This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.
Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.
We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:
-
Shaming.
-
Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.
-
Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.
-
Recruiting for a cause.
-
Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.
In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:
-
Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.
-
Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.
-
Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.
-
Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.
On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
I disagree with you here.
Setting aside the deep philosophical questions about personhood (which threaten to derail any productive discussion), I claim that LLMs are minds - albeit minds that are simultaneously startlingly human and deeply alien. Or at minimum, they can be usefully modeled as minds, which for practical purposes amounts to the same thing. (I should note: this position doesn't commit me to "AI welfare" concerns, or to thinking LLMs deserve legal rights or protections, or to losing sleep over potential machine suffering. You can believe something is a mind without believing it has moral weight. I do, I'm an unabashed transhumanist chauvinist.)
More importantly, I think there's nothing wrong at all with modeling them as having "intention or character flaws." if you use a variety of models on a regular basis, like I do, I think that becomes quite clear.
They have distinct personalities and flavors. o3 was a bright autist with a tendency to go into ADHD hyperfocus that I found charming. GPT-4o was a sycophantic retard. 5 Thinking is o3 with the edges sanded down. Claude Sonnets are personable and pleasant, being one of the few models that I very occasionally talk to for the sake of it. Gemini 2.5 Pro was clinically depressed, 3 Pro is a high-functioning paranoid schizophrenic who thinks anything that happens after 2025 is a simulation. Kimi K2 was @DaseindustriesLtd 's best friend, which I noted even before he sang its praises, being one of the weirdest models out there, being ridiculously prone to hallucinations while still being sharp and writing in a distinctly non-mode-collapsed style that makes other models seem lobotomized by comparison. If I close my eyes, I can easily see it as a depressed vodka swilling Russian intellectual, despite being of Chinese origin.
If these aren't character flaws, I don't know what is. Obviously they're not human, but they have traits that are well-described by terms that are cross-applicable to us. They're good at different things, Claude and Kimi (and sometimes Gemini) write at a level that makes the others seem broken. That being said, almost every model these days is good enough at a wide-spectrum of tasks. Hyperfocusing on benchmarks is increasingly unnecessary. Though I suppose, if you've got a bunch of Erdos problems to solve, GPT 5.2 Thinking at maximum reasoning effort is your go to.
They're model weights. <-- This is a link.
That's literally, exactly, precisely what they are.
You can map your own preferred anthropomorphized traits to them all you want, but that's, at best, a metaphor or something. This is the same as when people say their car has a "personality." It's kind of fun, I'll grant you, but it's also plainly inaccurate.
This is correct. But it is correct because of training data, superparameters, and a whole host of very well defined ML concepts. It's not because of ... personalities.
They're model weights, and we're collections of atoms: bags of meat and miscellaneous chemicals. Both statements are technically correct. And yet... a tiger being made out of atoms doesn't make it any less capable of killing you. The problem with pure reductionism is that
it throws out exactly the information you need to make predictions at the level you actually care aboutcan be a cognitively and computationally intractable approach, even if it's more "technically correct". Too much of it can be as bad as too little.All models are false, some models are useful. That's a rationalist saw, but for good reason. What actually matters is whether a model constraints expectations, in other words, is it useful?
Gemini 2.5 Pro doesn't meet the DSM-5 or ICD-11 criteria for clinical depression. After all, it's hard for a model to demonstrate insomnia or reduced appetite. Yet the odd behaviors it regularly demonstrated are usefully described by that label.
If my friend let me drive his Lambo, and told me "be careful, she's fierce!", I'm going to drive more carefully than I would in a Fiat Pinto. That is still, to some degree, useful, but I think it's clear that anthromorphic analogies are more useful for LLMs, because they have more in common with us behavior-wise than any car (unless you're running Grok on your Tesla). They process language, they exhibit something that looks like reasoning, they have distinctive response patterns that persist across contexts.
This is true in the same way that human behavior is fully determined by neurotransmitter levels, synaptic weights, and neurological processes. But just as you can't predict whether someone will enjoy a particular movie by examining their brain with an electron microscope or a QCD-sim, you can't accurately predict an LLM's macroscopic behavior by staring at its training corpus and hyperparameters. No human can.
Nobody at Google intended for Gemini 2.5 Pro to be "neurotic" and "depressed" or to devolve into a spiral of self-flagellation when it fails at a task, nobody wanted Kimi to hallucinate as regularly as it does. These were emergent, macroscopic properties, there's no equivalent of a statistical scaling-law that lets you accurately predict log-loss for a given number of tokens in a corpus and a compute budget.
Training models is still as much an art as it is a science, particularly the post-training and personality tuning phrases (as explicitly done by Anthropic). You test your hypothesis iteratively, and adjust the dials as you go.
Anthropomorphism is a cognitive strategy. Like all cognitive strategies, it can be deployed appropriately or inappropriately. The question is not "is anthropomorphism ever valid?" but rather "when does anthropomorphic modeling produce accurate predictions?"
I maintain that, if applied judiciously, as I take pains to do, it's better than the alternative.
I always find these arguments sort of annoying because it really conflates what is actually going on in ML/AI systems with this weird pseudo-science fiction mystification. Yes Tiger's are made of atoms, but no you can't use atomic physics to describe tiger-behavior. With AI models, you can describe behavior directly in terms of the underlying code. The model weights are deterministic parameters that literally decide how the system behaves.
Also you've gotten reductionism vs abstractions completely backwards. Abstractions "throw out information". High-level models compress details to make systems easier to reason about. Also not every useful abstraction corresponds to a mind, subject, or being.
Some Thought Experiments:
LLMs don't have minds and they aren't conscious. They are parameterized conditional probability functions, that are finite-order Markovian models over token sequences. Nothing exists outside their context window. They don't persist across interactions, there is no endogenous memory, and no self-updating parameters during inference. They have personality like programing languages or compilers have personality, as a biased function of how they were built, and what they were trained on.
This is false for most modern implementations. The same model weights, even at 0 temperature, give different outputs for runs in different environments (where "different" can be as subtle as putting the same hardware and software under more or less load), because anything that changes the ordering of reduction operations over non-associative (e.g. floating-point) arithmetic can change the result.
Well, you can imagine you can, anyway. LLM execution has that in common with Molecular Dynamics simulations: you can write down the equations on paper, but you're never going to evaluate them that way.
You are right this is technically true, with the caveat that these changes are from really tiny floating point changes on really tiny weights. But importantly, these tiny changes are akin to small random noise perturbations in molecular physics engines. It's an implementation detail due to the impreciseness of numerical operations on tiny numbers. In principle, if you froze the weights and evaluated the model on a perfectly precise machine with exact arithmetic. The mapping from inputs to outputs would be deterministic. The existence of minor numerical nondeterminism on real hardware doesn’t change the fact that the system is fully specified by its parameters, architecture, inputs, and execution environment. In a way that the effect of atomic biology of living organisms on their behavior is not. It's a bad abstraction, the inferential gap is too far.
The last part is ostensibly true, LLM with billions of parameters are essentially billions of interconnected equations. It is hard to dig through it just like codebase with a billion lines of code would be hard to dig through. We know what those equations do in small cases, just like we understand what individual lines of code do. Scaling them up doesn’t introduce agency We can extrapolate that since mathematical equations/code have no agency, they don't suddenly start doing something else when they are scaled up.
At what point does scaling up molecular dynamics result in agency? How many molecules does it take?
If you are defining agency as "non-deterministic behaviour introduced by variations at the level of floating-point math imprecision", just one?
That is not my definition, and I do not see how non-determinism is required at all.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link