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Nobody seems to talk about the RU-UA war here anymore. I guess it's because we're saturated with it everywhere else.
Yet given that Ukraine has launched what is unquestionably the largest offensive since the Kharkov surge in late September when it took back wide swathes of territory, I believe a status update is warranted.
First, it is immediately clear that the Russians are much more prepared this time. The area that Ukraine took back in autumn was barely defended by a rag-tag group of volunteer militias. That was a big lapse by the Russian general command, which also led to the big mobilisation drive. This time is different.
Even pro-UA accounts like Julian Röpcke are conceding that Ukraine is losing lots of armored vehicles with very marginal gains. Western officials like the CIA chief or the US foreign secretary have all pointed out that the aftermath of the offensive will shape upcoming negotiations. Given that Ukraine has little to show for their offensive thus far, this inevitably casts a dark shadow on any prospects for large territorial compromises. Why would the Russians give the Ukrainians something at the negotiating table which they cannot gain on the battlefield?
To my mind, the best that Ukraine can hope for now is a stalemate. This war has shown that in the era of ubiquitous ISR capabilities, trying to surprise your enemy is much harder if he's on his toes (which the Russians weren't in the autumn, but they are now). Consequently, offensives are simply far costlier and harder. The Russians had the same problems, which is why capturing Bakhmut took such an absurdly long time.
For those of us who would want to see a negotiated settlement, the reality is that neither side is running out of money or arms. Russia is spending a moderate amount of money and the West can keep supplying Ukraine enough to keep going for years if the decision is made that defensive action is the way to go. The only way this war ends is if the West tells Ukraine to give in and accept large territorial losses in return for a settlement and possibly security guarantees. Such an outcome would be nearly impossible to sell to Ukraine's domestic public and would almost certainly end the career of whoever was leading the country, including Zelensky. Whatever comes out of this war, I'm not optimistic about Ukraine's long-term prospects.
I also think we should've had more discussion of the war.
This caught my eye: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/singapore-speech-hrvp-borrell-shangri-la-dialogue_en
Some Brussels swamp creature swans out to East Asia and says many banal things but also this:
700 billion euros! And there's economic damage in addition to that. 700 billion is just the cost of the bandage for the stab wound (self-inflicted I might add). Europe could've chosen to ignore the US hectoring them into sanctioning Russia, as Hungary did. And what is the cost of the bleeding? What is the cost outside of the EU? Germany and Britain are in a recession, as I recall.
What is the point of it all? Why are we defending borders that were randomly redrawn by the Soviets (in the case of Crimea), why care? Why are we supplying weapons so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine? It goes rather against the Kosovo/Palestine/Kurds principle, if principle is an appropriate word to apply in relation to foreign policy.
This whole operation only makes sense if you start with the assumption that Russia is an enemy to be crushed. Then it makes sense to arm the Ukrainians to maximize the number of dead Russians at a relatively low cost. Relatively low, compared to a nuclear war. The War in Afghanistan probably killed more Russians/$ thanks to the sheer amount of poppies produced under our abysmal occupation government.
Anyway, trying to crush Russia has all kinds of bad effects. It pushes Russia towards China and Iran, solidifying an anti-Western axis that spans Eurasia. Our oil sanctions have unsettled OPEC, who might reasonably see a danger in the West trying to crush socially conservative, autocratic states that engage in 'illegal wars' and weaken their energy leverage. Saudi-Iranian rapprochement is accelerating rapidly and is brokered by China: https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/persian-gulf-states-to-form-joint-navy-in-coordination-with-china/
And then there are all the problems Russia can cause for us. Do we want Russian missiles being contributed to China during a Pacific war? Do we want enormous numbers of troops and considerable airpower tied down in Europe, just in case some 'volunteers' move across the border and set up shop in Estonian towns that border Russia? That's a precedent that the Polish Volunteer corps set in Belgorod. Do we want Russian energy and agriculture powering a gigantic mobilized Chinese war machine? Are we really confident in funding a war of attrition against Russia of all countries?
We can't really back down now that Leopards and Bradleys are aflame in Ukraine but it is not clear how any of this is in the national interests of most Western countries. We could've just ignored the whole thing, chose not to have an opinion on Ukraine in 2008, in 2014 in 2018 or 2022. It could be swept under the carpet, like the war in Yemen. Without Nuland, without NATO proposals, without Western training for the Ukrainian military, would there be a long and grinding war? It may well be in the interests of Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to pursue a foreign policy full of exciting conflicts and intensify rivalries, yet it is not so good for people with gas bills, fertilizer needs and taxes to pay.
Stop switching between perspectives. The economic costs you highlight are borne by europe, while the ‘russia is no threat / it’s just some lines on a map’ narrative is only valid from beyond the atlantic. Ask the ukrainians, then the poles, if russia is no threat. That China might get strengthened because of OPEC etc, and therefore the US could lose the world top-dog competition, doesn’t even register as a concern. Europe’s needs are decidedly lower on maslow’s hierarchy. There's an existential security threat at the door.
The closer to Ukraine, the more immediate the threat, the greater the cost that can be borne. “We” think 700 billion is cheap. You worry about your own gas bill. The LNG substitution has worked out well for the US, so relax.
If you are in NATO, then you have nuclear weapons and huge, technologically advanced armies on your side. You are not facing any threat, existential or otherwise, from a Russia in normal conditions. Only in certain scenarios are you in danger - if there's a war between Russia and NATO for example. Why might there be a war between Russia and NATO? Perhaps if this war in Ukraine massively worsens Russia-NATO relations... Europe's hysteria about the threat from Russia is ill-informed and makes no strategic sense. They have huge conventional and significant nuclear forces.
Ukraine, Georgia and so on obviously faced a threat from Russia but this does not mean NATO countries face a threat from Russia. There are significant differences between small countries without nuclear patrons or allies who have ongoing conflicts with Russian minorities right next door to Russia and NATO members.
Just because the bear is eating fish, it does not follow that it will start eating killer whales or giant squid.
You’re oscillating between the idea that russia is no threat , and that russia is only a threat because it’s antagonized – you should pick one and stick to it. It's like the law of merited impossibility."They won't ever invade, and if they do, it's your own fault!".
Putin believes that he can strongarm and break up nato. I’m sure you of all people are familiar with the narrative – the west is weak, decadent, unwilling to fight for its ideals. Were he not bogged down in Ukraine, he might do something really stupid like send little green men down to estonia to liberate oppressed russian-speaking minorities. Ukraine is a dry run for the west’s response in case of such an emergency, and continuing support signalizes nato’s commitment to defend its members, therefore avoiding a direct war.
The European half of NATO has a lot of weapons, a lot of troops, a lot of everything except tactical nukes. They spend far more than Russia on their military. There is no reason to feel threatened when you are very well armed at all levels short of nuclear war.
Someone can not be a threat in normal circumstances, yet be dangerous if antagonized. This is not a contradiction.
Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it signals that the West is ready to support any anti-Russian country next to Russia. If you're worried about little green men in Estonia, why not base troops in Estonia? Or maybe you could encourage the Baltics to be more tolerant to its Russian-speaking minority? I would've thought expelling people who didn't have sufficient grasp of Latvian is a rather odd approach for an EU embracing multiculturalism and 3rd world immigration: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russians-take-language-test-avoid-expulsion-latvia-2023-05-08/
If Russia didn't want russophones in neighboring countries expelled, they should stop using the existence of Russian speaking people in other countries as a casus belli.
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You're not from any place near Europe, are you?
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‘X is no threat’ implies ‘regardless of X”s feelings’. Relying on the goodwill of russia for security is no security at all.
Sure, russia would get crushed, but overwhelming material inferiority didn’t prevent the japanese from declaring war. I could listen to you all day telling me how ironclad nato's alliance and how outclassed russia’s army is. Therefore I'm sure you realize ukrainian victory is inevitable, the only question is how long russia can hold on. The loser determines when the war ends.
Irrelevant point-scoring. We’ll do as we please, and if putin thinks otherwise, he should get used to the taste of our metal.
You do understand that the militaries of NATO are different to those of Ukraine, right? That they have equipment they're unwilling or incapable of transferring, like F-35s, Eurofighters, AWACs planes? That the numbers and training of forces under Ukrainian command and NATO command are wildly different?
There are distinctions here that you are not grasping. Russia's conventional forces are weaker than NATO's. Russia's tactical nuclear forces are stronger than NATO's. Russia's strategic nuclear forces are roughly on par, perhaps somewhat weaker than NATO's. NATO is not Ukraine, though there are certain connections. These facts are important if you want to understand the conflict in context. Upthread, people are calling Mearsheimer a crackpot but his depth and breadth of understanding is far beyond a lot of what I'm seeing in this thread.
We were comparing budgets to ascertain the likelihood of victory. Supplying an amount far greater than russia's military budget is no problem for nato. The capabilities ukraine are already getting are superior to those of russian armaments.
Mearsheimer believes europe has no agency, he writes for a purely american audience. In his view, Ukraine, poland, and the rest of europe are just chips to be exchanged to hopefully recreate the cold war. Even in purely power-realists terms, he didn’t get the memo that the russian federation is far weaker than the soviet union and the EU, and therefore incapable of maintaining the USSR’s sphere of influence. You’ll understand why a european doesn’t find his perspective helpful or convincing.
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