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The Big Serge has a good overview of the RU-UA war. The TL;DR is that Ukraine has burned through multiple iterations of armaments and is now reduced to begging for active NATO matériel, hence Germany's reticence to send Leopards. One should understand that Europe's and even America's production capacities have atrophied badly over the decades. Losing hundreds of tanks - the number that Ukraine is asking for - isn't something you replenish within a year.
Serge's prediction that Ukraine will lose the war "gradually, then suddenly" seems plausible given Russia's attrition strategy. If we assume that Russia will win this war, then the question needs to be asked.. how much will actually change? Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important and the population is likely to be hostile to Russia, meaning that to integrate it into Russia proper will be difficult if not impossible.
I keep hearing hysterical rhetoric that the West must win this war or... something something bad. It reminds me of the flawed 'domino theory' that was used to justify the Vietnam intervention. While I don't think NATO will ever proceed towards direct intervention á la Vietnam, I can't help but think that too many of the West's elites have trapped themselves rhetorically where Ukraine's importance is overblown for political reasons (so as to overcome domestic opposition towards sending arms) and it has now become established canon in a way that is difficult to dislodge.
Ukraine is extremely important when it comes to base level goods like grain and iron. If Russia manages to capture just a decent chunk of Ukraine it could considerably strengthen any leverage it has over NATO and the EU. On top of that Russia as a government seems to be open to Asian immigration. It doesn't need to integrate Ukrainians, though it certainly can to an extent. Russia can just ethnically replace the population. Where the western elites have trapped themselves rhetorically as well.
Russia has its own demographic crisis looming. One potential reason for this war is to secure the grip on or even outright absorb ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Replace them with who? The Chinese are allies but not family and the various Russian minorities may be growing faster than the ethnic Russian population but they're not large enough to replace Ukrainians and have their own issues.
I don't know if you are an ethno-nationalist but these priors of racial families don't need to apply if folks writing policy happen to not be ethno-nationalists. If Russia opens the gates to large scale Asian immigration, which doesn't have to come from just China but the various Asiatic regions surrounding Russia, they can easily be underway to repopulate the region. In a few decades time there will be no reason to even consider Ukrainians to ever have existed in the first place, as far as Russia is concerned. Ukraine, not that anyone would ever call it that, could just be a regional melting pot of various immigrants of diverse ethnic backgrounds that exists within Russia. And if we cut the same historical corners as is being done in Europe and the US, we can say that it was never anything more than that in the first place.
Who are those Asiatics "surrounding " Russia you talk of — like, Uzbeks? And do you suppose the Chinese will flock to war-torn Russia-controlled Ukraine?
Russia already has very lax immigration policy and conducts population replacement, the popular sentiment among politicians is that Slavs are inferior workers and voters who think too highly of themselves. There's just nowhere near enough people in Central Asia to make it matter for purposes of repopulating Ukraine, and even Central Asians will be reluctant to say the least. I get the feeling that your model of the situation is informed by, like, 19th century racial stereotypes — Yellow Menace and stuff.
Along with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and anywhere else.
I suppose migrants will flock to the regions that offer some economic salvation. I don't think I'm making predictions grander than any of the predictions already made by market speculators about the potential gains to be made through investing in war ravaged Ukraine after most of the fighting dies down.
What exactly does a hypothetical victorious-in-Ukraine Russia have to offer random Kazakhs that they can't get at home?
Better paying jobs, higher quality of life. Indoor toilets. And all the other stuff that makes the third world move to or as close as they can to the first.
Kazakhstan isn't a Borat sketch; it isn't meaningfully poorer than Russia, and its people aren't desperate in a way the Afghans and Africans of this world are. They also aren't stupid, and have better things to do than move into warzones. I just don't see it happening.
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Russia's primary money maker is exporting fuel and other natural resources. The parts of its industrial sector that rely on Western inputs are going to suffer from sanctions or, worse, be made unproductive.
Not a great environment.
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Wait, Russia wants to conduct population replacement? And who do they want to replace their population with? I was under the impression that the country was fairly racist and slavic-supremacist.
In effect yes. Or at least people who matter in Russia do and act on this intention. You can consider this analysis to be representative of the underpinning rationale. Immigrants are an economic necessity in the simplifying Russian economy (simplifying, to some extent, because of adaptation to uneducated slave labor), see. Russians don't want to work for subsistence wages, don't breed enough, and we sure can't entice people from nations with high human potential to come over.
Of course, one must recognize that experts arguing for it are mostly blank slatists with leftist politics (and their sponsors are capitalists who couldn't care less about identities of worker bees), so they're not really thinking of this in terms of population replacement where populations are substantial entities. Like the late demographer Vishnevsky (also known as Rabinovich) argued,
So, if done well, there's no loss here, Russians and non-Russians are fully fungible.
The same offer you've seen above, Central Asian Turkic peoples mainly.
Sure, that's what one can get from listening to Western Neo-Nazi Putin Stans and from resentful Washington "policy experts" of Baltic stock (who are, ironically, wielding quasi-woke anti-colonial discourse and Pride badges to obscure their own SS roots) alike. Or from our pal Kamil Galeev, who seeks to advance his tribe and admits gleefully to exploiting gullible Westoids by feigning admiration of their naive slogans. There's plenty of trivia to substantiate the accusation. «Russians have a slur for every nation and ethnicity they've interacted with», so popular on Twitter (who doesn't?). «Russian landlords discriminate against non-Slavs» (of course, Americans of all people know how this goes and just why the market may reward making inferences from a person's ancestry; except their supposedly most-oppressed minority is American, genetically different but of the same language and faith and comprehensive civilizational background, and not straight out of an impoverished society stuck between tradition and modernity, in the middle of a tribal conflict, rife with opiate abuse, underground Salafi mosques and ISIS sympathies). «Here's a list of a dozen minority surnames of military dead in Ukraine, this is evidence Ruskies have smuggled an ethnic cleansing into the war!» Or, like, «there was an unironic Neo-Nazi march in Moscow... just 10 years ago!» People who seriously parrot this crap are either ignorant or knowingly deceptive, just happy to get some rhetorical ammo for their preconceived attitude with regard to Russians.
In reality, Russians are about as racist and supremacist as is typical for Eastern Europe. Of course, far more ethnic Russians than Western Europeans are racist as hell, but they have about as much systemic power to act on this prejudice as Appalachian Whites. Many, especially of the older generations, are thoroughly brainwashed by the false Communist era messaging of давно поперемешались все/нет никаких русских – «we've all been mixed up long ago anyway/there aint such thing as an [ethnic] Russian» – message that fails to convince peoples with healthier ethnic self-identification and thriving diasporas. All have to respect the authoritah of «ethnics»; not a single one among well-known people in Russia is more dangerous to offend than Ramzan Kadyrov, privates serving on a strategic nuclear site can be wantonly bullied and robbed by a random local ethnic bandit, and for your average small business owner local Dagestani mafia matters at least as much as local cops. Putin tries to appeal to our schizophrenic «multinational Russian people» by saying he's a Lakh, an Ingush and so on. He sometimes courts with Russians too, saying that we should try to attract diaspora Russians even more than other immigrants. And of course there's the 'Triune Russian People' pretext for the war.
But that's about it.
Interesting. It seems like there’s not enough people in the stans to actually replace Russia, and even the would be replacement theorists know it.
Stans have high (and increasing, post-USSR) TFR, so in the long run something may work out, but yeah, this far it only slows down the process of decline, even in Russia alone. Which is why the suggestion to repopulate Ukraine with those guys is preposterous.
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I don't think you can boil down Russia to a simple ethnonationalist picture, but they've been talking about defending Russian minorities for years and how Ukraine (especially the eastern half) was basically Russian in a very ethnonationalist way.
If. But do we have reason to think that Russia has the disposition of Canada here? Their demographic problem has been obvious since the chaos of the collapse of the USSR but they haven't done anything like Canada's...robust 1% immigrant intake from what I know.
I mean, yeah, if. By the same token there was no reason to think Russia would actually invade Ukraine. Despite having 'issues' with them for the better part of two decades. Some things don't happen until they do. Same was true for mass migration into Canda.
I don't think anyone can logic their way into the correct position here. The main point I'm making is that Russia has options. Arguing whether they will or wont is, to me, irrelevant to that point.
I don't agree with this claim and find it highly dubious.
As I said to another person it was predicted - down to the year!- by Peter Zeihan.
Beyond that, John Mearsheimer also argued back after Russia conquered Crimea that Russia would likely continue its imperialism in Ukraine, though his accuracy may have been let down by the belief that Russia was too smart to go for maximalist goals and annex the country (though, in his defense, mayhaps Russia wasn't actually trying to annex the whole thing but to overthrow the government and replace it with a puppet combined with perhaps claiming the more Russian regions).
If you wish to go back to before the first invasion...I reject that too. Russia has always been clear that it considers NATO expansion aggravating, even back in the more conciliatory Yeltsin days. American strategists like Kennan specifically noted this and lamented expansion for the dangers it would bring - even when Russia appeared prostrate. Putin was also consistently against it and consistently concerned with Ukraine in particular. Crimea was obviously of strategic importance. The idea that Russia would act after the revolution/coup and US officials on the ground triumphantly crowing and trying to pick Ukrainian government officials isn't fanciful. How do I know? Because Bush pushed for Georgian and Ukrainian entry into NATO and his own European allies blocked everything beyond a tepid claim that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join without any backing. Why do you think this was except for fear of Russian action?
(Which then promptly came against Georgia btw)
This is also a very dubious claim. Canada is a settler state. Open immigration predates the modern era. What's new is unconstrained mass immigration from non-whites.
It's the same situation as Australia; it has always been a land that took migrants. The cultural change is the nature of the migrants and the consistency of huge inflows.
Now, it's true that that was driven by the demographic decline but Canada and Australia already had a "hook" they could hang this new brown immigration on - "we're a nation of migrants".
You can't craft that narrative today; especially while talking about unifying or protecting the various Russian peoples as a goal.
And I think those options are vastly more constrained than you imply.
Ukraine is huge. To demographically replace it would take huge numbers of people* that are a) untrustworthy (Chinese) b) too small (Russian minorities) c) not necessarily popular amongst the very people Russia wants to rule - if Russia gains anything it'll be the Donbass. Are Russian speakers - allegedly happy to join Russia - going to be happy being ethnically cleansed from their own land? I thought the whole point was the unification of ethnic Russians!
* Canada needed 300,000 people to keep up with its one percent per year target, Ukraine is slightly larger than Canada at 43 million to 38.
If you didn't cut the claim up into pieces then it would be easier to digest.
Yes, it's new. Which was my point. How is the claim dubious? The immigration numbers into Canada today are completely unprecedented. Settling unsettled land is not the same as migrating into a city like Toronto.
Every land, by definition, has always been a land that has taken migrants. Or by definition could be called a 'settler' state. This is exactly the kind of corner cutting history I mentioned in an earlier comment. The point being made is the obvious difference between what is happening today and what was taking place earlier in time. Since you have already acknowledged the obvious differences I am at a complete loss as to what you are trying to say.
They're not. You could bring up every single one of these arguments in relation to muslim immigration into Europe. Still doesn't change the fact that it can take place. It doesn't matter how incompatible the Koran is to French liberal egalitarian values. You just need to move people around. Moreover, you don't need to replace every single person in the country. You just need to have enough working age people to fill in the bigger industries. Your argument is simply not serious or thought out. We are talking 10 million tops. At a migration rate of 500k a year we are talking 20 years. Which is exactly why I said that it could be done in a few decades time.
Nowhere did I mention 'the unification of ethnic Russians'. This is bordering on not being worth my time.
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The Russian birth rate is 1.5 which is more or less the same as Western Europe and higher than much of Europe. Russian demographics aren't really that bad. Considering that Russians die younger, they are in far better shape than Italy that has a lower birth rate combined with people who are retired for decades.
The simple answer is that Western Europe (and Japan and South Korea) is in trouble too, so this isn't comforting at all. Being around the same spot as other demographic decliners sounds good until we zoom out.
Russia is also the one part of Europe trying to fix problems via mass military conquest and action. Wars are best fought with young men and a consistently (very) sub-replacement birth rate means that that pool is not going to replenish as much or ever be as big.
(This is actually why Peter Zeihan predicted Russian imperialism by 2022 - because he thought it would be the point of demographic no return - in one of his surprisingly nakedly correct bombastic predictions. He...makes a lot of them)
And while it may be beneficial to avoid as much of a short-term financial crunch it's still sub replacement and countries still need people for work and consumption.
It also goes without saying that Russia has challenges that Italy/other US-aligned states doesn't that matter here like:
Sanctions on Western companies working for it which means Russian industry & workers will have to pick up more slack - if they even can.
Sanctions on resource exports that Russia uses for money (and to support welfare )
Peter Zeihan is interesting to me. I enjoy watching him, but very much from a 'where can I poke holes in the argument, and what is left.'
There are a number of things I'd give him high marks for, but also a plethora of areas where I go 'but this specific prediction does not follow from the supporting argument.' I'd tend to call him directionally correct, and strongest at the macro-level where he's a bit more forward leaning/seeing than a lot of contemporary wisdom, but weaker when he goes from theory into actual policy impact. There are things where he's absolutely grounded- Peter was identifying the policy paralysis/failure implications of the Chinese COVID response before the public breakdown of Chinese COVID policy- but there are places he misses the boat, either for not recognizing other pre-requisite factors (piracy is not going to instantly pop up to cripple global naval trade; a failure of the Chinese economic model does not mean a collapse of the Chinese state). Sometimes these are part of his bombastic showmanship- the man's job at this point is to shock you into paying attention to his underlying points- and parts are more general analytic failures.
I'd put him in the category of 'you need to be able to support wheat from chaff', but once you do Peter is interesting because he's comfortable bucking the conventional consensus and saying the parts out loud that leading conventional wisdom in the future. Over the last decade it's been interest as a number of things Peter has been saying when they were controversial are uncontroversial now. It's not that he's alone in saying them- the future implications of demographic trends has hardly been a secret- but he's rare in being consistent, public, and most important making specific predictions (some nations will make 'now or never' policies before demographic issues) and translating broad knowledge into actionable advice (demographics + regions at most risk for instability -> specific industrial relevance). He has enough expert/rare knowledge it identify specific indicators or specific disruptions- the Ukraine war's impact to neon production to chips is an example- and a willingness to share perceptions that aren't typically held/propogated by the prestige/establishment media (a recent video on the prospect of nuclear breakout by American allies- not a common media topic).
He's not always right, but he's consistently enjoyable with genuine insights often enough to be worth paying attention, if only to try and define why you disagree with his arguments.
Yeah, I enjoy Zeihan but I do go find some reviews to read after I'm done with his books. I have a much longer "digestion" period for his work than most others.
He's managed a blend of demographic studies, manufacturing and geopolitics in a way that makes him very attractive as a popular-facing commentator (if you start with Zeihan you'll get a broad outline of the questions, if not the answers). But he goes a bit over the top and the trouble is that his reach is so broad and he projects so much certainty that - unless you're a domain expert yourself- you're not sure when he's on firm ground (in terms of things like US demographics it's not a big risk but what about when he starts talking about things way out of his field like the politics of Tanzania?). You have to go back and pick through all of it without the distorting effect of his charisma.
I get that part of it is just his humorous writing/speaking style and it clearly seems to work for him since he seems to be permanently on tour. But some of the stuff he says is simply too much
Case in point.
It's one thing to say China will collapse as a nation - that's already eye-catching enough. Saying things like China will collapse this decade, "for sure" (which I've heard him say)...too much for me. Most academics I read don't talk this way.
I think this is a very fair critique, and specifically the point of recognizing the effect of his charisma and tour model. He is, at the end, in the business of convincing you to either buy his book, pay him to show up and talk, or both. Having that sort of overriding interest doesn't make everything he says suspect, but as you say it needs to be digested.
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Ukraine has little value from an economic standpoint. When you look at the amount that Ukraine produces, you'll see it's very little. Wheat for example: 20 million tons at $300/ton or just $6 billion/year. That's about 3% of the world supply or about 1% of the yearly revenue of Wal-Mart. If Ukraine production in all categories went to zero overnight, the market would barely even notice.
Possible counterpoint: Commodity prices went up because of the invasion.
Counter counterpoint: Commodity prices went right back down again now trade at pre-invasion levels.
...what?
Ukraine produces about 33 million tons of wheat, which is a bit over 4% of global production, but it exports about 19million tons, which is 9% of global exports. Taking nearly 10% of wheat exports off the global market is not 'market would barely even notice,' it's 'arab spring food riots,' because most of the most volatile countries in the world are not food self-sufficient.
Similar deal with other crops. Ukraine only produces about 3.5% of global corn, but what it does produce is 12% of the global export market. You're looking at even larger fractions of other items- 17% barley, 20% rapeseed, and around 50% of global export share of sunflower meal and oil. These are non-trivial shared of the global food market.
https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf
This gets even worse when one considers the Pakistan flooding, which has wiped off a considerable share of the global export rice market off the market for this year.
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It's not about dollar revenue, it's about control over natural resources. Ukraine has some of the most arable land in the world as well as holding significant shares of the total amount of high quality iron ore reserves and various other metals. If Russia holds power of the lion share of these various resources in conjunction with China they can turn the western dominated 'economic sanctions game' on its head. Just like Russia did with gas.
*edit, I should have added that the geographic location of Ukraine is also very relevant, considering the ease of European access to said resources.
I'm almost positive I'm being heavily downvoted for being a contrarian (oh the irony!) but this is the kind of misconception that I'd like to counter.
Russia's gas supplies were quickly replaced after some painful short-term disruptions. The world has centuries worth of coal which Germany is so giddily burning right now. One commodity can be replaced with another.
Likewise, Ukraine's wheat production or rapeseed or iron isn't important. Reduce world exports 10% and the price will spike, followed by a demand response, and shortly thereafter a supply response, and pretty soon the price of wheat will be right back where it started. I'm heavily invested in commodities and have watched all this develop before and will again.
I don't see the misconception. The point being made is that in a war of commodities having control over resources is important. Controlling more of X is better than controlling less of X. It's not about the sky falling on the heads of those who get economic sanctions applied to them. Of course markets adapt to their conditions as best they can. But the more or less leverage you have, the more or less impactful the sanction.
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I think these tend to be short term issues. The world has plenty of arable land to feed itself it’s just that it cheaper to use ukranian land than unused land elsewhere. In the short term shutting down ukranian production means big price spikes because hungry people pay what it takes. In the long term you just start producing elsewhere on lower quality land and prices are 5-10% higher than before.
Maybe, but spike in food costs and permanent 5% increase is not "the market would barely even notice". And that may be enough to trigger new waves of migration counted in tens of millions.
"wheat is 10% more expensive" is noticeable for people in USA or Europe but they will at most complain and may push them to vote differently. It is different where people spend 50% of budget on food where that may be enough to trigger riots, famine and mass migration.
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The world has plenty of arable land and is also a very small place when Russia and China are throwing their weight around. The argument here isn't that the sky will fall. The argument is that the leverage the west has over the rest gets weaker. Potentially getting turned on its head.
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