domain:alexepstein.substack.com
quiet_NaN
29m ago
I get what you are saying, but pointing to Hamas as an example of how to successfully de-radicalize young violent men is not entirely without irony in 2024.
faceh
30m ago
Multiple reasons. At least partially because of stuff like this:
https://nypost.com/2024/06/14/sports/bill-belichick-72-is-dating-24-year-old-former-cheerleader/
A 70 year old man can date a 24 year old.
A 50 year old can date a 25 year old.
https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/05/us/billy-joel-marries-girlfriend-alexis-roderick/index.html
A 66 year old can marry a 33 year old and pop out two kids with her.
Literally any heterosexual male aged 20-80 can try to compete for the same pool of desireable 18-30 year old females.
And social norms aren't pressuring against this. No, this isn't limited to celebrities, those are just the ones that get attention.
Every single 20-something woman taken off the market by an older man is one less available for the young men. Which by definition will decrease their chances of finding one.
Stats bear out that women are significantly more likely to be dating or married to a "much" older man than a man is a much older woman.
And young men can see these headlines and realize what it means for them.
Then of course there's my point that women are using corporations as a substitute for husbands
So men have to compete with megacorps, too.
Chrisprattalpharaptr
Ave Imperaptor
41m ago
Which, of course, means they have no power at all. In fact, the more seats they get (short of an absolute majority)
Ah, but you forget yourself. Even if they win a majority, there's always the bureaucracy of the deep state, the judiciary, the media and the academy ready to block any meaningful changes.
2rafa
44m ago
Indian facial features are extremely varied though. Many Indians, even some with very dark complexions, have essentially European or Levantine features.
2rafa
46m ago
Sunak’s face reminds me a little of Tobias Menzies’. Menzies is a Scottish name, apparently, although his mother was a Simpson which could be Scottish or English.
2rafa
50m ago
Not even, like, Mumford and Sons? London Grammar? They sound so very British to me.
2rafa
57m ago
Why is the number of eligible men higher than the number of eligible women? 5’6 Salvadoran construction workers and 6’ software engineers and guys in the hood with records aren’t competing for the same women.
orthoxerox
I realized I can change my flair color to Barbie pink
57m ago
The war isn't over yet and there's always a risk of another mobilization.
Hoffmeister25
American Bukelismo Enthusiast
1hr ago
I’m gonna go out on a limb and say he looks Indian.
sarker
Where are the Snowdens of yesteryear?
1hr ago
Bayes' Rule is fairly simple. You can try this khan academy video.
Felagund
1hr ago
I'm far too late, but I wrote up the (unevenly too long) following on a plane ride.
A few noteworthy, or amusing things I didn't see mentioned:
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The Vidal case is essentially 5-4 on methodology, despite all that mess. I don't really see why the majority is doing what it's doing, at all?
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Alito using "alien" and Jackson "noncitizen" at every possible opportunity, which is hilarious.
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The dissent from Gorsuch in the bankruptcy case is pretty strongly phrased. Jackson, in turn, quotes back Gorsuch's own words from a previous case, that the dissent is "just that."
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Barrett's trademark opinion at one point refers to someone attempting to register a trademark for Duchess of Windsor for ladies' underwear.
Regarding your point on the conservatives disagreeing more, the liberals agreed in eight of the nine cases the last two weeks—the only case not unanimous between them was the (in effect) 8-1 NLRB case, (and I suppose if you want to count it, agreeing with different portions of Barrett's concurrence). Meanwhile, the conservatives were less unified. Nearly every pair of conservative justices had some disagreement somewhere in the past two weeks:
Gorsuch disagrees with the other conservatives on the immigration case. Barrett disagrees with the other conservatives on the trademark case. Roberts disagreed with the remaining conservatives on Native American healthcare. Thomas disagrees with the Alito and Kavanaugh on the bankruptcy case. That leaves only Alito and Kavanaugh who didn't really disagree at all these last two weeks.
Anyway, now to what I had written:
Two days of opinions, this last week, in six cases. I've commented on the one about mifepristone here—in short, the doctors trying to get it removed from the FDA had no standing, that is, nothing that made them eligible to bring their case, no harm done, no remedy, etc.
As to the others:
Thursday's cases were all 9-0, at least in judgment, but only the above was truly unanimous; the others had some form of disagreement.
I had a bit more time, so I wrote more.
Starbucks Corp v. McKinney
Thomas wrote the opinion and everyone except Jackson signed on. Jackson filed an opinion which agreed with part of what they said, but had more to say, and I think, disagreed with what the practical outcome should be, despite agreeing on the court's action. That is, Jackson is "concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part."
That's opaque, so let's get into it.
The case is between Starbucks and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Some starbucks workers tried to unionize and called in a news crew to support them. Starbucks fired them. The NLRB was contacted, who filed a complaint with Starbucks, and filed a §10(j) petition (of the NLRA) asking for a preliminary injunction (that is, until the actual judgment) making Starbucks reinstate the fired employees. Notably, the judgment will be by the NLRB itself. The question is how exactly that petition should that be handled.
§10(j) authorizes a district court "to grant … such temproary relief … as it deems just and proper."
Courts follow two sorts of tests: a two-part test, used by the 6th circuit, or a four-part test. The two-part test is peculiar to the NLRA, and asks whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices occurred" and whether granting the injunction is "just and proper." Note that "reasonable cause" is kind of broad—you don't actually have to think that they're right, this just requires that it's not "frivolous". This also seems to be derived from the statute of 10(j), as listed above.
The four-part test is from for preliminary injunctions more generally. They cite another SCOTUS case here, which, I think, applies to preliminary injunctions more generally. What this requires is that they are (1) likely to succeed, (2 )to suffer irreparable harm unless granted such a preliminary injunction, (3) "that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor", and (4) "that an injunction is in the public interest." Note especially that "likely to succeed" is a good bit more stringent than the previous "reasonable cause to believe," and "irreparable harm" than "just and proper."
Thomas argues that section 10(j)'s "just and proper" phrase isn't establishing any other standard than the already accepted one, and so they should use the four-part test.
But the board, and Jackson, yield this. Where the disagreement rests is how those should be applied. Thomas addresses this in II-B, but first we'll turn to Jackson's dissent, on the same topic
Jackson argues that, from Hecht Co. v. Bowles, the courts must take into account the judgment and intent in the act from Congress. (This act was also cited by Thomas, but to a different end.) Jackson argues for a two part-standard to decide how the court should judge: first, "whether Congress has clearly displaced courts' equitable discretion," and second, "if no such clear statement exists, we evaluate how that discretion should be exercised in light of Congress's choices in the NLRA." She agrees on part 1, the question is on part 2, which she thinks the majority has hardly addressed.
Jackson thinks three of the four factors follow straightforwardly: for irreparable harm, that the interim relief is necessary to remedy the violation of labor rights. For balance of equities, they may consider harms to (in this case, Starbucks), but not its "desire to continue engaging in an alleged violation of the NLRA." For public interest, they defer to Congress in issuing the NLRA. Only the likelihood of the case's success remains. But in this case, it is the Board itself which issues the judgment, and requesting the injunction is a pretty good sign of what it's going to think in the actual judgment, especially since the NLRB doesn't ask for many injunctions, and since the board is granted quite a bit of deference in the appeal.
Okay, that's Jackson, now back to Thomas. He says that the Board actually thinks what the Sixth Circuit is doing is about the application of the statutory criteria. He argues that the reasonable cause standard goes well beyond what's in the traditional criteria, as "likely to succeed" is far more of an evaluation than "reasonable cause to believe." Then, in one paragraph, which is, as far as I can tell, practically the only one actually dealing with what Jackson is asserting, he states that "none of the views advanced in a §10(j) petition represent the Board's final position—they are simply the preliminary legal and factual views of the Board's in-house attorneys."
I don't know what I'm talking about, legally speaking, so I could be off-base, but he didn't explain that at enough length for me to be convinced that Jackson is wrong—if the NLRB is judging the case after the NLRB submits an injunction, then it seems reasonable enough to think it'll win on the merits. I'm not used to siding with the 1 in an effective 8-1 where the 1 is Jackson. Perhaps if I misunderstand this in some respect, it'd be great if any of you who are more knowledgeable could clear it up.
Practically speaking, this doesn't seem like it matters very much in the specific context that it's applied in. 14 injunctions filed per year doesn't seem like much, though I imagine that it could matter more if some of those are large in scope. I can't speak to whether there will be any larger effects regarding willingness to defer to the judgment of agencies.
Vidal v. Elster
Also 9-0 in judgment, but quite the mess in terms of who's with whom.
THOMAS [Sorry, I don't know how to do small caps on themotte], J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined that opinion in full; ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., joined all but Part III; and BARRETT, J., joined Parts I, II–A, and II–B. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which ROBERTS, J.J., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which KAGAN, J., joined, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III–B, and in which JACKSON, J., joined as to Parts I and II. SOTOMAYOR, J. filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
So, all in all, six different positions, considering the opinions together. But really, it's more like 2, the men versus the women.
The case regards the matter of trademarks. Steve Elster sought to register the trademark "Trump too small," (referring back to the Rubio comment in one of the 2016 debates) and was refused, because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a trademark that "consists of or comprises a name…identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent." Elster claims that this restriction, as a content-based restriction, violates the first amendment. The whole court agrees that it doesn't but has some substantial disagreements over why, exactly.
First, to Thomas's opinion (and I'll break them down a little further, because of all the partial concurrences).
In section I (Signed onto by all the conservatives, including Barrett) Thomas mostly just says the same things as I said two paragraphs ago, but at more length, and with a little more detail. Since he'll get into the detail later, I see no reason to look more.
In II–A (Also agreed upon by all 6), Thomas lays out the first amendment claim. Essentially, (by precedent) government content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional. Viewpoint discrimination is distinguished (by precedent) as a particularly bad kind of content discrimination. The court's already agreed in 2017 and 2019 that viewpoint-based discrimination, such as the Lanham Act's ban on disparaging trademarks and on immoral/scandalous trademarks were violations of the First Amendment, were unconstitutional. The names clause doesn't discriminate on viewpoint.
(I'll note here that my instinctive reaction to trademarks is backwards to that of the court—they feel more like prohibitions on speech than a case of speech themselves to me, but the court protects with the first amendment registering trademarks as a sort of speech.)
In II-B (also agreed on by all 6), Thomas considers the constitutionality of content-based but viewpoint neutral trademark restrictions.
Thomas begins by saying that there should not be heightened scrutiny here, most importantly because they have always coexisted with the First Amendment. Trademarks have been around from before the founding, going back to English law. Their purpose was to mark the manufacturer. The first federal trademark law was in 1870 (before that, purely states), and included some content restrictions (as did a SCOTUS case), which didn't change with the Lanham Act in 1946. They always involve content restrictions, including, for example, barring the registration of a trademark that is likely to cause confusion with another trademark. Thomas argues that because they have always coexisted with the first amendment that therefore there should not be heightened scrutiny. Further, content-based restrictions are inherent to trademarks more generally, as prohibiting confusion over the manufacturer requires looking to the content of the mark.
Thus far, Barrett signs off on it. In II–C, she departs, leaving us with five justices. Here Thomas chooses not to give a framework as to when content-based trademark restrictions are permissible, but chooses instead to look at history and tradition. It is for this, as we shall see, that he gets excoriated by the defense. Anyway, onto the history of name restrictions. Because people own their own names, trademarking names, even their own, was illegal (consider: there is more than one John Smith, so a ban on using it merely because another had the same name, would be a problem). Trademarks could contain one's name, though, if they also had other content. Originally, this allowed others with the same name still to use it (see, for example, SCONY's Faber v. Faber in 1867). The Lanham Act is to be seen to be incorporating existing trademark law, not making up a new one. The names clause serves to help identify the source, and to protect the markholder's reputation, by prohibiting the use of the name of another without permission. And no one has a "first amendment right to piggyback off the goodwill another entity has built in [that entity's] name."
Thomas concludes that there's a tradition of resisting trademarking of names, coexisting with the First Amendment. He declines to develop a comprehensive theory. Yes, nearly his sole argument in this opinion is that there's a history to it, therefore it's constitutional.
In part III, Thomas briefly addresses Barrett and Sotomayor, arguing that their analogy-based approaches are bad. He is joined in this only by Alito and Gorsuch, Roberts and Kavanaugh having dropped out. I'll return to this later. Part IV is a summary.
Kavanaugh's concurrence (joined by Roberts) is very short, one nine-line paragraph, only adding that such a content-based trademark restriction may well be constitutional even without the history backing it up, and that can be addressed in the future.
Now to Barrett's opinion. Kagan joins in its entirety, Sotomayor joins as to parts I, II, and III–B, and Jackson joins as to parts I and II. She disagrees that history and tradition settle the constitutionality for two reasons: first because the history doesn't suffice to match the names clause, and second, because the court never explains why the whole look for predecessors of the clause is the right approach anyway. Barrett prefers to adopt a standard.
Again, I'll break it down by section, because of the partial endorsements. In Section I (agreed by all four), Barrett begins by framing the constitutional issue as that content-based prohibitions are generally prohibited because they work to drive ideas or views out, but there may be some cases where there's no realistic possibility of suppression of ideas (citing precedents). Content-based trademark restrictions are not presumptively unconstitutional. It's always been content based. For example, trademarks merely describing a quality of an item were prohibited, as other manufacturers should be allowed to use them—that's a content-based rule. Barrett explicitly mentions the incorporation of the first amendment in 1868, which it seems to me, the majority really ought to have done, and agrees that content discrimination was inherent to "the very definition of a trademark" at that time. Hence content-based trademark rules have been needed historically. They've also coexisted with the free speech clause because they do not suppress ideas, and even can help protect them, by preventing things that shouldn't be, like the word "potato" from being trademarked. (example mine, sentiment hers)
In section II (still agreed upon by all), Barrett turns to decide how to judge this. She follows an analogy (proposed by the solicitor general) to limited public forums, when government allows speech on its property, but in some restricted manner. Rules restricting speech in limited public fora are judged based upon "whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves." She thinks that though trademarks are not limited public fora, it's an apt enough analogy. Therefore, "content-based criteria for trademark registration do not abridge the right to free speech so long as they reasonably relate to the preservation of the markowner's goodwill and the prevention of consumer confusion," and therefore, if it helps to serve as source identifiers. The names clause passes.
Before we get to section III (where Barrett addresses the Court), let's return to Thomas' thoughts on Barrett. He comments in two places: in a footnote in section II, and in section III. For the time being, only section III is relevant. Recall that section III is only Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, not the opinion of the court. Thomas argues that she doesn't justify why that makes sense, merely says that it is "apt," and that the rule is about fora, specifically, and that this is not a forum, and so as there is no analogous forum, it is hard to see why such a test should apply. (Barrett, in response, notes that she didn't say it was a forum, just analogous in that they form content-based restrictions, and states that Thomas ignores her reasons for drawing the analogy.)
Now to part III. Here, Barrett addresses the court's methodology, stating that she does not think the historical record suffices. In III–A, with Kagan alone, she argues that the history does not support what the majority does. Barrett is not convinced that the common law provides protection to someone seeking a trademark including someone else's name. She cites the SCOTUS case Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids. Mfg. Co. from 1914, where a "fairly complete" list of invalid marks are made, among which is not listed any names-clause analogue. Further, the sources cited in that case are against enforcing a trademark against individuals with the same name, not prohibitions on names without permission more generally. Barrett argues that the names clause prevents uses of names that may have been permissible under common law, citing several cases that allowed the use of names even of living individuals in the right case, such as Bismarck (because he was famous. The trademark was not to pretend the product is made him). The legislative history backs up that it was not merely common law, but meant to exclude cases like Bismarck, or "the Duchess of Windsor for brassieres and ladies' underwear" that might otherwise be permissible. (Thomas argues that the names she cites are not applicable, being dead, or already generic terms. Barrett rejoins that the cases explicitly allowed for living individuals, and in the case of Bismarck, he was alive at the time.)
In III–B, where Sotomayor joins back on, but not Jackson (and Kagan remains with Barrett), Barrett argues that tradition should not be the proper bar, even if it should be yielded to in some cases for purposes of stare decisis (that is, not changing up the law on everyone for minor reasons). She argues that the majority does not treat the history itself merely as "a persuasive data point," but as the constitutional argument itself. Rather, the court should articulate principles. Her preferred takeaway from history is that trademark restrictions have "been central to trademark's purpose" and "have not posed a serious risk of censorship," and states that this is a good way to think about whether such restrictions work with the first amendment.
Thus far Barrett. Now to Sotomayor, who is joined by Kagan and Jackson. (Simple, for once.) This is another methodological disagreement. Sotomayor argues against the use of looking to history and tradition in general. She points to Barrett's disagreement as indication of the uncertainty of such an analysis, and that the justices are looking at these without them having been raised by litigants, and that nonhistorians are doing historical analysis. She argues further that usages of it in Bruen are problematic, as it has led to confusion. Sotomayor would also prefer "a doctrinal framework drawn from this Court's First Amendment precedent," with the standard being that trademark restrictions should be viewpoint neutral and reasonable for the purpose of trademarks. Sotomayor, in accord with Barrett, allows some use of history, such as to understand what the purpose of trademarks is. Sotomayor argues that the reason that registration restrictions is fine with the first amendment is that failing to get a trademark registered is not a restriction on speech, merely the withholding of a benefit. She argues that there are several cases which back this up, including limited public forums (yes, she uses that plural, not the latin plural. Barrett used no plural, so I said fora due to nerdiness) and monetary subsidies. Those precedents permit imposing a "resonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on a state-bestowed entitlement." (Thomas, in section III thinks that these are too different; Sotomayor thinks that the underlying principle is still useful.) Because here, if a mark is ineligible for registration, it can still be used anyway (but not restricting the use of others) it's not a problem. It only does not confer exclusive rights to speech, it does not restrict that speech.
My thoughts: I found the (in effect) dissents quite compelling, and am not a fan of the majority's use of historical analysis as sufficient. One interesting thing to think about is what factors may have led some justices to sign onto parts and not onto other parts of opinions. I assume the difference between Barrett and the liberal justices in whether they agreed in part with the main opinion had to do with whether they wanted to show solidarity. Perhaps Barrett didn't sign onto Sotomayor's due to the more oppositional tone, as well as, perhaps, that it seems slightly harsher towards use of history more generally? I imagine Sotomayor either didn't want to engage in any historical analysis (by endorsing Barrett's), or agreed with Thomas that it wasn't sufficient. I'd guess the former. No idea why Jackson declined to sign onto Barrett's part 3. I assume Roberts and Kavanaugh chose not to sign onto Thomas's part three because they didn't want to reject the tests of Barrett and Sotomayor, merely not sign on to them on this occasion?
Now to Friday's cases.
United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
6-3 Opinion by Jackson, joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Gorsuch, joined by Thomas and Barrett.
In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the supreme court ruled that differing bankruptcy fees in districts governed by the U.S. Trustee Program vs. the Bankruptcy Administrator Program is unconstitutional (yes, it's weird that there are two types of districts). This case is about what remedy those harmed should have. Specifically, those who paid the higher amount when others paid the lower amount.
The majority rules that the only remedy is to be equal prospectively. They argue that the harm is inequality, not high fees, and that such a harm may be remedied in three ways: reimbursing those who overpaid, exacting more now from those who underpaid, or only changing things prospectively. Jackson then turns to Congress' intent as to how the remedy should occur (citing precedent). Since Congress wanted to raise fees in order to keep the U.S. Trustee Program to be self-sustaining, they would not have wanted something financially burdensome upon the program, and so remedying it would plainly be opposed to congressional intent. Further, such a remedy would make the disparity worse—if some are rewarded the remedy, then that would merely increase the amount, unless practically everyone, as only 2% of the bankrupt got to pay lower fees. Then, turning to the question of whether congress would want to impose higher fees, they argue that it did not, looking at its subsequent decisions, and that it would have pretty negative consequences. Hence, only prospectively. The remainder of the opinion responds to the dissent, so I'll turn to that first.
Gorsuch's dissent is rather up-in-arms. (And in turn, Jackson's opinion cites Gorsuch's own language that the dissent is "just that."—i.e. only a dissent.)
The dissent argues that Hammons should be entitled to a refund: the U. S. Trustee is agreed to have promised it, and Congress is agreed to have appropriated funding for refund, it is agreed that the suit is timely. Further, when "there is a general right to sue," but no specified form of relief, courts may use any remedy. It's long been the case that the proper remedy for overpayment is to pay them. They argue that this is no remedy at all—the past harm is not remedied. The dissent also casts some doubt on the whole process of imagining what Congress would do. Gorsuch also thinks that congressional intent is in favor of a refund, looking at the statutory text, where the program is authorized to provide refunds. Further, he characterizes it as a bait-and-switch, by promising the the refunds by standard procedures, and now denying any such possibility, and that that bait-and-switch violates due process. Gorsuch also attacks the argument that it would be disruptive as a turn to policy, but "not how remedies work." It's always cheapest not to give remedies.
Okay, now the majority, addressing the dissent: They argue that the dissent misunderstands the problem: to remedy a disparity, not to pay damages. Further, turning to congressional intent for a refund, it's passed regularly and therefore (only applies to ordinary situations, not ones involving 326 million? This is my best guess, it's not quite explicit.). And third, the government didn't really make a promise, but merely that it would wait to remedy until exhausting all appeals.
Jackson argues also that the dissent is wrong in its understanding of due process—she doesn't think the tax cases apply here, and there was a meaningful chance, which satisfied the due process clause.
I think I find the dissent more convincing, but am not sure. A lot would turn, I think on where precisely the harm in nonuniform bankruptcy rests: is it upon those who got a worse deal, or is it something ethereal upon the whole system?
Campos-Chaves v. Garland
Written by Alito, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Jackson wrote the dissent, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch.
This case is about deportation hearings. Aliens have to be provided with written notice. There are two varieties: in paragraph 1, it describes the notice to appear (NTA), and in paragraph 2, a notice saying the new time and place. Here, there were three individuals each of whom got notices that were defective, in that they had TBD or similar written in place of the time. They were subsequently given a notice saying what the time of the hearing was, but didn't show up. The defendants argue that they failed to be served the proper notice, and so should not be removed from the country.
Part of this has to do with the word "or". The statute says, "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)." Unfortunately legal statutes don't have parentheses, so such combinations of ors and negatives tend to be ambiguous. Alito argues that a notice of either variety counts. More specifically, it has to be whatever notice is relevant—whichever one is connected to the hearing missed.
Alito also interprets the phrase in the statute of changing the time to include the change from TBD to some concrete time.
Jackson disagrees, seeing this as giving the government a pass for writing incomplete and therefore invalid NTAs under paragraph 1. Because time and place is a necessary part of the notices to appear, failing to include them makes them not count under paragraph 1. But a paragraph 2 notice should be dependent upon a paragraph 1 notice: 2 only describes notices changing the time and place, which Jackson thinks should mean that there is already a valid notice to appear before 2.
Jackson also argues that the majority's understanding of the word "change" is a bit unreasonable: the passage is clearly talking about replacing one time with another.
I think I found Jackson more compelling—it's at least a little unintuitive to have a valid notice dependent on an invalid one. The court's remedy (show up and mention the lack of proper notice) helps, at least.
As a side note, it's pretty funny to see Alito using the word alien at every possible opportunity, whereas Jackson uses noncitizen as much as possible (and maybe even bracketed alien out, in a footnote? I didn't check.).
Garland v. Cargill.
Thomas writes the opinion, which the other conservatives join. Alito writes a one-page concurrence. Sotomayor writes a dissent, which the remaining justices join.
The National Firearms Act defines a machinegun as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." The question: are bump stocks machineguns? Thomas argues no. This used also to be the ATF's position, prior to the Las Vegas shooting, but afterward they included bump stocks. The core of Thomas' argument is as to what the words "a single function of the trigger" refers to. He argues that it refers to the trigger of the weapon, well, triggering once. (And he goes through, with diagrams, how exactly a trigger works.) Bump stocks do not change that there is one pull of the trigger for each shot. The finger pushes the trigger once for each shot. They argue, as a different route to the same point, that bump stocks do not cause it to happen automatically, as the forward pressure required is an extra thing in such a way that it is not automatic.
Alito mentions that the ATF should not have changed the rules—rather, congress should. And that the Las Vegas shooting doesn't change the meaning, merely reveals that regulation of bump stocks is probably a good idea. He agrees that the original congress would have wanted bump stocks banned, but denies that they did.
Sotomayor on the other hand argues that "a single function of the trigger" should not refer to how many times the lever of the gun moves, but rather its relation to the user, whether it's a single pull to the user. And in this case, as bump stocks allow for the use of them in a single motion, it should be considered a single function of the trigger. the relevant quality for a trigger is the relation not the user, not to the gun.
I found the dissent in this case more compelling than I expected, given the political valence. I'm not sure who I'd agree with, if I had to choose. But this case is essentially guaranteed to make liberals mad. Not good for trust in the court.
Stefferi
Chief Suomiposter
1hr ago
The leader is not supposed to just be able to walk over the entire party in a parliamentary, party-based system. Like, they are the helmsman, they are supposed to have a great deal of room for making decisions and maneuvering around, but there are obvious limits.
MiltonMurrayRobertLucas
Conan still talks to us too
1hr ago
Michael Huemer has published an article on Substack criticizing "pure empirical reasoning". His thoughts on the matter :
Say you have a hypothesis H and evidence E. Bayes’ Theorem tells us:
P(H|E) = P(H)*P(E|H) / [P(H)*P(E|H) + P(
H)*P(E|H)]To determine the probability of the hypothesis in the light of the evidence, you need to first know the prior probability of the hypothesis, P(H), plus the conditional probabilities, P(E|H) and P(E|~H). Note a few things about this:
This is substantive (non-analytic) information. There will in general (except in a measure-zero class of cases) be coherent probability distributions that assign any values between 0 and 1 to each of these probabilities.
This information is not observational. You cannot see a probability with your eyes.
These probabilities cannot, on pain of infinite regress, always be arrived at by empirical reasoning.
So you need substantive, non-empirical information in order to do empirical reasoning.
This argument doesn’t have any unreasonable assumptions. I’m not assuming that probability theory tells us everything about evidential support, nor that there are always perfectly precise probabilities for everything. I’m only assuming that, when a hypothesis is adequately justified by some evidence, there is an objective fact that that hypothesis isn’t improbable on that evidence.
He later goes on to criticize "subjective Bayesianism":
Subjective Bayesians think that it’s rationally permissible to start with any coherent set of initial probabilities, and then just update your beliefs by conditionalizing on whatever evidence you get. (To conditionalize, when you receive evidence E, you have to set your new P(H) to what was previously your P(H|E).) On this view, people can have very different degrees of belief, given the same evidence, and yet all be perfectly rational.
Subjective Bayesians sometimes try to make this sound better by appealing to convergence theorems. These show, roughly, that as you get more evidence, the effect of differing prior probabilities tends to wash out. I.e., with enough evidence, people with different priors will still tend to converge on the correct beliefs.
The problem is that there is no amount of evidence that, on the subjective Bayesian view, would make all rational observers converge. No matter how much evidence you have for a theory at any given time, there are still prior probabilities that would result in someone continuing to reject the theory in the light of that evidence. So subjectivists cannot account for the fact that, e.g., it would be definitely irrational, given our current evidence, for someone to believe that the Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle.
The thread's OP asks if there's a question that I'm kinda embarrassed to ask. Well, I'm completely embarrassed to say that I understand very (if any) of the arguments posited here by Huemer regarding Bayesian probability, because I know little of it besides its very basics (make statements in terms of likeliness, not absolutes). I don't fully understand Bayes Theorem and I'm not quite sure what math skills are required to know it. My question (not embarrassed to ask it) is: where is a good place to start learning Bayesian probability and how to use it? Apart from what's mentioned in LW Sequences, is there a beginners book anyone can recommend?
faceh
1hr ago
If you're living in a city the number of male suitors is going to be large as well.
So it seems likely that the males are going to be in a state of hypercompetition until they get lucky enough to pull an eligible woman. And many, many won't get so lucky.
And the harder the males compete, the less worthwhile the actual reward is, which will lead some to "drop out."
The stats on males without relationships seem to bear this out.
ApplesauceIrishCream
1hr ago
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. Constitution, Preamble
I think the liberal justices, generally, take the underlying sentiment of the Preamble seriously, and see the rest of the Constitution as the means to the ends laid out above. The Supreme Court is one of the major branches of the government thereby established, and so it ought to carry its weight in pursuing the goals of the Preamble. Therefore, the Court ought to promote and defend good policies, and reject bad policies. After all, in doing so, it isn't making policy, but merely exercising judgment to ensure that the popular branches are properly oriented to the "general Welfare."
I'd go so far as to say that about half that logic is uncontroversial, but the remainder draws in some premises that are not shared.
The liberal justices largely follow the dominant philosophy of the American legal profession--legal realism. This philosophy was formulated over a hundred years ago, in its rejection of the dominant mode of thinking at the time, which the realists called 'legal formalism.'
The formalist frame was that every case had an objectively best outcome, determined by applying the governing law to the operative facts. Sometimes judges would fail in this task, and sometimes even the best outcome wasn't very good--or even good at all--but there was a best outcome to be found.
The realists rejected this frame, accusing the formalists of feigning their roles as a disinterested third party merely applying law to facts mechanistically, and instead smuggling in their own policy preferences in determining outcomes. In fact, the realists claimed that this was inevitable: no matter how much the formalists claimed to be acting in good faith in trying to be neutral arbiters, they were actually just another set of partisan actors on the stage of national politics. Since neutral disinterest was only a convenient mask for the formalists, it's all politics anyway, and the realists might as well pursue their own policy preferences unhindered by feigned neutrality.
The core of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy was a rejection of legal realism, and a return to the narrow conception of the judge's role commonly understood beforehand. While the realists correctly pointed out that no judge could consistently be perfectly disinterested, the ideal of neutrality was too important to jettison, and it is the obligation of every judge to stick as close to that ideal as possible. Judges are not permitted to reject bad policy solely on the basis of its badness; they are only allowed to overturn any policy--good or bad--if it is inconsistent with a controlling authority, and properly presented as part of a real 'case or controversy.'
2rafa
1hr ago
Macron has a genuine will to power. Hard to describe in other terms, but it really feels like, completely independent from ideology, he desperately seeks a kind of greatness. He will likely fail, but he will do whatever he thinks it will take to get it, even if it involves sacrificing his own party and movement to do it.
I think he wants someone to win. If the RN (or RN-LR coalition) wins a majority I don’t particularly think that he would have much trouble agreeing to much of their program, his own views on things like immigration and security are pretty vague, it’s questionable if they’re even views at all.
Others even speculate this may be part of a complex scheme to allow him a third term beyond the two consecutive ones allowed by the constitution, as he would resign and then come back.
It unironically cannot be ruled out.
Pasha
Defend Kebab
2hr ago
Even when the war was developing very dangerously for the Russian army they have only ran a very limited conscription scheme that amounted to “urged volunteering” of the lowest classes of the society. My understanding is that they sent summons to stg like 10 times the men they needed and as soon as the targets were reached by people voluntarily responding to the summons in 1-3 days they immediately ceased recruitment. I am not aware of any coerced conscription of a Russian man who would otherwise definitely not enter the army.
Right now the Russian army has a clear upper hand in fighting and reportedly a steady stream of volunteers. Meanwhile an incredibly disquieting amount of press gang/abduction style of conscription videos are coming out of Ukraine.
This is my reasoning for why there won’t be ever real conscription for this war in Russia. Russian speaking friends I have talked to seems to agree with this assessment
Which is funny for bump stocks, but it's not like this has stuck to bump stocks. There's a fair argument that SCOTUS doesn't, but Aposhian, GOA v Garland, and Guedes all strike here. Guedes even had Gorsuch writing out bad some lower court opinions were. In 2020, he could punt in the hope that other courts would give considered judgement -- "provided, of course, that they are not afflicted with the same problems." Today, we know exactly how that turned out, and what cost it took to receive other courts making the same fuckery with Chevron.
The thing to remember here is that the Supreme Court does not want you to have guns. Even the six are elites and elitists. (OK, maybe not Thomas). They're appalled at the idea of guns in the hands of ordinary people. But they have a peculiar attachment to the high-class Constitution debating society they're in, and they have a side, and that side is both pro-gun and sour on expansive regulatory powers. So they want to make the point that the Constitution does support gun rights and not expansive regulatory powers, but also ensure the actual system of government restricts guns by any means necessary. Thus, decisions with loopholes that they refuse to plug, a refusal to provide any interim relief, and slapping down the Fifth Circuit when it attempts to apply these academic decisions as if they matter.
BahRamYou
2hr ago
He certainly pissed off the Worm fan community (by refusing to bring back the main character, and re-writing a lot of the continuity from Worm). But uh Panacea yeah... apparently now she's a Evil with a capital E because she's a rapist. Before there was some moral complexity and shades of grey, she did bad stuff but only because she was so messed up at the time. Now, no, she's just pure evil.
At least, that's what people say in summaries, I've never actually read that far. I've only read the first 5 arcs, I just can't bring myself to go further because of what a slog it is. So, so much of it is just therapy talk + dumping on this christian cult strawman punching bag.
Felagund
2hr ago
Roberts and Kavanaugh definitely vote together more with each other than with Barrett.
do_something
2hr ago
It looks pretty certain at this point that they won’t be conscripted
why you think so?
Right, I’m well aware of that, and obviously my comment was intentionally flippant. However, I don’t see anything in Sunak’s phenotype that looks “more British than American” nor vice versa. He’s obviously quite visually distinct from any European-derived person. I wouldn’t consider him one of the Indians who has European or Levantine facial features.
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