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I feel we end up talking in circles discussing casualty estimates that are wide apart, but I'm always interested in the pro Russia (Ukraine skeptic? How would you define it?) side.
Based on the above, would you suggest Putin should sign up to Trump's deal?
Sounds like everything is going all to plan for him based on your assessment, NATO support totally failed to help Ukraine and so annoying the US doesn't move the needle on the conflict, and the Ukrainian army is basically gone based on the estimate above if true: why accept a deal today (even if you're going to break it soon) if you'll win tomorrow?
Of course, Putin could be not really serious about the negotiations and is just running the clock/trying to drive a wedge between the US and Ukraine (which is my opinion too). But based on the pro Russia narrative, the USA doesn't have the power at this point to do much to Russia? US stocks of relevant systems are depleted or earmarked for a fight against China, sanctions aren't working, and past shipments of kit did little. Is that about right?
What would you suggest to Putin? Hold out till you can roll all of Ukraine and dictate terms? What should they be? One poster a few weeks ago suggested annexing everything Ukrainian east of Poland as a demonstration of Russian power, do you think that's the most credible outcome based on the fact that Ukraine is on the ropes in your assessment?
First - no ceasefire ever. Just work on the treaty. Hammer Ukraine until they relent on this point. Second - take only majority Russian territories. Third - Ukraine is forbidden to be in military alliances, but allowed to have whatever and how much they want of conventional forces. No foreign peacekeeping force, but are allowed generous amount of observers/trainers as long as they are not affiliated with NATO. Also allow security guarantees. Fourth - give USA and EU the frozen assets to reconstruct Ukraine in trade for sanctions lift. Not Ukraine. They are allowed to draw for them for paying EU and US companies that do work there. Fifth - Create international company that gets ownership of the gas transit infrastructure of Ukraine with ownership split between Germany Italy and couple of other countries. Ukrainians will squeal like pigs, but bribing parts of EU is always a good idea. Sixth - offer Ukraine discounted hydrocarbons for couple of years. Seventh - make Ukraine take blame for Nordstream and make them pay reparations to Germany that will be used for rebuilding it. There is not a chance in hell of Ukraine having the money to pay, but a nice pressure point.
For casualties - I would say probably parity. Ukrainians having favorable ratio before 2025 and giving more from Kursk onwards.
Russia is hurting now so it actually needs peace.
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I'm still overwhelmingly globohomo, but let me channel the other side.
What is the realistic amount of success Putin can expect? Even if Ukrainian frontline finally collapses, the rate of Russian advance reaches 10km/day, Zelensky is deposed and the provisional government capitulates, it's super easy for the EU to recognize some Ukrainian government-in-exile and keep Russia under sanctions.
Is this better or worse than a negotiated peace? Depends on its terms. Every article in a peace treaty should be viewed through a very specific prism: how is it enforced, what will happen if one of the parties violates the terms of the treaty? It's like buying drugs from a dealer you don't trust.
Anything that goes "will be determined via additional negotiations" is a massive trap. Given that Russia currently has the initiative, any ceasefire agreement has to be sweetened with something concrete and immediate.
In general, if I could guarantee the original 28-point agreement would be implemented by all parties in good faith, I would suggest signing it. It's not a massive win, but a massive win is already impossible. But since it will be interpreted in bad faith, to the letter of the agreement, by all parties, I would advise examining every letter of the agreement with a magnifying glass first.
I’d say one destructive consequence of the Versailles ‘Treaty’ is that the notion of any great power terminating a war through a just and negotiated peace treaty has become a laughingstock. It’s no wonder no great power has ever waged war under such delusions since 1919. Everyone fights to win or to the death. If neither option is on the table, you get a trainwreck of a ‘settlement’ like that in Korea.
The historic critiques of the Treaty of Versailles regarding Germany were themselves derived from the terms Germany imposed on France beforehand. If there's any historical denunciation to be had for ruinous reparations as a way to peace, it well predates WW1.
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One of the consequences of propaganda culture that I think is not discussed enough is how having too effective control of public opinion in your camp can actually work against you in contexts where treaties have to be made. Similarly to the concept of "right to be sued" I have seen in the context of trade agreements, being able to assert that some party will judge and appropriately punish you should you violate the terms actually gives you more freedom to offer terms. In the case of international agreements, when the world police (US) has a stake in the game or is aggressively indifferent or both, the only one that could stand in judgement whether a treaty is being adhered to is public opinion (which could enforce its judgement by boycotts, protests or simply non-cooperation when a treaty party needs the general public to cooperate e.g. by enlisting to fight in the military or maintaining social exclusion). However, this does not work if a treaty party has the part of the public it is sensitive to (usually its own populace) around its finger to the point that it will always be able to convince it that it is in the right. In this way, Russia has crippled itself long ago, and the collective West has by now followed suit.
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You may feel you're talking in circles. My perception has always been that the million dead Russians line of thought was bullshit and you and others like @Dean never presented any arguments that could overturn the extremely simple calculation based on the similarity of both countries and simple weight of material on either side.
I mean, you're free to bet on Polymarket on there actually being only 100k Ukrainian KIA which could imply they suffered only 2.5x relative casualties of Russians.
Based on how much ordinary Russians hate the deal, and how the front is deteriorating, no..
They're sure to get a better deal soon once all the reserves are gone.
Pretty sure everyone would be happier if there was a Ukrainian nationalist containment zone left. Western Ukraine has no interesting economy or mineral deposits. Russians don't want to run a harsh occupation, Americans would prevent not having to deal with ten thousand war hardened drone operators. I mean, imagine what would happen if some of them wanted to displace the blame from the war from themselves onto Americans? How many FPV snuff compilations featuring US elites would be one too many is the question FBI doesn't want to ask itself.
I actually do think that a million Russian dead is clearly too high for the same reason that half a million dead Ukrainians is too high: we would see the evidence everywhere in both economies if that were true. For example, this interview with Russia's former deputy energy minister was a year ago but seems credible where he pushes back on Russia taking a million people out of the economy not being likely at that point https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy . No disagreement there, where we differ as I understand is that I would guess Ukraine is taking 1 casualty for every 2 Russians (which could be an issue, given the 1:3 pop ratio), and you assume it's actually something like 10:1 in favor of Russia? For example, I think this is fairly credible https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/desertions-and-loss-ratios-trends, which was in spring this year, and estimated that Ukraine was trading at 1:1.8, which in itself is not enough to be a central theory of victory for the same reason, they need Russia to run out of money or will or something else before men at that rate if Russia can keep recruiting. Not sure what @Dean 's opinion is, I do not want to put words into their mouth.
I actually do bet on Polymarket, and have been making good money versus those bullish on Russia by putting bets on "no" across a spread of markets where Russia takes city X by date Y. When I win I roll the original sum over and take the winnings, some I lose when the point eventually falls but I'm $5k up on $5k in just over a year thanks to Russia under performing their expectations. https://polymarket.com/event/will-russia-capture-all-of-pokrovsk-by-september-30?tid=1764080674035 Pokrovsk has been particularly good so far, so close but so far for so long. There isn't a market for casualties exactly because it's kind of impossible to resolve (our problem here), plus possibly Polymarket thinks its too spicy, but I would be very interested if there was one. I might bet.
Thanks though for your thoughts on the war, it is very interesting to hear, we disagree but I would guess fundamentally we're all just observers trying to understand. I find this conflict interesting from a cultural perspective: there are two narrative bubbles that are often a bit surprising, and we will have to see where the chips land in the end. I would personally would be surprised if Russia takes Kharkiv or anything past the Dnieper full stop even if the war runs through 2026, and would bet on Polymarket to that effect, but lets see.
Side note, how do I embed links? I look like my father using emails here.
Comments here, like on Reddit, follow Markdown formatting.
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Thank you. I appreciate not being assigned a position I've never taken.
My position for some time (years) has been neither side is running out of manpower in an absolute sense. The somewhat less than 2-to-1 in favor of Ukraine is reasonable-ish, with emphasis on swings on which part of the front when. When Ukraine does localized counter-attacks over time, such as trying to delay the fall of defense line that has gotten supply-interdicted by fires (drone or artillery), it's worse. When Ukraine is doing 'generic' line defense, it's higher. Per-capital casualty rates of national populations aren't really relevant, since neither side is being limited by the size of the population per see, but rather political considerations for accessing significant parts of it.
In Ukraine, this limitation the political willingness to draft the younger age cohort to fill the infantry with more fit bodies. This is bad, and people can feel free to add more emphasis if they like, but it's not the 'there is nothing left' metaphor either. Every year of the war, an entirely new year of potential conscripts leaves the protected age bracket, and when you compare that number to casualties per year, the number of potential 'new' conscripts far outnumbers the casualties by a large degree in absolute terms. The issues are separate about opportunity costs and so on, so the decision on what to prioritize is a political / policy decision, not a physical limit. Bad politics or policy can and do lead to bad results. But this is also not as bad in the same way / to the degree most people might conceptualize, because the Ukraine War- and particularly the drone dynamic- has changed what sort of 'fit body versus support force' ratio actually is, in ways that military science, let alone social understanding, haven't caught up with. A few years ago, a 'healthy' infantry-drone balance might have a drone user per platoon, with X platoons for Y amount of territory. Now we are looking at multiple drone operators per squad, with Z squads per Y' territory. Whatever the ratio 'should' be, the amount of infantry 'needed' for a certain level of frontage is changing. Ukraine can simultaneously not have enough, and people have outdated / over-inflated assumptions of what 'should' be.
In Russia, the limitation is the economic willingness off older age cohorts to take volunteer enlistment bonuses. Russia tried to leverage its population via a conscription model in the first year of the war, and it went so badly that somewhere between half a million to a million Russians left the country in the first year, and Putin preferred to pay significant other material and other costs to avoid a reoccurance. This works as long as the Russian volunteer base is willing to take the offered salaries, but the issue with market-rate enlistment bonuses are you actually have to pay them, and any model that relies on pre-saved money to fund deficit spending to avoid other issues will, eventually, run out of pre-saved money. Market-rate military expenses are fickle as well as fiscal, and are prone to spiking when shortages occur, such as if fewer people want to volunteer because parts of the contract bonuses (such as regional government bonuses) are cut for fiscal constraints. Difficulty does not mean absence, and Russia has already gone through various long-term costs to provide the short-term funds to meet needs, but shell-games come with tradeoffs and the functional recruitable base is not a simple total-population-size ratio between Russia and Ukraine.
This all matters because much of the discussion about casualty ratios is applied to total population sizes (Russia is X times bigger, so Ukraine needs an Y kill ratio to compensate). This misses the manpower limitation on both sides, and that casualty ratios matter more as a factor of the relative recruitable bases, which are far less clear / even less consensus.
This is approaching my position, but with a whole lot of context / framing that would take a rather long post in and of itself.
In so much that I present a definition of 'victory' for Ukraine, my inclination has generally leaned towards 'terms that are sufficient to allow Ukraine to deter yet another continuation war by Russia.' As a result, my general stance since the first two years of the war have been that victory in the war is more about the final terms than the terrain.
(The 2022 invasion is arguably the 3rd continuation war since the 2014 Crimea incursion, which was followed by the Nova Russia campaign and then the direct intervention when that failed.)
By this standard, the 'peace terms' offered by Russia in the first month of the war would have been a loss as they were basically disarmament demands that would have reduced the Ukrainian army to fewer tanks than the Ukrainian army lost in the next year or so of actually fighting the war. The Ukrainians would have 'won' more land in the short term, but at an extremely high risk of Russia just reorganzing and launching another mechanized invasion that Ukraine would likely have been able to resist without a reoccurance of the 2022 fuckups, which would have led to the strategic defeat. By contrast, while Ukraine has taken [insert McBigNumber] casualties in the three years of war since the invasion, in the process it has largely depleted the Soviet strategic stockpiles of tanks / ammo / etc. that were what allowed Russia to replenish mechanized formations. Now those reserves are largely gone, and so even if Ukraine loses all of the Donbas and the fortress belt fighting rather than merely turning over uncontested, it's still a 'better' [victory] than if Russia still had the perceived mechanized invasion capacity it had a few years ago.
Similar points exist in other aspects of deterrence credibility. If the war had not continued, the limits of the Russian ammunition stockpiles (since supplemented by purchased North Korean munitions) would not have been so clear to all, and thus strengthened the Russian negotiating leverage were Russia still at 10-to-1 artillery advantage as opposed the more contemporary 3-to-1 estimates. If the war had not continued past the first month, Russia might still have had a unilateral advantage in terms of its long-range strike capability of operational stockpiles of cruise missiles, and Ukraine would not have gradually increasing its own long-range strike campaign credibility to the point where it now routinely hits highly-visible, and budget-significant, Russian infrastructure. Had the war ended sooner, when Russia was still aggressively using Soviet AA missiles against everything it could, the deterrence narrative might have been stuck on the question of 'has Ukraine / the West run out of air defenses,' rather than flip that to 'if Russia struggles against these drones, how safe is it against NATO airpower?'
None of this is to say that Russia hasn't advanced its own capabilities in various areas over the war. Drone warfare is absolutely a thing. But deterrence isn't about 'can the attacker win,' but rather 'can the defender make it not worth the cost.' And in that sense, and for that purpose, increasing Russian costs now, in the present, shapes Russian future cost calculus later, when Russia (particularly Putin) might try again.
This is an attritional struggle, but it's not an attritional struggle to 'win' this war in terms of 'Russian military collapses and Ukraine regains territory.' While I'm sure the Ukrainian public would love it if some sort of Russian balance of payments default led to the Russian army leaving the field or mutinying in mass and marching on Moscow, that's neither likely or necessary. Rather, the war is an attritional struggle that seeks to add enough military and economic and political-will costs such that even Putin will think about starting another invasion, and go 'I'd rather not.'
And in that context, the attritional goal for Russian infantry and such isn't 'there are literally not enough men to fight,' but rather 'future!Putin does not want to pay the costs he'd have to to get enough men to fight.'
That could the direct economic costs to the Russian state budget and fiscal planning if he has to pay market costs. That could be the political costs if Putin in this war has to supplement the volunteers with conscripts. That could be the material costs, if Russia feels it needs to replace the stuff it already lost in this war before it tries again. That could be reconstitution costs, if the survivors of this war decide they'd rather not join the next war because they got their signing bonus and intend to live with it. It could be any or all of these, so long as the sum-total is enough that Putin, when he's out of sunk-cost-fallacy mode, would rather not try.
But all of this framework derives from a theory of victory that doesn't really define victory in this war in terms of territory lost or gained, or even Ukrainian casualties.
They tried drafting everyone btw 25-60 or so.
They won't get much from 18-25. Smaller cohorts too, lower birthrates.
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No, I said in per capita it's 10x higher. If we go by the mediazona estimates for Russians (~200k) and this leak of half a million, it's 1:2.5 in favor of Russia. I believe I estimated lower numbers earlier, 300k and up.
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I wonder if we're seeing the sort of issue that historians have in assessing ancient wars, where a lot of people just stop being counted in the official population numbers. That doesn't necessarily mean they're dead. I imagine there's a lot of men, especially on the Ukrainian side but also in Russia, who would prefer to not let the state know that of their existence right now. Obviously it's better overall that not as many people are dying, but from the state's cynical view it's sort of the same whether they're actually dead or just unreachable.
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The articles about stunning and brave Ukrainian girlbosses taking over the coal mines and shipyards because all the men were... uh.... somewhere else started popping up like a year and a half ago.
https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/npr/g-s1-40964/in-a-workforce-transformed-by-war-ukrainian-women-are-now-working-in-coal-mines
https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/12/as-ukrainian-men-head-off-to-fight-women-take-up-their-jobs
Ukraine's workforce is clearly under pressure, but adding 5% of women to a mine/industry (from what I read in your article there) is entry level mobilization shit surely? In the UK in WW1 or WW2 we would call that a Tuesday, and the UK wasn't under a manpower collapse in either war.
Again, Ukraine is clearly under pressure, but if 1 million were out of action from deaths/wounds it would look like the Ukrainian military not existing and Russia strolling forwards, which is not the case (Pokrovsk has been contested for over a year now, and within walking distance of the pre war lines).
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Embed with [text](link): text.
Nice post, too. I always appreciate it when someone plays the
adult in the roommarket rationalizer on predictions.Thanks a million, that makes a lot of sense.
Speaking of Texas in your tagline and the Ukraine conflict, did you hear that Mary from Texas Oblast may not actually be from Texas? If twitter always showed locations I bet the bot/shill account founders would have used VPNs and they would all be US/European, not showing locations and then suddenly changing it created the perfect storm of hilarity.
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Same as Reddit: surround the hyperlink text with [square brackets] and immediately follow it with the (URL in parentheses).
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