site banner

Culture War Roundup for the week of April 22, 2024

This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.

Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.

We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:

  • Shaming.

  • Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.

  • Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.

  • Recruiting for a cause.

  • Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.

In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:

  • Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.

  • Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.

  • Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.

  • Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.

On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.

5
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

STATUS GAMES

When people talk about "status games" 'round these parts, they're normally referring to our obsession with relative social status and the games that we play in order to increase it. However, this morning, I listened to oral arguments in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, a case about a municipal ordinance, from a town in Oregon, prohibiting people from sleeping in public, at least with some 'aggravating' factor, like having a blanket. Of course, as is probably traditional for me at this point, I hardly even want to talk about the specifics of this case, at least not concerning homelessness. Instead, I'd like to jump off into questions of categories (which, uh, I guess are made for man?), agency, and the games we play with categories like 'status'.

The background is a 1962 case, Robinson v. California, referred to in all blockquotes from the Court as just "Robinson", which considered

A California statute makes it a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics," and, in sustaining petitioner's conviction thereunder, the California courts construed the statute as making the "status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense for which the offender may be prosecuted "at any time before he reforms," even though he has never used or possessed any narcotics within the State and has not been guilty of any antisocial behavior there.

SCOTUS held:

As so construed and applied, the statute inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Details aren't the most important, but a vague sense of that backdrop is. If someone is "addicted to narcotics", that's considered just a "status", not actual behavior or conduct that can be regulated by the state.

This status/conduct categorical divide has a long history of being quite confusing, and this confusion was on full display at the Court. A Ctrl+F of the transcript shows 121 mentions of the word "status", and many of them are trying to figure out what counts. I collected more blockquotes than I could possibly clean up or feel comfortable bombarding TheMotte with, so I'll try to be sparing. First off, Justice Kagan asking questions of Ms. Evangelis, who is arguing on behalf of the city:

JUSTICE KAGAN: So can I talk about that, Ms. Kapur? So taking Robinson as a given, could you criminalize the status of homelessness?

MS. EVANGELIS: Well, I have a couple points to that.

JUSTICE KAGAN: It's just a simple question.

MS. EVANGELIS: So Robinson doesn't address that and I think it's completely distinguishable. So Robinson was a --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Could you criminalize the status of homelessness?

MS. EVANGELIS: Well, I don't think that homelessness is a status like drug addiction, and Robinson only stands for that.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, homelessness is a status. It's the status of not having a home.

MS. EVANGELIS: I actually -- I disagree with that, Justice Kagan, because it is so fluid, it's so different. People experiencing homelessness might be one day without shelter, the next day with. The federal definition contemplates various forms.

JUSTICE KAGAN: At the period with which -- in the period where -- where you don't have a home and you are homeless, is that a status?

MS. EVANGELIS: No.

There is a bit of meandering that I'll omit, but it comes back to:

MS. EVANGELIS: The statute does not say anything about homelessness. It's a generally applicable law. One more -- it -- it's very important that it applies to everyone, even --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, I -- I got that.

MS. EVANGELIS: -- people who are camping.

JUSTICE KAGAN: But it's a single person with a blanket.

MS. EVANGELIS: And --

JUSTICE KAGAN: You don't have to have a tent. You don't have to have a camp. It's a single person with a blanket.

MS. EVANGELIS: And sleeping in conduct is considered -- excuse me, sleeping in public is considered conduct. And this Court -- this Court in Clark discussed that, that that is conduct. Also, the federal regulations --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, sleeping is --

MS. EVANGELIS: -- are very --

JUSTICE KAGAN: -- a biological necessity. It's sort of like breathing. I mean, you could say breathing is conduct too, but, presumably, you would not think that it's okay to criminalize breathing in public.

MS. EVANGELIS: I would like to point to the federal regulations which I brought up.

JUSTICE KAGAN: And for a homeless person who has no place to go, sleeping in public is kind of like breathing in public.

and finally:

JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I'll tell you the truth, Ms. Kapur. I think that this is -- this is a super-hard policy problem for all municipalities. And if you were to come in here and you were to say, you know, we need certain protections to keep our streets safe and we can't have, you know, people sleeping anyplace that they want and we can't have, you know, tent cities cropping up, I mean, that would create one set of issues. But your ordinance goes way beyond that. Your ordinance says as to a person -- and I understand that you think it's generally applicable, but we only come up with this problem for a person who is homeless, who has the status of homelessness, who has no other place to sleep, and your statute says that person cannot take himself and himself only and, you know, can't take a blanket and sleep someplace without it being a crime. And -- and -- and that's, you know -- well, it just seems like Robinson. It seems like you're criminalizing a status.

Kagan may be the smartest of the liberal Justices, so it's probably no surprise that I think she got the closest to a conceptualization of status that is friendly to the left in this case. Unsurprisingly, though, "Republicans Pounce". Justice Gorsuch said that, "[T]he distinction between status and conduct is a slippery one and that they're often closely related," and had what was perhaps the most comprehensive exchange on the topic with Mr. Kneedler, who is the Deputy Solicitor General, weighing in on the case on behalf of the federal government, who was technically supporting neither party, but is obviously in practice representing the equities of the Biden administration portion of the left.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Kneedler, I want to probe this a little bit further because it -- it does seem to me the status/conduct distinction is very tricky. And I had thought that Robinson, after Powell, really was just limited to status. And now you're saying, well, there's some conduct that's effectively equated to status and -- but you're saying involuntary drug use, you can regulate that conduct. That doesn't qualify as status. You're saying compulsive alcohol use, you can regulate that conduct in public. Public drunkenness, even if it's involuntary, that doesn't qualify as status, right?

MR. KNEEDLER: Right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're saying you can regulate somebody who is hungry and has no other choice but to steal. You can regulate that conduct even though it's a basic human necessity, and that doesn't come under the -- under the status side of the line, right?

MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. But, when it comes to homelessness, which is a terribly difficult problem, you're saying that's different and -- because there are no beds available for them to go to in Grants Pass. What -- what about someone who has a mental health problem that prohibits them -- they cannot sleep in -- in a shelter. Are they allowed to sleep outside or not? Is that status or conduct that's regulable?

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I think the -- the question would be whether that shelter is available.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's available.

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, no, available to the individual.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's available to the individual.

MR. KNEEDLER: But --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's just because of their mental health problem, they cannot do it.

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I think there might be -- I mean, that's -- the mental health problem --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Status or conduct?

MR. KNEEDLER: The mental health situation is itself a status.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right, I know that.

MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. But -- but if the

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It has this further knock-on effect on conduct. Is that regulable

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- by the state or not?

MR. KNEEDLER: -- I -- I think that -- I think if the --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: All the -- you know, alcohol, drug use --

MR. KNEEDLER: Right, right.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- they have problems too and that that -- and -- and -- but you're saying that conduct is regulable. How about with respect to this pervasive problem of -- of persons with mental health problems?

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I think, in a particular situation, if the -- if the -- if the person would engage in violent conduct as --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, no, no, don't mess with my hypothetical, counsel.

(Laughter.)

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I like my hypothetical. I know you don't. It's a hard one, and that's why I'm asking it. I'm just trying to understand --

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- the limits of your line.

MR. KNEEDLER: I think it would depend on how serious the offense was on the -- on the individual.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's -- it's -- it's a very serious effect. The mental health problem is serious, but there are beds available.

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, what I was trying to say, it would depend on how serious being required in -- to -- to go into that facility was on the person's mental -- if it would make his mental health situation a lot worse, then that may not be something that's --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So that's status -- that falls on the status side?

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I -- I -- I -- I guess you could put it that way, but I -- I guess what I'm saying is that --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- that's what I'm wondering. I don't -- I'm asking you.

MR. KNEEDLER: Well -- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I really am just trying to figure out --

MR. KNEEDLER: No. You could view that as status or --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're asking us to extend Robinson, and I'm asking how far?

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, what I was going to say, you could -- you could think of it as status, but I think another way to think about it, and this is our point about an individualized determination, is that place realistically available to that person because --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: It is in the sense that the bed is available --

MR. KNEEDLER: I know that it's --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- but not because of their personal circumstances.

MR. KNEEDLER: Right. Right. And that's -- and that's my point. It -- it's available in a physical sense. It may be available to somebody else, but requiring an individualized determination might include whether that person could cope in that setting. That's the only --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So that -- so that might be an Eighth Amendment violation?

MR. KNEEDLER: Because it may not -- yes, because it's not available.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So that's an -- it's an Eighth Amendment violation to require people to access available beds in the jurisdiction in which they live because of their mental health problems?

MR. KNEEDLER: If -- if going there would -- would --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: How about if they have a substance abuse problem and they can't use those substances in the shelter? Is that an Eighth Amendment --

MR. KNEEDLER: That is -- that is not a -- that is not a sufficient --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why? Why? They're addicted to drugs, they cannot use them in the shelter. That's one of the rules.

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, if they -- if they -- if it's the shelter's rule, then they have no -- they -- they -- they can't go there if they're -- if they're addicted. That's not -- that's not --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So that's an Eighth -- that's an Eighth Amendment violation?

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, no, the -- the -- the Eighth Amendment violation is prohibiting sleeping outside because the only shelter that is available --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is not really available to that person?

MR. KNEEDLER: -- won't take them -- won't take them, yes. And that's an individualized determination.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Same thing with the alcoholic?

MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So the alcoholic has an Eighth Amendment right to sleep outside even though there's a bed available?

MR. KNEEDLER: If -- if the only shelter in town won't take him, then I think he's in exactly -- he's in the same -- he's in the same condition. And there can be all sorts of reasons, and the City doesn't normally --

...

JUSTICE GORSUCH: How about if there are no public bathroom facilities? Can -- do people have an Eighth Amendment right to defecate and urinate outdoors?

MR. KNEEDLER: No, we -- we --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is that conduct or is that status?

MR. KNEEDLER: I -- it's, obviously, there -- there is conduct there and we are not suggesting that cities can't enforce their --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why not, if there are no public facilities available to homeless persons?

MR. KNEEDLER: The -- the -- that situation, you know, candidly, has never arisen. And whether or not there -- I mean, in the litigation as I've seen. But no one is suggesting and we're not suggesting that public urination and defecation laws cannot be enforced because there are very substantial public health reasons for that.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, there are substantial public health reasons with drug use, with alcohol, and with all these other things too.

MR. KNEEDLER: And they can all be --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And you're saying the Eighth Amendment overrides those. Why not in this circumstance right now?

MR. KNEEDLER: No, I'm not -- I'm not saying the Eighth Amendment overrides the laws against drug use.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Oh, I know that.

MR. KNEEDLER: Oh, I'm sorry.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I know that.

MR. KNEEDLER: No, I misunderstood what you --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: That one -- that one the government wants to keep. I got that.

MR. KNEEDLER: No, I misunderstood your question. Sorry.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. Last one. How about -- how about fires outdoors? I know you say time, place, and manner, but is there an Eighth Amendment right to cook outdoors?

MR. KNEEDLER: No. I -- I -- I -- I think what -- what --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: That's -- that's an incident -- a human necessity every person has to do.

MR. KNEEDLER: But this -- but this is one -- this is one of those things that, you know, is taken care of on the ground as a practical matter. There are restaurants where someone can go. There are --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, no, no, we're talking about homeless people.

MR. KNEEDLER: No.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: They're not going to go spend money at a restaurant necessarily. Let's --

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, there -- there may be inexpensive places. Some people get --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let's say there isn't, okay?

MR. KNEEDLER: And --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let's say that there is no reasonable --

MR. KNEEDLER: And -- and the local community --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do they have a right to cook? They have a right to eat, don't they?

MR. KNEEDLER: They have -- they have a right to eat, a right to cook if it entails having a fire, which I think it -- it -- it probably -- it probably would, but -- but, as I said, the -- the -- the eating, the feeding is taken care of in most communities by nonprofits and churches stepping forward --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: But if there isn't

MR. KNEEDLER: -- as they have for 200 years.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- but, if there isn't, there's an Eighth Amendment right to have a fire?

MR. KNEEDLER: No, no, we are not saying there's an Eighth Amendment --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, I thought you just said there was.

MR. KNEEDLER: Well, there -- there's food that you can eat without cooking it. I mean, they -- and they could could get a handout from the -- from a -- from an individual that, you know, people can beg for money. I mean, there are -- there are ways that this works out in practice.

Oof, that was long and covered a lot. Gorsuch would go on to suggest that the Court should just push the case back the State for a "necessity" analysis and not "get into the status/conduct stuff that -- that Robinson seems to invite." Roberts, meanwhile, went after immutability in a colloquy with Ms. Corkran, representing the class of homeless people challenging the law.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A number of us, I think, are having difficulty with the distinction between status and conduct. You'll acknowledge, won't you, that in those terms, there's a difference between being addicted to drugs and being homeless? In other words, someone who's homeless can immediately become not homeless, right, if they find shelter.

Someone who is addicted to drugs, it's not so -- so easy. It seems to me that in Robinson, it's much easier to understand the drug addiction as an ongoing status, while, here, I think it is different because you can move into and out of and into and out of the status, as you would put it, as being homeless.

MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. So it's interesting, we today understand addiction as an immutable status. In Robinson, the Court suggested that someone might be recovered and no longer have the status of addiction. So the Robinson Court wasn't thinking about addiction as something that couldn't change over time.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that may limit the applicability of Robinson to a different situation, but what is the -- I mean, what is the analytic approach to deciding whether something's a status or a situation of conduct?

MS. CORKRAN: So the question is a status is something that a person is when they're not doing anything. So being addicted, having cancer, being poor, are all statuses that you have apart from any conduct.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Having cancer is not the same as being homeless, right? I mean, maybe I'm just repeating myself because homelessness can -- you -- you can remove the homeless status in an instant if you move to a shelter or situations otherwise change. And, of course, it can be moved the other way as well if you're kicked out of the shelter or whatever. So that is a distinction from all these other things that have been labeled status, isn't it?

MS. CORKRAN: I -- I don't think so because, you know, a cancer patient can go into remission, they no longer have that status. I don't think -- I mean, I don't think there's any question that being poor is a status. It's something you are apart from anything you do. It's a status that can change over time, and at that point, you wouldn't be a part of the class, but I don't think it changes the fact that it is a status. And what Robinson found so offensive about status-based conduct --

But it would take Justice Jackson to blow up our first real bombshell of the argument, following up on the Roberts' discussion of immutability:

JUSTICE JACKSON: Can a person go from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs?

MS. CORKRAN: So I think under common -- as we think about it in terms of modern medicine, the answer is no. But the Robinson Court certainly thought that was the case, right? Sixty years ago, we didn't have the same understanding of addiction as we do now.

JUSTICE JACKSON: So your view of Robinson is that it doesn't really matter, the permanency of the condition; it's still a status?

MS. CORKRAN: Right. The Robinson Court did not think that the permanency mattered because it thought that addiction was a status that could change.

In summary, the Robinson Court was actually wrong on the facts. They thought that people could go from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs. So, they clearly didn't care all that much about permanency. But BOOM goes the claim that, apparently the New Correct Lefty Science has determined that people don't ever transition from being addicted to drugs to not being addicted to drugs. I guess I heard it here first. My years of shouting at clouds that Scott pointed out that basically all honest alcoholism rehabilitation studies fail to outperform a placebo and that narcotics rehabilitation studies don't even use measures like "stops taking narcotics" in favor of measures like "causes trouble for other people while using narcotics somewhat less often" is finally being adopted! (Frankly, in far stronger form that I would have even stated. I wouldn't say that people can't stop being addicted to drugs; just that we can't magically impose a "treatment" regime that is going to result in them stopping.) Wow! Was the failure of Oregon's decriminalization experiment so spectacular that we're no longer going to have endless claims that we can make everything completely legal, so long as we pray to the god of providing "treatment" (without any serious consideration of how this is going to happen or whether it will actually do anything)? I can hardly believe it.

As amazing as this concession to Justice Jackson was, Alito somehow at least comes close:

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, see, the problem is that once you move away from the definition that makes the inquiry basically tautological, then you get into the question of assessing the closeness of the connection between the status and the conduct. And you do run into problems with the person who's a kleptomania -- a kleptomaniac or a person who suffers from pedophilia. So how do you distinguish that? How does the Court assess how close the connection has to be?

MS. CORKRAN: So -- so, for both of those categories, the -- the -- the status is defined -- I don't know if status is the right word there -- being a pedophilia or having pedophilia is defined by the urge that you have, not by your conduct, and acting on that urge. So, if someone were to act on that urge, that tight causal nexus on why they didn't have access to shelter, then they would be outside of our claim.

What's this?!?! A distinction between "having an urge" and conduct?!? In the realm of sexuality? Say it isn't so! How many times can The Lefties That Be just boldly admit that the entire slew of homosexual behavior to gay marriage cases were based on a fundamental lie?!

The more cynical among us might observe that status/conduct games seem to be yet another way that folks run away from agency, shielding anything that they like in terms of it "being who you are" or things that just "happen to you". There is no real theory here, and most attempts to justify it are pretty philosophically incoherent. It doesn't seem like the Court is going to buy this particular extension of The Game, but why wouldn't they try? They've had all these other victories, including effectively banning Christian groups from campuses, by substituting "status" in for "conduct/belief". Why are the Status Games so powerful?

What's this?!?! A distinction between "having an urge" and conduct?!? In the realm of sexuality? Say it isn't so! How many times can The Lefties That Be just boldly admit that the entire slew of homosexual behavior to gay marriage cases were based on a fundamental lie?!

I'm a little confused what the lie is supposed to be. In both Lawrence and Obergefell the state was discriminating against people because of their status. If two people of the opposite sex wanted to engage in some conduct they could, but if the two people were of the same sex they couldn't. The conduct wasn't at issue, the status of the participants was. Unless the idea is being a particular sex is conduct rather than a status? Or that the conduct is different if different people are doing it?

Mostly what @gattsuru said. We could have gotten a string of cases that treated sex as the status in question and then applied standard 14A intermediate scrutiny, but we didn't. Don't forget that it's not just Lawrence and Obergefell. It's Lawrence, Romer, CLS, Windsor, and Obergefell. They made an absolute hash out of the whole mess, and they certainly did not rest simply on distinctions being made based on the status of sex.

Would be the absolute peak of irony, however, in an alternate universe, to hear KBJ interrogate counsel with a frank and straightforward, "Can a person go from being the male sex to being the female sex?"

being a particular sex is conduct rather than a status

Judith Butler certainly seemed to think so. Performative gender identity and all that good stuff.

Or that the conduct is different if different people are doing it?

I challenge any gay man to have sex with his husband by inserting his penis into his husband's vagina.

More seriously, I've never read Lawrence, and don't particularly feel like subjecting my eyes or brain to tortured legal reasoning at the moment. Is it written in a way that would allow a state to criminalize anal sex in general without regard to the sex of the persons?

The law in question for Lawrence specifically only applied to homosexual sodomy.

But approximately nobody wants to ban the penis-in-vagina conduct, and generally nature conspired to make the straight option the one that has the most unique options available. To get a purely conduct-based rule that prevents same-sex activity, you'd have to write something tortured like "you must not let two penises come in contact", and this would not only give lawmakers the vapours just having to put these words to paper but would also only capture some subset of same-sex activity (and the state would struggle to dispute a claim by a gay couple that they fastidiously avoided that particular act).

Maybe you could criminalise all sexual conduct that is also possible for same-sex couples; good luck with convincing a majority to make that sacrifice just to get at those pesky gays at last, or else to convince the higher courts that any selective enforcement is purely accidental.

Maybe you could criminalise all sexual conduct that is also possible for same-sex couples

I believe the sodomy laws common until 2003 actually did this. It was hypothetically just as illegal for a man to get his dick sucked by his wife as by another man.

But then those laws were almost never enforced against openly gay men and truly never enforced against straight couples using their mouths or butts.

No tortured constructs needed, just prohibit penile stimulation of prostate.

There's a lot of hilarious edge cases that proposal invokes -- could a gay man defend his partner's honour by claiming he just sucked at topping, missed the button every time? Was too short, just let the tip in? The Texas law in question prohibited stimulation with a sex toy (by a same-sex partner), but I've never seen evidence it was enforced; are we just giving up on that here? What happens with a penis sheathe? Strap-on over chastity cage (50+ images on e621)?

There's a lot of hilarious edge cases that proposal invokes

"Constructive Possession" should create lots of hilarious edge cases as well. They become less hilarious when the government simply deploys a YesChad.jpg.

To be clear, this is not an endorsement, but rather an attempt to highlight the fact that the "struggle" inherent in law enforcement is not an innate feature of law enforcement, but rather a choice the enforcers are making. The truth value of the statement "This would be impractical to enforce" often smuggles in a number of assumptions about the nature of enforcement.

Yeah, that's absolutely fair, and 'constructive possession' is in many ways just the tip of the iceberg, as bad as the shoestring machine is. Stuff like autokeycard, the various recent regulatory changes, Abramski, so on, very much show the limits of textual formalism as a control protecting the actually disfavored, even to the point of blocking defendants from raising the text.

For the first type of edge cases, the same thing as sucking at marksmanship or having an insufficient weapon to penetrate the target. For the second type, are you arguing that piv sex in condom is not piv sex?

eta: chastity cages should be outlawed separately, for the reasons of their misandristic nature.

For the first type of edge cases, the same thing as sucking at marksmanship or having an insufficient weapon to penetrate the target.

Charging someone with attempting sodomy, if we're taking the metaphor that direction, kinda just makes it funnier.

For the second type, are you arguing that piv sex in condom is not piv sex?

Dunno. There are sheathes that are like condoms in being full-enclosed (still not rated or tested as contraceptives, though I'd expect that regulatory reasons drive that more than practical ones), but most of them range from an eight-inch to more than a quarter-inch of silicone all around. Their point is to alter texture, appearance, and/or girth/length, but especially since some are dual-use as dildos or even intended for women or trans men to wear, the line between stimulating the prostate with a sex toy and stimulating it with the top's dick isn't very clear.

At least to my intuitions, a condom is very much the same underlying sex act, but there's a point where a gal wearing the same sex toy can hit the same button that makes it a lot harder to call the penis doing the stimulation. But my intuitions aren't anywhere near yours.

Again, how would the state prove that this happened, against a claim by a gay couple that they didn't do that? My understanding is that anal penetration as the sine qua non of gay sex is largely a product of the imagination of homophobes in a narrow sense, as it lives at some sweet spot of triggering their disgust reflex and being easy to describe.

and the state would struggle to dispute a claim by a gay couple that they fastidiously avoided that particular act

Are you familiar with the gun-law term "constructive possession"?

The "struggle" involved in proving a crime exists because the authorities in question want it to be a struggle. if they decide they don't feel like struggling any more, they can simply remove the struggle and go straight to enforcement.

Texas' law was somewhat unusual in that it had originally had prohibited heterosexual sodomy, but had been revamped, possibly by accident, such that only same-sex sodomy was actually punishable. Anal sex, among other things, was defined as "deviate sexual intercourse" regardless of who did it with whom, but it was only an offense if done with "another individual of the same sex".

((It also restricted homosexual oral sex, and possibly using a dildo or a sounding rod on someone else, though I've not seen any evidence of it actually being used in this way.))

And O'Connor's concurrence pushed on this hard: she held that it mattered that the state was expressed moral disapproval not of an act, but of an act being done by a group:

This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534; Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S., at 634-635. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.

(emphasis added)

But only O'Connor signed onto that concurrence, which even at the time came across as a nitpick. The majority opinion, which received five votes but not O'Connors, didn't rest on it being a status-based offense, in no small part because the courts were still trying avoid committing to treating homosexuality as a special status, with even status-based SCOTUS matters like Romer hiding behind rational basis. Lawrence argued certain types of 'intimate contact' outside the scope of the general police power, so it invalidated not just bans on (consensual private non-commercial adult) sodomy, but also a wide variety of other private behaviors.

The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.

This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.

In theory. Like a lot of that era of SCOTUS jurisprudence, there's a decent chance that these lofty principles get smothered under balancing tests. It's not clear how this applies to situations like extreme BDSM; so far, the only relevant cases have generally alleged consent violations, sometimes pretty credibly. But where courts have had cause to evaluate restrictions under the assumption they would be applied in a consenting framework, they often do so by reframing Lawrence post-hoc, generally by promoting the O'Connor concurrence:

Under the Lawrence methodology, history and tradition continue to inform the analysis. See id. at 2598 (“History and tradition guide and discipline [the implied fundamental liberty interests] inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”). Yet, courts must consider not only the history and tradition of freedom to engage in certain conduct, but also any history and tradition of impermissible animus that motivates the legislative restriction on the freedom in order to weigh with appropriate rigor whether the government's interest in limiting some liberty is a justifiable use of state power or an arbitrary abuse of that power. In this respect, the conclusion reached here under the Glucksberg line of reasoning that there is no deeply rooted history or tradition of BDSM sexual activity remains relevant and important to the analysis. Also relevant and important to the analysis is the absence of a history of impermissible animus as the basis for the restriction at issue here. Sexual activity that involves binding and gagging or the use of physical force such as spanking or choking poses certain inherent risks to personal safety not present in more traditional types of sexual activity. Thus, as in Cruzan and Glucksberg, a legislative restriction on BDSM activity is justifiable by reference to the state's interest in the protection of vulnerable persons, i.e. sexual partners placed in situations with an elevated risk of physical harm. Accordingly, consistent with the logic of Lawrence, plaintiff has no constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in BDSM sexual activity.

((Probably not helped by the guy in that case probably being a douchebag.))

Technically no, but that's because the logic of Lawrence would extend Griswold and similar right-to-privacy cases to prevent the state from criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults of either the same or opposite sex. Quoting Lawrence:

As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.

The opinion then goes on to discuss various right to privacy cases and ultimately come to the conclusion a prohibition on sodomy would likely be unconstitutional applied to basically anyone. Quoting Lawrence again:

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.