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PaperclipPerfector
13hr ago
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Be advised: this thread is not for serious in-depth discussion of weighty topics (we have a link for that), this thread is not for anything Culture War related. This thread is for Fun. You got jokes? Share 'em. You got silly questions? Ask 'em.
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Item 0 of 7
Jarvis, I'm low on karma. After a six-month lapse, I can't resist resuming the posting of interesting and funny court opinions.
All opinions will also be posted on this external page. Opinions likely to trigger whining will be posted only on the external page. (Maybe I'll finally stop being too lazy to update my website's RSS feed.)
Item 1 of 7
A prison guard is accused of smuggling a can of chewing tobacco into the prison. However, the prosecutor charges him under the wrong law! Title 61 section 5902(d) bans the smuggling of tobacco—but instead the officer is charged with violating title 18 section 5123(c) and title 61 section 5902(a), which ban the smuggling of poison.
The prosecutor attempts to save the situation by bringing in a toxicology expert to argue that a can of chewing tobacco counts as poison, since it technically contains enough nicotine to kill a human if the nicotine is extracted from the tobacco and injected into the human. But the trial judge is unpersuaded and dismisses the case, since (1) there is no evidence that the inmate for whom the guard was smuggling the tobacco had any plans to extract the nicotine and use it as a poison, and (2) this line of reasoning would lead to absurd results like criminalizing the delivery of toothpaste and water. The appeals panel affirms.
Item 2 of 7
In year 1993, a company (1) buys a lot in order to build a Dunkin Donuts restaurant on it, and (2) leases a 30-year easement over a 20-foot strip of a second, adjacent lot in order to build a drivethrough.
In year 2023, the easement expires. The company sues the owner of the adjacent lot to extend the easement. Its arguments: (1) The actual intended duration of the easement is, not 30 years, but however long a Dunkin Donuts restaurant exists on the first lot. (2) If the easement is not extended, then the company will experience a hardship from having to tear out a chunk of its restaurant to make room for a drivethrough on its own property. The owner of the adjacent lot countersues for trespass, since the drivethrough still is operating even though the lease has expired.
The trial judge finds the company's arguments unpersuasive, rejects its attempts to extend the easement, and grants trespass damages of 1 k$/mo to the owner of the adjacent lot. (1) The easement says "30 years". If you wanted to make it "for as long as a Dunkin Donuts restaurant is present", you could have done that—but you didn't. (2) This is a hardship of your own creation. The appeals panel affirms.
Item 3 of 7
A person's house is assessed at "market value" of 194 k$. The county govt. seizes it over 2 k$ of unpaid property taxes, sells it at auction for 76 k$, and returns the excess 74 k$ to the person. The person sues the county, claiming that he should have gotten 192 k$ (assessed value minus tax delinquency) rather than 74 k$ (auction proceeds minus tax delinquency).
The trial judge, the appeals panel, and the federal Supreme Court reject this argument. If the auction was conducted in a fair manner, then by definition it revealed the true "market value", and using the speculative assessor valuation instead would be unreasonable. However, the Supreme Court remands for the appeals panel to check whether the auction actually was conducted in a fair manner, especially since the company that bought the property at auction sold it again for 195 k$ just a year and a half later.
Item 4 of 7
In year 1995, by constitutional amendment, New Jersey creates the "Council on Local Mandates", a pseudo-court empowered to strike down any unfunded mandate imposed by the state govt. on local govts.
In year 2014, the state govt. enacts a law (1) requiring municipal govts. to equip their police cars with dash cameras and (2) adding to each drunk-driving conviction a 25-dollar surcharge allocated to pay for the cameras. A municipal govt. challenges this law before the Council on Local Mandates, alleging that it is an unfunded mandate, since the 25-dollar surcharge suffices to pay for only six percent of the cost of the cameras. In year 2016, the Council agrees with the municipal govt. and rules that the law is unconstitutional.
In year 2021, a class-action lawsuit alleges that municipal govts. still are collecting the 25-dollar surcharge even though the Council ruled it unconstitutional. In response, the municipal govts. argue that the Council was empowered to strike down only the unfunded mandate itself (part 1 of the law), not the inadequate funding mechanism attached to the mandate, which has purposes other than attempting to fund the unconstitutional mandate (punishing offenders and raising revenue). The trial judge agrees with this argument and rules that municipal govts. are justified in continuing to collect the 25-dollar surcharge. The appeals panel (in year 2024) and the state supreme court (in year 2026) affirm.
Item 5 of 7
[Court opinion censored due to mention of child abuse; external link]
Item 6 of 7
A drunk woman jaywalks across a four-lane, 50-mi/h road at night. An eastbound motorist swerves around her. A westbound motorist does not notice the eastbound swerve, and hits the jaywalker, killing her.
The jaywalker's daughter sues the motorist for wrongful death. She hires an expert (a "traffic-accident reconstructionist") who claims that, if the motorist had noticed the eastbound swerve, then he would have had time to notice and avoid the jaywalker.
The trial judge dismisses the lawsuit, and the appeals panel affirms. The expert's report is not sufficient to support liability. He did not say that the motorist should have seen the eastbound swerve and slowed down out of caution (so he was negligent in failing to see it), or that his headlights should have allowed him to see and avoid the jaywalker (so he was negligent in failing to see her). Rather, the expert based his conclusion on a hypothetical situation ("if the motorist had noticed the eastbound swerve") that the motorist explicitly denied in his unchallenged testimony (he didn't notice any swerving cars). Therefore, there is no reason to think that the motorist was negligent. "Plaintiff failed to present any competent evidence that defendant could have, would have, or should have seen the swerve."
Item 7 of 7
[Court opinion censored due to mention of child abuse; external link]
God, those censored cases are so fucked up. Still I like reading them, as a form of very black comedy.
How did item 7 keep getting off with 6 months of jail for this?
I assume that the lenient sentences are due to the offender's (1) being only barely outside the crime's four-year Romeo-and-Juliet margin and (2) pleading guilty rather than going to trial.
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