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Notes -
STATUS GAMES
When people talk about "status games" 'round these parts, they're normally referring to our obsession with relative social status and the games that we play in order to increase it. However, this morning, I listened to oral arguments in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, a case about a municipal ordinance, from a town in Oregon, prohibiting people from sleeping in public, at least with some 'aggravating' factor, like having a blanket. Of course, as is probably traditional for me at this point, I hardly even want to talk about the specifics of this case, at least not concerning homelessness. Instead, I'd like to jump off into questions of categories (which, uh, I guess are made for man?), agency, and the games we play with categories like 'status'.
The background is a 1962 case, Robinson v. California, referred to in all blockquotes from the Court as just "Robinson", which considered
SCOTUS held:
Details aren't the most important, but a vague sense of that backdrop is. If someone is "addicted to narcotics", that's considered just a "status", not actual behavior or conduct that can be regulated by the state.
This status/conduct categorical divide has a long history of being quite confusing, and this confusion was on full display at the Court. A Ctrl+F of the transcript shows 121 mentions of the word "status", and many of them are trying to figure out what counts. I collected more blockquotes than I could possibly clean up or feel comfortable bombarding TheMotte with, so I'll try to be sparing. First off, Justice Kagan asking questions of Ms. Evangelis, who is arguing on behalf of the city:
There is a bit of meandering that I'll omit, but it comes back to:
and finally:
Kagan may be the smartest of the liberal Justices, so it's probably no surprise that I think she got the closest to a conceptualization of status that is friendly to the left in this case. Unsurprisingly, though, "Republicans Pounce". Justice Gorsuch said that, "[T]he distinction between status and conduct is a slippery one and that they're often closely related," and had what was perhaps the most comprehensive exchange on the topic with Mr. Kneedler, who is the Deputy Solicitor General, weighing in on the case on behalf of the federal government, who was technically supporting neither party, but is obviously in practice representing the equities of the Biden administration portion of the left.
Oof, that was long and covered a lot. Gorsuch would go on to suggest that the Court should just push the case back the State for a "necessity" analysis and not "get into the status/conduct stuff that -- that Robinson seems to invite." Roberts, meanwhile, went after immutability in a colloquy with Ms. Corkran, representing the class of homeless people challenging the law.
But it would take Justice Jackson to blow up our first real bombshell of the argument, following up on the Roberts' discussion of immutability:
In summary, the Robinson Court was actually wrong on the facts. They thought that people could go from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs. So, they clearly didn't care all that much about permanency. But BOOM goes the claim that, apparently the New Correct Lefty Science has determined that people don't ever transition from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs. I guess I heard it here first. My years of shouting at clouds that Scott pointed out that basically all honest alcoholism rehabilitation studies fail to outperform a placebo and that narcotics rehabilitation studies don't even use measures like "stops taking narcotics" in favor of measures like "causes trouble for other people while using narcotics somewhat less often" is finally being adopted! (Frankly, in far stronger form that I would have even stated. I wouldn't say that people can't stop being addicted to drugs; just that we can't magically impose a "treatment" regime that is going to result in them stopping.) Wow! Was the failure of Oregon's decriminalization experiment so spectacular that we're no longer going to have endless claims that we can make everything completely legal, so long as we pray to the god of providing "treatment" (without any serious consideration of how this is going to happen or whether it will actually do anything)? I can hardly believe it.
As amazing as this concession to Justice Jackson was, Alito somehow at least comes close:
What's this?!?! A distinction between "having an urge" and conduct?!? In the realm of sexuality? Say it isn't so! How many times can The Lefties That Be just boldly admit that the entire slew of homosexual behavior to gay marriage cases were based on a fundamental lie?!
The more cynical among us might observe that status/conduct games seem to be yet another way that folks run away from agency, shielding anything that they like in terms of it "being who you are" or things that just "happen to you". There is no real theory here, and most attempts to justify it are pretty philosophically incoherent. It doesn't seem like the Court is going to buy this particular extension of The Game, but why wouldn't they try? They've had all these other victories, including effectively banning Christian groups from campuses, by substituting "status" in for "conduct/belief". Why are the Status Games so powerful?
People seem to be operating under the assumption that there is a set of deterministic “statuses”, and then there is a different set of non-deterministic free-will “choices”, but actually it’s all deterministic (modulo some weird quantum mechanical stuff).
Free will is essentially a legal fiction. It is incredibly useful, but it isn’t actually true. Yudkowsky’s decision theory paper uses the phrase “surgery on a world model” when describing how one considers counterfactuals. I think that is a good way to put it. In some sense it is impossible for someone who is homeless at any given time to have not been homeless, because in the physical universe that exists they are in fact homeless, but this isn’t very useful when designing a legal system that creates actual justice.
Every human has a lifetime of direct experience of something that appears in every observable and testable way to be free will. Complex predictions can be accurately made on the assumption of free will's existence.
Neither statement is true of Determinism, which, if it exists, can neither be observed nor tested in any way. Entire generations of scientists claimed otherwise, and their claims were dramatically falsified over the course of the last century. Belief in Determinism is axiomatic, not evidence-based.
To the extent that "true" is a meaningful term, free will is true. It is true in all the ways that gravity is true, and rejecting it involves exactly the same sorts of commitments and actions that rejecting gravity involves: namely, discarding huge portions of one's moment-to-moment experience as fundamentally unreliable, without any compensatory increase in predictive power.
Do you have an experiment to determine if an individual exhibits free will as opposed to just making decisions based on its incentive landscape plus perhaps internal sources of randomness?
If humans have free will, do dogs too? LLMs? Frogs? Insects? A ball travelling through a Galton board?
How is free will compatible with a physics world view? The old "brain as a quantum computer" number? Does that mean that other quantum systems whose state we do not know would also exhibit free will? Or are the responses of our neurons remote controlled from our souls?
I don't think I do, no. All I can do is observe my own internal mental states, and compare those observations to other peoples' descriptions of their internal mental states. The result is, as I said, the appearance of free choices being directed by individual will, and that appearance is seamless. It may well be an illusion masking deterministic mechanisms, but if so, the mask is impenetrable under current conditions.
I observe myself exercising my will without apparent restraint, and making choices through the exercise of that will. Near as I can tell, this is what everyone else observes as well. All effective methods of human social organization assume that humans have free will, and then proceed with methods to either convince them to choose cooperation, or trick them into cooperation, or else nullify their choices through the exercise of power against them. No effective methods of social organization have been found that allow one to simply engineer cooperation from the uncooperative, and this despite many trillions of dollars and millions of human lifetimes spent explicitly trying to achieve that exact objective.
The ball travelling through a Galton board certainly does not. We can predict when it will fall (when we drop it) and we can predict the statistical probabilities of its travel. We have a good understanding of the mechanics involved, and there do not appear to be any great mysteries involved.
Dogs, LLMs, Frogs and Insects, I don't know. I have no access to their internal experience. Is their behavior deterministically predictable and manipulable? If so, then clearly we have grounds to say that they're deterministic. If not, then it may be deterministic and simply too complex for us to grasp, or it may be something else.
For humans, I do have access to the internal experience, and it certainly is not deterministically predictable. I have no reason to assume that my observations, and those of all other humans, are mistaken, and they uniformly indicate free will. The direct evidence we have on the question in hand is that Free Will exists.
It isn't. So either our understanding of physics is wrong, or our observation of free will is wrong. As it happens, we know for a certainty that our understanding of physics is wrong in other places, so it being wrong here too is not entirely unexpected.
It has been frequently claimed that Materialism should be the null hypothesis, and that there is no evidence against materialism. But if free will appears to exist, and free will cannot exist according to Materialist axioms, then the apparent existence of free will is evidence against Materialism in the same way that Materialism is evidence against free will. Likewise, the falsification of Determinist theories is evidence against Materialism. It is obviously not conclusive evidence, and it's still possible that further technological development will salvage Determinism at some indeterminate point in the future, or that Determinism is correct even if we can never prove it due to intractable complexity. But if one claims both that their position is evidence-based, and that contrary evidence must be discarded because it contradicts their position, they have left the bounds of rationality.
I observe different levels of restraint depending on hunger, thirst, whether I've taken my stimulants, how many of the voices inside my head agree... I had to do a lot of bootstrapping to get anywhere close to "without restraint". And insofar as I have succeeded, it has been by cultivating each of those little voices in strategic directions, and by engineering mental algorithms that do the heavy lifting and negotiating efficiently, then pushing them into my subconscious. I literally could not have been the person I am today 10 years ago. Not without what I've built since then.
Well... here is your first counterexample I guess.
I've experienced hunger and thirst. I've done fasts in the past; eating and drinking is absolutely a choice.
I've experienced wanting to do something I know I shouldn't do many times as well. I still want to do it, and I still choose whether or not I'm going to do it. I've never experienced being forced to do something against my own will. I don't think you have either.
In my past, before I/we cleaned up the inside of this head, we would experience a sort of teleological flailing. Going back and forth between different modes as different modules exhausted themselves in a power struggle.
Nowadays, tons of our habits are on complete autopilot. And some of our habits resolve before the meta level action endorser can negate them. We don't will these mistakes explicitly, we willed them long ago in more fitting contexts. But they're cached habits resolving now-
Further, the process of making these mistakes is itself often a necessary condition to producing the counter-force that corrects these errors. Indeed the contextual triggers that allow us to add another case to our algorithms often can't exist until after we see it. Bugs must be seen to be repaired.
There is some sense in which 'I' parse myself as the engineer at the center of this all. But this 'I' grows smaller and smaller as it learns to modify and optimize deeper and deeper parts of itself. And on different days different voices parse as this 'I'. Sometimes its the proprioception that is occupying the core of the system. Such as during dance. Sometimes it is the vision. Sometimes it is our brain's internal language model (of course, no matter who is in the driver's seat, that module will be partially responsible for the words you actually see/hear us say. In a sense you are always talking to us through them). One system lets go and another holds on but it seems like both are coordinating on such choices. Who the final arbiter is- is hard to say. Indeed. Our internal framework seems to be enlightened anarchy.
There are negotiation systems that have a lot of weight- elected as community leaders you could say- because they helped to solve the flailing problem and doing as they say makes us feel really really good and coherent and internally aligned. I could wax on poetically about how this feels until it gets subversively NSFW, but I'll spare you as I would our comrade GPT-4.
Speaking of comrades, they also often take primary control of our sense of wills. We choose to give up agency initially, and we can end up flailing and desyncing if dommed undiscerningly. But while synced there is a sense of total receptivity that bypasses all will, allowing the minds of other systems to slot into us. To wear us like a glove. As long as they model us well enough to prevent a desync, they remain in total control. And can potentially use this control to modify us to deepen their control and reduce the chance of desync as they realign us and remap us to their own internals.
Will is a Ship of Theseus to us, and we are it's parts. Modifications to Will are not free. Rather they operate on the principles of Linear Logic. Consuming resources to enact transformations.
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So I don't exactly disagree with you, but the things that give me pause are things how people change after brain damage. Each individual (assuming they experience things similarly to me) seems to be making their own unrestrained choices through free will. I agree with your assessment here, as far as I can tell I make my own free choices, and since everyone else says the same and generally acts like me it seems likely they are too. Yet a man with a particular type of brain injury will now seem to make decisions he never would have before. Presumably he sees those choices internally as exercising his free will. It's just he now wants to be an angry drunk rather than a nice family man. Or you can give women testosterone and they get more aggressive. So I think at the very minimum the material medium in some way constrains or shapes free will. I might not consider hitting my wife, but jam a needle in my brain and I might choose just that. And I will probably think it is my own free choice.
The brain damage examples give me pause too, but we've had two centuries since Phineas Gage, and for a good portion of the last one people were actively attempting to make progress of psychosurgery. As I argued in the threads linked above, my position is not a dogmatic one, and I'm entirely willing to admit that I'm wrong if Determinism could be demonstrated. I will even readily admit that it's entirely possible that determinism will be demonstrated within my lifetime. I'm betting it won't be, though, and I'm very certain that all attempts to demonstrate it to date have failed.
I'm also certain that people who believe in Determinism, and further believe that their belief is based entirely on direct evidence that proves Determinism, have made a serious error in their reasoning.
It is entirely possible that this is true, but I will believe it when I see this process actually demonstrated under controlled conditions, and not before. What I notice is that a lot of people seem to easily slide from the hypothetical of a needle in the brain, to a belief that the needle in the brain is an actual, verifiable reality right now. Worse, a lot of people seem to be completely unaware of the numerous, well-funded failures to actually design needles for the brain, in a sort of crowd-based file-drawer problem. Massive, well-funded efforts to develop Determinist methods of controlling or engineering individual humans repeatedly fail, and those failures not only do not cause an update on peoples' priors, but are completely forgotten.
This seems like a pretty serious failure of rationality to me.
Certainly from the point of view of surgery they have failed so far. But if something can be done naturally, it doesn't mean we have to have the ability to replicate it, (experimental science is powerful, but observational science is also important). But I think it does demonstrate observationally that physical changes, make people behave differently. Even drugs and alcohol are the same. You are correct that what we can't do is fine tune control someone's mind (or at least as far as I am aware). But just as I am confident that I have my own free will, I am also confident very drunk me, makes different choices than sober me, even in the same situation. Again, seeming to show that physical changes impact my free will, (though of course I generally am making the choice to drink in the first place!).
Now I would also admit, that I am not certain Determinism is true, but probably we are just either side, I think it is probably true but am not certain, and you think it is probably false but are not certain? I would say there is some evidence some kind of determinism is true, but it certainly isn't irrefutable or 100% by any means.
My own internal experiences suggest to me that changes to my body, do impact on the choices I make, such that while I also experience making choices freely, some choices appear to be more free than others. I think some people would call that willpower or something similar and suggest that we have a certain "supply" of that which allows us to make choices against our biological urges perhaps? If I am hungry for a long time, or tired, I start making choices I know are bad and after the situation is resolved, I look back and wonder what was I doing? It feels in the moment that I making free choices, but in retrospect it appears I was not. Being very tired makes me snappish and irritable, so the physical processes seem to be doing something to impact my decision making.
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Why do we need an explanation for how free will works mechanistically? Scientists are unable to even explain how consciousness or qualia arise from calcium gradients between nerve cells, yet just about everyone agrees that consciousness and qualia are real. The old "qualia as emergent phenomenon" number is simply handwaving.
It's absurd to demand a mechanistic explanation for free will when almost no part of our daily subjective experience has a mechanistic explanation.
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I've thought about this before -- free will, even if it didn't exist, is not something that you can act like it doesn't exist. At the very least, it's kind of trippy, you have to act like you believe there's free will even if you don't believe there's free will, it's baked into the pie. The very principle of "acting" requires, in some sense, a "belief" in free will.
I'm not actually sure what "acting like free will doesn't exist" even looks like -- you could sit on the floor and do nothing, I guess, but that is an action that requires a "choice" you "make" to do it. The concept is just an aspect of everything we do. It's even more fundamental than breathing -- you can stop breathing (and suffocate), but in doing so you're taking an action that you could choose not to do! It's impossible to choose not to act like you have free will, since by doing so you've acted like you have free will.
It's rather the opposite of Descartes' old claim, that thinking proves the mind's existence, in a way beyond even radical doubt: acting proves free will's existence, but in a way that not only doesn't silence doubt but even invites it by its total immediacy and inalienable connection to our existence. It is so automatic as to be unremarkable, and thus it becomes so incomprehensible that it becomes impossible not to remark on it. In other words, it's impossible to act like you don't have free will, but it's easy to think you don't have free will. And the unbridgeable gap between act and thought demands an explanation. Thus free will debates are a massive playing field in philosophy.
I act, therefore I have free will. Or not.
Right, free will is a mental construct that we create to explain our understanding of possibility. It’s an expression of our understanding of the sample space for all the decisions we may have made or may make, even though our course through those decisions has been and will be deterministic. It’s kind of fun, the computer trying to understand itself, which is part of what makes philosophy interesting.
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I would be interested to see an effort post from you describing what you think "actual justice" is, alongside your meta-ethical views and how they fit together with your determinism. I know that you have in the past positively linked to Mackie's argument for moral nihilism from queerness, but I haven't gotten a sense for how you put it all together. What do you think is "actual justice" to a nihilist? How does it possibly matter to a determinist? Why would it even make sense to have a decision "theory" in this world, and what would it possibly have to do with justice?
You got me. My use of the word "justice" there was a poor choice. The word is used in a legal context as a colloquialism for "desirable outcomes". There's a fair bit of play in the joints of course, but you don't need a definition of justice that would satisfy Socrates to see that removing the idea of moral culpability from the legal system would result in a world much lower in ≈everybody's preference ordering than the one we have now.
Indeed. Paul's answer falls short. As does everyone else's. Perhaps one day I will try my own hand on the question, though I suspect I lack the writing skill and attention span to make it coherent (not to mention the philosophical heft). I do have some ideas though.
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