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PaperclipPerfector  17hr ago (text post)   3763 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of January 12, 2026

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Trump has given a "red line" to Iran about killing protestors, but we still aren't seeing US involvement as deaths move into the thousands, reportedly. If the regime follows through with its claims, it will be executing many if not most of the thousands it has arrested.

I have an essay on my view that the US/West/Israel should clearly intervene in the Transnational Thursday thread, but the Culture War dynamics strike me as interesting in that it's not really Culture War Classic material. Traditionally, the Left has been soft on Iran and the Right has been hawkish. Iran has tried to kill Trump and Trump officials, as revenge for the Soleimani assassination.

There's a strong anti-interventionist Right and Left. During the 12-Day War, Trump went from tweeting about regime change, to abruptly demanding cessation of hostilities, which Israel and Iran complied with. (I think had the war continued the regime would already have fallen, given how easily Israel was bombing them.) This is something that's already kicked off, unlike the Maduro rendition. My understanding is that action got more popular in the polls having succeeded, though it's an open question what Venezuela's fate will be.

The Right strongly criticized Obama for declaring a red line in Syria, and then backing off. In hindsight, I think it would have been correct to have intervened against Assad. Here, I think there's a clear cost-benefit analysis case, whether you care about the plight of the Iranian people or the amoral realist power dynamics for America First Global Superpower Edition.

Bombing and regime change aren't the same thing. They could have bombed Iran into a parking lot but it would have done nothing to change who was in power unless they were able to actually occupy Tehran and take control of government. That's a tall order considering the size and remoteness of the country and Tehran's location within it. Not that it couldn't be done, or even be done easily, it just wouldn't be same quick in and out operation and would almost certainly involve taking significant casualties.

There's an ongoing mass uprising.

You can do regime change without boots on the ground if you're providing air support for a mass uprising.

There are protests, not a mass uprising in the sense that there is a rival faction ready to take power. The situation in 2011 was markedly better than the current situation in Iran, as large parts of the country were already under rebel control, and foreign countries, the US included, had already recognized a different government. That's the only instance I can think of where we did "regime change by bombing only", and I haven't heard too many people describe that campaign as something we should try to replicate.

You can't really have "a rival faction" when the police state kills those off immediately in the normal course of business.

But also a mass uprising is a mass uprising, and you're just making up something about a "rival faction." These are the first protests where regime change, not reform, is the explicit goal. Millions of Iranians are risking their lives to take out the regime. They might succeed on their own. They'll almost certainly succeed with some shock and awe backing them up.

A pet theory of mine is actually that the last 50-70 (?) or so of history is qualitatively different than previous eras because leaders are too easy to kill or remove. It used to be that movements would generate Washingtons and Jeffersons and Lafayettes and such who built up their reputation and fame and could lead after winning, or at least strike a deal. But in the modern era, assassinations and executions are relatively more common, and emigrating relatively easier, such that countries suffer "leadership drain" during civil conflict and make civil wars worse than in previous eras. Also, compromise is more difficult because leaders have less political capital at their command. At least, so the thinking goes.

We did that in Libya. The result was an unmitigated disaster.

Anyone have a good postmortem on how this one ended up so fucked?

Reuters:

  • 2011—Revolt and civil war: An uprising against Muammar Gaddafi's four-decade rule rapidly spreads, becoming an armed revolt aided by NATO airstrikes. Gaddafi is ousted in August and killed in October by rebels.

  • 2012—Missed opportunities: A rebel council holds elections for an interim General National Congress which creates a transitional government. True power lies with local armed groups. Islamist militants gain ground and attack the US consulate in Benghazi, killing the ambassador.

  • 2013—Growing divisions: Armed groups are ever more powerful, besieging government buildings. The Congress is increasingly divided and trust ebbs as it seeks to extend its term and delay elections.

  • 2014—East–West schism: The Congress rejects the results of an election to a new parliament—the House of Representatives (HoR)—and sets up a government backed by armed groups in the west. The newly elected parliament moves from Tripoli to the east in support of a rival government backed by Khalifa Haftar, a former general who has brought together several armed factions as the Libyan National Army. Libya is now split between warring administrations in east and west.

  • 2015—Islamists on the march: Islamist groups take advantage of the chaos and Islamic State seizes Sirte, Gaddafi's home city in central Libya, in February. In December, the rival parliamentary bodies sign the Libyan Political Agreement to set up a new transition. The agreement confirms the HoR as Libya's parliament but gives members of the General National Congress a new role as an advisory second chamber—the High State Council (HSC).

  • 2016—Islamic State driven back: The HoR rejects the new government as it takes office in Tripoli, entrenching Libya's east–west divide. Western armed factions eventually take Sirte from Islamic State as Haftar fights militants in Derna and Benghazi and seizes the oil crescent region of central Libya.

  • 2019—Haftar attacks Tripoli: After two more years of on-off fighting across Libya, Haftar drives his LNA through the south, bringing most remaining oil fields under his control. In April, Haftar launches a surprise offensive against Tripoli, taking Sirte en route. He is backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia. Western Libyan armed groups come together to support the Tripoli government with help from Turkey, their alliance bolstered by a deal on maritime borders that angers Egypt and Greece.

  • 2020—Ceasefire: Turkey openly offers military support to Tripoli and Haftar's offensive collapses. As his forces pull back, evidence of atrocities is found in the town of Tarhuna. The sides agree a ceasefire and the UN launches a new peacemaking effort aimed at holding national elections the following year.

  • 2021—A failed election: Eastern and western factions accept a new Government of National Unity (GNU) and Presidency Council, meant to oversee elections in December. But the HoR in the east and the HSC in the west cannot agree on a new constitution or rules for the vote and the election falls apart at the last minute.

  • 2022—Standoff: Both parliamentary bodies now say the unity government has lost its legitimacy but the prime minister, Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, refuses to quit. The HoR in eastern Libya again appoints a rival administration, but it fails to enter Tripoli. The Nawasi, a major Tripoli militia, is driven from the capital.

United Nations:

More than 14 years after the 2011 revolution and the fall of the former regime, Libya remains mired in an unstable transition marked by recurring violence, fragmented and divided institutions and the entrenchment of powerful armed groups. Its current governing and legislative institutions have continued to operate well past their mandated terms. The lack of an agreed upon constitution and the failure to hold national elections in December 2021, competing interpretations of political agreements, transitional road maps and provisional legal instruments are being used to entrench positions within the prevailing stalemate.

In the aftermath of the failure to hold national elections in December 2021, the political landscape of Libya has been defined by a prolonged stalemate and two distinct centres of power: the Government of National Unity in the west and the Libyan National Army in the east and south. In the west, in the absence of strong institutions, hybrid armed groups often act as de facto providers of security. Competition among these groups over territory, resources, control of illicit activities and institutional influence has fuelled recurring violence that often affects the civilian population. In May 2025, the killing of a major armed group leader triggered some of the deadliest clashes in Tripoli since 2011. With no unity of vision among Libyan political and institutional leaders on a national security architecture and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the various armed groups have limited incentives to pursue alternate paths.

In the east, over time, administrative structures that parallel those in the west have consolidated, including a military structure, executive bodies and economic institutions, presenting a challenge to efforts to unify national institutions. In the south, the situation remains characterized by divisions along tribal lines and complex security dynamics, including the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries and the cross-border movements and activities of criminal networks, including illicit trafficking. Southern Libya, while rich in natural resources, remains politically and economically marginalized. The Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg communities, which are the country’s three recognized non-Arab Indigenous groups, are not adequately represented in State institutions.

What if there are no guarantees and Iran is not like Libya for a multitude of reasons?

If you want America to commit to yet another military intervention in the middle east, I think you should provide something pretty close to a guarantee. The last several interventions were all disasters, and further, demonstrated that the elites in charge of managing the interventions could not actually be held accountable in any meaningful way for their disastrous management and decision-making. This has been a serious problem, and until I see some evidence that it has actually been corrected, my vote is no, hell no, are you insane?

If you want America to commit to yet another military intervention in the middle east, I think you should provide something pretty close to a guarantee.

Why? Surely it can be justified on the grounds that almost any replacement is going to be better for the US + allies than the current one.

This is famously what they thought about Syria, which is now controlled by Al Qaeda. I've yet to hear how any serious explanation for how Al Qaeda running Syria is better for America or Americans than Assad

Well, we can be very positive Al Qaeda won't be running things in Iran.

They presently have a Shia theocracy running things. That's a major reason they're a problem.

The opposition, in contrast, wants secular democracy.

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Why? Surely it can be justified on the grounds that almost any replacement is going to be better for the US + allies than the current one.

The problem with claiming that things can't get worse is all the previous claims that things couldn't get worse, combined with the numerous, extremely horrifying examples of how they did, in fact, get worse.

We've already done a recent intervention in the Middle East that went pretty well.

Namely, we bombed Iran's nuclear program (and supported Israel bombing other targets). There were decades of handwringing about Iran's weapons program and the downsides of intervention and it turned out most of that was needless concern.

Here's another one: Heard much about ISIS lately? Probably not, because we blew the fuck out of them.

That's the great thing here: Bombing is low risk, and things are already so bad for the Iranian people it would be hard for them to get worse.

Even a humanitarian disaster would be something chosen by the Iranians, and we take an enemy of Western Civilization out.

Knowing what we know now, we could have done the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan and then simply left. We don't have to do "you break it you buy it" if our concern is removing enemies, and not nation building. (Noting that taking out Saddam wasn't a great idea for the general geopolitical reason that he didn't have a nuclear weapons program, and Iran did, and he was their primary enemy.)

Iran is in a far better position to succeed as a country if the regime is removed than any recent example I can think of.

Here's another one: Heard much about ISIS lately? Probably not, because we blew the fuck out of them.

ISIS shot and killed numerous people in the city I live in while I was out having dinner with my partner - I actually got to see the police cars leaving to go deal with the active shooters, so I have in fact heard a lot about them recently.

Do you live in the Middle East?

Because that was the geographic context of the response. They don't control territory anymore, but they still do attacks worldwide.

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