Recently it was widely reported that the – to use its lengthy official name - Monument to the Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga from the German Fascist Invaders was destroyed by local authorities in the Latvian capital. This is certainly not without precedent, as numerous Red Army monuments have been removed in the Baltic states and also in Poland, Czechia and other nations formerly in the Warsaw Pact, many of these decisions being clearly driven by events in the Ukraine since 2004. I think we on this forum are mostly aware of the talking points used to justify their removal so I won’t bother to repeat those here. Instead I’d make the simple assumption in this particular case that those Latvians who support this decision are clearly unhappy with the direction their national history took in the past, and ask the question what sort of past they’d have preferred to have. I suppose this is a relevant Culture War question in Eastern Europe.
Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that Operation Barbarossa begins as it did, and then history develops differently. From then on, I think Latvia had the following options:
A – Germany wins decisive victory in the East and incorporates Latvia directly into the Reich; it only remains as an administrative area, if that; presumably, local Jews and Russians are either deported/killed or used as slave labor, and German settlers move in
B – same as A, but Latvia is allowed to retain limited autonomy as a vassal state / protectorate
C – the war in the East concludes with a separate negotiated peace in 1941 or 1942, and Latvia remains an independent nation as part of some demilitarized neutral zone between Germany and the USSR
D – same as C, but Latvia remains under German influence and its autonomy remains limited in the practical sense, maybe the Germans even retain military bases in Latvian territory
E – the war concludes with decisive Allied victory, but Stalin recognizes the independence of the Baltic states and withdraws his troops from there; still, Soviet influence remains palpable
F – same as E, but the USSR incorporates Latvia into a new military and economic system of cooperation under Soviet hegemony, and maintains military bases on Latvian soil; also, the Soviets have enough influence, soft power and political mechanisms to ensure that Latvia cannot leave this sphere of influence
G – everything happens as it actually did, but the Baltic states get nominal independence after 1945 instead of getting turned back into Soviet republics. Basically, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON have 3 more members.
I assume hardliner Latvian nationalists would prefer B (even for them, A is too extreme), and more moderate nationalists would prefer C or D. For obvious reasons however, even in the current climate of general anti-Russian/Soviet sentiment, I very much doubt they’d be willing to say this out loud. After all, A, B, C and D all mean that Nazi Germany remains undefeated, and Latvian Jews get genocided and pogromed. For the same reason, I believe these 4 options are unacceptable for the Russian and Jewish minorities in Latvia. After all, even C entails the strong possibility that they get oppressed and ethnically cleansed.
Also, I cannot help but notice that the same very obviously applies to Ukrainian nationalists in general, no matter how much leeway they currently get in Western media.
I’ll make the guess that E is the most ideal option in the eyes of Latvian centrists/normies at first sight; however, it still means that, realistically speaking, Latvia never gets to join either NATO or the EU. It’s the same as Finland’s fate but worse, as the border region between Russia and Finland at least consists of dense forests and numerous lakes, practically impassable ground for Russians if they invade (again). Also, I think it’s clear that the Soviets would agree to something (in their eyes) so unrealistic only if the US agrees to the same in Western Europe. In short, this means that even if NATO is formed, it remains limited in its geographical scope i.e. West Germany never gets incorporated into it, in other words, either the two German states remain neutral or the German state never gets divided and remains neutral.
G is very obviously unacceptable for most Latvians, as the difference from what actually happened is negligible.
F is, I think, also something most of them would only begrudgingly accept. However, the issue with this is that it’s basically merely the local version of NATO, but overseen by Russians. If our position today is that this would be unacceptable and violates our political norms, we’d also have to say that it was not acceptable for the Americans to maintain hegemony over Western European states and station their military units and nuclear weapons on their soil. (I’ll make an expectation for West Germany, as it was a defeated enemy and no peace treaty was signed.) Alternatively, one can make an argument that “but it’s different when the Americans do it, the Russians have always been Mongoloid Ugric-Turkic savages”, but I don’t know how many normies would be willing to say this unironically.
Also, both F and G entail the very real likelihood that the Soviets still get to erect a huge monument in Riga. Even in the case of E it’s relatively likely.
So where does that leave us?
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Notes -
Everyone in replies has stressed how this decision has nothing to do with alternative histories. It clearly does. When you denounce Soviets in the hindsight, you explicitly deal with counterfactuals, assuming that Soviets could have avoided their excesses (presumably like other European states or US), but had chosen not to. And that this choice – of pursuing aggressive political agendas, by brutal means – might be attributed to the barbaric attitudes of their leaders (and probably people).
Isn’t this a purely causal interpretation? If instead you could have attributed Soviet policies to other factors, partially beyond their control – like geopolitical prisoner-dilemma-like situations, or mere incompetence of the leaders – you wouldn’t denounce them.
This counterfactual reasoning is at the heart of most cultural wars, and it has nothing to do with "rewriting" the past. It has to do with imputing motives and hidden geopolitical variables, in the hindsight.
I would be glad to hear counter-arguments, as it seems many commenters disagree.
It's not counterfactual. It's very factual - Soviets kept Baltic states under occupation for decades, and Russia just showed they are fully embracing the Soviet doctrine of occupation and subjugation of bordering nations. In fact, they are willing to go further - while Soviets nominally embraced the "multicultural" doctrine (the reality was more complex, but at least the goal was not to completely destroy the subject cultures), the Russians are openly declaring Ukraine is a "fake nation", Ukrainian culture does not exist, Ukrainian language is a mere "corrupted dialect of Russian" and one of the first things they did when occupying Ukrainian territories was to take over the schools to institute Russian-driven learning programs heavy on emphasizing how Russia is the only thing around that has the right to exist. All that points not to "multiculturalism" but to embracing full-fledged cultural genocide of neighboring nations, intending to wipe any non-Russian identities that might exist there.
Seeing that, there's no wonder Baltic states have little tolerance for endorsing and lauding any actions of Soviet occupiers or the current Russian government. Nobody cares "what happened if in 1940s..." - but a lot of people care what actually happened and what is happening now. Removing Soviet monuments is a way for them to show their rejection and lack of tolerance for any Russian expansionist ambitions.
I think a minimal level of nuance is warranted here. Let's look at the following statements:
A. Ukrainian national identity and culture are real, distinct and legitimate i.e. those who belong to it have the right to maintain and defend it.
B. Ukraine is a real nation, and has a right to its own state.
C. Ukraine is a real nation, and has a right to exist as an ethnostate within the post-1954 borders of the former Ukrainian SSR.
D. This ethnostate should be a NATO member, permit American bases and weapon systems on its soil if it sees fit, and take Sevastopol away from the Russian Navy if it sees fit.
Based on past Ukrainian events and their timeline, it seems clear to me that Russian government, and the majority or Russians, object to C and D, not A and B, and even C would not have warranted military action in their eyes.
Russia is objectively a multicultural state, and ethnonationalism was never practiced there by the state. To accuse them of "embracing full-fledged cultural genocide of neighboring nations, intending to wipe any non-Russian identities that might exist there" is laughable.
When one lives in a Finno-Ugric nation and has even a cursory understanding of history, it becomes evident that the fundamental difference in whether a Finno-Ugric nation thrives or faces a slow disappearance from existence is whether it has been able to detach itself from the Russian/Soviet state or not.
It doesn't matter if ethnonationalism is practiced in Russia or not, the practice still is that being a part of the Russian/Soviet state has meant a slow, ongoing process amalgamation and disappearance to the general Russian culture for all nationalities within, expect perhaps those that don't have the clear separator of religion.
Wasn't the Finnish homeland incorporated into the Czarist state for more than a century? That should have been ample time for it to disappear. No?
With respect to Siberian Finno-Ugric peoples, I'd say that whatever misfortune has befallen them is due to them being hunter-gatherers and also being few in numbers, not due to living within Russian borders. Hunter-gatherers are in a similar situation all around the world, I imagine.
Finland had a specific form of autonomy that guaranteed completely separate institutions from Russian ones, which helped in preserving Finnish culture.
More to the point, though, I'm not talking about some sudden disappearance - I'm talking about a slow but inevitable-seeming process. Finnic tribes of Merya and Murom, and some others, have already disappeared. Numerous other Finnic nations are doing the same, even the ones that have titular republics, like Mari, Udmurts and Mordvins - if I remember correctly, all are already minorities within their republics - none of them in Siberia, incidentally, or hunter-gatherers. If Soviet Union had not fallen, Estonians (along with Latvians, at least) might be facing the same fate.
Could I ask your view on late Russian Empire? Although lagging behind, it seemed to be more in touch with European states (than its own people, ironically), industrialized at impressive rates, and eventually yielded to some democratic changes. If Russian whites were as successful as Finnish ones during their civil war, I believe - in the hindsight - they could steer toward better trajectory, than the Soviet one.
It's an interesting question, but I think that fundamentally the sheer ease at which the Russian empire (and then the white rule) fell also belie internal weakness that might have doomed it anyway.
Of course, if Russian Whites had won, it might have been very bad for Finland, since it is not all that probable they would have accepted any former subject nations as independent even temporarily, and would have also been intent in crushing national movements (alongside socialist ones, so all political forces in Finland). This was actually acknowledged by many Finnish Whites, which is why they said no when Mannerheim wanted to help his White former Russian army comrades to take back Petrograd from the Soviets.
Imperial regime as a whole survived defeats in two consecutive wars (Japan, WWI), two revolutions (1905/17) and had adapted to incessant domestic unrest -- all within 20 years. And was definitely defeated only after few more years of civil strife. World war pushed many states down the similar roads, so I don't see relative to whom Russia was an easy case. What indications of ease do you mean?
Even Ru Provisional government inherited that stance, sadly. Historical irony though, is that much of early Bolshevik maneuvering was a pure opportunism - including acceptance of Finnish independence (if that acceptance is to be considered legitimate at all), Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc. When they secured power, the game had changed. Eh, Mannerheim.
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