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PaperclipPerfector  10mo ago (text post)   32495 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of June 12, 2023

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Nobody seems to talk about the RU-UA war here anymore. I guess it's because we're saturated with it everywhere else.

Yet given that Ukraine has launched what is unquestionably the largest offensive since the Kharkov surge in late September when it took back wide swathes of territory, I believe a status update is warranted.

First, it is immediately clear that the Russians are much more prepared this time. The area that Ukraine took back in autumn was barely defended by a rag-tag group of volunteer militias. That was a big lapse by the Russian general command, which also led to the big mobilisation drive. This time is different.

Even pro-UA accounts like Julian Röpcke are conceding that Ukraine is losing lots of armored vehicles with very marginal gains. Western officials like the CIA chief or the US foreign secretary have all pointed out that the aftermath of the offensive will shape upcoming negotiations. Given that Ukraine has little to show for their offensive thus far, this inevitably casts a dark shadow on any prospects for large territorial compromises. Why would the Russians give the Ukrainians something at the negotiating table which they cannot gain on the battlefield?

To my mind, the best that Ukraine can hope for now is a stalemate. This war has shown that in the era of ubiquitous ISR capabilities, trying to surprise your enemy is much harder if he's on his toes (which the Russians weren't in the autumn, but they are now). Consequently, offensives are simply far costlier and harder. The Russians had the same problems, which is why capturing Bakhmut took such an absurdly long time.

For those of us who would want to see a negotiated settlement, the reality is that neither side is running out of money or arms. Russia is spending a moderate amount of money and the West can keep supplying Ukraine enough to keep going for years if the decision is made that defensive action is the way to go. The only way this war ends is if the West tells Ukraine to give in and accept large territorial losses in return for a settlement and possibly security guarantees. Such an outcome would be nearly impossible to sell to Ukraine's domestic public and would almost certainly end the career of whoever was leading the country, including Zelensky. Whatever comes out of this war, I'm not optimistic about Ukraine's long-term prospects.

I also think we should've had more discussion of the war.

This caught my eye: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/singapore-speech-hrvp-borrell-shangri-la-dialogue_en

Some Brussels swamp creature swans out to East Asia and says many banal things but also this:

For the first time ever, we have been funding military support to a country under attack. Providing about €40 billion of military support to Ukraine, coming from the [EU] Institutions, coming from the resources I manage in Brussels, and coming from the Member States. Yes, much less than the US support. But if you add up all the support – military, civilian, economic, financial and humanitarian – the level of support to Ukraine is about €60 billion for Europe. But let me show another figure which is really impressive: if you include the support that the European governments have had to pay in order to help their families and firms to face the high prices of electricity, of food, the subsidies to our people in order to face the consequences of the war is €700 billion – ten times more than the support for Ukraine.

700 billion euros! And there's economic damage in addition to that. 700 billion is just the cost of the bandage for the stab wound (self-inflicted I might add). Europe could've chosen to ignore the US hectoring them into sanctioning Russia, as Hungary did. And what is the cost of the bleeding? What is the cost outside of the EU? Germany and Britain are in a recession, as I recall.

What is the point of it all? Why are we defending borders that were randomly redrawn by the Soviets (in the case of Crimea), why care? Why are we supplying weapons so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine? It goes rather against the Kosovo/Palestine/Kurds principle, if principle is an appropriate word to apply in relation to foreign policy.

This whole operation only makes sense if you start with the assumption that Russia is an enemy to be crushed. Then it makes sense to arm the Ukrainians to maximize the number of dead Russians at a relatively low cost. Relatively low, compared to a nuclear war. The War in Afghanistan probably killed more Russians/$ thanks to the sheer amount of poppies produced under our abysmal occupation government.

Anyway, trying to crush Russia has all kinds of bad effects. It pushes Russia towards China and Iran, solidifying an anti-Western axis that spans Eurasia. Our oil sanctions have unsettled OPEC, who might reasonably see a danger in the West trying to crush socially conservative, autocratic states that engage in 'illegal wars' and weaken their energy leverage. Saudi-Iranian rapprochement is accelerating rapidly and is brokered by China: https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/persian-gulf-states-to-form-joint-navy-in-coordination-with-china/

And then there are all the problems Russia can cause for us. Do we want Russian missiles being contributed to China during a Pacific war? Do we want enormous numbers of troops and considerable airpower tied down in Europe, just in case some 'volunteers' move across the border and set up shop in Estonian towns that border Russia? That's a precedent that the Polish Volunteer corps set in Belgorod. Do we want Russian energy and agriculture powering a gigantic mobilized Chinese war machine? Are we really confident in funding a war of attrition against Russia of all countries?

We can't really back down now that Leopards and Bradleys are aflame in Ukraine but it is not clear how any of this is in the national interests of most Western countries. We could've just ignored the whole thing, chose not to have an opinion on Ukraine in 2008, in 2014 in 2018 or 2022. It could be swept under the carpet, like the war in Yemen. Without Nuland, without NATO proposals, without Western training for the Ukrainian military, would there be a long and grinding war? It may well be in the interests of Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to pursue a foreign policy full of exciting conflicts and intensify rivalries, yet it is not so good for people with gas bills, fertilizer needs and taxes to pay.

Why are we supplying weapons so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine?

This quite clearly isn't true. Like most people I expected the Donbass to collapse within days of invasion, but what I saw instead was video after video of Russian-speaking Ukrainians fighting to the death to defend Sumy and Kharkov from their nominal brethren. Some might think they're stupid for choosing a provincial Ukrainian identity over being part of greater Russia, but that is the decision they have made.

This whole operation only makes sense if you start with the assumption that Russia is an enemy to be crushed.

Yes. The European members of NATO and Russia have mutually incompatible security interests; each requires the border between their spheres of influence to be as far away from its core territories as possible. Until one of these two factions is completely ideologically or militarily subjugated by the other (i.e. never), any chance to move that boundary will be taken by either side. America supports its European allies in this conflict. Simple as that.

Like most people I expected the Donbass to collapse within days of invasion, but what I saw instead was video after video of Russian-speaking Ukrainians fighting to the death to defend Sumy and Kharkov from their nominal brethren.

This is happening but there are also a significant number of people in the former Donetsk and Luhansk Republics fighting for Russia, plus there's Crimea. All of these places are recognized by the US to be part of Ukraine and those are the territories that Western weapons are formally being supplied to retake.

The European members of NATO

They had grave doubts about NATO expansion eastwards for decades and were pulled along by the US from 2008 onwards.

All of these places are recognized by the US to be part of Ukraine and those are the territories that Western weapons are formally being supplied to retake.

The current flow of weapons is a direct result of Russia's invasion of the non-DPR/LPR portions of Ukraine. During the preceding eight years there was a smaller level of support proportional to how much the US cared about the Ukrainians retaking the rebel territories in and of themselves i.e. not nearly as much. Recognizing Crimea and the entire Donbass as Ukrainian is just a diplomatic formality, as they are unlikely to ever retake those regions.

They had grave doubts about NATO expansion eastwards for decades and were pulled along by the US from 2008 onwards.

They didn't seem to have had any problems with the Visegrád countries joining, with the US actually blocking France's proposal for immediate accession of Romania and Slovenia in 1997. In 2008 there was a split on further expansion, with the US and Visegrád countries on one side, Germany and France on the other, and the UK in the middle. Now, you can say that Poland and Romania's opinions shouldn't count as much as France or Germany's, but the latter wanted to let the former into the club. At best then opinion among European NATO members was divided, rather than unanimously opposed to further expansion.

It pushes Russia towards China and Iran, solidifying an anti-Western axis that spans Eurasia.

A Russia-China alliance also drives India away from Russia and into the arms of the West.

A Russia-China alliance also drives India away from Russia and into the arms of the West.

Don't be so sure. I told it in the beginning of the invasion. Nobody cares if Russia wins, but a lot of people around the world want to see EU and US lose.

An India-China rivalry is a very good bet, and Russia won't get much from either without pissing off the other. That's one reason why China won't even recognise Russia's claim to Crimea: Russia has not proven itself to be a loyal and obedient ally, yet.

India and China's trade climbed over $130 billion in 2022. They may never become allies as we've seen with the PLA's military incursions beyond the LAC many times over, and given China's friendship with Pakistan. But a begrudging partnership is not out of the picture just yet. I don't think the "India factor" would be a bad enough wedge between China and Russia, even as Russia closes into their orbit. Or put another way, even China realises it's unwise to antagonise India to such an extent.

India and China's trade climbed over $130 billion in 2022.

The US trades a lot with China, but it's still not possible to be an ally of both.

Remember, China doesn't even recognise Russia's claim to Crimea, let alone the Donbass. Until Russia shows itself to be willing and able to accept its subordinate role in any partnership with China (e.g. confirming with China that its military interventions are ok - China does NOT like violations of territorial integrity, for obvious reasons, and Russia would have to learn to accept that) it can only be a business partner, not an ally, and certainly not part of a "Eurasian Axis". Also, the Chinese leadership have a long memory, and they remember that the USSR didn't treat them as an equal when it was China that was the weaker power.

Do we want enormous numbers of troops and considerable airpower tied down in Europe, just in case some 'volunteers' move across the border and set up shop in Estonian towns that border Russia? That's a precedent that the Polish Volunteer corps set in Belgorod.

Wasn't that precedent already set years ago in Crimea, with the 'little green men'?

If Russia does it to Ukraine, it's fine (or at least standard procedure). If the US does it to Syria, it's fine. But if Poland does it to Russia or Russia to Estonia, then we have more serious problems.

“Why die for Danzig Donetsk?”

Why are we supplying weapons so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine?

This proves too much - it can be applied to a staggering number of wars throughout history. While I would tend to agree with the claim that these decision aren't really driven all that much by principle, still, this sentiment would get us to places like a Frenchman in 1780 saying, "Why are we supplying weapons so that Philadelphia can hold onto predominantly English-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of some revolutionary war?". Whether it's a good idea or not, it's not going to be driven by the lingua franca in a given area.

It's enemy-of-my-enemy thinking, though Russia as enemy is relatively recent and arguably America's doing. From 2009 to 2014 NATO troops were transiting through Russia in support of the war in Afghanistan: https://usrussiarelations.org/3/geopolitics/map/northern-distribution-network

though Russia as enemy is relatively recent and arguably America's doing.

Please clarify, did you somehow miss the whole cold war/

No, but the foreign policy establishment seems to have missed its end in 1991.

War being mostly a young man’s game, most of those fighting now were born after the end of the Cold War.

No, but the foreign policy establishment seems to have missed its end in 1991.

I hate to defend the foreign policy establishment, but it appears Vladimir Putin did also. Those directing the current war certainly lived through the Cold War.

Maybe Putin was biding his time for the past twenty years, waiting for a plausible excuse to pursue a war in Ukraine.

Or maybe he saw Biden’s Ukraine strategy as the end of any hope for the Minsk accords to work.

Stop switching between perspectives. The economic costs you highlight are borne by europe, while the ‘russia is no threat / it’s just some lines on a map’ narrative is only valid from beyond the atlantic. Ask the ukrainians, then the poles, if russia is no threat. That China might get strengthened because of OPEC etc, and therefore the US could lose the world top-dog competition, doesn’t even register as a concern. Europe’s needs are decidedly lower on maslow’s hierarchy. There's an existential security threat at the door.

The closer to Ukraine, the more immediate the threat, the greater the cost that can be borne. “We” think 700 billion is cheap. You worry about your own gas bill. The LNG substitution has worked out well for the US, so relax.

If you are in NATO, then you have nuclear weapons and huge, technologically advanced armies on your side. You are not facing any threat, existential or otherwise, from a Russia in normal conditions. Only in certain scenarios are you in danger - if there's a war between Russia and NATO for example. Why might there be a war between Russia and NATO? Perhaps if this war in Ukraine massively worsens Russia-NATO relations... Europe's hysteria about the threat from Russia is ill-informed and makes no strategic sense. They have huge conventional and significant nuclear forces.

Ukraine, Georgia and so on obviously faced a threat from Russia but this does not mean NATO countries face a threat from Russia. There are significant differences between small countries without nuclear patrons or allies who have ongoing conflicts with Russian minorities right next door to Russia and NATO members.

Just because the bear is eating fish, it does not follow that it will start eating killer whales or giant squid.

You’re oscillating between the idea that russia is no threat , and that russia is only a threat because it’s antagonized – you should pick one and stick to it. It's like the law of merited impossibility."They won't ever invade, and if they do, it's your own fault!".

Putin believes that he can strongarm and break up nato. I’m sure you of all people are familiar with the narrative – the west is weak, decadent, unwilling to fight for its ideals. Were he not bogged down in Ukraine, he might do something really stupid like send little green men down to estonia to liberate oppressed russian-speaking minorities. Ukraine is a dry run for the west’s response in case of such an emergency, and continuing support signalizes nato’s commitment to defend its members, therefore avoiding a direct war.

The European half of NATO has a lot of weapons, a lot of troops, a lot of everything except tactical nukes. They spend far more than Russia on their military. There is no reason to feel threatened when you are very well armed at all levels short of nuclear war.

Someone can not be a threat in normal circumstances, yet be dangerous if antagonized. This is not a contradiction.

Ukraine is a dry run for the west’s response in case of such an emergency, and continuing support signalizes nato’s commitment to defend its members

Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it signals that the West is ready to support any anti-Russian country next to Russia. If you're worried about little green men in Estonia, why not base troops in Estonia? Or maybe you could encourage the Baltics to be more tolerant to its Russian-speaking minority? I would've thought expelling people who didn't have sufficient grasp of Latvian is a rather odd approach for an EU embracing multiculturalism and 3rd world immigration: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russians-take-language-test-avoid-expulsion-latvia-2023-05-08/

Or maybe you could encourage the Baltics to be more tolerant to its Russian-speaking minority?

If Russia didn't want russophones in neighboring countries expelled, they should stop using the existence of Russian speaking people in other countries as a casus belli.

an EU embracing multiculturalism and 3rd world immigration:

You're not from any place near Europe, are you?

‘X is no threat’ implies ‘regardless of X”s feelings’. Relying on the goodwill of russia for security is no security at all.

They spend far more than Russia on their military.

Sure, russia would get crushed, but overwhelming material inferiority didn’t prevent the japanese from declaring war. I could listen to you all day telling me how ironclad nato's alliance and how outclassed russia’s army is. Therefore I'm sure you realize ukrainian victory is inevitable, the only question is how long russia can hold on. The loser determines when the war ends.

Or maybe you could encourage the Baltics to be more tolerant to its Russian-speaking minority? I would've thought expelling people who didn't have sufficient grasp of Latvian is a rather odd a pproach for an EU embracing multiculturalism and 3rd world immigration

Irrelevant point-scoring. We’ll do as we please, and if putin thinks otherwise, he should get used to the taste of our metal.

Therefore I'm sure you realize ukrainian victory is inevitable, the only question is how long russia can hold on.

You do understand that the militaries of NATO are different to those of Ukraine, right? That they have equipment they're unwilling or incapable of transferring, like F-35s, Eurofighters, AWACs planes? That the numbers and training of forces under Ukrainian command and NATO command are wildly different?

There are distinctions here that you are not grasping. Russia's conventional forces are weaker than NATO's. Russia's tactical nuclear forces are stronger than NATO's. Russia's strategic nuclear forces are roughly on par, perhaps somewhat weaker than NATO's. NATO is not Ukraine, though there are certain connections. These facts are important if you want to understand the conflict in context. Upthread, people are calling Mearsheimer a crackpot but his depth and breadth of understanding is far beyond a lot of what I'm seeing in this thread.

We were comparing budgets to ascertain the likelihood of victory. Supplying an amount far greater than russia's military budget is no problem for nato. The capabilities ukraine are already getting are superior to those of russian armaments.

Mearsheimer believes europe has no agency, he writes for a purely american audience. In his view, Ukraine, poland, and the rest of europe are just chips to be exchanged to hopefully recreate the cold war. Even in purely power-realists terms, he didn’t get the memo that the russian federation is far weaker than the soviet union and the EU, and therefore incapable of maintaining the USSR’s sphere of influence. You’ll understand why a european doesn’t find his perspective helpful or convincing.

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If you are in NATO, then you have nuclear weapons and huge, technologically advanced armies on your side.

Yes and this is precisely why Ukraine wanted to join NATO in the first place.

The Ukrainians believed, correctly as it turns out, that Russia wanted them either dead or back under Moscow's thumb, and they really didn't want to be back under Moscow's thumb, so they acted accordingly.

towards China and Iran, solidifying an anti-Western axis that spans Eurasia

Fun:looks somewhat like Mongol Empire.

so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine?

It looks like that before population movement, only Crimea had solid majority who didn't want to be in Ukraine. Speaking Russian language doesn't necessarily mean being want to be part of Russia, compare Ireland and UK for example.

A Russia--Iran--China axis means that all of Central & Northern Asia is outside US influence as an unbroken landmass. The stan countries are irrelevant and Pakistan is a Chinese vassal state.

It's fortunate that China is so dependent on sea based trade, because it is thoroughly flanked by US allies in the sea. Effective land based trade needs to be established between Iran, Russia & China. If that's achieved, then between those 3 and indebted B&R nations, China should be able to get dedollarification started quite soon.

Been there, won that.

More seriously, I don’t know that China’s development really hinges on Russia. It’s going to follow the Belt and Road plans one way or another. It has energy, and it has manpower. If they want to get off the dollar, they’ll do it whether or not they have Russian debts.

A Russia--Iran--China axis means that all of Central & Northern Asia is outside US influence as an unbroken landmass. The stan countries are irrelevant and Pakistan is a Chinese vassal state.

You speak this as if it's a bad thing for the Americans, rather than a plus. Central & Northern Asia is just about the least threatening center of gravity for any anti-US coalition, all the more so if you helpfully exclude India from in.

It's fortunate that China is so dependent on sea based trade, because it is thoroughly flanked by US allies in the sea. Effective land based trade needs to be established between Iran, Russia & China. If that's achieved, then between those 3 and indebted B&R nations, China should be able to get dedollarification started quite soon.

'Effective' land-based trade is not the same as 'cost-efficient', and that's always going to come back to the cost of water-based transport vis-a-vis everything else. If China wants to invest huge sums of money on infrastructure to carrying material from the coasts of China up and over and through the hindu kush, they should actively be encouraged to do so. A land-based trade route is a far less economically efficient, and thus slower growth and less throughput, than a sea-based economy.

Dedeollerification doesn't exactly hinge on having land-based trade either. That's a misconception of why the Dollar is useful in trading between states, and why the Chinese yuan isn't a much-sought reserve currency.

The land based trade that China is interested in (Gwadar fantasies aside) is alternative routes for importing fossil fuels and natural resources via its northern and northwestern borders. Decidedly worse economically than sea-based trade, that's still far more practical than the Hindu Kush route. And in a Taiwan contingency, the costs don't matter too much: it's already decided to nuke its economy. It's more than willing to take on otherwise uneconomic projects if those can secure resources from a Russian vassal state to help wage its war, and that's entirely rational (taking the rationality of a Taiwan invasion as given).

Its goal isn't to create some permanent Eurasian land-based trading bloc but to provide energy security in the case of war. Post-conflict, it would return to sea-based trade, with the hope/expectation that it would be able to dictate the terms of what sea-based trade in the western Pacific looks like.

China has to be pretty happy about what the war is doing to Russia. Before, there was some chance (admittedly less than likely) that Russia could be drawn into some kind of sanctions regime. But now it's certain where Russia's chips will land, because it really won't have a choice.

It looks like that before population movement, only Crimea had solid majority who didn't want to be in Ukraine.

A considerable chunk of Donetsk and Luhansk wanted to leave and backed their words with force of arms.

Is this meant to be any kind of statement about the legitimacy of Ukrainian or Russian government there? If so how? A 'significant chunk' of those in Ulster wanted to leave and backed their words with force of arms, hardly makes British rule illegitimate or not worth fighting to preserve.

The legitimacy of the Ukrainian and Russian govts isn't really important. We shouldn't be interfering in other people's messy problems. It would be inappropriate for the Soviets to send guns and munitions to Ulster or London.

The fracking USA sent guns to Ulster.

Rep Peter King (IRA-NY) suffered no adverse political consequences for being a terrorist fundraiser, and was allowed to be Grand Marshall of the NYC St Patrick's Day parade (despite provoking a boycott by the Irish embassy) and Chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security (I suppose he did have relevant experience given the main project of the committee under his leadership was investigating terrorist financing). He remained unrepentant until Sinn Fein irritated him by opposing the Iraq war, and continued to befoul Congress until retiring in his late 70's.

Except it isn't messy. Russia invaded a sovereign nation without provocation - indeed they were the ones already being provocative with their support of separatists. If foreign support isn't justified now then when is it?

We invade or attack sovereign countries all the time without provocation, under novel ideas like 'responsibility to protect' or Bush's 'pre-emptive strike'. Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yugoslavia... The Russians had the good grace to mostly stay out of the way and not flood these countries with MANPADs or other weapons directly aimed at our troops. They mostly stayed out of our way and we stayed out of theirs. This is how we avoid WW3.

What were we doing in Syria if not supporting separatists? What are US troops doing on the ground there?

If we undermine the broad strokes of international law like 'don't attack people without Security Council approval' we shouldn't be surprised if others do the same thing. If we start sending tanks, aircraft, missiles to Ukraine, why shouldn't the Russians send weapons to anyone who causes problems for us? Shouldn't the Chinese decide 'well if they'll all fight us anyway - let's open the floodgates and pump Russia and everyone else full of arms'.

Raising the energy level of these conflicts is bad for everyone.

Europe could've chosen to ignore the US hectoring them into sanctioning Russia, as Hungary did.

Are you quite sure Europe wants that?

Time after time, I've seen pro-Russians portray the situation as the US dragging a kicking and screaming Europe into an anti-Russian confrontation it wants, but at least in most European countries, there has been extremely widespread support for anti-Russia sanctions and material support for Ukraine right from the starting months of the war, also lasting (in perhaps a bit more subdued form) through last winter (which pro-Russians widely predicted to be a trump card - "the weak Europeans will surely yield in an INSTANT when they experience a bit of a freeze without Russian gas!") This support has extended even beyond traditionally anti-Russian nation (us, the Baltics, Poland), but of course these the sheer fact that these countries are in the EU would tend to powerfully influence the whole union to that direction.

Why are we defending borders that were randomly redrawn by the Soviets (in the case of Crimea)

Because the whole of post-WW2 order is based on countries invading other countries and annexing parts of them - which was the thing that sparked WW2 in the first place - happening ever again. No matter if they are "randomly redrawn" borders or whatever. Russia confirmed the existence of that border in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union fell, and then blatantly violated that confirmation, and then proceeded to violate it more and more by declaring the annexation of four oblasts.

whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine?

This can be argued for Crimea (though even in Crimea the secessionist party had been a marginal electoral force before the Russian invasion and annexation) or even for the pre-2022 separatist-occupied areas of Donbass (if only due to the anti-separation population moving out/being pushed out), but on what basis would one argue this for the four currently occupied oblasts in their full form? On the basis of the farcical referendums? In case of Zaporizhzhia the Russians didn't even occupy the full area of the territory where they were purporting to hold the referendum.

Anyway, trying to crush Russia has all kinds of bad effects. It pushes Russia towards China and Iran

Russia was already moving towards China way before 2022. If anything the true problem currently is American belligerence re: Taiwan pushing China towards Russia.

This is My recollection as well, If anything Poland, the UK, and the Baltic States roped the US into supporting Ukraine rather than vice versa.

I understand that it is an article of progressive dogma that the US is the only nation on earth capable of exercising agency but as someone who does not subscribe to that dogma, I'm just not seeing it.

If anything the true problem currently is American belligerence re: Taiwan pushing China towards Russia.

Can you elaborate on this a bit? From my perspective, Taiwan is a real, independent country and the United States has continued to tread carefully when we really should have made that incredibly clear back in the Reagan era when China didn't have the ability to do anything other squawk with embarrassed rage in response.

we really should have made that incredibly clear

Why? What would the Americans and even the Taiwanese ever gain from this? Taiwan got very very wealthy from acting as the competent capitalist step-brother to China trying to explore capitalism. All this rhetoric about liberal democratic Taiwan against big bad oppressive China is quite new. Taiwan was also an oppressive military dictatorship for most of its history.

The main advantage of recognizing Taiwan as independent is it would make much harder for the PRoC to make kissy faces and get Taiwan to rejoin the mainland without a fight. That looked vaguely possible for a while, but I think at this point it's off the table.

So no advantage at all as you admit this was a “vague possibility” for a while and nothing more. And Taiwan was supposed to make a mortal enemy of their only geographic neighbour and the source of a great deal of its wealth, for this? That they would possibly voluntarily join PRC?

I am sorry but what you are saying doesn’t make any sense at all.

Taiwan IS a mortal enemy of their only geographic neighbor; nothing is likely to change that except the fall of one government or another. So considering that a consequence is not sensible.

What do we get from reneging on the One China Policy?

In my view we got the best side of that deal, by far. We get to treat Taiwan as its own country in everything but name and state visits. We even get to have visa-free travel agreements, and embassies, though they're not called embassies. China gets to save face with Taiwan being "part of China" in name only.

Had we gone another way and ended up with hostilities the RoC would have certainly lost its "outlying islands" which are accessible by bridge from the mainland.

Of course if PRC actually invades Taiwan it's a bad thing. It would destabilize the entire region, throw the economy into a tailspin, bring superpowers to conflict etc. EU's proper role would be mediation and conflict avoidance.

Still, formally, as far as I know, the Taiwan/China situation continues to be the same as before - the two countries agree that they're a part of "China", even though they - again, formally - disagree on whether the PRC or the ROC is the valid government. The same arrangement is confirmed by external parties, including the US, and even if the current Taiwan govt is led by the pro-independence side, they still haven't declared independence. As such, the situation is different from Ukraine. Again, while the US maintains One China policy, stuff like Pelosi making a very state-visit-like visit to Taiwan is a destabilizing factor in itself.

Of course, it must be admitted that I don't live in a vacuum myself, and for me, personally, well, Russia is right over the border and Taiwan is on the other side of the world. I just can't bring myself to care about these two situations to the same degree.

Time after time, I've seen pro-Russians portray the situation as the US dragging a kicking and screaming Europe into an anti-Russian confrontation

The start of this whole loathsome story was with the US trying to bring Ukraine into NATO back in 2008, which was vehemently opposed by France and Germany, the principal European countries. Eventually they got the US to water it down into 'when, not if, not now'. The US was the one providing lethal military aid to Ukraine pre-war, 90% of all aid pre-war.

Because the whole of post-WW2 order is based on countries invading other countries and annexing parts of them - which was the thing that sparked WW2 in the first place

Missing a not, anyway this is just a made up principle. Annexation is beyond the pale but we can bomb various countries into anarchy, set up puppet governments in them, divide countries into smaller parts, place troops in countries without their permission? We can meddle in the internal workings of other countries in ways that make Russiagate look like even more of a joke (looking at you Yeltsin). But as long as there are no annexations, it's fine?

This is like saying you can march into someone's house, shoot the owner, take their property, re-educate their children, give the property to nearby friends, squat on it indefinitely - but as long as you don't write your name down on the deed it's OK. No sane person would stand by this principle. Anyway, if Russia said 'oh we're not going to annex Ukraine, just conduct regime change', there would be no difference in the reaction from the West. Annexation is clearly not the issue here.

Besides, where is it written in the UN charter that countries can't be annexed or that invasions are illegal? The UN charter says nothing about 'no annexations', the Security Council is the highest authority on these matters. Whatever the Security Council decides is binding. If the Security Council can't make up its mind, then there is nothing left to say.

but on what basis would one argue this for the four currently occupied oblasts in their full form?

The whole of Ukraine, including Crimea, is officially targeted for NATO integration and has been for years. For example, in 2021 the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership affirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its ownership of Crimea. It said that Ukraine was going to get 'full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions' which means NATO and EU. The US was helping Ukraine finish the necessary reforms and so on. It's just putting two and two together: full integration into Euro-Atlantic, full recognition of pre-2014 borders, plus weapons = the military support is to retake everything: Luhansk, Crimea and so on. Now maybe the US doesn't quite want to go that far in real terms, yet that's what they're formally saying, that's what is written down in treaties and in their rhetoric.

Russia was already moving towards China way before 2022.

Sure and the US has been egging them on all the way. There's a haunting Biden clip from the early 2000s where, when Putin says that he'll work more with China because the US is overbearing, Biden says something like 'good luck with that - there is no replacement for the US, ultimately you have to come to the table whether you like it or not'. There were opportunities to work with Russia in the war on terror but the US just squandered them, pulling out of the ABM treaty for instance. What is that if not a giant red flag?

Missing a not, anyway this is just a made up principle. Annexation is beyond the pale but we can bomb various countries into anarchy, set up puppet governments in them, divide countries into smaller parts, place troops in countries without their permission?

Yes. Wars of annexation materially strengthen aggressors and incentivize further war, they are a sort of geopolitical positive feedback loop. In the modern era going to war makes you weaker and poorer, less capable of waging war rather than more. Sometimes countries are willing to do it anyway, and of course there is gaming of the boundaries, but keeping the feedback loop negative rather than positive helps stop this getting too out of hand. How harmful (or beneficial) the war is to the country being invaded isn't really relevant to that, the important thing is that it be harmful to the aggressor. For instance the invasion of Iraq imposed a cost rather than a benefit on the U.S. (as even most of its proponents knew it would) so it didn't result in a series of more U.S. invasions, but the Russian invasion of Crimea was sufficiently beneficial that it chain-reacted into the invasion of the rest of Ukraine.

Wars must have no winners, only losers, and to ensure this continues to remain the case countries are willing to take losses themselves so that attempted wars of annexation leave the aggressor indisputably worse-off. Complaining that countries are "irrationally" willing to harm themselves for the sake of deterrence is deeply silly, it's basic game-theory and central to the logic of modern war. If Russia thought countries wouldn't really be willing to harm themselves for no benefit besides vague principles of game-theoretic value, that's just another way that Russia's status as a low-trust society has made them weaker.

For instance the invasion of Iraq imposed a cost rather than a benefit on the U.S. (as even most of its proponents knew it would)

Did they know that? I remember that time well and I recall many, many hours of debate with advocates of the Iraq war who spent a great deal of time telling me about the many benefits of victory in the Iraq war.

Sometimes I wish I had kept in touch with some of the more passionate voices. I'd be interested in hearing their perspective now.

as even most of its proponents knew it would

But they weren't saying this. Nobody in the US was saying officially that the Iraq war was going to weaken America but that they should do it anyway. The opponents of the Iraq war were saying this would be a quagmire, cause all kinds of problems. The proponents were saying 'let's get rid of Saddam it'll be easy and stabilize the Middle East, spread democracy, make new allies...'. Now the proponents weren't exactly honest about their true goals and were not aligned with US national interests... But anyway, if you march into a country and turn it into a vassal, it's supposed to strengthen your alliance bloc since they then can contribute to further wars.

The proponents were saying 'let's get rid of Saddam it'll be easy and stabilize the Middle East, spread democracy, make new allies...'.

Helping Iraqis and the Middle East doesn't significantly materially strengthen the U.S., it's expending U.S. resources and power for the sake of charity. This is inherently self-limiting, the U.S. has resources to waste on things like this but in the end it is left with less capability to wage war than it started with. Having Iraq as an ally or vassal was never going to be valuable enough to be worth a war, even if it was as easy as proponents thought it would be, and proponents of the war instead justified the war in terms of humanitarian (Saddam, democracy) or threat-reduction (WMDs) concerns. And the U.S. didn't even really turn Iraq into a vassal, it's a democracy that has been at times vocally critical of the U.S. and there is no guarantee that U.S./Iraq relations won't worsen further in the future. It would have been far easier to turn it into an ally in some other way, like buddying up to Saddam or replacing him with some other dictator. Proponents of the Iraq war didn't say they would turn Iraq into a vassal, they said they would turn it into a democracy, and that is indeed what they did. It was the opponents of the Iraq war who said the U.S. would materially benefit, the "No blood for oil" people, but that was never remotely realistic and the proponents didn't say it was.

Missing a not, anyway this is just a made up principle. Annexation is beyond the pale but we can bomb various countries into anarchy, set up puppet governments in them, divide countries into smaller parts, place troops in countries without their permission? We can meddle in the internal workings of other countries in ways that make Russiagate look like even more of a joke (looking at you Yeltsin). But as long as there are no annexations, it's fine?

The actual principle is that the United States can do what it wants because of its military capacity. There are many fig leaves layered over the top of this, but the reality is that the principle that governs the difference between the United States and Russia is that those that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. American diplomats and politicians claim otherwise, often with sweet language about democracy and such, but the reality is quite apparent.

The American order has been based on bombing and fighting constantly. Arguing that Iraq was better because they have forced Sunnis and Shias to stay in the same country is a stretch. Tearing Libya into a patch of warlords nominally under the same government was far worse. If anything Russia is giving the people in Donetsk citizenship and integrating them into the Russian medical system. The US left Yemen as ruins while taking no responsibility. Was forcing Pashtuns and Tajiks to live in Afghanistan together really a great humanitarian success?

Trump is bragging about destroying Venezuela and talking about how the US should have stolen their oil.

The US doesn't change borders, it forces countries to submit and then blocks medical supplies to the country if it doesn't obey.

Without having to put their own forces on the line, and at the cost of a fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget, the US is getting to incapacitate one of their major geopolitical threats.

If that's how the U.S. policy towards the war is being couched, I wonder what that says about the entire U.S. war in Afghanistan taken from the reverse point of view.

I wonder what that says about the entire U.S. war in Afghanistan taken from the reverse point of view.

Same thing Vietnam said. The US military is pretty great at dismantling the machinery of a state, but there's not really much point to doing it if you aren't going to annex the territory (see basically every empire ever) or at least fully occupy the area and re-build it (see Japan/Germany post-WWII). There's just no end-game if you're doing that, you just have to keep mowing the grass.

There's a theoretical reason to do this to dismantle a state that's a significant threat to the US, but the states that are a significant thread all have nuclear weapons, so it doesn't really work in practice post 1948.

Russia's nukes are fine, their submarines are fine and their airforce is lightly attrited. Their army is still mostly intact, even if it has been greatly weakened.

The US military is the smallest, oldest and least trained it has been since before WWII. The US nuclear triad is absolutely ancient, submarines are old, the US doesn't even make cruisers any more, B52s are going through another upgrade cycle. The US military manufacturing sector was hit bad by the wars in the Middle East. The US has largely kept Reagan's military in order while fighting peasants in the middle east for the past 20 years. Apache and black hawk helicopters are old.

The US has now become the patron for the Ukrainian military, which is about the size of the US Army. The Ukrainians are rapidly expending the mountain of equipment left behind from the Soviet era and will need to be supplied with western gear. The Ukrainians barely have any bases left, minimal military infrastructure is left, they have an extreme shortage of officers. Training and equipping Ukraine is going to be massive black hole for decades to come. Ukraine has already drained vast quantities of ammunition, spare parts, training capacity and basic military equipment.

The US isn't competing with Russia, the US is trying to establish global hegemony. Borrowing money at 5% interest to try to keep the largest military in Europe outside of Russia in a high state of readiness is going to swallow tonnes of resources.

While the US is expending more ATGMs, artillery shells, short range air defences in a week than they manufacture in a month, China is producing at a level comparable to all of NATO. In the 50s the US had fighter jets while much of the world was in the 1800s. Today the world is catching up, and US exceptionalism is harder to defend. France outclassed Vietnam and Algeria, yet they defeated the French empire.

The US made a big mistake of not establishing Limes. The US hasn't gone for natural and easily defensible borders, instead it pushes to the end of the Earth. The US therefore gets stuck wasting trillions defending villages in Afghanistan, will soon be spending a hundred billion a year defending Taiwan and will have to finance 1.5 times the French military to defend Europe's worst backwater.

Russia's nukes are fine, their submarines are fine and their airforce is lightly attrited. Their army is still mostly intact, even if it has been greatly weakened.

I think I see some "citation needed" here. Probably their subs aren't too affected by this conflict, though how active that fleet is would probably be pretty secret. The NATO sub fleets might have an idea, but I don't think they're talking. Not gonna bet either way on their nuke arsenal, though I will note that the maintenance quality evident on the high-tech weapons they've tried to bring to bear in Ukraine has not been too impressive.

"Where is the Russian Air Force?" has been the millionbillion-ruble question in this whole war. Pre-war, every serious defense analyst I could find expected them to systematically dismantle Ukraine in something that looked like the US Gulf War 1. They had the assets on paper to do it. Instead, they've been missing in action. Given the efforts Russia has gone to so far, I somehow doubt they're all sitting in hangers somewhere in perfect condition, with skilled pilots standing by to run complex missions with them as soon as Putin gives the order. It's all speculation on exactly what is going on, but I bet that either their maintenance has been such shit that only a fraction are airworthy, or they are terrified of losing a substantial fraction of them to Ukrainian air defense or otherwise looking incompetent, possibly both.

think I see some "citation needed" here.

There is no great mystery here. Russian conventional army is very mediocre because they are spending enormous amounts of their military budget (which isn't even that high) keeping up with the latest nuclear capabilities and missile delivery systems.

"Where is the Russian Air Force?" has been the millionbillion-ruble question in this whole war.

Yeah but no, again there is no great mystery. Their air assets were definitely present early in the war when they expected a quick victory with a small force. But Russian Air Force is small, and is not really fit for fighting against capable air defense. That is what happens when you have a limited military budget and spend it on very expensive nuclear systems. None of this was unknown.

Pre-war, every serious defense analyst I could find expected them to systematically dismantle Ukraine in something that looked like the US Gulf War 1

Because they expected an invasion with near full power of the Russian army rolling across the border. This is not the invasion that actually took place and so what is the point of taking attrition to your valuable air assets when it is not going to accomplish anything because the army is not suited for it?

This comment says nothing. All this money is negligible compared to the size of the American economy. It “sounds big”, that’s all. And I think it’s important, now and again, for any great power to show the world who’s boss. Looking at historical imperial lifespans it’s likely the US still has at least fifty years on top.

All this money is negligible compared to the size of the American economy.

The industrial capacity is the biggest bottleneck. It doesn't matter how much money the US spends, there won't be enough artillery shells. The US is emptying it stock of air defence on the border to Iran, which clearly strengthens Iran's ability to hit back with missiles. Ukraine had thousands of SAM before the war which now are largely expended. Replacing s300 missiles with 5 million dollar Patriot missiles isn't only expensive, it requires those missiles to be manufactured. Add on the 250 s300 launchers and there is both economic and supply chain woes. Meanwhile, China outpaces the US in SAM production. The resources to train troops is strained. This war is causing a major NATO-supply chain shock. After three decades of failed wars, the US can't simultaneously keep the war in Ukraine going, dominate the middle east and keep China back. Latin American countries and the middle east have clearly moved away from the American orbit, with the US tied down in Taiwan and Ukraine.

As for cost, the cost has been enormous. It isn't just the tens of billions spent on weapons so far, it is going to be tens of billions per year for decades. Add 5% interest on these loans and the cost is significant. The inflation, caused by this war combined with the raised interest rates to combat it, far surpasses the direct cost of the weapons.

While empires don't die quickly, the US is clearly in a latter phase as it is stuck continuously fighting wars on the periphery while not being able to expand. Empires tend to decline when problems that need to be dealt with outstrips the ability to handle them. The Russia situation piled more problems on the US.

The inflation, caused by this war combined with the raised interest rates to combat it, far surpasses the direct cost of the weapons.

US inflation was high before the war and it has fallen during the war: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=167K2

It isn't just the tens of billions spent on weapons so far, it is going to be tens of billions per year for decades.

This is nothing for the US.

The inflation, caused by this war combined with the raised interest rates to combat it, far surpasses the direct cost of the weapons.

The inflation was caused by money printing during COVID. The war has contributed very little to inflation, at least in the US.

to a country barely hanging onto its ability to field forces outside of the Ukraine theater.

Citation needed. Hasn't there been scaremongering about Russian control over Sudan of all places, via Wagner? There are still a fair few Russians in Syria too. Russia seems to have plenty of energy left to pursue other campaigns.

Without having to put their own forces on the line, and at the cost of a fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget, the US is getting to incapacitate one of their major geopolitical threats.

I keep seeing this take in a lot of social media and I really don't think that it has any relation to reality. It isn't a "fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget" but a massive economic imposition and cost upon the rest of the west. Aside from the direct costs of sending money and arms to one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, the indirect costs from rising energy prices, economic disruption, inflation, sanctions, refugees and the like have made this entire affair incredibly expensive. If the de-dollarisation that the sanctions regime has spurred continues it could ultimately prove to be one of the most expensive mistakes in US history.

Even then, the cost in materiel matters as well. Western supply chains and reserves have been tapped out to funnel that equipment to Ukraine, and those stocks have been considerably depleted (at least among EU member state militaries). While that's bad by itself, it becomes even worse when you remember who Russia's biggest ally is - China. The Chinese government is, presumably, sitting back and rubbing their hands together with glee as they watch the west burn vast amounts of military equipment on a pyre. Every bit of kit that gets blown up in the Ukraine or sold onto the black market by some unscrupulous oligarch is a piece of kit that is not going to be used in any prospective defence of Taiwan - if the US is getting a pretty great deal, you're gonna run out of superlatives when you try to describe the one China is getting.

I keep seeing this take in a lot of social media and I really don't think that it has any relation to reality. It isn't a "fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget" but a massive economic imposition and cost upon the rest of the west. Aside from the direct costs of sending money and arms to one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, the indirect costs from rising energy prices, economic disruption, inflation, sanctions, refugees and the like have made this entire affair incredibly expensive.

This conflates a few different topics of wildly different scopes, so I'll focus on the point of energy prices. The energy price rising isn't the consequence of the war, it's the consequence of the Europeans- namely the Germans- refusing energy blackmail. The war was the context of the blackmail, but the capacity for the blackmail was baked into the status quo ante as a result of deliberate central and western European policy choices over the objections / concerns / warnings of US and Eastern European countries. The Russians were always very blatant that they were prioritizing political goals over economic profit with their use of gazprom, and that the German industrial base getting functionally subsidized energy was a means to an end.

The energy costs Europe is experience are the cost of a much delayed structural shift away from a nigh monopoly supplier to more resilient import network infrastructure. This is the epitome of a good cost, and will drastically increase European economic safety over the long term.

For any sort of advocate of European strategic autonomy, this is perhaps the best cost of the entire conflict, and exceptionally well timed as it occurred when there was the US-alliance network to fall back on for sourcing for LNG imports.

If the de-dollarisation that the sanctions regime has spurred continues it could ultimately prove to be one of the most expensive mistakes in US history.

Laconic 'If' applies. De-dollarization has been a thing for literal decades, and continues to be a thing, and will continue to be a thing. The reason it always seems to never happen is epitomized by the Russia-India experience in the rupee trade debacle- the other person has to want your currency, and to want your currency at scale it needs to be a a stable and fungible store of value. It's not enough to offer your own money as loans to buy stuff back from you, as is common with the Chinese yuan projects- the currency has to have value with others.

I am happy to concede that China may yet get some value out of the Yuan as a way to facilitate corruption outside of dollar monitoring systems (which is how, say, Lulu got caught for corruption in Brazil)- but this is independent of the war.

Even then, the cost in materiel matters as well. Western supply chains and reserves have been tapped out to funnel that equipment to Ukraine, and those stocks have been considerably depleted (at least among EU member state militaries).

They are depleted because they were incredibly thin beforehand, due to decades of neglect and under-resourcing and frankly falling behind the tech curve. Again, this is a good cost to pay if you are any sort of advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe, as the cost was going to come regardless.

With unavoidable costs, timing is key to relative preference, and the Ukraine crisis is about as ideal a time to restock / modernize, as political support is high, support from the current American establishment is high to subsidize modernization costs, and the political costs of emptying out the outdated cold war stock to free up budget / admin capacity for modernization is practically negative.

While that's bad by itself, it becomes even worse when you remember who Russia's biggest ally is - China. The Chinese government is, presumably, sitting back and rubbing their hands together with glee as they watch the west burn vast amounts of military equipment on a pyre. Every bit of kit that gets blown up in the Ukraine or sold onto the black market by some unscrupulous oligarch is a piece of kit that is not going to be used in any prospective defence of Taiwan

...but it was never going to be used in any prospective defense of Taiwan regardless, because water is a thing other than the color blue on a map.

This has been a thing since last year, but it bears repeating: Taiwan is an island. It's not in need of tank columns to drive across the strait. No one is building trench lines in the water. Many of the weapon systems that are very useful in the Ukraine conflict are practically irrelevant in a Taiwan conflict, because even if they were on the island they wouldnt' reach far enough off the island to matter in what really matters in a Taiwan conflict- the ability of the Chinese to maintain a blockade of the island against the US Navy.

In a Taiwan conflict, there will be no Ukraine-style aid packages to fight a major ground war. Only the equipment already on the ground has any relevance, and even then only in so much that it extends the time the Chinese need to maintain a blockade. As long as there is any blockade, no aid package would get through. If there is no blockade, it's because the Americans have beaten back the Chinese navy, and if the Chinese navy isn't there, it's not landing forces.

The Taiwan conflict isn't about ground-force kit, it's about naval assets. Which, notably, have not been sent to Ukraine.

if the US is getting a pretty great deal, you're gonna run out of superlatives when you try to describe the one China is getting.

A white elephant.

The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect. This included the power of offense versus defense, assumptions of acceptance by the targeted population, the unwillingness of the Europeans to assume costs to diplomatically resist pressure, and inability of the US to do things, and of course the ability of the Russians as allies.

The war was the context of the blackmail, but the capacity for the blackmail was baked into the status quo ante as a result of deliberate central and western European policy choices over the objections / concerns / warnings of US and Eastern European countries.

I don't think this even qualifies as an argument that needs refuting. This loss of energy was understood to be a consequence of military engagement and so because it was a known consequence it doesn't matter? The economic problems and energy supply issues caused by provoking hostilities with your main supplier of fossil fuels are in fact caused by provoking hostilities by your main supplier of fossil fuels!

The energy costs Europe is experience are the cost of a much delayed structural shift away from a nigh monopoly supplier to more resilient import network infrastructure. This is the epitome of a good cost, and will drastically increase European economic safety over the long term.

This isn't happening and Europe is currently undergoing serious economic problems as a result of the lack of fossil fuels. This could indeed be qualified as shift to an import network infrastructure, but the idea that this makes the continent more resilient is farcical. The huge costs associated with importing LNG from the US rather than a pipeline from Russia have no compensating factors, and will continue to act as a drag/tax on the economy as a whole due to the massively important role played by fossil fuels in modern economies. There is going to be less energy, it will be less reliably sourced and it will cost more - this will have a ripple effect through the rest of the economy, and again, I do not think that this is a cost worth paying for the goal of making sure that Kiev can continue to shower the breakaway regions with artillery fire.

That said, the flagrant violation of the sanctions has also contributed - Europe is still using Russian fossil fuels, they're just paying India a premium to do so, and the US doesn't have the stones/capability to sanction India and China. Actually going through with the economic threats and sanctions in a real and serious way, as opposed to paying them lip-service and paying someone else so you can ignore them, would impose such a disastrous political cost that the leaders who did so would be removed from power in short order.

Laconic 'If' applies. De-dollarization has been a thing for literal decades, and continues to be a thing, and will continue to be a thing.

Recent events and sanctions have given that process rocket-skates and supercharged it. De-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before the war, and the sanctions regime that was imposed upon Russia has contributed to that. You're right when you talk about the problems associated with not using the current global reserve currency, but the problems associated with staying on the dollar are starting to match or even exceed them.

Again, this is a good cost to pay if you are any sort of advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe, as the cost was going to come regardless.

I agree that European militaries were largely jokes, but the supply chain and logistical issues that this affair has exposed are not minor and will take considerable time and investment to fix. Ammunition factories can't be built overnight. Of course, if you're an advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe you'd have to advocate for getting them out from under the thumb of the USA so this entire affair is meaningless anyway.

The Taiwan conflict isn't about ground-force kit, it's about naval assets. Which, notably, have not been sent to Ukraine.

I'm taking the Rand corporation's word for it - they're as fanatically pro US empire as it is possible to be, and even they are saying that the engagement in Ukraine is tying up resources which could be used in the conflict with China, which is far more important (source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html ). Most serious pieces I have seen discussing this topic claim that the conflict is drawing away resources which could be used in China.

Moreover, the idea that this materiel is irrelevant because Taiwan will get blockaded is also meaningless, given that hostilities haven't actually started yet and that equipment could be sent there before they do anyway. Anti-air defences and artillery are absolutely the sort of military equipment that could be useful, and those have definitely been showing up in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect.

I think you're wrong but I don't think that there can be an actual resolution of this with words - so instead I'm going to offer a bet. My position is that Russia is absolutely capable as an ally, that western nations are not willing to shoulder the burdens required to prevent the rise of a multipolar world and the US is in fact incapable of achieving their goals. The US failed in Iraq, is failing in Syria, failed in Afghanistan and failed in Vietnam. The recent history of the US empire's military adventurism has been a long litany of defeats, and I see no reason for that to change. If you disagree, I'll give you a chance to put some money on the table - I'm willing to throw 200 USD in monero into escrow for a bet that Ukraine will not retake Crimea and the breakaway republics by the time hostilities cease.

I don't think this even qualifies as an argument that needs refuting. This loss of energy was understood to be a consequence of military engagement and so because it was a known consequence it doesn't matter?

Incorrect. The point is not that it doesn't matter- the point is that the causal mechanism is different. Being a result of energy blackmail as opposed to war is a meaningful distinction because the energy cutoffs could occur in non-war contexts as well- as the eastern Europeans had previously experienced in the 2010s, but which Germany dismissed on arguments that Russia had been a consistent supplier to them so the warnings of the Americans were baseless.

The economic problems and energy supply issues caused by provoking hostilities with your main supplier of fossil fuels are in fact caused by provoking hostilities by your main supplier of fossil fuels!

The Europeans did not provoke hostilities, unless you consider the pre-Maidan support by European and especially German economic interests in supporting pro-European Ukrainian groups a form of provocoation.

This isn't happening and Europe is currently undergoing serious economic problems as a result of the lack of fossil fuels. This could indeed be qualified as shift to an import network infrastructure, but the idea that this makes the continent more resilient is farcical. The huge costs associated with importing LNG from the US rather than a pipeline from Russia have no compensating factors, and will continue to act as a drag/tax on the economy as a whole due to the massively important role played by fossil fuels in modern economies. There is going to be less energy, it will be less reliably sourced and it will cost more - this will have a ripple effect through the rest of the economy, and again, I do not think that this is a cost worth paying for the goal of making sure that Kiev can continue to shower the breakaway regions with artillery fire.

That said, the flagrant violation of the sanctions has also contributed - Europe is still using Russian fossil fuels, they're just paying India a premium to do so, and the US doesn't have the stones/capability to sanction India and China. Actually going through with the economic threats and sanctions in a real and serious way, as opposed to paying them lip-service and paying someone else so you can ignore them, would impose such a disastrous political cost that the leaders who did so would be removed from power in short order.

You can't have it both ways: either the Europeans lack fossile fuels, or the Europeans are still using Russian fossile fuels. Choose one argument and stick to it.

Further disagreements on framing include-

-The US isn't the primary supplier of LNG on the markets, it was the Arabs (who the Europeans bought much of the gas that normally went to Asia, especially China)

-The ability for sea-based LNG imports is what makes the energy import more reliable, as it avoids critical dependencies on any particular provider due to maritime LNG's fungible nature

-The fact that the LNG import terminals are actually importing LNG, while the Russians actually did shut down the gas pipelines on pretext, belies the reliability difference

-The German economic difficulties were a market distortion result of the Russians functionally subsidizing the pre-war German energy market for the purpose of the blackmail setup, which was raised

-The Europeans are paying a premium in a technical sense, not a global market sense, where their price for the Russian products benefits from the price caps

-You continue to misunderstand the design purpose of the sanctions, and chest-thumping bravado is not a superior alternative

Recent events and sanctions have given that process rocket-skates and supercharged it. De-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before the war, and the sanctions regime that was imposed upon Russia has contributed to that. You're right when you talk about the problems associated with not using the current global reserve currency, but the problems associated with staying on the dollar are starting to match or even exceed them.

This is repeating the same claim, not a counter-argument with any falsifiable new claims. The use of non-dollars for transactions is not a new thing. The reasons it is not an at-scale thing over time is due to the dynamics of reserve currency, and the functions which drive reserve currency usage have not changed. Until they do, 'de-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before' is synonymous with 'the Russians are sanctioned from the dollar, and are trying to make a virtue of a weakness they've been lobbying to have reversed.'

I agree that European militaries were largely jokes, but the supply chain and logistical issues that this affair has exposed are not minor and will take considerable time and investment to fix. Ammunition factories can't be built overnight. Of course, if you're an advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe you'd have to advocate for getting them out from under the thumb of the USA so this entire affair is meaningless anyway.

Setting aside that Europe is not under the US's thumb, it remains better to identify and start fixing logistical issues before they are needed in another crisis. Either the European logistical issue is not an issue for whatever role they might have in a Taiwan crisis- in which case earlier forced awareness is only going to improve the position- or the European logistical issue were insufficient for a Taiwan crisis- in which avoiding the issue (by avoiding the Ukraine crisis) would have been worse, as any Chinese effort willing to take the risk on an assumption of European strength would have been more likely to succeed as the Taiwanese and Americans might have been assuming a level of support not there.

I'm taking the Rand corporation's word for it - they're as fanatically pro US empire as it is possible to be, and even they are saying that the engagement in Ukraine is tying up resources which could be used in the conflict with China, which is far more important (source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html ). Most serious pieces I have seen discussing this topic claim that the conflict is drawing away resources which could be used in China.

This may be a retreat to a bailey, but it's still a bailey to the original claim of which types of resources matter between conflicts. Your RAND article does not claim the weapon kits and systems being sent to Ukraine are the resources that matter in a China conflict, nor does it address the point on how the cost-value of these resources that were already paid for implies costs in the current era.

Setting aside RAND's own contested history and accuracies, the article's claims regarding China (which is mentioned all of 8 times) center around whether Russia is 'completely' subordinated to it by the end. It makes no claim that the Russian level of support to China in a Taiwan conflict has or would change, not least because it doesn't actually identify the sort of resources / support that would be provided, let alone what would change.

The point remains: the types of resources matter. The types that the Europeans are investing into Ukraine are not the type that would matter in a near-term Taiwan scenario. Unless you believe that the resources / economic costs would have been directly substituted into a maritime naval buildup, these are not costs with a Taiwan-relevant opportunity cost, because the Europeans were never a credible military factor in a Taiwan conflict.

Moreover, the idea that this materiel is irrelevant because Taiwan will get blockaded is also meaningless, given that hostilities haven't actually started yet and that equipment could be sent there before they do anyway. Anti-air defences and artillery are absolutely the sort of military equipment that could be useful, and those have definitely been showing up in Ukraine.

But they wouldn't send significant amounts in advance, for the same reason they didn't go to Ukraine in advance despite Ukraine actually being at far more direct and recent threat: a mix of limitations, their economic interests, and the strategic interests of key European leaders uninterested in being involved in the situation and trying to minimize exposure.

This is an argument that assumes a generosity of the Europeans that didn't exist in their own neighborhood. More to the point, this assumes that they would have been more generous in the face of an uncontested Russian invasion on their borders, rather than finding the advance of Russians in their neighborhood a compelling reason to keep their air defense systems defending themselves, and thus tying down potential resources to Taiwan in a functional strategic fixing action.

The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect.

I think you're wrong but I don't think that there can be an actual resolution of this with words - so instead I'm going to offer a bet. My position is that Russia is absolutely capable as an ally, that western nations are not willing to shoulder the burdens required to prevent the rise of a multipolar world and the US is in fact incapable of achieving their goals. The US failed in Iraq, is failing in Syria, failed in Afghanistan and failed in Vietnam. The recent history of the US empire's military adventurism has been a long litany of defeats, and I see no reason for that to change. If you disagree, I'll give you a chance to put some money on the table - I'm willing to throw 200 USD in monero into escrow for a bet that Ukraine will not retake Crimea and the breakaway republics by the time hostilities cease.

I'll disagree, without betting. Setting aside that it's a poorly structured list in measurable and general claims, I don't bet in general.

Being a result of energy blackmail as opposed to war is a meaningful distinction because the energy cutoffs could occur in non-war contexts as well

What?

I legitimately do not understand your position here. If I go to a restaurant that I've been a regular at and decide to chuck a huge tantrum and break some plates and then get banned from returning or doing business with said restaurant, the fact that they could have banned me from entering at any point prior to that does not mean that being banned as a result of my actions is no longer a result of my actions. What, precisely, is the distinction you're making here? How is it relevant to a given incident, at all, that a business could choose to stop selling to me for breaking their rules beforehand? All I can see is playing games with words to disguise the fact that disruptions in energy supplies are a direct result of sponsoring the war.

You can't have it both ways: either the Europeans lack fossile fuels, or the Europeans are still using Russian fossile fuels.

The Europeans lack the ready access to fossil fuels they had previously - but they are still using Russian fossil fuels anyway by paying middlemen like India, and this is having a noticeable impact on their economies.

You continue to misunderstand the design purpose of the sanctions, and chest-thumping bravado is not a superior alternative

The purpose of the sanctions was to reduce Russia's ability to wage war by targeting their economy, and to put pressure on the population in order to achieve a political goal (leadership change/stopping the war). These efforts have failed - the war is still happening and the Russian economy has not been destroyed.

Until they do, 'de-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before' is synonymous with 'the Russians are sanctioned from the dollar, and are trying to make a virtue of a weakness they've been lobbying to have reversed.'

Incorrect - China has been aggressively pursuing de-dollarisation and so has India. They're experiencing difficulties doing so, of course, because financial systems and currencies have a lot of inertia and moving parts. The Global Times, which is essentially a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, has explicitly stated that the weaponisation of the dollar is driving other countries away from it (though they also correctly note that this process takes time and a lot of nations have complicated linkages to the USD which will take time to unwind) - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1289549.shtml

The US dollar does not only serve as public good to the international community, it has also been used by the US as a strategic tool, and has become a pillar of US hegemony alongside military power. The US government has also increasingly weaponized it. De-dollarization is of course crucial and is the general trend, but the "de-weaponization of the dollar" is even more urgent.

This may be a retreat to a bailey, but it's still a bailey to the original claim of which types of resources matter between conflicts.

Ok, whatever - a distinction without a difference. I freely admit that a substantial portion of the resources spent on the Ukraine conflict could not be used in any prospective Taiwan conflict. This does not damage my point in any real way - the military equipment is one factor, and the drain on attention, time and decision-making are all relevant as well. Though that said, I will admit that I may have been unclear earlier when I said "at least among EU militaries". I did not exclusively mean EU militaries when talking about the reduction in western capability, and was including the US in that category.

But they wouldn't send significant amounts in advance, for the same reason they didn't go to Ukraine in advance

Huh? They did send significant amounts of aid to Ukraine in advance. I'd argue that "the defence minister mentions the event to the press" to meet the threshold of significant - (and no, I am not talking about the exercise that is the main thrust of the article, but the following quote) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29204505

Russia denies sending troops to aid the rebels, as alleged by Ukraine and Nato.

Over the weekend, Ukrainian Defence Minister Valery Heletey said Nato countries had begun arming his nation in the fight against the rebels.

He did not specify the type of weapons being delivered or name the countries involved.

And inserting some text here just to clearly mark the difference between a BBC quote and your post...

Setting aside that it's a poorly structured list in measurable and general claims, I don't bet in general.

The actual bet is very straightforward and specific - will the Ukraine regain control over Crimea and the breakaway republics when hostilities end? Though that said, given that you're not willing, I'm leaving the bet open for any takers, mainly because I don't think even the people arguing that the Ukraine will win this conflict take that belief seriously enough to put money on it (and I'd love to get some free, easy money from anyone who does).

If there is no blockade, it's because the Americans have beaten back the Chinese navy, and if the Chinese navy isn't there, it's not landing forces.

This isn't quite true. The Chinese can control the strait without being able to control the entire Taiwanese coastline.

It's not the particular coastline, but the ability to deny support from American carrier groups. Sailing between the continent and the island is a flex, but it's ultimately not where the carrier groups that could shut down an invasion would be.

"Sailing between the continent and the island" is how they would land forces. It is possible for the Chinese Navy to be able to do so while being unable to prevent the US from supplying Taiwan via the east side of the island. Not likely, I'll admit, most likely the US denies them the strait. It is also possible they could deny the US ability to supply the island while also being denied the strait, though I suspect this situation would not last long.

Isn’t the western coast of Taiwan famously difficult to land troops on?

I think I may not have been clear / been on a tangential point. As a clarification of my previous point, not a rebuttal to this point:

My intended point was that if the Chinese cannot prevent the American carriers from operating on the east side of the coast, or the south, or the north, they do not control the western Straight, because the carriers are still able to do their job of launching planes to target invasion vessels with anti-ship missiles. My assessment is that the Chinese generally believe preventing this is a requirement to go ahead with the invasion in any sort of enduring scenario (ie. anything other than an immediate 'run to the ports and rush over' attempt at a fait accompli). This is why the Chinese anti-access / area-denial weapons, such as the vaunted anti-carrier ballistic missile or threats to guam, are so much further outside the range of the straight itself: they need to be to keep the carriers from operating off the east coast of Taiwan, or long-range bombers from taking off in range to cause unacceptable amounts of trouble.

If the Carrier groups are operating off the east, then these systems have already failed. If these systems have failed, the Chinese won't be attempting to launch more landing craft. If the systems succeeded, then the carriers are not there, and the ability to execute the blockade is maintained. Thus, the general importance is on the ability to maintain the blockade, as a failure to be able to do so means that carrier groups are active in the immediate area, which pre-empts the landing flotilla.

Once again with feeling.

Every Russian soldier killed in Ukraine, every Tank that gets it turret tossed, every aircraft shot down, every missile expended is one less that can be used to threaten Poland, Latvia, Finland or any other NATO power. The money we are paying now to eliminate the Russian military's reserves and reinforce the post WWI norm of "no you can't invade your neighbor" is arguably some of the best ROI we could possibly ask for.

The money we are paying now to eliminate the Russian military's reserves and ... is arguably some of the best ROI we could possibly ask for.

I do not think that the final tally has come in yet, but I absolutely do not believe that this is the case or that this juice is worth the squeeze. That said I don't think this is an argument that can actually be resolved - the facts aren't visible beyond the fog of war yet, although if you have top secret intelligence verifying the exact capabilities of the Russian military please share it with the class.

reinforce the post WWI norm of "no you can't invade your neighbor"

There has been no reinforcing of this whatsoever, nor is it a norm. The USA has been extremely aggressive militarily and launched invasions all around the world - the fact that they haven't invaded Mexico or Canada means absolutely nothing unless you think it'd be perfectly ok for Russia to launch an invasion of the UK instead because the UK isn't, strictly speaking, their neighbour.

I agree that UN resolutions are a joke, but I must have missed the part where the US tried to incorporate Iraq and Afghanistan as territories.

I highly doubt that's your actual problem with what's happening - would you be perfectly ok with the invasion if Russia simply did to Ukraine exactly what the US did to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Is the argument here that the US was upholding some important international norm when they kept ridiculous corrupt occupation governments in Iraq and Afghanistan for decades to the great detriment of their populations, and then left them as smoldering ruins refusing to take any responsibility?

Many observers in important positions around the World deducted from these events that American leaders don't give a shit about any of their rhetoric, are short-sighted, unreliable, agreement-incapable and live in their own media narrative where they are always right in the end. They will make up norms when it suits them and adjust them mid-game if it doesn't suit them anymore.

Unfortunately I believe Ukrainians are due to discover this as well after sacrificing their youth and their relations with their only important neighbor for drip-fed fickle promises.

Is the argument here that the US was upholding some important international norm when they kept ridiculous corrupt occupation governments in Iraq and Afghanistan for decades to the great detriment of their populations, and then left them as smoldering ruins refusing to take any responsibility?

Pick one. Either the US kept "kept ridiculous corrupt occupation governments in Iraq and Afghanistan" or it refused to take any responsibility. The US in fact took on a great deal of responsibility in Afghanistan and Iraq, responsibility the Iraqis and (especially) the Afghans would have preferred we NOT take on.

Unfortunately I believe Ukrainians are due to discover this as well after sacrificing their youth and their relations with their only important neighbor for drip-fed fickle promises.

Why are Romania, Poland, and Hungary not important neighbors again?

More comments

As a European, this is half the reason I'm in favor of us supporting Ukraine.

It is the reason why I support Russia. Being nothing more than an American colony run by hyperwoke American financial institutions and state department critters is the end of Europe.

A Russian victory would put no stop to that; the Americans already won the very moment the Russians didn't get their instant victory. If we want to be independent, we have to be independent and do it ourselves. The Russians aren't going to somehow save us.

Shhh...

you were not supposed to notice that. ;-)

Stop this snide, low effort tittering.

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