall for a cheerleader effect. I wanted Ukraine to win, and badly, and not only was this desire reflected in the sources of news I peruse, but the sheer hatred for the Russian side was sufficient to bury most evidence of them ever doing anything right. The Just World fallacy is hard to avoid personally if all your sources of information fall prey to it.

On /r/CombatFootage, anything remotely pro-Russian, or even depicting their success without obvious bias, gets buried. While I'm fond of /r/NonCredibleDefense, its NAFO sympathies make a honest calibration impossible, and as the name suggests, its members aren't particularly focused on academic rigor or epistemics.

But with that said, the whole Wagner affair confuses me.

Prigozhin managed to get within 2 hours of Moscow, prompting a panicked evacuation, and then suddenly stopped and took his ball home.

What the fuck? In normal circumstances, I'd say he just signed his death warrant, is Putin really going to forgive him for his quasi-coup? Wagner shot down around 7 Russian aircraft in the process!

And there I was thinking Lukashenko was largely a lap dog, unable to exercise agency except when it came to desperately avoiding sending Belarusian troops to Ukraine since it would upend the only thing keeping his dictatorship going. How did he become powerful enough to mediate a truce between Prigozhin and Putin?

It's not like the dust has settled, even leaving aside more questionable rumors, I've seen footage of the VDV cartel-killing one of their own for expressing sympathies for Wagner. Even if Prigozhin himself manages to avoid most consequences of his actions, his men are going to be making their pants desert-camo'd.

So far, I've only come up with one model that I think reasonably fits the evidence, albeit it's more consistent with the era of warlords and medieval feudalism than what I expect to see even in a failed state today:

Prigozhin is actually loyal, or at least he thinks of himself that way, and came to believe that Putin, like the well-meaning Emperor kept in the dark by a coterie of eunuchs (Shoigu and Co), simply wasn't involved in the attempts by the Russian MOD to swallow up Wagner whole.

Thus, he embarked on his crusade more as a demonstration of his ability to perform a coup, rather than a genuine desire to do so. Like an indecisive general crossing the Rubicon, shaking his fist in the direction of Rome and then high-tailing it back.

Cause some chaos and embarrassment, but stopping before what he thinks the red lines are, namely an occupation of Moscow.

I'd also wager that Lukashenko has more agency and freedom than most suspect, or rather Putin's power has declined relatively, such that he can credibly offer to shelter Prigozhin and fend off the dogs.

As far as I can tell, his gambit only partially worked, because Shoigu hasn't gone anywhere, and Prigozhin ended up like a dog that finally caught that damn car but isn't sure what to do with it.

"Sure, let's try and Thunder Run to Moscow, I'm sure we'll run into some real resistance along the way, and we can both rattle sabres at each other and go home."

"Huh. This is awkward, everyone is just giving up and letting us walk right past them. Might as well shoot down a few helicopters, they're the only things that have directly engaged us."

"Uh.. We're about two hours away from Moscow. Now what?"

I'm not going to weight my assessment heavily since I claim no particular expertise, but I'm outlining it here for the more knowledgeable to poke at.

I'd like to see everyone at least attempt to make concrete predictions about the near future. Does Prig make it out of this alive and with his power base intact? Does Putin slip him some unusually heavy and radioactive teabags?

What the hell is going on in Russia?

In general, I think far too little credence is given to what one might call the "retardation hypothesis", namely that a lot of powerful people are kind of stupid, or at least - if they are intelligent - also impulsive, prone to anger and lack of self-control and often unwilling to consider the advice of smart people around them.

I don't think Prigozhin's run to Moscow was a psy-op or 5D chess. At the same time, I also think it was never likely that the few thousand fighters that made it to Moscow would be able to make a play for the whole country. He lacks the regional powerbase, lacks the ideological column, lacks the administrative expertise, much of the public still has some degree of fondness for Putin, and the estimated 50,000 strong FSO, plus the air force, plus large remaining portions of the military appeared to stay loyal to Putin. It was not a 1917 situation, and nor was it a present-day Sudan situation where the rebel/mercenary army was much better funded and much larger relative to the official military.

Assuming I'm right that it isn't 5D chess, I think Prigozhin's initial gambit was to occupy Rostov-on-Don as a 'protest', win some major concessions from Putin (maybe firing Shoigu, giving Prigozhin more of what he wanted, maybe money, whatever) over the phone immediately, then go back to Ukraine. Instead, something seems to have gone wrong, maybe Putin played hardball, and some portion of Prigozhin's forces decided to march on Moscow. This caused some degree of panic. Putin eventually semi-relented and here we are.

It's obvious why Prigozhin accepted the deal: he never actually wanted to die, he wanted concessions. Marching on Moscow forreal forreal, to borrow from the zoomers, would have been certain death for him and the men he might care about (eg. senior Wagner officers). He couldn't escape to the West or any Western-friendly country because he'd be extradited to the Hague for war crimes. He's too hot for the Arabs to accept him now, and neither them nor the Iranians want to annoy Putin. A Prigozhin that was Putin's enemy would be stranded with nowhere to go, wanted by both Russia and the 'West'.

Taking Lukashenko's deal (which Putin might have put him up to) was Prigozhin's only option by Saturday evening. As to why he attempted the move in the first place, I think a combination of impulsive rage and a desire to show Putin he was serious explain it pretty easily. Putin called Prigozhin's bluff and - at great cost, I'd argue, but nevertheless - he won.