Search for "Friday" - The Motte"

Dean Flairless 1yr ago

There are some strong palace coup vibes here, in the sense that the decision of how to release the information wasn't Biden's, but on the part of whomever needed it released ASAP. If you want to put bad news, that'd typically be a Friday afternoon, not Sunday afternoon, and if you want a normal controlled release, you do it via press release on Monday business hours. Sunday afternoon is for if you want it done, and have a first-mover advantage when others are taken by surprise and not in work yet.

A more conspiratorial take might be that the release of the concession preceeded the actual capitulation- that Biden could have been shown the tweet and been forced into a position in which he'd have to reveal he lacked control of his own White House / social media platform if he wanted to compete against it, which would be further political kryptonite.

More likely, this is something more akin to the pro-Harris faction in the White House just marching it over to the Twitter-handler desk, which they could have access/control to, and releasing it as soon as Biden capitulated, but before any other planned event. This would allow the Harris-faction to steal that march on immediate coordinations to pressure others not to capitulate / not announce contestation this coming week.

(Harris has the lock on the Biden-raised money, reportedly, but several of the reported key players behind Biden dropping out are- allegedly- less committed to his replacement being her. Thus, the Harris-faction needs to work fast with the advantage of being the first aware of the concession.)

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Rov_Scam 1yr ago

Since it apparently wasn't obvious, the content of these criticisms only seldom aligns with my actual opinions on these films. I love several of these, at least like most of them, and a few more at least get grudging respect. Some of these I actually haven't seen, and others I've only seen bits and pieces of, or watched on a bus trip, or saw in 30 minute increments in school, or saw so long ago I don't remember anything about them. This is just me finding nitpicks for the sake of some Friday shitposting. My criticism of the graduate has nothing to do with the film so much as the bullshit on the back of the DVD cover.

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zPvQINBQvfFR 1yr ago

Eh, not really? Executable files have structure in them other than raw code and still have to be parsed by a loader. A file that's all zeros should fail to load. (Yes, I know DOS had .com files with were just code blobs loaded at a fixed address and immediately executed and I'm sure there are even more ancient examples of that sort of thing, but surely Windows kernel modules can't work like that.)

Anyway, the rumors I've read said that it was actually a data file and that's why they considered it acceptable to deploy it on a Friday -- the assumption being that changing configuration without rolling out a new version of the executable wouldn't break things too badly.

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Rov_Scam 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

The AFI 100

Given the tendency of people to post lists this week, it seems like quite the coincidence that after 20 years of making a half-assed attempt at seeing all of the movies on the AFI 100, my journey is finally complete. I’m sharing my thoughts on every film on the list in the hopes that nobody else here will subject themselves to such a pointless exercise. Without further ado:

Citizen Kane (1941)The Great Gatsby has famously never been made into a good film, and this one is no exception. Yes, it’s the same story, trying to figure out who some rich guy really is. Skip this one.
Casablanca (1942) It may be the ultimate date movie of all time, but that’s not saying much. Everyone knows all the famous lines from this movie, including the ones that weren’t actually in it. No one remembers what the plot is actually about, and it wasn’t marketed as a romance until everyone who saw it realized that the international intrigue elements fall flat. Skip this one.
The Godfather (1972) The American Dream given a cynical twist with the realization that the crime business is a business like any other. But never mind that the two “heroes” of the tale—Vito and Michael—are mass murderous gangsters, the rendering of the story on screen is ponderous. The amber lighting, the shadows, the pace, the score, and the entire tone are so serious and pretentious that they verge on parody. This film would be just as good as a comedy if you added a laugh track. They say there is a fine line between comedy and tragedy, but it’s not quite this fine. Skip this one.
Gone with the Wind (1939) A sentimental epic that whitewashes history. It’s not as offensive as Birth of a Nation, but the insensitivity to the real suffering caused by slavery is there and has to be dealt with. I’m not trying to be a politically correct nitpicker; slavery isn’t nitpicking. And anyone who has the slightest bit of false nostalgia for the Old South should remind themselves that the landed, slave-owning aristocracy represented by Rhett and Scarlet was only between 1% and 2% of the population. Everyone else, black and white, endured miserable poverty working in the fields. At least that’s the normal criticism, which is fair enough, but that only describes minor plot points in the first half. The rest of it is just another old tearjerker where a spoiled bitch manages to alienate three(!) husbands because she’s still hung up on a teenage crush. Skip this one.
Lawrence of Arabia (1962) A four hour epic that only exists to impart the sensation of how vast and endless the desert is. This would have been better as a 20 minute IMAX documentary. Skip this one.
The Wizard of Oz (1939) One for the kiddies. But if you’re all grown up you can skip this one.
The Graduate (1967) The back cover of the DVD described this as “love and idealism triumphing over the forces of corruption and conformity”. Nope. Benjamin Braddock is a whiny asshole with no ideals and is himself a force for corruption. If he does indeed represent a rebellion against the conformity of middle-class life—as he breaks up two marriages and a business partnership—he only serves to make us appreciate squareness. Skip this one.
On the Waterfront (1954) This movie does more to reinforce the negative stereotype of unions than any Republican ever could. Skip this one.
Schindler’s List (1993) Speaking of Republicans, Tom Coburn raised a huge stink when NBC aired this film unedited and uninterrupted in prime time in 1999. If you were among the 65 million people watching then you don’t need to see it again. If you weren’t then you’re probably a hopeless Zoomer without the attention span to sit through this. Skip this one.
Singin’ in the Rain (1952) Tapdancing is as much an “art” as throwing a basketball through a hoop, and this crap is very dated. No one born after 1945 has any reason to watch this movie today, unless you’re one of those schlocky lounge/cocktail/swinger ‘40s revivalists who are into this type of thing so you can wear cool clothes. Skip this one.
It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) Frank Capra was an overly sentimental cornball, but beyond that, this movie raises significant concerns about the criminal justice system, making one think it should be routine for a policeman to use deadly force to prevent the escape of someone wanted for disorderly conduct. Skip this one.
Sunset Boulevard (1950) Jack Webb is Joe Friday and Joe Friday only, not “one of the nicest guys you’ll ever meet”. Skip this one.
Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) This movie sends too many mixed messages with regard to its historical inaccuracies. On the one hand, the Japanese are portrayed as incompetent at engineering and construction, which they most certainly were not in real life, giving this somewhat racist undertones. One the other hand, prison camps building the Burma-Siam Railway were much more brutal than this film suggests, given that the real bridge was built using forced labor in conditions that are too appalling for me to describe here. Without either of these inaccuracies, however, there would be no movie. Skip this one.
Some Like It Hot (1959) Neither Tony Curtis not Jack Lemmon pass as women. Skip this one.
Star Wars (1977) This was the first of the big-budget special effects movies in which plot and characterization take a back seat, ushering in the reign of big-budget special effects movies in which plot and characterization take a back seat, to the point that these days every movie is a big-budget special effects movie in which plot and characterization take a back seat. Skip this one.
All About Eve (1950) There’s a good line in this movie about a piano thinking it had composed a concerto—actors ought to keep their egos in check and realize they wouldn’t even have lines to mouth if it wasn’t for writer. Hell, Shakespeare is still read, but does anyone remember the famous thespians of the 16th century? Unfortunately, that one line is the only good thing the writers came up with in this otherwise dull movie. Skip this one.
African Queen (1951) This is a fine romance if you’re one of those crotchety old-timers who think it’s actually sexier when couples don’t take their clothes off and let innuendo and tension do the job for you. The rest of us can skip this one.
Psycho (1960) This isn’t very scary, and there isn’t much suspense. This is better than your average horror film, but that isn’t saying much. Skip this one.
Chinatown (1974) The plot of this is so convoluted it makes Raymond Chandler look like Anton Chekov by comparison. Skip this one.
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) Jack Nicholson is at his craziest and hammiest, along with a bunch of other actors who wound up on Taxi. The beginning of his self-parody period (which has yet to end). Skip this one.
The Grapes of Wrath (1940) If you’re a tankie who needs to go back to the Depression so you can find a fictional example to showcase the horrors of capitalism, this is required viewing. Otherwise, skip this one.
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) This movie looked like it would be good after watching the first few scenes with the apes, which mistakenly give the impression of a masterful epic. Instead we’re given 20 minute sequences of spaceships docking and no plot. When the most interesting character is a computer, you know you’re in trouble. Skip this one.
The Maltese Falcon (1941) Dashiell Hammett was a trash writer whom critics adore because he absorbed all of Hemingway and furthered along the development of a distinct American style. Unfortunately, that distinct American toughness is really just nothing more than a high body count. And the book is better than the movie. Skip this one.
Raging Bull (1980) Jake LaMotta just isn’t an interesting character, and two hours with him is pretty wearying. Skip this one. If you really want to watch a Scorsese movie, even Boxcar Bertha is better.
E.T. The Extra Terrestrial (1982) Chalk another one up for the kids. Skip this one.
Dr. Strangelove (1964) “Black Humor” is nothing more than excuse film buffs give themselves to justify watching comedies that aren’t funny. Skip this one.
Bonnie & Clyde (1967) The real Bonnie & Clyde were considerably less sexy than Faye Dunaway and Warren Beatty. Skip this one.
Apocalypse Now (1979) A very loose adaptation of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness that bears about the same relation to the reality of Vietnam as Star Wars did to the Roman Empire. Skip this one.
Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) With our awareness of the rampant corruption and venality within the Beltway in the post-Watergate era, this film seems hopelessly naïve. Skip this one.
Treasure of the Sierra Madre (1948) Ah yes, it is not gold that makes men act like animals; filthy lucre is merely one more thing to fight over. This is the kind of dime-store philosophy that practically defines “middlebrow”. Skip this one.
Annie Hall (1977) There are two kinds of Woody Allen movies: The funny ones, and the serious ones. This movie is a transitional work that attempts to fuse the two sides. Unfortunately, it’s hard to tell what’s a joke and what isn’t. His paranoia about anti-Semitism? That lobster scene—he’s not that much of a wimp, is he? Skip this one.
The Godfather Part II (1974) Was responsible for The Godfather Part III. Skip this one.
High Noon (1952) The only notable part is the structure. The action begins at 10:40 a.m. and unfolds in real time until noon, paralleling the length of the film. Other than that, it’s a rather standard Western. Skip this one.
To Kill a Mockingbird (1962) Hollywood changed the plot of the book too much to make it more palatable to moviegoers. Skip this one.
It Happened One Night (1934) Film buffs toss around “pre-Code” like the era was full of racy and disgusting content. It’s really no more shocking than anything in a modern Pixar film. Skip this one.
Midnight Cowboy (1969) Film buffs like to point out that this is the only X-Rated movie to ever win an academy award. They don’t point out that this is only R-Rated by today’s standards and was given an X due to the subject matter more than anything actually pornographic. Skip this one.
The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) This isn’t a movie, it’s a piece of propaganda designed to make returning WWII veterans adjust to home life. It’s alright for a public awareness video, but after serving its admirable purpose, it became obsolete. Heck, nobody’s going to nominate all those “Just Say No” anti-drug movies, are they? So why this? Skip this one.
Double Indemnity (1944) There’s nothing here you won’t find done better on old Perry Mason reruns not to mention your average post-Hill Street Blues cop show. Skip this one.
Doctor Zhivago (1965) Length doesn’t equal quality. Skip this one.
North by Northwest (1959) This movie has all the sophistication of a Timothy Dalton-era James Bond movie. Skip this one.
West Side Story (1961) Theoretically, the marriage of music and narrative ought to take both to new heights, but in practice the narrative suffers because it has to find corny ways to incorporate the songs and the music suffers because individually inspired songs are outnumbered by makeshift hack pieces designed to move the plot along. The world would be a much better place if no one ever penned an opera or musical ever again. Skip this one.
Rear Window (1954) Jimmy Stewart as a Peeping Tom? Skip this one.
King Kong (1933) There’s no need to delve into pre-Civil Rights America’s warped racial/sexual fantasies. Skip this one.
The Birth of a Nation (1915) Ignoring the fact that it completely distorts history and glorifies the KKK, this is just boring. Skip this one.
Streetcar Named Desire (1951) What I said earlier about musicals notwithstanding, Streetcar! was better. Skip this one.
A Clockwork Orange (1971) A great book would have been better if anyone other than Kubrick, the most boring great director of our time, directed this movie. Skip this one.
Taxi Driver (1976) John Hinckley Jr. watched this film over and over. Skip this one.
Jaws (1975) With Sammy Fableman being an overt self-portrait it’s now understandable why all of Spielberg’s characters range from annoying to evil. Suffice it to say, I was rooting for the shark. Skip this one.
Snow White & the Seven Dwarfs (1937) Too bad Wile E. Coyote and the Roadrunner never made a feature film, or I’d want it here instead. Skip this one.
Butch Cassidy & the Sundance Kid (1969) A buddy film without homosexual undertones seems a bit quaint in the 21st century. Skip this one.
Philadelphia Story (1940) Katherine Hepburn’s annoying fake British accent (oh, sorry “Mid Atlantic”) just plain grates. Skip this one.
From Here to Eternity (1953) This snoozefest was created entirely so that Frank Sinatra could revive his failing career. Inadvertently, the producers seem to have pioneered the irritating “Oscar bait” genre that clogs up our theaters every winter. Skip this one.
Amadeus (1984) First, it rewrites history. Second, it doesn’t try to give you any insight into one of music’s greatest geniuses and just portrays Mozart as a party animal. Finally, the soundtrack inexplicably left off “Rock Me Amadeus”. Skip this one.
All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) Certain nations gearing up for war have banned this film, which should tell you something about how powerful an anti-war piece this is even today. Unfortunately, some wars are necessary, so see this if you’d like, but don’t go showing it in high schools or anything lest we have a repeat of Vietnam.
The Sound of Music (1965) Speaking of schools, completely against my will my helpless fellow classmates and I were forced to watch this in elementary school. The only time I’ve ever cheered for the Nazis. Skip this one.
MAS*H (1970) Possibly the only time in recorded history that the TV show was actually better than the movie it spun off from. Skip this one.
The Third Man (1949) There are only two good things about this film: The first shot we see of Orson Welles, and the fact that the main character keeps calling Calloway Callahan just to piss him off. Other than that it’s a movie that tries to convince you that the cobblestones and zither of postwar Vienna are enough to make a film about counterfeit penicillin interesting. Skip this one.
Fantasia (1940) A revolutionary film that let Disney animators stretch the boundaries of what could be done with animation. Unfortunately, no one actually watches this, unless they like shadows of people playing musical instruments. Skip this one.
Rebel Without a Cause (1955) James Dean’s legend overshadows his achievement, which actually wasn’t much: Three films, all of which display some talent, but not enough to warrant his current status. If he hadn’t died young, he’d be remembered as a decent but unremarkable ‘50s actor/teen idol. The movie itself is dated and you’d have to be a retro ‘50s obsessed revivalist to get worked up over it. Skip this one.
Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) Okay, maybe that wasn't the only time I rooted for the Nazis. Skip this one.
Vertigo (1958) Lonely, unattractive Alfred Hitchcock had a lifelong crush on Grace Kelly, and his psychosexual obsessions are nowhere as obvious as in this twisted film about a man who just can’t get an icy blonde out of his head. Skip this one.
Tootsie (1982) If conservatives want to make a film about how DEI has made it hard for white men to get jobs, then they probably shouldn’t load it up with an obvious trans angle. Unless, of course, they’re trying to tell us something they’re afraid to admit… Skip this one.
Stagecoach (1939) I guess this was good for 1939, but it made a star of John Wayne, who became an American icon by playing an insufferable asshole in every movie he was ever in and acting like even more of an asshole in his public life. Skip this one.
Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977) If they want to include sci-fi, and they want to include kitschy noir like Double Indemnity, then why not include kitschy sci-fi, like Invasion of the Body Snatchers, The Day the Earth Stood Still, or The Fly? Skip this one.
Silence of the Lambs (1991) If you need to pick out scary trash with lots of sex and murder from the ‘90s, then you get a pretty big playing field. Why not Basic Instinct, or, better yet, Scream? Skip this one.
Network (1976) It’s supposed to tell painful truths about how media manipulates society. Instead, it convinces you that the Tea Part Republican turned MAGA Republican rambling on in a bar is on to something. Skip this one.
The Manchurian Candidate (1962) This movie dates horribly considering what we now know about brainwashing, and if any Republican sees it in the next 6 months it’s going to lead to endless 4Chan conspiracy theories about how Thomas Crooks was compromised in a Democrat-controlled nursing home to give the libs plausible deniability. Skip this one.
An American In Paris (1951) One Gene Kelly tap dancing special was more than enough. Replace with The Decline of Western Civilization II: The Metal Years and give the old fogies who voted for this tinnitus. Skip this one.
Shane (1953) The charming tale of a family who thinks it’s a good idea to take in a drifter with a mysterious past and no last name (or first?) and let him babysit their son. I just realized that for all the movies about men who like other men a whole bunch there aren’t any cute animal movies on this list! Where’s Homeward Bound? Or Milo and Otis? Skip this one.
The French Connection (1971) When Eddie Egan and Sonny Grosso made the French Connection bust in 1962, it was the largest narcotics seizure in the country’s history. Strange, then, why they’d participate in this hack job that completely tarnishes their legacy. The real Eddie Egan must have been given a lot of money to berate the fake Eddie Egan relentlessly for being a bad cop. And the image of the detective as a slovenly womanizer doesn’t do his image any favors either. Skip this one.
Forrest Gump (1994) The moral of this apparently is that if you’re living through an era of monumental societal change, it’s best to be the smiling idiot on the sidelines. Skip this one.
Ben-Hur (1959) I understand the desire to include the type of over-the-top production that Hollywood was making in the 1950s to counter the popularity of television, but this is nothing more than a Charlton Heston movie without guns or apes. Skip this one.
Wuthering Heights (1939) This is a movie for housewives who read trashy romance novels, which, in fact, the book it’s based on was (it's only considered a "classic" because it was written in the 19th century, not the vulgar 20th). Emily Bronte was the Danielle Steele of her time. Sure, Laurence Olivier can act, but will Americans please get over their misguided prejudice that English accents somehow automatically denote sophistication and intelligence? Skip this one.
The Gold Rush (1925) The silent era ended for a reason. I don’t want to read a movie. Skip this one.
Dances with Wolves (1990) Kevin Costner takes himself far, far too seriously, and turns every film he stars in into a boring, turgid dirge. He winds up making a far greater fool of himself than Jim Carrey and Pee Wee Herman combined with his grim-faced schtick. Hollywood’s portrayal of Indians as great noble savages is one of those deep-seated traditions that is long overdue to go. How about a movie that takes place in an Indian casino? Skip this one.
City Lights (1931) We definitely don’t need silent films made 4 years into the sound era. Skip this one.
American Graffiti (1973) This movie did for 50s nostalgia what “The Big Chill” did for 60s nostalgia and “Dazed and Confused” did for 70s nostalgia — make films better known for their soundtracks. Skip this one.
Rocky (1978) "My old man told me that I'd have to use my body 'cuz I didn't have much of a brain." Thus, Sylvester Stallone neatly sums up his entire movie career in one line. Skip this one.
The Deer Hunter (1978) As a Pittsburgh native, I feel deeply offended that the only actual deer hunting in this movie was shot in the Cascades and not Tionesta or some other place where people actually have camps. And there’s no reason why they had to shoot the mill town scenes in Steubenville rather than Clairton. This kind of inaccuracy is easy to overlook if you’re more focused on the completely unrelatable plot, but to someone like me it’s like portraying New Yorkers as having southern accents to fit foreign stereotypes of Americans. Skip this one.
The Wild Bunch (1969) When the amount of violence in a movie is the only thing it has going for it, it’s not a good sign. Skip this one.
Modern Times (1934) And we certainly don’t need silent films that were made 7 years into the sound era and a year after the Hayes Code. Skip this one.
Giant (1956) Rock Hudson, Elizabeth Taylor, James Dean. If they wanted to include a teen movie how about Annette Funicello and Frankie Avalon in Beach Blanket bingo, or better yet, Ski Party?
Platoon (1986) All Oliver Stone films are just his incoherent political ramblings translated to the screen. Unless you plan on voting for RFK Jr., skip this one.
Fargo (1996) I get it, people in the Upper Midwest have funny accents. And it doesn’t even take place in Fargo. And it inspired an absolutely dreadful television series that featured a scenery-chewing Kirsten Dunst and an unexplained flying saucer. Skip this one.
Duck Soup (1933) Snappy one-liners are not dialogue. Skip this one.
Mutiny on the Bounty (1935) “Battleship Potemkin” was better, but it was made by Soviet commies, so it’s ineligible for this list. A half-assed substitute doesn’t cut it, even at 86. Skip this one.
Frankenstein (1931) See above about lamentably substituting an American snore because the better foreign films are ineligible — the monster movie was always one thing the Japs did better. If you need a stand-in then at least use “Young Frankenstein”, which scared the hell out of me. Skip this one.
Easy Rider (1968) I know they were different times, but the hippie rhetoric is laughable today. Not to mention that there isn’t much of a plot and the ending is hard to believe (sure, the roads are filled with rednecks going around shooting unarmed strangers). Skip this one.
Patton (1970) The movie starts with an incredibly boring monologue where Patton marched in front of an American flag and starts delivering a harangue about warfare. There are better things to do with three hours than spend them stuck with a warmongering lunatic. Skip this one.
The Jazz Singer (1927) The fact that Al Jolson sings for about two minutes doesn’t make up for the fact that you have to read this film. They could have at least included the Neil Diamond version with what should be America’s national anthem. Skip this one.
My Fair Lady (1964) Yeah, whatever. Shouldn't they disqualify this since it was written by Brits, has a British subject, and British actors? George Bernard Shaw is that rare playwright who is great on the page but talky and long-winded on stage or screen. Skip this one.
A Place in the Sun (1951) Theodore Dreiser was one of the clumsiest writers to ever hold a pen, and when he starts expounding on turn-of-the-century ideas about chemicals and glands, he's laughably dated. I guess it’s good that this film is better than spending 800 pages with him, but unless you’re trying to get out of a school assignment, you can skip this one.
The Apartment (1960) A philandering executive bribes an employee with a promotion so he can use his apartment to sexually harass a member of the Psychic Friends Network. Skip this one.
Goodfellas (1990) Martin Scorsese tries to whitewash the fact that Henry Hill was a total fucking moron who hung around with women who were even dumber than he was. And he was a snitch, too. Skip this one.
Pulp Fiction (1994) About ten years ago I was at a casino with a friend of mine who lost his wallet. When he had to tell the kindly old woman at customer service that it said “Bad Ass Motherfucker” on it, well, let’s just say he was no Samuel L. Jackson. Having a slightly out of order plot is not impressive. And, as with “Duck Soup”, zingers aren’t a substitute for dialogue. Skip this one.
The Searchers (1956) John Wayne in full-blown asshole mode, to the point that he wants to murder the girl they’ve spent years looking for. Skip this one.
Bringing Up Baby (1938) For some reason critics love to fellate 30’s screwball comedies (if you're not familiar with that term, it means a movie in which the hero and heroine start off hating each other and wind up falling in love), but don’t take their modern equivalents seriously. If they were going to include this on the 1998 list then they should have added “American Pie” when they updated it ten years later. Skip this one.
Unforgiven (1992) Another western featuring an asshole extraordinaire, but at least the John Wayne movies on this list didn’t subject the audience to the star’s right-wing political views. Skip this one.
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner (1967) If the “Oscars So White” people wanted to pick a more worthy target, this list would be as good of one as any. The exclusion of blacks somewhat understandable since they weren’t really able to make films until the 70s, but making this piece of dated claptrap their sole representative (and No. 99, at that) is simply inexcusable. No Spike Lee Joints? No Sweet Sweetback’s Badass Song? Skip this one.
Yankee Doodle Dandy (1942) If you feel the need to see a James Cagney movie, at least make it a James Cagney gangster movie. Skip this one.

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celluloid_dream 1yr ago

This thread?

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sarker It isn't happening, and if it is, it's a bad thing 1yr ago

Rumors suggest that it may have been rolled out Friday morning local time.

Of course, a slow rollout is pointless if you have no canary process and no means of determining if you just bricked all Australia...

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DirtyWaterHotDog 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

Ok this might just be funny to me, but the ~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike worldwide outage is the funniest thing to happen in computer security this decade.

If you haven't caught up, ~~100+ million~~ (billion?) computers around the world were simulatenously broken in an instant. It's black comedy for sure. Hospital & emergency systems around the world have crawled to a halt, and there will be a few hundred deaths that will be traced back to this event. Millions of $$ will be lost. But, the humor comes from the cause of it.

Here is how things panned out:

~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike is a 100 billion valuation tech company that provides security services to a bulk of the world business.
Most sensitive organizations (govt, military, healthcare) will refuse to work with you unless you are compliant & all your machines have this installed.
It is effectively an anti-virus that sits 1 level below your operating system, 'protecting' your organization from 'bad outcomes'.
On Friday afternoon (which we all know is the best time), ~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike deployed a software update that began this outage
For any other software this would be a simple restart or uninstall away, but since ~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike is a 'trusted' secuirty tool, it sits under the OS layer, bricking the whole device.
Alright, so how do they fix it ?...... THEY CANT !
The beauty of bricked device, is you can't send any more software updates to it. You must do it manually. Raw dog it like the 90s.....all 100 million of these computers.
That's bad, but surely they can give those instructions to people and each person can fix their laptops themselves. Divide the labor.....
NOPE !
This software is used in vending machines, kiosks, tablet displays....and all sorts of devices that sometimes don't have keyboards and other times haven't been looked at for years. But at least there is a fix right ?
Yes....... but it needs you to start the computer in safe mode....which you can't because 'Bitlocker'.
Ah yes, Bitlocker. Turns out, another security measure, makes it so that 99% of a company's employees can't open safe mode.
So yes, a few hundred IT people will be responsible for fixing hundreds upon hundreds of laptops, daily, for weeks !

This is the Y2k that was promised.

The world spends billions in computer security every year, and no virus has managed the kind of world-wide disruption caused by one simple bug by the premier security company in the world.

No direct culture war implications, but goes to show just how much of a house-of-cards the tech ecosystem is. 1 little, simple, stupid bug can bring the whole world to a halt. Yet, the industry continues quarterly-earnings chasing.

Jobs keep getting cut, senior members get aged out, timelines get thinner and 'how many features did you deploy' remains the only metric for evaluation.

In tech, staying at a job for more than 3 years is seen as coasting. Devs are increasingly expected to do everything, because 'everyone should be full stack' and everything that isn't feature development (testing, staging, canaries) get deprioritized. Overworked novices means carelessness, carelessness creates mistakes.

At the same time, devs get zero agency. Random HR types make list of regulations mandating certain checkboxes for compliance, while having near-zero knowledge of the risks-and-benefits of these technical decisions. Therefore, the implications of a mistake are opaque to decisions makers. So by being compliant, you've suddenly given ~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike a button to shut your entire business down.

This kind of error should literally be impossible in a company of the size of ~~CloudStrike~~ Crowdstrike . If such an error happens, it should be impossible for giant corporations to crumble zero backup. Incompetence on display, on all sides. Having worked in 'prestigious tech companies', especially in 2024, it isn't surprising. At times, the internal dysfunction is seriously alarming, other times it's a tuesday.

I'm not going to hope for much out of this. Just like Spectre & Solar , people will cry about it for weeks, demand change and everyone will get collective amnesia about it as the next quarter rolls around.

End of the day, tech workers are treated as disposable labor. Executive bean counters are divorced from the product. And the stock price is the only incentive that matters.

As long as tech is run by MBAs and smooth talkers, this will go on.

Some choice photos:

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jake 1yr ago

Austin Private Wealth is the group in question, they're a fee-only fiduciary with just over $1B in assets managed. Their filing on Friday 7/12 listed 12,000 puts on $DJT. They put out a statement saying a third-party vendor caused all of their options positions to be multiplied by 10,000, and so the actual position was 12 puts. I don't know enough about the workings of actual investing groups to speak here with any definitiveness, but it seems unusual to me that they would buy 12 puts--assuming a $1 premium, that's $1200. That's nothing compared to their total holdings. Maybe there's a diversified spread and they had like $50,000 or $100,000 of puts, and I'm sure that'll come out if they did. Or maybe it was a hedging move if they have 1200 shares of $DJT, but I think they'd have probably included in their statement if they had such stock. "We didn't have this large short, in fact we hold $DJT." Simple.

But that also ignores a worse question, from my cursory research their holdings would be reported under SEC Form 13F. Maybe this is wrong, if it is the following can be crossed out, but if that's true: multiple people from APW should have, and possibly would have needed to sign off on it prior to its approval, so did they all fail obscenely in their fiduciary duty? Or did they fail it by only one person being charged with verifying and then approving. If the financial guy doesn't notice a position worth $1200 has been marked as $1.2 million, should he keep managing your money? Now multiply that by as many options positions as they had. It's insane. They should absolutely be investigated if for no other reason than the claimed lapse in duty, unless it's a regular thing for investment groups to give astronomically wrong filings to the SEC. But there is presumably a lengthy paper trail here, so if they're lying and they did have a 1.2 million share short, I assume it's a matter of time before someone with the proper finance bona fides uncovers what happened.

All this meaning: if APW did in fact have a 12,000 put position, then that combined with their statement now denying it and their attempted obfuscation, is clear evidence of conspiracy.

As for #3, sure, all plausible. #4 yeah remains to be seen. I don't think I emphasized enough, but that is the question above all other questions. When did they know? If people go to prison over this, it will be on that question. The CBS report says at 5:51 they had a suspicious person with a rangefinder, that's enough for me to say someone had a failure in duty worthy of prison. But that's criminal negligence, for failure to protect the President and the people around him, the death of Compertore. Whether it was malicious aforethought is the deeper question, and one that, again, remains to be seen.

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jake 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

Before now I thought it would take so many people to be in the loop that someone would turn, but as I wrote downthread it now seems entirely plausible that it would only take 1 person on-site to open the door, or prop up the ladder.

My major questions are these:

Short activity, some of the information in the tweets is wrong but the short interest was shooting up, there are plenty of reasonable explanations for that but not this one, last Friday was there in fact a major put acquisition with a fast expiry? If so, that's investigation-level suspicious
Sniper ROE, my assumption would be they have very broad rules for engagement, so if the rules changed, how long ago was it changed, and is there documentation? If that's wrong and they do have broad ROE, 2a, why didn't they shoot? 2b, why didn't they talk to the detail? Or radio to command? Or hell, if nothing else, why not just shout? Did they radio it in and it was ignored? If so, I would immediately assume conspiracy, and that someone's going to turn
I see people elsewhere saying there was an atypical amount of media presence at the rally, is this true, and if so, why?
Most significantly, allowing Trump to go on the stage. I've seen clips before of USSS being highly proactive about pulling the President. If this guy had been initially identified an hour before, then someone with the USSS confirmed "suspicious guy on roof" at 5:52, what is the minute-by-minute explanation for that information failing to reach his detail?

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FiveHourMarathon Wawa Nationalist 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

A Trip to the Mall and our Society-Wide Experiment in Extreme Trust

OR

Whatever happened to dress codes?

TLDR: We expect the vast majority of shops, restaurants, and other common commercial services to provide service to anyone regardless of appearance. This is a nearly unique experiment in human history, an effort towards not just a high-trust society but an extreme trust society, not long ago it would have been common to refuse service based on appearance. This should be considered when debating the role of trust in modern American society: we have removed the mechanisms by which one can establish trust at a glance, and as a result any degree of trust must be universally extended.

My wife's birthday was this week, and for various reasons my original birthday gift for her fell through, so instead I took her shopping at our fanciest regional mall. Which in practice meant wandering for hours through various luxury brand stores, where she mostly bought nothing but tried a lot of things on and took notes for later second-hand online shopping. What struck me most about the experience, along with going to several rather nice restaurants recently for various occasions, was that people don't dress up anymore. Not just in a general, people have no class anymore kind of way. But in a particular, we don't use dress, appearance, and presentation as a basic credit check kind of way. In the old days class was very easily visible from dress, many historical societies carried sumptuary laws forbidding certain forms of dress to the lower classes. White collar and blue collar and redneck, rather than merely being colorful phrases, were specific references to particular modes of work-clothing: a white dress shirt indicated office work, a blue denim workshirt indicated proles, a red-neck was a poor outdoor laborer with no collar at all, sunburned from labor in the fields. The presence of these class indicators showed what kind of work you did, and showed that you had the wealth to keep these things clean. And in social and commercial settings, a person in one mode of dress would be treated one way, a person in another mode of dress treated another. This has melted away.

I mean, obvious, right? But I'm at a store where the cheapest pair of shoes is $800, or a purse is $2,000, or a jewelry store with a selection of $8,000 watches. And people come in wearing flip flops, sneakers, shorts. And the sales staff were taking care of them as customers. It's summer, so of course people were dressed like that. One obvious objection is that the branding on some of those items indicates to the trained eye that a pair of flip flops can cost vastly more than any suit I've ever owned. But the staff weren't discriminating on that basis either: my canvas sneakers were Amazon chinesium, and the T shirt was Kirkland Signature, and at Ralph Lauren the salesman helped me try on a $2500 suit without blinking. The staff essentially treated, and certainly was expected to treat, everyone who came in as a potential customer regardless of presentation and appearance. I'd imagine there's some level of filth or obvious poverty that would potentially disqualify a person and lead to their being asked to leave, but I didn't see it happen. Certainly, many customers came in wearing clothing that would not reliably indicate an income over $100k/yr, and were treated with respect as potential customers. This is a remarkable fact about our society!

We've decided as a society that classism, most frequently enforced on a commercial level through dress codes and similar mechanisms, is Bad^tm. We all dress like slobs, and you can wander into Cartier in shorts and a T shirt and expect to be allowed in. Restaurants almost never refuse service based on appearance or dress. This is particularly a problem for Restaurants. Where the worst a bad customer can do in a retail store is steal, and this is fairly easily prevented in a luxury goods store by providing security and limiting access to product without a salesman nearby; a fancy restaurant is essentially giving you a very short term loan, giving you the goods up front and expecting payment after the meal is over. A person who refuses to pay, or leaves without paying, could in theory be arrested or sued in small claims but in practice I've never even heard of such a thing. Yet even the fanciest restaurants I've been to recently have no dress code, no attempt to screen in the most basic way that the people coming in have the ability to pay. There's no effort to screen against lower class people coming into a store or restaurant they can't afford.

Racism was, of course, the most commonly enforced form of classism until at least the 1960s. Black people, and immigrants of all kinds, were typically poor, and so if you lacked white skin or had an immigrant accent, you would be refused service. That has been eliminated, largely through long legal and social efforts by activists, but also simply isn't that useful today. I'm not sure the crowd overall was quite majority-minority, but certainly black Americans and Chinese immigrants (or tourists) formed a strong plurality among paying customers, and a definite majority of customers I saw spending vast amounts of cash on large hauls. You hear stories today about black customers having difficulty getting help, or being followed around, but I saw lots of black customers being served, and if it happens at all today it is much more subtle than one would expect if it were being used as a screening mechanism.

But I'm curious as to how and why we abandoned any effort to screen for class or presentation in these situations.

Clearly the lack of screening "works." In the sense that these stores are open and don't do it. Perhaps it is my Wawa theory of societal honesty striking again: there are few enough problem customers that you gain more from refusing to screen than you lose from screening, and that says something about our society in itself. Or maybe we're missing out on what a truly great public retail experience could be if it were done? There are a handful of boutiques that are appointment only, and restaurants at which one has to Know Somebody to get a table, and those are an obvious cuts above. But even the wealthiest wear Hermes and Rolex as status symbols, and those stores didn't really screen at all. So maybe it's a solution in search of a problem? Americans are generally honest enough that it's not worth checking.

But it's still noteworthy that this is an unparalleled experiment in human history, a society that does not discriminate based on class when providing public services, except at the extreme high end or when someone is visibly disordered. And I'm not sure what that means. I've talked before in the Wawa post linked above, about the evolution of their ordering system. At first one ordered, paid over at the register, your order slip was stamped, and then you handed it to the staff in exchange for your sandwich. Then it was that they didn't collect the slip. And now it's that most people order online, and they set the hoagies and coffees on a big rack and you walk up and take it and leave without talking to anyone or being observed or checked by anyone.

It bugs me, because I read all these screeds, from Op-Eds in respectable newspaper weekend editions to NrX substacks to published sociologists, and they all tell me that our society is becoming ever lower trust. That people don't trust their fellow citizens like they used to. And this seems intuitive to me in my day to day. But then I zoom in on some of these activities, and what I'm seeing isn't lower trust, it is higher trust. Once upon a time if you walked into a Cartier in a T shirt, they'd ask you to leave and not waste their time. If you tried to get dinner at a $100/entree restaurant without a blazer not that long ago, they would refuse to seat you. Today, we don't do that kind of screening. That's a level of trust that you see, that is manifest, and it is raised, rather than lowered. The salesman trusts you not to waste his time, the hostess trusts you to pay your bill. Perhaps they screen in more subtle ways I'm not picking up on. But they once used far more obvious ones.

And I'm not sure why they abandoned them.

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Hoffmeister25 American Bukelismo Enthusiast 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

Alright, I tried not to overthink it. Whittling down a list of 100 down to 50 was an interesting challenge, and there’s a lot more I’d like to include, but I think this is a good representation. It’s weighted toward the 80’s, with a good smattering of 70’s and a bit from the 60’s. I started with a few mega-hits but tried to stay away from songs that I’m sure you’ve already heard a million times, although I’m sure there’s a few on here you’re already very familiar with. Many of these are, of course, very well-known bands, and in those cases I tried to use somewhat lesser-known songs rather than the ones everyone already hears all the time. A few - for example, ABBA and Def Leppard, two of my all-time favorite bands - were very difficult because I would have loved to include a number of their songs, but decided to stick with just one each.

”Kiss” - Prince

“And She Was” - Talking Heads

“Fat Bottomed Girls” - Queen

“Peace Of Mind” - Boston

“What You Need” - INXS

“Don’t Bring Me Down” - Electric Light Orchestra

“Open Your Heart” - Madonna

“Youth Gone Wild” - Skid Row

“Soul Man” - The Blues Brothers

“Saturday Night’s (Alright For Fighting)” - Elton John

“Vacation” - The Go-Go’s

“Surrender” - Cheap Trick

“Roam” - The B-52’s

“Jungle Love” - Steve Miller Band

“This Charming Man” - The Smiths

“Dreams” - The Cranberries

“Wasted Years” - Iron Maiden

“Rio” - Duran Duran

“Waterloo” - ABBA

“Friday I’m In Love” - The Cure

“Do You Believe In Love” - Huey Lewis & The News

“Bad Reputation” - Joan Jett & The Blackhearts

“Oliver’s Army” - Elvis Costello & The Attractions

“War Pigs” - Black Sabbath

“Higher Love - Single Version” - Steve Winwood

“Emotions” - Mariah Carey

“Fox On The Run” - Sweet

“Freeze-Frame” - The J. Geils Band

“Land Of 1000 Dances” - Wilson Pickett

“Dance Hall Days” - Wang Chung

“Everybody Wants You” - Billy Squier

“Down On The Corner” - Creedence Clearwater Revival

“Hysteria” - Def Leppard

“Lido Shuffle” - Boz Scaggs

“Would I Lie To You - ET Mix” - Eurythmics

“Kiss Me Deadly” - Lita Ford

“Paradise By The Dashboard Light” - Meat Loaf

“You Can Call Me Al” - Paul Simon

“China Grove” - The Doobie Brothers

“Breaking The Law” - Judas Priest

“Tell It To My Heart” - Taylor Dayne

“We Belong” - Pat Benatar

“Nightrain” - Guns N’ Roses

“I Was Made For Dancin’” - Leif Garrett

“Stand” - R.E.M.

“Take It Easy” - Eagles

“Young Hearts” - Commuter

“Cold As Ice” - Foreigner

“Dreaming” - Blondie

“Don’t Worry Baby” - The Beach Boys

Maybe I’ve underestimated your knowledge of this era, and this list will all be stuff you know well. (Or, conversely, perhaps I’m assuming too much, and should have just gone with a list of 50 mega-hits. Who knows?)

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ulyssessword 1yr ago

I want people to know that it's possible to make fandom.com more readable than an average website. It just takes uBlock Origin and a couple dozen custom filters.

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Sloot 1yr ago

Red tribe fathers who proudly quote the rules "for dating my daughter" cheerfully send their little princesses off to college without a second thought, where they will very predictably spend four years away from any male relative supervision getting covered in cum from head to toe by men who have zero chance of committing to them.

Some fathers even pay a quarter mil or more for such a privilege.

Is the second link in the quoted portion what you meant, though? I suppose, in its stead the parent comment to the above link could also work, for getting covered in cum from head to toe (in addition to a well-diversified portfolio of other bodily fluids).

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Walterodim Only equals speak the truth, that’s my thought on’t 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

Today in weird election arguments, Wisconsin has an ongoing dispute about the legality of ballot drop boxes and with a shift in Supreme Court seats, there is a big stare decisis is for suckers revisiting of it:

The 4-3 decision released Friday reverses a near-total ban on ballot drop boxes, which was handed down by the state's high court in 2022.

In 2022, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in another 4-3 ruling that unsupervised ballot drop boxes outside of clerk's offices are illegal, because they're not specifically authorized in Wisconsin law.

I have my usual objections to encouraging more absentee voting, but they're not the point from a legal perspective. Instead, let's just look at the actual statute:

Except as otherwise provided in s. 6.875, an elector voting absentee, other than a military elector or an overseas elector, shall make and subscribe to the certification before one witness who is an adult U.S. citizen. A military elector or an overseas elector voting absentee, regardless of whether the elector qualifies as a resident of this state under s. 6.10, shall make and subscribe to the certification before one witness who is an adult but who need not be a U.S. citizen. The absent elector, in the presence of the witness, shall mark the ballot in a manner that will not disclose how the elector's vote is cast. The elector shall then, still in the presence of the witness, fold the ballots so each is separate and so that the elector conceals the markings thereon and deposit them in the proper envelope. If a consolidated ballot under s. 5.655 is used, the elector shall fold the ballot so that the elector conceals the markings thereon and deposit the ballot in the proper envelope. If proof of residence under s. 6.34 is required and the document enclosed by the elector under this subdivision does not constitute proof of residence under s. 6.34, the elector shall also enclose proof of residence under s. 6.34 in the envelope. Except as provided in s. 6.34 (2m), proof of residence is required if the elector is not a military elector or an overseas elector and the elector registered by mail or by electronic application and has not voted in an election in this state. If the elector requested a ballot by means of facsimile transmission or electronic mail under s. 6.86 (1) (ac), the elector shall enclose in the envelope a copy of the request which bears an original signature of the elector. The elector may receive assistance under sub. (5). The return envelope shall then be sealed. The witness may not be a candidate. The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots. [emphasis mine] If the envelope is mailed from a location outside the United States, the elector shall affix sufficient postage unless the ballot qualifies for delivery free of postage under federal law. Failure to return an unused ballot in a primary does not invalidate the ballot on which the elector's votes are cast. Return of more than one marked ballot in a primary or return of a ballot prepared under s. 5.655 or a ballot used with an electronic voting system in a primary which is marked for candidates of more than one party invalidates all votes cast by the elector for candidates in the primary.

To fulfill that clause and allow remote ballot drop boxes, the new court would need to discover that these remote drop boxes are actually the municipal clerk. That might sound like a stretch, but they're willing to enact the labor:

¶25 By mandating that an absentee ballot be returned not to the "municipal clerk's office," but "to the municipal clerk," the legislature disclaimed the idea that the ballot must be delivered to a specific location and instead embraced delivery of an absentee ballot to a person——the "municipal clerk." Given this, the question then becomes whether delivery to a drop box constitutes delivery "to the municipal clerk" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.

¶26 We conclude that it does. A drop box is set up, maintained, secured, and emptied by the municipal clerk.10

This is being characterized as a big win for democracy. To be clear, I don't really think there's anything going on here that's a problem or poses a threat, but it just remains very weird to me how there are all these arguments in favor of doing weird things that don't really seem necessary with solutions in search of a problem. What exactly is the situation where someone can't drop a ballot in the mail or swing by the clerk's office? Why is it so critical to Our Democracy^tm that there be more drop boxes? I suppose one could easily ask the same of Republicans, wondering why it's so critical that clerk's offices not put out boxes, but it seems like the simple answer in this case is simply that the statute pretty obviously doesn't allow it.

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LateMechanic 1yr ago

Wasn't the timing that Obama's public support on Friday helped stem the tide for a few days, but then on Tuesday/Wednesday stories started coming out saying that Obama was now privately highly concerned? WaPo tuesday night: Obama shares concerns after shaky debate, offers Biden his advice, and then a bunch of articles came out from other outlets based on that report, with harsher headlines.

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sodiummuffin 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

Liveblog of the podcast with the details from someone skeptical about the allegations (she's only done the part with the first accuser so far):

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1808514093323587854.html

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1808604076650660238.html

The highlights would be the Whatsapp messages. Like this one after the day when Neil Gaiman allegedly sexually assaulted her on her first day as a nanny:

She sends Neil some what's-app messages about childcare and then adds, "Thank you for a lovely, lovely night. Wow. Kiss."

And this one a few days later after the weekend when he allegedly "anally penetrates her, she says, without asking and without using a condom and she says he uses butter as a lubricant.":

Hello darling. I've had a crazy weekend. To getting bitten by a spider, to ridiculously crazy and rough and kind of amazing sex.

Or these messages to Neil, also from shortly after the alleged anal rape:

Now they're telling us her What's App message the next day: "Do you feel like a rain bath? smiley emoji"

The next day: "I am consumed by thoughts of you, the things you will do to me, I'm so hungry. What a terrible creature you've turned me into. I think you need to give me a huge spanking very soon. I'm fucking desperate for my master." That's from Scarlett to Neil.

If I've got it right, they met on Friday, and she sent that to him on Monday. He says she was into "mild BDSM," I guess describing that kind of message. She says he groomed her (over a weekend?)

Or these after he messaged her about her supposedly telling people he raped her and she planned to MeToo him:

I feel like bawling my eyes out. I would never Me Too you. I don't where that came from, and I have told Amanda that even though it began questionably, eventually it was undoubtedly consensual and I enjoyed it. Heart is pounding too.

Or the general description of the year of messages following her meeting Neil, a relationship that supposedly started with him sexually assaulting her on the first day they met and anally raping her the second day:

The journalists say that the What's App message they have from Scarlett's phone cover her entire relationship with Neil Gaiman and go back and forth for an entire year afterwards. ?!?!!?!

"The messages are friendly, often affectionate or supportive."

Journalist: "It feels like a very different story, not so black and white, like we're viewing the offense from the other end of the telescope." They're presuming there is an offense to view.

Journalist: "It really throws me, because when I read the What's App, Scarlett comes over to me as besotted."

Other journalist: "Messages like these appear to be evidence of consent in black and white."

In summary:

The journalists ask experts "How can we reconcile her What's Apps to Neil Gaiman with her account to us of what happened?" That is not the right question to ask. The right question to ask is, "Is she telling the truth?"

They seem to be working from the assumption that her account is truthful and then trying to justify why the evidence doesn't fit it.

EDIT: Liveblog of episodes 3 and 4:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1808683675984302279.html

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1808707805915889918.html

They are talking to a woman in Atlanta, in the US. She's the second accuser, they call her K.

The first quote they have from her says "I never wanted any of the stuff he did to me, including the violent stuff, but I did consent to it."

Neil says they had a two-year consensual relationship and exchanged hundreds of emails for years afterwards, and none of the emails indicate a problem.

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KMC 1yr ago

Good Omens is Pratchett book, at least 51% if not more like 80%. I'm not sure what Gaiman ever brought to the book. The four horseman are already in Discworld, although I notice they left out Mr Soak the milkman.

This is praise. Pratchett is one of the best to ever write and the high quality of his prodigious output is astounding.

If you don't like fantasy, the Long World with Baxter is fantastic.

But now we're in the Friday Fun thread, What Are You Reading.

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EverythingIsFine Well, is eventually fine 1yr ago

I'm still confused why, if the intent is to regain momentum and fight the narrative, he's doing an interview on Friday, which is normally the day to bury news that will disappear over the weekend. Today would have been a much better day. As it is, Biden's fitness is going to be one of the biggest casual conversation pieces at family get-togethers tomorrow.

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Amadan Enjoying my short-lived victory 1yr ago

This is a bad comment. You can think what you like about Biden and you can post links to the various allegations if you want to talk about them or bring them up as evidence that he's bad, but just replying to someone talking about Biden by saying he's a sex pest and a blob creature isn't an argument, it's just hawking and spitting.

Normally you'd just get warned not to do this. But you've been doing this and been warned that if you don't rein it in, you're going to start to get longer bans. Your record is shitty. Eight warnings and two bans, you keep ignoring our requests to chill out, and you come back from your bans just to whine about how they were unfair.

Now you're banned for a week. Returning to whine about how it was unfair is unlikely to result in greater leniency if you continue down this path.

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curious_straight_ca 1yr ago

PredictIt is a terrible source of information because the position limits mean dumb retail traders set the probability, but polymarket's odds are like 45% (biden drops out) so not much better.

I've mentioned before how he's used the SPR to keep gas prices down, knowing that simple things like that matter a lot.

Can we really attribute that to Biden, did he come up with that or drive the implementation? I think it makes more sense to credit Employ America or staff for that, with Biden approving it. Whereas something like the Afghanistan withdrawal can significantly be credited to Biden.

It seems like the choice is entirely in Biden's hands, and his inner circle and family, those who'd have the most influence, appear to be supporting him so far. There's some level of opposition from his party that'd force him to pull out, but I agree it's not enough so far.

Biden will be interviewed by George Stephanopoulos on ABC this Friday we'll see if that goes better than the debate. Since the debate he's spokento the press - and to his congressional and governor dem allies - surprisingly little.

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yofuckreddit 1yr ago

I finished up Harassment Architecture the other day.

In summary, it's a book I would only have a paper copy of and only recommend to very few people that I know very intimately - since high school at a minimum.

It's plotless, written by a 20-something, and printed somewhere kind of random in SC. It's satirical, hateful, aggressive, and could be in some ways more subversive than something like The Anarchist's Cookbook. I was recommended it on Amazon I think after reading a linked blog post here (which worries me) and only saw it discussed directly here once by @Etw0.

I was reading it while on a train in Europe during pride month, which was probably the best possible situation for getting value out of it. I may expand on it this Friday, but the main themes of the book were underlined by, to borrow the author's framing, being in a land full of gluten-intolerant LGBTQIA+ cucks surrounded by meaningful architecture created hundreds of years ago.

If you're here, you may like it, though I'll stop short of recommending it as I mentioned to start. A good mix of catharsis and humor. I don't imagine a centrist moderate, much less a leftist would be able to stomach it at all.

The downside of having finished it is realizing I probably won't be able to talk to anyone about it face to face. Anyone who'd agree with parts of it may not process it as deeply, and anyone else maybe capable of doing so would be too disgusted by it to finish. So a general feeling of loneliness and frustration afterwards.

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Felagund 1yr ago

Thursday's cases:

The abortion DIG I already wrote up. I still need to get to Friday's cases.

Ohio v. EPA

5-4, men vs. women. Gorsuch writes, Barrett dissents.

Another procedural case. The question is whether to stay the enforcement of the Clean Air Act as some states sue over it.

Specifically, the EPA threw out a bunch of State Implementation Plans when it wanted to put in place a Federal Imlementation Plan for preventing ozone pollution (ozone is bad at low altitudes). The states want it not to be enforced until they sue.

The court approves. Gorsuch, joined by the other men, argues that the harms go both ways, so the question goes to who is more likely to actually win the case. He think the states. Specifically, the states are arguing that the agency hasn't explained why the plan would remain in place for the remainder without needing additional evaluation or justification if some states drop out. He rejects the EPA's arguments that they offered a sufficient response (to the argument that the number of states involved might have affected the threshold, so it should be reevaluated), he rejects their claim that they were required to have submitted it during public comment (Gorsuch argues that there was a comment that was close enough), and he rejects their argument that they need to refile, as their grounds for objection arose after the period of public comment. He also rejects the dissent's argument that the complaint was not important, as it doesn't depend on the number of states, because the government did not make the arguments the dissent makes, and there is some reason to think that the different rules for harmless errors seem to be for "procedural determinations," not "actions." And so the stay is granted.

Barrett argues (as background) that the 23 states' SIP rejections were legitimate, and that the disapprovals are only temporarily stayed, not yet invalidated. Barrett rejects the Court's main complaint, the lack of reasonable response, as something that could not have been brought up earlier, and so requires a petition for reconsideration, as it's a new problem. (That is, there was no way to object that, before the public comment period was over.) Second, she doesn't think the comments applied specifically enough. She further thinks that they need to show that the actions were "arbitrary and capricious," which she doesn't think was the case: she doesn't think the cost-effectiveness thresholds were dependent upon which states were involved, but that they were based on national data, so it shouldn't matter which states were involved. It justified the severability in the plan. And they might not be important comments, and the agency only needs to respond to relevant and significant comments. Finally, there's a harmless-error rule in the Clean Air Act. (She argues contra Gorsuch that it applies.) She argues that the court itself is following a theory not advanced by the applicants' briefs, only the oral argument. And so it would be odd to expect the EPA to have forfeited when it never had the proper opportunity to respond. And she would exercise discretion anyway to look at the harmless-error rule, even had this not been brought up.

I'm more sympathetic to Barrett here.

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

5-4, but not quite the usual lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson. Kavanaugh dissents, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kagan.

The case is about bankruptcy law.

Based on Gorsuch's presentation of the history:

Purdue Pharma, held by the Sackler family, made billions from sales of Oxycontin, and so was a major force behind the opioid epidemic. A decade later, they admitted it was wrong to brand it as less addictive, and underwent thousands of lawsuits. In response, the Sacklers significantly increased the revenue that they took in from the company.

Purdue filed for bankruptcy. The Sackler family proposed to return 4 billion over the course of a decade of their 11 billion profit, asking to extinguish outstanding claims that the Purdue bankruptcy estate would have against the family, and "the Sackler discharge": to stop lawsuits against them from opioid victims. The Sackler discharge consisted of a release voiding current and future opioid-related claims, and an injunction enforcing the release "forever staying, restraining and enjoining" claims against them. Purdue agreed to this (of course) and included them in the bankruptcy plan. In that plan, Purdue wanted to reorganize as a company for opioid education and abatement. And they would pay victims between 3500 to 48000 over up to ten years. Opioid victims opposed the plan, as did some states. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. The district court vacated the plan. The Sacklers suggested upping the amount in Purdue's estate by another billion and a half, if the states would withdraw their objection, which events then took place. The Second circuit judged it good. Now SCOTUS addresses it.

Gorsuch turns to the text of the statute, saying what a bankruptcy plan may do. All agree that the Sackler discharge is justified in the final category: "(6) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title." Gorsuch argues that it is standard to interpret catchalls like this not in the most broad manner, but in context, involving only similar things to the preceding list. But the previous five all involve the rights, responsibilities, and relationship to creditors of the debtor (here, the debtor is the Purdue estate), not other parties. And the word "appropriate" qualifies it, it is not unbounded. The dissent claims that not all are about the debtor's rights and resonsibilities, as (3) may settle "derivative claims" against nondebtors, but Gorsuch responds that that involves only claims belonging to the estate. All agree that the bankruptcy plan can address claims held by Purdue. But not claims by others against others. Gorsuch rejects the dissent's arguments that the catchall should be read as anything that would help bankruptcy law in its purpose, by arguing that bankruptcy law is not intended to be limitless; it cannot just do whatever to manage bankruptcy, without regard to other legal mechanisms.

He argues further that there are other statutory reasons to reject the Sackler discharge. First, in general, the bankruptcy code only gives discharges to the debtor. But that isn't the case here. Second, it constrains the debtor: they must come forward on all assets, it doesn't dismiss charges around fraud or willful or malicious injury, does not affect trial by jury regarding injury or wrongful death. But the Sackler discharge does none of these—they pay much less, and even those sorts of claims are extinguished. And finally, bankruptcies involving asbestos have a specific provision that they may bar action against third parties, and so that shouldn't be allowed in general. Gorsuch turns to history, stating that there are no comparable cases prior to the enactment of this act under previous bankruptcy codes, so it should not be read as embracing it, when there's nothing explicit to that effect.

Gorsuch states that "plan proponents and the dissent resort to a policy argument." (Recall that in Rahimi last week, Kavanaugh, the author of this dissent, rejects policy.) That argument is that the Sacklers assert that they will give nothing unless the release and injunction are granted, and so this is better for victims. The Trustee argues that the Sacklers can still face lawsuits of their own, and they may even negotiate consensual releases to avoid the lawsuits. On the other hand, the U.S. Trustee argues that ruling in favor of the Purdue here, and allowing nonconsensual third-party releases allow winning immunity for claims that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and without all assets, which would allow corporations to misuse the system to avoid liability. Gorsuch rejects policy concerns, on both sides, as irrelevant; he's not Congress.

Kavanaugh's dissent is enormous—54 pages. 13 on the appropriateness of non-debtor releases, 13 on appropriateness in the case of Purdue, and 21 disagreeing with Gorsuch's (20 page) opinion. This might be the longest opinion of the year; it's at least the longest one I've read yet from this year, I'm pretty sure.

Kavanaugh opens by explaining bankruptcies. They exist to resolve collective-action problems, in the form of everyone trying to get in a claim, then the slowest get nothing once the first ones recover everything. Instead, creditors get a proceeding upon all of them. The parties make a plan, and that plan may release claims against the debtor. At least creditors holding at least 1/2 in number, 2/3 in a mount, and in every class must confirm the plan for it to go into effect. They are consensual, even if some dissent. This case is a mass-tort case. Sometimes, "it is not only the debtor company, but rather another closely related person or entity such as officers and directors who may hold valuable assets and also be potentially liable for the company's wrongdoing." But it can be hard to pass legal hurdles, or reach their assets, so settlements are often reached releasing them, in exchange for substantial payments. It also solves a collective-action problem, in that it allows them to be divided equitably. And so they have often found them appropriate, and have been in use in asbestos bankruptcies and other such cases. They are needed for fair recovery and distribution of claims. He argues, then, that they are "appropriate," as that is the key term in (6), and argues that that, as in previous cases, is a broad term. The second circuit has ruled that the released party must be (1) closely related to the debtor, (2) they must have claims "factually and legally" intertwined with the ones against the debtor, (3) the "scope of the releases" must be "tailored to only the claims that must be released to protect the plan,"(4) the court should approve only if it is essential to the plan's success, (5) and the court must consider whether they've paid substantially to the estate, (6) determine if it provides fair payment, and (7) show that creditors must approve with at least 75%.

1-4 are to solve collective action problems, 5 makes it not a free ride, 6 to ensure fair compensation, 7 to ensure most approve.

He highlights that in general, there are high approval rates. He highlights also that these bankruptcies, by default, involve releasing claims non-consensually, the only difference here is against whom.

Then he turns to Purdue Pharma and the Sacklers. Apparently, there are $40 trillion worth in claims. Over 95 percent approved of the plan. Claims against both Purdue Pharma and the Sacklers were released. This was needed to preserve Purdue's assets. Purdue had agreed to pay for liability and legal expenses that officers and directors of Purdue would undergo in the future, including against the Sacklers. So Purdue could pay a substantial amount of money from the Sacklers. "So releasing claims against the Sacklers is not meaningfully different from releasing claims against Purdue itself." Otherwise some could race to the courthouse and take all the assets. (Gorsuch had addressed this in a footnote, saying that the US Trtustee said that the agreement does not apply if the Sacklers did not act in good faith, and that bankruptcy courts could get rid of the claims in other ways.) Second, the agreement increases the funds in the Purdue estate, so that victims receive more. (The US would take the entire 1.8 billion first, otherwise.) Kavanaugh says that the Bankruptcy court said that victims would be unlikely to recover from the Sacklers the money otherwise, as their legal theories have weaknesses, and their assets are overseas and otherwise protected. And if they did, one large claim could wipe out most of their assets, leaving everyone else with virtually nothing. Over 95 percent approved. Only a few are opposing it now. And so, it is appropriate.

Now Kavanaugh turns to address the court. He doesn't think the ejusdem generis (that is "of the same kind") canon for interpretation of catchalls was applied there properly. The releases do still involve the debtor: they involve releases on Purdue's misconduct. But he reads the court's argument as wrong in two ways: First, they are not limited to the debtor, as (3) nonconsensually extinguishes derivative claims against nondebtors. He argues that the court is wrong in distinguishing derivative from nonderivative claims. Kavanaugh argues that three other types of release also argue against the court's interpretation. Consensual non-debtor releases happen, are uncontroversial, and are not explicitly authorized in the bankruptcy code (and so would fall into 6.) But that would seem different—why should that be permitted in bankruptcy plans? Full-satisfaction releases provide full payment, and then release the claim. But this too is not explicitly listed. Exculpation clauses "shield the estate's fiduciaries and other professionals from liability for their work on the reorganization plan," (in order to prevent liability in creating the bankruptcy process), also fall into the catchall, and involve claims against nondebtors.

And secondly, it is proper to look at the purpose of the statute when doing an "ejusdem generis."

He rejects the Court's other arguments: the asbestos portion explicitly says it is not to be taken to affect any of the rest of the statute. He reject's the court citing a passage which says that a plan's discharge of the debtor "does not affect the liability of any other entity on … such debt," as that is instead to be read as leaving those who were co-debtors with a bankrupt company with the debt they had taken on, instead of wiping it. He rejects the claim that this is a discharge, as discharges are technical, and involve getting rid of all debts. Released are narrower, and involve payment. Kavanaugh rejects also the court's saying they would need to file for bankruptcy, to pointing to where they could release a nondebtor from liability to the debtor. He argues that discharges are meaningfully different from releases, so it's not a problem that it releases all classes of torts, not just some. And he says that the court seems concerned that they did not pay enough, but that is no reason to categorically shut down such releases. He also disagrees on history and practice, as they have been in use throughout the history of the bankruptcy code, and changes in the current code from previous codes are relevant.

He says, "today's decision makes little sense legally, practically, or economically. " Among other things, it hurts the victims. More litigation is costly, even if things get worked out. It is hard to achieve a deal without such releases. There are unlikely to be any settlements. This will prevent exactly what the bankruptcy system is designed to do.

I don't really know how I feel about this case. Kavanaugh convinced fairly effectively that his preference is better for the victims, but I'm still not sure which is better law.

SEC v. Jarkesy

6-3. Roberts writes, joined by the conservatives. Gorsuch concurs, joined by Thomas, Sotomayor dissents, joined by the liberals.

The court argues that under the 7th amendment, the SEC needs juries, as it is trying people for fraud, which is

Roberts briefly notes that the seventh amendment was a product of the British trying people without juries in other courts that did not require it, and it was in this context that it was enacted. Its text is that in "suits at common law…the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Common law there is not restricted to common law at the time of the founding, but is talking about law as opposed to equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. (He cites precedent for this.) So any suit that's not equity or admiralty jurisdiction is common law. This requires that it be legal in nature. The relevant factor (citing Tull) is that its remedy be legal, not equitable. Because the SEC seeks monetary damages as punishment, not solely to restore, it is legal. The facts are clearly legal, as both the conditions for penalties and the level of them have to do with punishing the defendant, rather than restoring to victims. (The SEC may give money to victims, but that's optional.) And so this must involve the Seventh Amendment. This also makes sense because securities fraud is closely related to common law fraud, even if the boundaries are not precisely the same. This is also evidence that it is legal in nature.

Roberts turns to address the contention of the Government and the dissent that the "public rights" exception applies. In such cases, Congress can give it to an agency, without the Seventh amendment. Private rights cannot be removed from Article III courts. But the court has recognized "public rights." These could historically be done exclusively by the executive and legislative branches. The example cited is compulsion of a customs collector to deliver a sum of public funds that he had failed to deliver; his land was seized to do so. Other examples also exist, such as a fine on a steamship company on those who brought the sick who had bad diseases (He rejects the dissent reading this broadly; the case cited here explicitly restricts itself to power over foreign commerce). Or the imposition of tarriffs. Some others involve Indian tribes, administration of public lands, and granting public benefits, like patent rights. While these are not worked out in full, Roberts emphasizes that these are exceptions, not the rule, and so require close attention. (The dissent would read this as Congress can do whatever, essentially, that public rights are whenever Congress passes a statute. This is, Roberts says, argued neither from constitutional text, ratification history, careful analysis, nor case-specific analysis. Rather, some unrelated cases, and Atlas Roofing. This, Roberts says, blurs distinctions in a legally unsound way. He also rejects an appeal to precedent, considering how new the relevant law is.)

There is relevant precedent. Granfinanciera, 35 years ago, did much the same as what they do in this case: it ruled that Article III judges are needed for fraudulent conveyance claims. They ruled in the same way then, for the same reasons: they were "quintessentially suits in common law."

He rejects the argument that Congress can form new statutory obligation—they can't make up a new penalty for the same old common law thing and so strip away protections.

The dissent depends mainly on Atlas Roofing. Roberts doesn't quite get to the point of arguing that Atlas Roofing is overturned, but he critiques it. He points out that its author thought so, when Granfinanciera was judged, in a footnote. Atlas Roofing claimed that what Congress was doing was outside the Seventh amendment in the OSH act, when it required how walls be built. They ruled that it was a new cause of action. Atlas Roofing acknowledges that common law actions need a jury, and so is not relevant here. It cannot support a broader rule. Roberts, in a footnote notes that the dissent treats it as widely respected, and in response provides a lengthy list of critiques of Atlas Roofing, then finishes the footnote by saying "We express no opinion on these various criticism." He then notes that subsequent precedent after Atlas Roofing have clarified that new statutory regimes are included, if the claims are "akin to common law claims," and that the public rights exception does not apply every time Congress gives an agency any adjudicatory power. Roberts also rejects the argument that public rights applies whenever more government efficiency is useful, which would gut the Seventh amendment altogether.

Roberts declines to reach the other two issues (nondelegation, and separation of powers), as this suffices to resolve the case.

Gorsuch concurs, with Thomas, writing "to highlight that other constitutional provisions reinforce the correctness of the Court's course." He points to Article III and the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Gorsuch goes a little further into the process of Jarkesy's case. The Dodd Frank act in 2010 had given the SEC the ability to direct people through its own adjudicatory system, rather than through courts, which the SEC did in this case. They sent him to an "administrative law judge," but those judges are not as independent as article III judges, but serve an agency, and there is no jury. They have a significantly higher win rate. He lost, in doing so, many other procedural protections, such as being able to cross-examine witnesses, or discovery being a thing. Its judgment can be appealed to the Commission, but they may decline to review, or may increase the penalty. Afterward, he can go to court, but there he would not have had a jury.

Gorsuch then turns to history. The British would preferentially seek rulings not in local courts, but in vice-admiralty tribunals, without juries or properly independent judges, and with weaker standards of evidence. Those courts were supposed to be confined to maritime matters originally, but more and more things were allowed by Parliament to be litigated there over time, at least, in the American colonies. They preferred to avoid colonial juries, who "were not to be trusted." The British preferred to turn to them, as they were more successful there. This matter was among the causes motivating the declaration of independence. Article III served to avoid this, in its vesting the Judicial power in courts giving life-tenure and protected salary, to restrict the influence of the executive branch. Nor could Congress move other things out from judicial power. In response to additional concerns, the bill of rights was passed. The seventh amendment preserved juries, the fifth amendment ensured proper procedure.

Each of these three require ruling in favor of Jarkesy. First, since it is in the common law, it requires Article III judges, in article III courts. Second, it is neither equity nor admiralty, but before common law courts, so the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury. And third, the Due Process clause requires common law, which would mean usual proceedings, not "ad hoc adjudication procedures before the same agency responsible for prosecuting the law, subject only to hands-off judicial review."

Gorsuch turns to public rights. The government suggests any new statutory obligations, civil penalties, and administrative agency suffice. Gorsuch agrees that they are not that, but specific classes. He mentions theories as to their origin—practical consideration in tax collection, or that they fall outside the traditional "life, liberty and property." But whatever the cause, they need "an unbroken historical pedigree." The things outside judicial courts at the time of the founding are what public rights actually are. But this is plainly not that. Gorsuch addresses their reasoning: the Court's precedent In Crowell v. Benson, the court allowed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation to proceed. It had it vested in a commission. Gorsuch treats it as a bit sketchy ("took a dash of fiction and a pinch of surmise"), and involved some dubious things in relation to Article III judges. But at least it was only in admiralty jurisdiction. But swiftly, there were further encroachments. The most was in Atlas Roofing, which some read to suggest essentially anything in a statute is public right. But this was mostly rejected in Granfinanciera, which read Atlas Roofing as leaving "public rights" undefined. Various tests have occurred since then, but in this case they return to the proper understanding.

The court may not deprive the people of their constitutional rights. They do not treat the other rights so lightly. (See the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th amendements.) The 5th and 7th should likewise be taken seriously.

Gorsuch says that the dissent's account is "astonishing." The Constitution, apparently imposes no limits on the government's power to seek penalties outside the ordinary courts of law. Not even the balancing tests after Atlas Roofing. No account of how at all this addresses the Founders' concerns, or where this rule comes from Article III, the Seventh Amendment, or due process. They cherry-pick the precedent. Misread Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, which is actually just one of the narrow questions. It's odd, Gorsuch says, if the public rights is really that broad, that the former courts would bother to look at all the things they did to justify their law, instead of following the simple rule of the dissent. Gorsuch notes (and I found this particularly pointed) that the dissent is not even consistent, as in other cases the same justices have often argued for the need for procedural safeguards, worried about governments abusing, and pressure from prosecutors, and been concerned with matters of procedure, and argued the importance of the jury-trial right. The dissent also gives no explanation why this does not extend to criminal matters. The dissent complains against turning to the founding, and says that it's rule would be easier. (Gorsuch cites himself saying in Rahimi that it would indeed be easier to implement a rule that the government always wins.) When the dissent complains that this is unworkable and unpredictable, he rejects their balancing test approach as no better. And the Court's approach to precedent is better, and, as they acknowledged in another case, consistent with stare decisis. He characterizes this as really about a "power grab," that the Constitution's promise of a jury trial would constrain governance too much.

It's well written.

Now, onto the dissent. After her intro, and introducing the facts, Sotomayor states that "longstanding precedent and established government practice uniformly support the constitutionality of administrative schemes like the SEC's." This, she cites, should have great weight.

Sotomayor says there are two relevant constitutional provisions: the 7th amendment, and the vesting clause of Article III. "The principal question" is about aricle III and the separation of powers. The amendment is about "suits at common law." As it is suits, it only involves judicial, and not administrative proceedings. And since it must be at common law, it must be legal in nature. When it is not in an Article III forum, the proper question for whether it is legal in nature is whether Congress properly assigned the matter to that forum consistent with Article III and the separation of powers. If Congress properly assigned the matter to an agency for adjudication, it therefore resolves the Seventh amendment challenge. So, then, the question is whether it can assign it to a non-Article III factfinder. These are permissible as public rights. Public rights, Sotomayor says, refer to "right of hte public," claims brought by or against the United States.

Sotomayor goes through precedent. Murray's Lessee, involving seizure of lands to make up for withheld funds, referring to "public rights." Then Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, upholding a customs offical's imposition of penalties. It rejected that "in cases of penalty or punishment enforcement must depend upon the exertion of judical power, either by civil or criminal process." There was already at the time delegation by Congress to executive officers to enforce penalties, without judicial power. Congress being able to assign that power has been repeatedly affirmed by SCOTUS. This was unanimous in Atlas Roofing, the last case involving the constitutionality of an "in-house adjudication of statutory claims." Two employers had argued that OSHA was unconstitutional, because seeking civil penalties for violation of a statute is a suit for a money judgment, which is in common law. SCOTUS upheld OSHA, due to public rights arguments. Sotomayor says that the majority "wishes away Atlas Roofing by burying it at the end of its opinion and minimizing the unbroken line of cases on which Atlas Roofing relied, and this undermines stare decisis and rule of law. Both this and Atlas Roofing involve "new causes of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law." So it's fine to assign them elsewhere. "In a world where precedent means something this should end the case."

Sotomayor says that this has not been addressed since Atlas Roofing because it is so settled, and undisputable. Sotomayor does not think the majority suitably defines a public right, and does not explain why it exists. Atlas Roofing rejects the theory that public rights is limited to particular exercises of congressional power. The employers made the argument that they referred to several narrow roles like taxation; SCOTUS rejected that. And she does not think the majority can justify Atlas Roofing's decision. Sotomayor points out further that the majority skips several cases where they uphold adjudication in a non-Article III forum, in cases not able to be characterized as public right under the majority's definition. She asserts that it is actually the majority and concurrence that are picking and choosing, not her. She thinks their definition of public right is a "we know it when we see it."

Tull and Granfinanciera she thinks not relevant: the first involved a suit in federal court, and the second a dispute between private parties, and so do not involve the government in its sovereign capacity. Sotomayor argues that the Court has long endorsed imposing money penalties without needing judicial power. Tull was in federal court, so it isn't relevant to show that "statutory claims for civil penalties" is a "type of remedy at common law." Tull also agrees that it does not involve administrative proceedings. Granfinanciera only involves disputes in which the Federal Government is not a party in its sovereign capacity, and allows for claims analogous to common-law claims to be judged in non-Article III fora. (In a footnote, Sotomayor says that Granfinanciera reaffirms Atlas Roofing several times; disagreements are constrained.) Sotomayor says that Granfinanciera says how to identify public rights: from Congress, inhering in the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity, or when Congress, acting according to a valid purpose, created a private right integrated into a public regulatory scheme "as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." Sotomayor sees the majority as dismissing the distinction between the two. The majority is wrong to have Granfinanciera decide the case, when it only specifies that its analysis applies when not involving the Federal Government. And so the majority fails to distinguish Atlas Roofing. "A faithful and straightforward application of this Court's longstanding precedent should have resolved this case." Following precedent keeps courts apolitical. Departure should have considered special justification. The majority's striking down the law is "a seismic shift." It "Pulls a rug out from under Congress" without acknowledging what it's upending. There are over 200 relevant statutes, and more than two dozen agencies that can impose civil penalties. It is a "massive sea change." Sotomayor does not like that the Court tells Congress how to structure agencies, or provide for the enforcement of rights. the SEC's scheme has benefits. This decision is a "power grab," an arrogation of Congress's policymaking role, and violates the separation of powers.

Thoughts: I think Sotomayor was more convincing as to what the precedent was saying, though not to the point that the majority didn't have a few points here or there. On the other hand, the majority was more convincing as to what the Constitution was saying, and unequivocally so. I think Gorsuch's account upheld the 5th circuit, though he didn't say as much, on all three possible grounds, which makes it considerably more radical. It's a good opinion, though. Also, Gorsuch thought Granfinanciera was 25 years old; it's 35. This is a big deal, though maybe not quite as big a deal as Sotomayor portrays, because Roberts restricts himself to the first ground. I think I was underestimating importance, despite already thinking it relatively important, prior to reading it.

Anyway, I still need to get to Friday's cases.

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gattsuru 1yr ago · Edited 1yr ago

The charitable answer for Idaho is that the moderates saw non-intervention as likely to result in some absolutely abominable precedent in the 9th Circuit under the original constraints (eg, finding that any federal encouragement of a thing prohibited a state restriction, which the Civil Marksmanship Program would absolutely love to hear about), which SCOTUS would have to overturn in the most controversial case possible, and then the concessions from both the federal and state government during trial set that concern off the table.

The less charitable is that the concessions were enough that, even if the moderates could recognize voluntary cessation when it was slapping them in the face, they saw that they could punt. See NYSPRA I, Fulton, so on for previous editions that got further along. It's not a lack of willpower; it's a lack of desire.

He rejects the arguments of the liberals, saying that it requires stabilization of any threat to an unborn child. And that it fails to take into account the spending clause. [Side note: would this make all abortions illegal? No one argues this, so I must be missing something.]

The text of EMTALA covers only stabilizing care in emergency rooms that accept medi* funds. There'd be a hilarious mirror stretch where a conservative administration tried to turn it into a hospital Born Alive Act, but trying to ban abortion at clinics that don't have emergency rooms would be far more of a stretch.

I still need to get to three more Thursday opinions, and by the time I do that, there'll be some Friday ones too. SEC v. Jarkesy seems like it will matter.

Yeah, that's a big one. I think people overestimate how big -- too much of ALJ depends on these civil penalties for them to actually comply with the dicta, and a lot of the targets of these historical civil penalties will roll over for the equivalent of plea bargains when various administrative offices start pointing out that it's not that much harder to prove jail-time-penalties if they have to go to a jury anyway. But it's also not just Big Business that gets hit by civil penalties: while I expect them to Massively Resist it, everything from the EPA to the ATF depends on this sorta thing.

((Technically, even a lot of fire/safety code stuff does, though the weird state of incorporation of the right to a jury trial means that it probably doesn't matter for state regs in the near future.))

EDIT: and Loper-Bright on Friday is a second part of a Mozambique for admin law advocates. It's likewise not going to matter as much as it should, since lower courts are still going to do Chevron-in-all-but-name -- and Robert's bizarre stare decisis argument is just giving permission for it -- but just having to put the work in will slow a lot of expansive reads of federal law.

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Felagund 1yr ago

This week's SCOTUS:

Wednesday, there were two opinions, and a leak of a third.

Murthy v. Missouri

6-3, by Barrett, dissent from Alito, joined by Gorsuch and Thomas.

I accidently deleted this, and it's decided on standing, so I won't bother to write it up at length.

The case is about the first amendment, and government pressuring social media to censor. Earlier this term was NRA v. Vullo, which was decided against the government pressuring organizations.

Barrett argues that they don't really have the standing needed to seek an injunction. Most of them didn't do a good enough job showing that their censorship was a result of the government, and they didn't do a good enough job to show that they are in need of an injunction to prevent likely future continuing censorship due to subsequent government pressure. (Especially because several of these related to COVID, and that's changed. Some underwent more censorship, but that wasn't necessarily from more government action.)

Alito presents a thorough narrative, and argues that they meet the standing requirements (not quite sure he manages that). He makes some connections the plaintiffs didn't, which Barrett thinks he shouldn't have, as it's not the job of judges to look through more than 20000 pages of documents for themselves; it's the job of the parties to make the case to the judges. He argues that the standard shouldn't be excessively high to show standing, as then the government can just maintain a touch of plausible deniability and do all the pressuring it likes.

Snyder v. United States

6-3, conservatives vs liberals. Opinion by Kavanaugh, concurrence by Gorsuch, dissent by Jackson.

The case is about gifts to officials.

Kavanaugh introduces the difference between bribes and gratuities: bribes are intended to influence action as a quid pro quo, gratuities are gifts given afterword for official conduct. The question is whether section 666, a statutes concerning state and local government officials, prohibits bribes and gratuities, or only bribes, and was taken because circuit courts disagreed. The text is

corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5000 or more.

The key words are "corruptly," and "influenced or rewarded."

Kavanaugh makes six arguments:

The text. Kavanaugh argues that the text was modeled after a federal bribes statute, and doesn't look like the gratuities statute right next to it. One particular feature is that this has a mens rea (that is, criminal intent) requirement, while the gratuities statue has no such requirement.
Statutory history. It was revised; Kavanaugh argues that that was an elimination of gratuities language from an earlier version of the text.
Statutory structure. Nowhere else includes both bribes and gratuities in a single statute. (Except maybe one other passage, section 215, with identical language, which the court has not interpreted to date)
Statutory punishments. This statute sets a max of 10 years. For the federal bribery statute, the max is 15 years. For the federal gratuity statute, the maximum is 2 years. It would be weird for state and local officials to have five times the maximum as federal officials.
Federalism. State and local entities regulate gratuities already; the presumption should generally be that Congress would not lightly override that.
Fair notice: the government hasn't exactly set clear lines, so it's hard for anyone to know.

Kavanaugh's response to the dissent: "reward" is ambiguous. It can mean rewards promised before the fact (and is used as such in some other bribery statutes), or rewards with no such promise (gratuities). But here, because of the word "corruptly", it must be talking about before the fact. He argues that Congress added "rewarded" in addition to "influenced" to make it impossible for officials to argue that they would have done whatever things anyway, so it isn't technically covered, as they try to get away with being bribed.

Note also that throughout, Kavanaugh chooses small gratuities, like gift cards and meals, as his examples.

Gorsuch concurs that this is an instance of "lenity." The statutes leaves some reasonably doubt, so you should lean in favor of the "presumptively free individual." He sees that as what's going on behind the reference to "fair notice." And he is "pleased to join."

Jackson dissents. She says that they should begin and end with the text. She reads "influenced" as capturing quid pro quos, and therefore, bribes. "Rewarded" is intended to capture corrupt officials acting without an explicit quid pro quo. "Reward," as ordinarily read, would not require that there be a beforehand agreement. Jackson points out that there are other statutes which use "reward" to refer to gratuities. And she argues that mentions of "reward" in the bribery statutes that the majority refers to, makes it explicit that it is attached to an agreement, whereas that is not seen here.

Jackson argues that statutory history makes the case for the majority worse. She agrees that it traces to section 201. But she points out that: originally, it is agreed that section 666 refers to both bribes and gratuities, and that it then also had the 10-year maximum. Then she argues that the majority is wrong to see the subsequent changes as changing what it covers, as it was part of a package of "technical and minor" changes. It was here that Congress changed the language to get what is under dispute, going from "for or because of" to "intending to be influenced or rewarded." But Jackson does not read this as based off of section 201(b), but based on section 215 (which the majority had dismissed as as of yet uninterpreted). she cites also a House Report characterizing it as being meant to track section 215, not 201 as the majority claims. And a house report had spoken of 215 as including gratuities (in that context, referring to bank officials).

Jackson then turns to whether all gratuities are covered, or which exactly; she says that they do not need to reach that question. Looking at Snyder's case, it seems pretty bad. He had several instances of bidding for contracts to buy garbage trucks, where the specifications were tailored to help one of the bidders. In fact, one of the times, that bidding process happened only after he tried to have the vehicle bought directly before being told that wasn't how things were done. Then he went to the dealership and asked for $15000, and was given $13000, which he subsequently claimed was due to consulting. Employees testified that said consulting never existed. He was charged under section 666. (Jackson here notes that it is odd that the decision was reversed (that is, ruled the lower court was wrong) instead of vacated and remanded (that is, sent back to lower courts for further judgment) is odd, as arguably there's enough circumstantial evidence to conclude bribery, not just gratuities, likely existed.)

Jackson argues that section 666 is not talking about the things that the majority uses as examples. It applies to officials in entities getting at least 10000 in government benefits. It must be connected to business or transactions, of value at least $5000. It does not apply to things like fees or wages or other ordinary compensation, nor to reimbursements or payments for expenses "in the usual course of business." And it specifies that it must be done "corruptly." She would not read that narrowly as referring solely to quid pro quos. She argues that "corruptly," combined with the reference to intention involves knowledge of wrongfulness, so ambiguity in cases benefits the official. This makes it difficult for prosecutors to meet the burden of proof in cases where it is, in fact, innocent. She argues also that in the cases that have happened, the track record seems to be actually bad examples, so the built-in limitations work. She reads the real motivation for the majority's decision as Kavanaugh's fifth reason: that he thinks it better to leave it to state and local decisions.

Frankly, Jackson's responses here seemed pretty devastating; I have no idea how the majority acquired six people. I'm not used to siding with the dissent when that dissent is the three liberals and only them. It's also not the best look for the court when people are complaining about corruption, even when those complaints are done with extreme prejudice and heavy exaggeration, as it's easy to spin the case in the news as allowing bribery.

The supreme court also accidentally leaked Moyle v. United States, which was released Thursday.

Moyle v. United States

Per curiam. The case was dismissed as improvidently granted (DIG); the courts stays vacated. We see the court's 3-3-3 structure, as Kagan concurs, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson (Jackson in part, she also writes her own opinion); Barrett concurs joined by Kavanaugh and Roberts; and Alito dissents, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch (Gorsuch in part). It was 5-4 on whether to grant certiorari

Moyle v. Unite States was asking about the relation between the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor act requiring medicare-funded hospitals to provide emergency aid, and an Idaho abortion ban: what happens when an abortion is needed to prevent serious health harms.

The district court had issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the government, as it expected the government would succeed. Idaho asked for a stay, the ninth circuit said no, and SCOTUS granted Idaho the stay and granted "certiorari before judgment."

Kagan argues that federal law would embrace such cases, as there are health-threatening but not life-threatening emergencies that require an abortion. She does not think Idaho is likely to succeed on the merits of its case that EMTALA does not require emergency treatments violating state law. And so, the preliminary injunction mandating such abortions should remain.

She responds to Alito's dissent (this is the only part that Jackson joins), by saying that abortion is needed in some cases to "stabilize" the patient, and so EMTALA does at times require it. She doesn't think the statute's applying also to requiring emergency care for unborn children changes the matter.

Barrett, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh, think that "the shape of these cases has substantially shifted since we granted certeriorari." She goes through history: the U.S. has sued Idaho to enjoin its abortion ban "to the extent it conflicts with EMTALA." The District court granted a preliminary injunction because (1) "The act prohibits the termination of ectopic pregnancies" (2) The woman's death must be objectively imminent or certain before they may perform an abortion, per Idaho, and (3) "'necessary to prevent death' is only an affirmative defense." But since then, the Idaho supreme court, ruled that the act doesn't require objectively certain, and ruled that "treating an ectopic pregnancy, by removing the fetus" does not count as an abortion under the act. (Side note, as I'm in pro-life circles enough to guess as to what the ruling there was saying: I assume that that is because it removing the fetus would be distinct from killing it directly, with the death merely being an unfortunate side effect instead of a means. And so it's not an abortion.) Idaho since amended the act to exclude removal of ectopic pregnancies, or removal of already dead children, and changed the affirmative defense to an exception. Barrett's now no longer convinced that they need early resolution. They still disagree whether abortions are needed as stabilizing care, and whether EMTALA can preempt state law. But the law's been changed twice, and the US government has disavowed what Idaho claimed the injunction would do: make its law unenforceable, by including jeopardy to mental health as required by EMTALA, and threatening religious providers, by ignoring conscience. But the government's clarified that it isn't needed for mental health, that it can require delivery, rather than abortion, if the kid's already viable, and that conscience protections still apply. Meanwhile, from Idaho's side, they've argued that it's okay if abortions happen under certain emergencies, even if the the threat to the mother's life is not imminent. "A grant of certiorari before judgment presumes that further proceedings below are unnecessary to the court's resolution." But a bunch of things have changed. There's also a not-before-discussed "difficult and consequential argument…about whether Congress, in reliance on the Spending Clause" can obligate recipients of federal funds to violate state criminal law, and they should let lower courts look at that first. And so they should let them happen below. Barrett agrees to vacate the stay, as the arguments that Idaho would be irreparably injured mostly go away. There's still relevant differences between the two that need to be worked out but most of the factors that made it a serious issue demanding quick action have gone away. Idaho's still mostly able to enforce it's law.

Jackson concurs in part and dissents in part. She writes argues that "this months-long catastrophe" (the stay up to this point) was unnecessary. She argues that it's plain that EMTALA requires abortions, and that the state law must plainly give way. She agrees on lifting the stay, but doesn't think the court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted. She thinks it's still certainly necessary to address the supremacy clause question in relation to EMTALA and state law, as various courts have passed abortion requirements. Meanwhile, there's a plain contradiction, in that one prohibits except in case of threat of death; the other requires them in cases of threat to health. The fundamental matter remains the same. She's a little rude to Barrett (characterizing it as convenient). It will plainly still continue to conflict in some cases. Idaho's representations to the court are not official and definitive interpretations of Idaho law. Jackson thinks that they should stick to what they have done. They've heard the arguments, and so forth. Jackson also thinks it's bad that the court hasn't yet rejected the argument about the "farfetched" theories about the spending clause, leavings states, for now at least, "nullifying" federal law. She's opposed to letting the harm continue.

Alito also dissents, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch in part. Alito points out that EMTALA requires protecting unborn children. And he argues that "conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous," according to previous cases on the spending clause. But here, the statute is unclear. The court previously thought Idaho was likely to succeed. "This about-face is baffling. Nothing legally relevant has occurred since January 5." They've received briefs, and heard arguments, everything that's been needed has been heard; it's ready to be decided, nothing new will happen. "The Court has simply lost the will."

Alito argues that the text of EMTALA requires treating unborn children. They must be protected—both in the case of treatment, and in the case of transferring to another hospital. He argues further that the government's argument that the provision requiring treatment only with the patient's consent lets the patient decide the mode of treatment is not correct, and cannot be used to demand illegal treatment (and so regulation on experimental treatment still holds). So EMTALA does not require abortions. He argues further that the context of its enactment shows that they did not contemplate requiring abortion, and was supported by the same Hyde, by the same Congress, and the same President that pushed the Hyde Amendment prohibiting federal funds supporting abortions (except in limited circumstances) and promised not to support abortions. He rejects the government's citations of some cases, and its reference to the affordable care act in EMTALA's interpretation.

He also argues under the spending clause: parties may take federal funds, agreeing to comply with federally-imposed conditions. Those accepting must have "voluntarily and knowingly" have accepted the conditions for the conditions to have been enforced, like a contract. And so the conditions must be unambiguous, and recipients must legitimately have a choice. EMTALA is not unambiguous, as he argued earlier that it does not require abortion. Further, Congress is usually expected to make its intention clear if it intends to "pre-empt the historic powers of the States." He argues further that this binds Idaho, whereas Idaho never agreed to be bound by EMTALA. He also presents Idaho's arguments that EMTALA cannot preempt the State's abortion rules because Idaho is not a party to the agreement between the federal government and hospitals that take medicare. Alito also argues that EMTALA says that it is not to be read as giving federal officials control over how medical services are provided in states. So it shows that they did not intend to have the federal government intrude into state healthcare regulation. He thinks the government's arguments do not suffice against the spending clause argument. And so they should reject the government. He rejects the arguments of the liberals, saying that it requires stabilization of any threat to an unborn child. And that it fails to take into account the spending clause. [Side note: would this make all abortions illegal? No one argues this, so I must be missing something.]

Alito then turns to address the Court. He argues that the Government should lose, and so the stay should remain. He argues that it's been established that failure to enforce its laws is a form of irreparable harm, and Idaho is undergoing that. The injunction will lead to more abortions. The laws continue to conflict, so they should judge the case. The parties agree that it matters whether the law is enforced. He affirms that there is a conflict: in the cases of abortions that would be needed for health, but not life.

Alito argues that the government still thinks that health includes mental health, and so EMTALA could, under their interpretation, require an abortion. Meanwhile, many medical organizations argue that abortion is often needed for mental health. And so the stay is a serious error.

I'm really not sure what to make of this. Evidently the deciding votes were the block of three moderate justices, but I don't get what caused them to change their mind.

I still need to get to three more Thursday opinions, and by the time I do that, there'll be some Friday ones too. SEC v. Jarkesy seems like it will matter.

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stolen_brawnze I am the way Sia says "batteries" in that one song. 1yr ago

On March 9th I posted a comment talking about how I had in the past prematurely dismissed the remaining upside on Nvidia.

Ironically if I had just bought some the very next Monday I'd be up 48% right now in under 4 months. Hindsight eh.

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