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Nobody seems to talk about the RU-UA war here anymore. I guess it's because we're saturated with it everywhere else.
Yet given that Ukraine has launched what is unquestionably the largest offensive since the Kharkov surge in late September when it took back wide swathes of territory, I believe a status update is warranted.
First, it is immediately clear that the Russians are much more prepared this time. The area that Ukraine took back in autumn was barely defended by a rag-tag group of volunteer militias. That was a big lapse by the Russian general command, which also led to the big mobilisation drive. This time is different.
Even pro-UA accounts like Julian Röpcke are conceding that Ukraine is losing lots of armored vehicles with very marginal gains. Western officials like the CIA chief or the US foreign secretary have all pointed out that the aftermath of the offensive will shape upcoming negotiations. Given that Ukraine has little to show for their offensive thus far, this inevitably casts a dark shadow on any prospects for large territorial compromises. Why would the Russians give the Ukrainians something at the negotiating table which they cannot gain on the battlefield?
To my mind, the best that Ukraine can hope for now is a stalemate. This war has shown that in the era of ubiquitous ISR capabilities, trying to surprise your enemy is much harder if he's on his toes (which the Russians weren't in the autumn, but they are now). Consequently, offensives are simply far costlier and harder. The Russians had the same problems, which is why capturing Bakhmut took such an absurdly long time.
For those of us who would want to see a negotiated settlement, the reality is that neither side is running out of money or arms. Russia is spending a moderate amount of money and the West can keep supplying Ukraine enough to keep going for years if the decision is made that defensive action is the way to go. The only way this war ends is if the West tells Ukraine to give in and accept large territorial losses in return for a settlement and possibly security guarantees. Such an outcome would be nearly impossible to sell to Ukraine's domestic public and would almost certainly end the career of whoever was leading the country, including Zelensky. Whatever comes out of this war, I'm not optimistic about Ukraine's long-term prospects.
I also think we should've had more discussion of the war.
This caught my eye: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/singapore-speech-hrvp-borrell-shangri-la-dialogue_en
Some Brussels swamp creature swans out to East Asia and says many banal things but also this:
700 billion euros! And there's economic damage in addition to that. 700 billion is just the cost of the bandage for the stab wound (self-inflicted I might add). Europe could've chosen to ignore the US hectoring them into sanctioning Russia, as Hungary did. And what is the cost of the bleeding? What is the cost outside of the EU? Germany and Britain are in a recession, as I recall.
What is the point of it all? Why are we defending borders that were randomly redrawn by the Soviets (in the case of Crimea), why care? Why are we supplying weapons so that Kiev can hold onto predominently Russian-speaking territories whose population mostly doesn't even want to be part of Ukraine? It goes rather against the Kosovo/Palestine/Kurds principle, if principle is an appropriate word to apply in relation to foreign policy.
This whole operation only makes sense if you start with the assumption that Russia is an enemy to be crushed. Then it makes sense to arm the Ukrainians to maximize the number of dead Russians at a relatively low cost. Relatively low, compared to a nuclear war. The War in Afghanistan probably killed more Russians/$ thanks to the sheer amount of poppies produced under our abysmal occupation government.
Anyway, trying to crush Russia has all kinds of bad effects. It pushes Russia towards China and Iran, solidifying an anti-Western axis that spans Eurasia. Our oil sanctions have unsettled OPEC, who might reasonably see a danger in the West trying to crush socially conservative, autocratic states that engage in 'illegal wars' and weaken their energy leverage. Saudi-Iranian rapprochement is accelerating rapidly and is brokered by China: https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/persian-gulf-states-to-form-joint-navy-in-coordination-with-china/
And then there are all the problems Russia can cause for us. Do we want Russian missiles being contributed to China during a Pacific war? Do we want enormous numbers of troops and considerable airpower tied down in Europe, just in case some 'volunteers' move across the border and set up shop in Estonian towns that border Russia? That's a precedent that the Polish Volunteer corps set in Belgorod. Do we want Russian energy and agriculture powering a gigantic mobilized Chinese war machine? Are we really confident in funding a war of attrition against Russia of all countries?
We can't really back down now that Leopards and Bradleys are aflame in Ukraine but it is not clear how any of this is in the national interests of most Western countries. We could've just ignored the whole thing, chose not to have an opinion on Ukraine in 2008, in 2014 in 2018 or 2022. It could be swept under the carpet, like the war in Yemen. Without Nuland, without NATO proposals, without Western training for the Ukrainian military, would there be a long and grinding war? It may well be in the interests of Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to pursue a foreign policy full of exciting conflicts and intensify rivalries, yet it is not so good for people with gas bills, fertilizer needs and taxes to pay.
Fun:looks somewhat like Mongol Empire.
It looks like that before population movement, only Crimea had solid majority who didn't want to be in Ukraine. Speaking Russian language doesn't necessarily mean being want to be part of Russia, compare Ireland and UK for example.
A Russia--Iran--China axis means that all of Central & Northern Asia is outside US influence as an unbroken landmass. The stan countries are irrelevant and Pakistan is a Chinese vassal state.
It's fortunate that China is so dependent on sea based trade, because it is thoroughly flanked by US allies in the sea. Effective land based trade needs to be established between Iran, Russia & China. If that's achieved, then between those 3 and indebted B&R nations, China should be able to get dedollarification started quite soon.
Been there, won that.
More seriously, I don’t know that China’s development really hinges on Russia. It’s going to follow the Belt and Road plans one way or another. It has energy, and it has manpower. If they want to get off the dollar, they’ll do it whether or not they have Russian debts.
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You speak this as if it's a bad thing for the Americans, rather than a plus. Central & Northern Asia is just about the least threatening center of gravity for any anti-US coalition, all the more so if you helpfully exclude India from in.
'Effective' land-based trade is not the same as 'cost-efficient', and that's always going to come back to the cost of water-based transport vis-a-vis everything else. If China wants to invest huge sums of money on infrastructure to carrying material from the coasts of China up and over and through the hindu kush, they should actively be encouraged to do so. A land-based trade route is a far less economically efficient, and thus slower growth and less throughput, than a sea-based economy.
Dedeollerification doesn't exactly hinge on having land-based trade either. That's a misconception of why the Dollar is useful in trading between states, and why the Chinese yuan isn't a much-sought reserve currency.
The land based trade that China is interested in (Gwadar fantasies aside) is alternative routes for importing fossil fuels and natural resources via its northern and northwestern borders. Decidedly worse economically than sea-based trade, that's still far more practical than the Hindu Kush route. And in a Taiwan contingency, the costs don't matter too much: it's already decided to nuke its economy. It's more than willing to take on otherwise uneconomic projects if those can secure resources from a Russian vassal state to help wage its war, and that's entirely rational (taking the rationality of a Taiwan invasion as given).
Its goal isn't to create some permanent Eurasian land-based trading bloc but to provide energy security in the case of war. Post-conflict, it would return to sea-based trade, with the hope/expectation that it would be able to dictate the terms of what sea-based trade in the western Pacific looks like.
China has to be pretty happy about what the war is doing to Russia. Before, there was some chance (admittedly less than likely) that Russia could be drawn into some kind of sanctions regime. But now it's certain where Russia's chips will land, because it really won't have a choice.
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A considerable chunk of Donetsk and Luhansk wanted to leave and backed their words with force of arms.
Is this meant to be any kind of statement about the legitimacy of Ukrainian or Russian government there? If so how? A 'significant chunk' of those in Ulster wanted to leave and backed their words with force of arms, hardly makes British rule illegitimate or not worth fighting to preserve.
The legitimacy of the Ukrainian and Russian govts isn't really important. We shouldn't be interfering in other people's messy problems. It would be inappropriate for the Soviets to send guns and munitions to Ulster or London.
The fracking USA sent guns to Ulster.
Rep Peter King (IRA-NY) suffered no adverse political consequences for being a terrorist fundraiser, and was allowed to be Grand Marshall of the NYC St Patrick's Day parade (despite provoking a boycott by the Irish embassy) and Chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security (I suppose he did have relevant experience given the main project of the committee under his leadership was investigating terrorist financing). He remained unrepentant until Sinn Fein irritated him by opposing the Iraq war, and continued to befoul Congress until retiring in his late 70's.
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Except it isn't messy. Russia invaded a sovereign nation without provocation - indeed they were the ones already being provocative with their support of separatists. If foreign support isn't justified now then when is it?
We invade or attack sovereign countries all the time without provocation, under novel ideas like 'responsibility to protect' or Bush's 'pre-emptive strike'. Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yugoslavia... The Russians had the good grace to mostly stay out of the way and not flood these countries with MANPADs or other weapons directly aimed at our troops. They mostly stayed out of our way and we stayed out of theirs. This is how we avoid WW3.
What were we doing in Syria if not supporting separatists? What are US troops doing on the ground there?
If we undermine the broad strokes of international law like 'don't attack people without Security Council approval' we shouldn't be surprised if others do the same thing. If we start sending tanks, aircraft, missiles to Ukraine, why shouldn't the Russians send weapons to anyone who causes problems for us? Shouldn't the Chinese decide 'well if they'll all fight us anyway - let's open the floodgates and pump Russia and everyone else full of arms'.
Raising the energy level of these conflicts is bad for everyone.
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