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Culture War Roundup for the week of April 13, 2026

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The more I think about politics, I always end up coming back to this quote from a very good video (from a very good youtuber!).

A common bait-and-switch happens so quickly you might miss it, and it occurs very frequently. Pinker lines up a number of things that involve good fact-checking, methodological research, and asking questions, but these are not the reasons why we have core disagreements about values—they simply aren’t. There isn’t a scientific problem that is going to convert a Democrat into a Republican, and the insinuation that we can just “use science” to solve these problems is misleading.

A great example is abortion. This is largely a question about choice, life, and volition. While science can show developmental details about what a fetus is, or whether it has certain cognitive abilities, the core belief revolves around whether there is a responsibility to preserve that life, whether it has inherent value, and whether society recognizes a duty toward it. That is what governs the debate—not the microscopic details. So regardless of how much information we gather about the fetus, the abortion issue does not fundamentally change. It won’t be resolved by higher-resolution data; the question is about the value we assign, and science alone cannot determine that.

I think in most cases, politics are about values. To piggy back off the abortion example. The go to argument surrounding this typically is bodily autonomy, and although one could argue that this isn't really consistent on a factual, legal level. If I were in the room debating a pro-choice person on the issue, here is how it would go.

PC Person

The fetus is not entitled to its mothers body, consider the court case McFall v Shimp: McFall suffered from a life-threatening bone marrow disease and his cousin, Shimp, was a compatible bone marrow donor. Shimp refused to donate bone marrow. McFall requested Shimp be compelled to donate. The Court considered Shimp’s refusal “morally indefensible,” but still ruled in Shimp’s favor, explaining,

“For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind.”

Judith Jarvis Thomson tackles the issues of bodily integrity and moral obligations in her essay, “A Defense of Abortion.” Thomson asks us to imagine a famous violinist with a fatal kidney ailment. One day a bunch of music lovers kidnap you and hook your kidneys up to the violinist’s circulatory system. In nine months the violinist will have recovered, but if you disconnect yourself prematurely the violinist will die. Thomson asks, “Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?”

When you drive (have sex), you know there’s a possibility you could crash into someone (conceive). Even when you drive very cautiously (use contraception), there is still a chance of a car accident. Should you be in a car crash in which the victim’s life is at stake, the law does not compel you to donate blood or organs to save the victim. While it would be admirable for you to donate, you are not required to do so."

Me:

"Thats cool. Lets say you, for whatever reason, are a psychopath who enjoys taking children, draining them of their blood, hospitalizing them and or possibly killing. If I was king for a day, and assuming your blood was a match, I would sentence you to life in prison, and then order that your blood be drained and given to the remaining children to save them. Fight Me"

I don't find this to be unreasonable, given that we would already use lethal injection for these kinds of people (also a violation of "bodily autonomy"). Draining someone of their blood would be no less worse than forcefully injecting them.

You are free to think I'm a crazy person, fine. But that's not my main point. The same problem exists for issues like nationalism & immigration. You can scream all day about how immigrants are a net gain to the economy, or how they commit less crime. But a ethno-nationalist will simply go "No, I value the culture and heritage of the green people, and I'd rather them go extinct than to have our way of life polluted by the purples.".

Another explicit example of what im talking about is race. A black person does not vote democrat because they are factually good for the economy (whether or not they are is besides the point). If you asked average black voter to produce a study about specific policies that cite this, they would come up short. Support for democrats comes from the idea of racial solidarity, and the fact that black people value the black race, and would like to advance black interest.

I have no clue how one would even go about resolving this. Morals & values are not empirical - you cant prove bodily autonomy and cultural heritage are good in the same way you can prove what foods are and aren't healthy. These things are based on moral intuitions that are fundamentally subjective. I don't think I could ever change my personal mind on that issue to be completely honest, but on a societal scale, this is obviously not sustainable. There needs to be some way to reconcile a difference in moral values.

I never liked the proverb that goes like hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue (why is paying a tribute a compelling metaphor here?), but the underlying sentiment is somewhat relevant. Specifically, (1) unlike the rat-adjacent crowd, most people don't have absolute, immutable values nor are even particularly disturbed by the prospect of value drift; (2) they experience "conflicting" values/terms in their value function (ones that you can't maximise simultaneously) not as a fun math problem but as painful and embarrassing; (3) if a pair of values they hold keeps causing problems as in 2., they will happily gradually do away with one of them as in 1. (At some point vice is driven to default?)

Now, add to this that most people also, apart from any other values, hold pragmatism and reasonableness as a value, as well as (more cynically) being perceived as following universal, elegant principles of the kind that get mentioned as a Philosophy in textbooks, as opposed to boring non-universalisable ones like "more power to my race". As a result, it's generally actually quite effective to promulgate the statement that some object-level aspect of your target's value system is inconsistent, impractical and/or non-universalisable. They will feel the tension between the "LARP as philosopher-king" value and whatever other value you are challenging (e.g. abortion views, religion, in-group favouritism) and often enough the other value will be the easier one for them to do away with.

(Of course, this also creates the continued demand for apologetics, * Studies and other word slop that basically serves to shield the object-level values from having to be traded off against the acting-reasonable value.)

I would be very interested in reading some effort posts that explore how people actually change their core moral principles. Off the top of my head, some of the historical examples that I don't fully understand are:

  1. how exactly did gay marriage and pro-choice become the default?
  2. how do religious groups reliably attract converts (or prevent deconversion)?
  3. how did America become anti-alcohol and then pro-alcohol so quickly in the Prohibition era? (These required Constitutional Amendments! I can't fathom 2/3rds of the population agreeing on something like this.)
  4. how did America change it's mind on eugenics / slavery / the Indian question / so many other political topics so abruptly?
  5. why did American fail to win the "hearts and minds" in Iraq / Afghanistan / Vietnam?

I have a decent sense of what happened for each of these topics individually, but I feel like there's a lot of commonalities / general principles that good be extracted here. I feel like this could provide a good sense of "epistemic hygiene" to help me from changing my mind when I don't intend to, help me better predict what future society will look like, and help me better convince people of my own moral intuitions. Maybe something like this already exists buried in the lesswrong archives?

I'm skeptical that there's a single story that hits all of these categories, without being so broad as to be useless. That said...

how exactly did gay marriage ... become the default?

There are three competing narratives, here:

  • Mistake theory. In this model, the median person who opposed gay marriage or homosexuality before 2000 had a bad model of what that meant. Over time, increased exposure, through the internet, the media representation, and especially through people discovering people in their own lives were gay, corrected those mistakes - not making two men kissing each other more interesting, but enough that it wasn't alien, just Those Weirdos Doing That Weird Thing. In some, this just made their discomfort a lower-priority matter; in others, it showed them people who would have direct benefit from the change in policy and who they wanted to benefit.
  • The Deluge. In this model, the gay rights movement had spent thirty-plus years building political infrastructure, and it hit a turning point and was able to overcome other external forces that prevented that force from being used. Some of those changes were legal (reduced mail censorship, cable media and internet avoiding broadcast censorship), some were social (actors coming out, cheaper transportation, easier small publication efforts), and some were both (there was a national movement for school teachers to come out, focused around teacher's union and their ability to fight firings). This force was brought to persuade or replace leadership, which brought changes to policy, and then people agreed with whatever became the new normal.
  • The Crush. In this model, the gay rights movement was able to bring the weight of institutions down, hard, on anyone who disagreed, with any and all tools available. This both made disagreeing more difficult, but more critically also removed the actual disagreements from public space, such that by Obergefell no one in Blue Tribe spaces (and even many people in Red Tribe spaces!) hadn't heard the full form of any strong policy arguments in the better part of a decade.

The real answer is a mix of all three (and probably one feeding into another), but the proportions matter. I hope for the mistake theory, but the more cynical I'm feeling the more The Crush seems plausible - not helped by the extreme unwillingness of anyone serious to engage with the possibility, even to recognize its failure in the trans stuff.

I think your explanations are missing a driver of why these trends started happening. (I also think you are underemphasizing the greater difficulty of being opposed to gay marriage when one has gay friends or family, though I am not so ambitious as to attempt to explain why being gay seems more common now than 50 years ago.) Anyway, for Gen X/Milennials, the traditional opposition to gay marriage from Boomers and previous generations was severely undermined by the prevalence of divorce among Boomers; why should younger generations take Boomers' moralizing about marriage seriously? This seems like a perfect issue for rebellion.

Another factor (technically fits under deluge I guess?): widespread access to pornography leading to men seeing lots of dicks which desensitized their natural disgust reaction to another man's dick having sex.

I'd put the desensitization under Mistake Theory - if you actually want a throbbing hard cock (in your porn), it doesn't matter whether that's because you're desensitized or it just isn't that gross - but they're not exactly natural categories. I'm more motioning around 'mistake' if it's about changing an average person's beliefs, and more 'deluge' if it's about changing policies or elite beliefs, but your framework may be more helpful for your perspective.

I hope for the mistake theory, but the more cynical I'm feeling the more The Crush seems plausible - not helped by the extreme unwillingness of anyone serious to engage with the possibility, even to recognize its failure in the trans stuff.

To temper that cynicism a little, I’d think that the “crush” scenario can only work, or at least only be really durable, when the “mistake theory” is also true (and probably with a “deluge” period in between). By the time “crush” factors were meaningfully coming into play, the overwhelming majority of the public was already on board with gay rights broadly, or at least cared so little about the issue that the opposition seemed at least as out-there as the supporters. This meant the only people being meaningfully “crushed” were easily written off by a supermajority of the public as wingnuts and weirdos. Certainly homophobia, especially the really hardcore type, has become drastically rarer in the US compared to, say, the 1980s, or even the 2000s. That win is organic and durable.

One could argue that this frame also describes the relative failure of the trans rights movement: trying to speedrun the deluge and ride the momentum straight into a crush, while skipping entirely over the long slog of boring acceptance into society which made the deluge -> crush political strategy actually work for gay rights.

That's true to an extent, but in turn it's easy to overstate it. Prop 8 got majority support in California at the same time that the Crush side was boycotting entire states or beating Brendan Eich in public. Much of the Crush side's successes came through expansive understandings of employment law, which only required only a small number of people to be persuaded (sometimes not even judges: a lawyer or HR head warning of potential liability is persuasive for big companies, even if they might win the eventual lawsuit).

trying to speedrun the deluge and ride the momentum straight into a crush, while skipping entirely over the long slog of boring acceptance into society which made the deluge -> crush political strategy actually work for gay rights.

Maybe. Another option's just that the terrain was rough. Both trans sports and puberty blockers had a pretty severe problem where they didn't work, and clearly didn't work, in a way that was hard for all but the most blinkered activists to deny, and which the Crush strategy could no longer serve to silence.

Not sure.

(Counterthought: If AIDS had hit in 2003, rather than the 1980s, would that have meant gay rights would have normalized in the Reagan era and then been marginalized again? Hit, but not marginalized by it? Or without the organization and tempering HIV politics caused, would they have stayed marginalized longer? Or would there have been a better reaction to the early stages of GRID, either internal or external?

Probably unknowable.)

how exactly did gay marriage and pro-choice become the default?

Our appointed, highest legislative body decided it shall be so

For gay marriage?

In legal terms, in the USA, kinda. A dozen-ish states had already made gay marriage legal by legislation or referendum before Obergefell, and dozens more had already legalized it based on state court or lower federal court rulings, but Obergefell did cover a third of the country in one swoop.

In terms of core moral principles, no. Support for gay marriage in America went from 27% in the 1996 up to 60% right before Obergefell, and it kept going up along basically the same linear trend with no significant disruption one way or the other for 6 or 7 years afterward, before leveling off or declining a bit in the last few years.

how exactly did gay marriage and pro-choice become the default?

Mostly cohort effects, meaning new people and not existing people changing.

how do religious groups reliably attract converts (or prevent deconversion)?

Religions do not necessarily change moral intuitions. Instead, they appeal to existing intuitions and create Schelling points around doctrines which promote those existing intuitions.

how did America become anti-alcohol and then pro-alcohol so quickly in the Prohibition era? (These required Constitutional Amendments! I can't fathom 2/3rds of the population agreeing on something like this.)

Probably like anti-smoking. Had to do with empirical beliefs about alcohol, not moral intuition. The United States is still the most deeply anti-alcohol country in the West.

how did America change it's mind on eugenics / slavery / the Indian question / so many other political topics so abruptly?

Cohort effects.

why did American fail to win the "hearts and minds" in Iraq / Afghanistan / Vietnam?

Iraqi, Pashtun, and Vietnamese moral intuitions are contra Anglo people's democracy.

Yes, every moderately educated person knows all of this. I want a grand unified theory of mind change that simultaneously explains all of these historical effects and simultaneously makes predictions about the future.

Most moderately educated people actually think all of this was just some kind of vague arc of justice bending towards equality, culturally of course. A minority of educated people might suspect a clearer image, but they can't prove it with certainty.

I want a grand unified theory of mind change that simultaneously explains all of these historical effects and simultaneously makes predictions about the future.

Great. That sounds really interesting. Are you prepared for it to be extremely politically incorrect, philosophically alienating, and mathematically dry? What you're asking for will look like a poison mixture of HBD, free will denial, and quantitative modeling at least at the level of stochastic calculus, which is generally considered post-grad and too hard for 90% or more of people to understand. Making something like this would take a lot of effort, potentially result in cancellation, ostracization, and denialism, to whatever extent it wouldn't just be ignored. Because the free marketplace of ideas hates hereditarianism, human instrumentalism, and math.

I want a grand unified theory of mind change that simultaneously explains all of these historical effects and simultaneously makes predictions about the future.

"Cthulhu always swims left"

Mostly cohort effects, meaning new people and not existing people changing.

The rate of "should be valid" answers to the question "Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?" went steadily from 27% in 1996 to 70% in 2021, faster than the old "one funeral at a time" method of changing people's minds would allow. Although the results vary with age in the direction you'd expect, the 50-64 and 65+ groups are still at around 60%. The difference between retirees and young adults today is lower than the difference between Republicans and Democrats.

Iraqi, Pashtun, and Vietnamese moral intuitions are contra Anglo people's democracy.

Views toward America in Vietnam were 84% favorable vs 11% unfavorable in the latest large-scale survey I could find; 84% was higher than in any of the other 36 countries being polled. Part of this is probably that they weren't as disappointed by Trump as most, but the favorable/unfavorable margin for America there was still nearly double their margin on confidence in Trump. 69% specifically said they like "American ideas about democracy", higher than any other country polled except South Korea.

faster than the old "one funeral at a time" method of changing people's minds would allow.

Citation needed. This paper suggests cohort effects can explain a super majority of the shift. Very likely, there's a cohort effect kernel driving the change, with smaller period effects following as a result of mimesis dragging everyone closer to the new cohort mean.

Citation needed.

"Are sexual relations between two adults of the same sex not wrong at all?" is not exactly the same question as "should same-sex marriage be legal" in logical terms, but the societal changes track pretty well, and we have a longer history of finer-grained data on the former via the General Social Survey. Figure 1(a) here gives some estimates of the magnitudes of intra-cohort changes. Before around 1990 there was no trend at all; afterwards every cohort who were adults in 1990 but still young enough to have a complete sample by 2005 shows some upswing; the ones still adults with a large sample size past 2020 show roughly 40% swings. That's a clear supermajority of the roughly 50% swing for the country as a whole. Each cohort usually starts out with more "not wrong at all" responses than their next-nearest-age peers, but by a few percent, not a few tens of percent.

Very likely, there's a cohort effect kernel driving the change, with smaller period effects following as a result of mimesis dragging everyone closer to the new cohort mean.

You mean the new total mean? "50 year olds' opinions are changing to better match the opinions of 50 year olds" wouldn't have any effect.

But the total mean can't be affecting everyone - 35-49 year olds have been tracking right around the mean, and 18-34 year olds have been steadily moving away from it.

How do you come up with "very likely"? The data seems to match "peoples opinions are all being affected by their environment, but the older you are the farther back your environment goes" just as well.

I can't rule out that 50-year-olds are trying to mimic 25-year-olds' views specifically, except by anecdote (does the phrase "kids these days" sound like it's going somewhere positive, or somewhere negative?), but I'll note that even if this were true, it isn't what people generally mean by "cohort effects"; it would be something much more strange and interesting.

  • Figure 1(a) here gives some estimates of the magnitudes of intra-cohort changes. Before around 1990 there was no trend at all; afterwards every cohort who were adults in 1990 but still young enough to have a complete sample by 2005 shows some upswing; the ones still adults with a large sample size past 2020 show roughly 40% swings. That's a clear supermajority of the roughly 50% swing for the country as a whole. Each cohort usually starts out with more "not wrong at all" responses than their next-nearest-age peers, but by a few percent, not a few tens of percent.

I read the whole paper, and it would appear that the way the article models that chart is by having there be a cohort change force which bubbles up into earlier generations through social pressure, where people shrink towards the new mean of each year slightly. Which exactly what I said.

gay marriage

I was around when Obergefell v. Hodges was ruled on. What happened in a nut-shell was that there was an entire campaign to convince people that being gay was ok. It took family members coming out to each other on a personal level, the whole "born this way narrative" trying to indicate that this wasn't a choice. I especially think the fact that friends and family were gay really made the issue salient: should I really be against my brother, uncle, etc. Marrying another man if thats what they like? In particular, I also think most of the arguments against being gay or gay marriage itself are kinda ass.

But another factor that is likely worth taking into consideration is demographic shifts. We simply are a less religious society as we were before, and younger generations tend to be more liberal than older ones. Its just plain old demographic replacement. As to why the young are more liberal than the old - I couldnt tell you.

Like I said in my post:

I have a decent sense of what happened for each of these topics individually

I'm not looking for individualized explanations of these events. I'm looking for a grand overarching theory of society mind changes that can simultaneously explain all of them.

Explainability/Interpretability in modelling is often directly anti-correlated with predictability. Modern AI/ML is a very good example of this. Highly flexible models often gain predictive power by learning complex, distributed, nonlinear structure that is hard for humans to summarize cleanly.

I'm looking for a grand overarching theory of society

Societal Genetic Algorithms and Multi-Agent Game theory is probably your best starting point. Assume the fitness function is the resilience of such a system to survive + the desire of participants to propagate it/adopt it/live in it. Develop the theory from there.