Friday
I still have one case left to give thoughts on from Thursday, and all five from Friday. Here's one of each.
Moore v. United States
7-2. Opinion by Kavanaugh, signed onto by Roberts and the liberals. A concurrence by Jackson. Concurrence in the judgment by Barrett, signed onto by Alito. And a dissent by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch.
The question here is about the constitutionality of taxation. The specific context is from the tax cuts and jobs act of 2017, in the mandatory repatriation tax (MRT), wherein individuals were taxed for (undistributed) income of the foreign corporations that they owned shares in.
A handy summary I ran across of the various opinions:
Checkmarks left to right mean (1) sided w/ government (2) no "realization" req, and (3) considers "attribution" valid
✅✅✅ - KBJ
✅❓✅ - Kav, Roberts, Kagan, Sotomayor
✅❌❓ - ACB, Alito
❌❌❌ - Thomas, Gorsuch
Some relevant tax background: in the United States, there are two types of taxes: direct and indirect. Roughly speaking, direct taxes are taxes on things, indirect on transactions. The Constitution says that direct taxes cannot be passed by Congress unless apportioned among the states by the states' population. This turns out to be inconvenient, as most types of direct tax, like property taxes, do not scale purely with population, so such a tax would need to have different taxes at different locations. Hence, why there's no federal property tax, and taxes of this kind in general are avoided. Indirect taxes, on the other hand, only need to be uniform between states. This is much easier and more natural to do. Additionally, the 16th amendment authorizes taxation of income from whatever source.
The Moores argued two claims at the lower levels: first, that the MRT is a direct tax, because it taxes unrealized income. Second, that the retroactivity of the tax violates due process. But at the supreme court, they only argue the first issue.
Kavanaugh argues that the income is definitely realized, as it has been realized by the corporation, so there's no need to address whether realization is necessary for an income tax. Rather, he argues mainly about attribution. There's a long history to some things being taxed "on a pass-through basis," where income is attributed to individuals, regardless of whether it has been distributed to them. One example is in partnerships: the individual partners are taxed on them, rather than the partnership itself. Kavanaugh argues that this is just that, and that the Moores don't make any convincing case that this law is different from other taxes that they acknowledge are constitutional. Kavanaugh emphasizes also the limitedness of this decision more than once, saying that they rule only on "(i) taxation of the shareholders of an entity, (ii) on the undistributed income realized by the entity, (iii) which has been attributed to the shareholders, (iv) when the entity itself has not been taxed on that income. In other words, our holding applies when Congress treats the entity as a pass-through," and makes very clear that he is not here addressing about several other sorts of taxes, that the government had made arguments that they would be fine, such as a wealth tax.
Jackson, concurring, writes to argue that there are several further steps to striking down a tax, were that ever to happen: first, they would need to show that realization is necessary, (which she thinks is wrong, as that isn't in the text of the 16th amendment, and argues that the wording there was broad enough), and secondly that the tax was a direct tax, which she also interprets narrowly. She also argues that the Court should limit itself, pointing to the backlash over Pollock (which had classified some sorts of income taxes as direct) and the passing of the 16th amendment as an instructive lesson.
Barrett, joined by Alito, concur in the judgment. They argue that the Sixteenth amendment requires realization, when it says "derived from any source," means the same time by derived as what realized means—both are used when talking about "profits from capital." Barrett then argues that they have not realized income from their shares—"they have not 'derived' income from their shares because nothing has come in." She argues that the government is wrong in its argument that a tax on unrealized gains would be fine, like looking at a property's appreciation, because the person hasn't actually received the value yet, and the market could still change things before they actually receive any benefit from it. But the corporation they owned shares in did realize that income. Barrett argues from there differently than Kavanaugh did, though, saying that what is actually happening in the precedent cited, is that the past cases "allow Congress to disregard the corporate form to determine whether the shareholder received income in substance, if not in form."—that is, Barrett thinks that whether it's allowed to be taxed does not depend as much upon what structure it's legally in, but what structure it's functioning as, so in the case of foreign corporations set up as tax shelters, for example, it's fine to attribute and tax the shareholders of them. Barrett argues that attribution is limited constitutionally, due to the Due Process clause, and also in the 16th amendment, and that were that not the case, it could be abused. (There's an example involving Ford trucks that I don't follow.) But she declines to actually try to work out what the exact boundaries should be, since no one brought it up adequately. She agrees with Kavanaugh that the MRT (what's being ruled on) is pretty much the same as subpart F (what the Moores argued was fine and different). And so, the Moores haven't persuaded, and that's that.
Thomas dissents, with Gorsuch (EDIT: not alone, contra what was said above), because the taxes have not been realized. He also rejects attribution. He goes on a lengthy exposition on the history of taxation in relation to the Constitution, from the time of the articles of confederation, through to the passage of the 16th amendment. It's good, and of the cases I've read over the past few weeks, it's the single thing most worth reading more broadly speaking. He argues for a fairly narrow reading of what the 16th amendment does. He argues that Pollock revised the meaning of direct and indirect taxes, disagreeing with the civil-war era consensus (where only head taxes and land taxes were direct) and connected incomes to the source of those incomes—they would be direct or indirect if taxation upon the source would be direct or indirect. The 16th amendment then removes the source component, and makes it always indirect. Thomas agrees that realization is required, for the same reasons as Barrett. Thomas rejects the arguments the majority made on behalf of attribution, though in several cases for different reasons than Barrett does. He comes to roughly the same conclusion as she does (though she had chosen not to lay down any clear rule): "At most, the cases cited by the majority demonstrate that Congress may attribute income to the entity or individual who actually controlled it when necessary to defeat attempts to evade tax liability." Thomas argues that Subpart F is different MRT, because Subpart F deals only with income in that year, whereas the MRT does not care whether the shareholder had the corporation at the time of the earning, and does not really have a good reason for it to be considered income. He declines to say whether it is unconstitutional, but does think that it is meaningfully different. Thomas rejects the consequentialism of the majority in their mentioning the large amount of tax revenue that would be lost.
The 7-2 does not reveal what the true division of the court is on these questions. Barrett and Alito are quite close in their views to Thomas and Gorsuch. Kavanaugh and company are a bit further, because they endorse an attribution standard. Jackson clearly has a much broader view of what taxation should be allowed, compared to Kavanaugh who made very clear how limited this ruling was in what it allowed.
It was also interesting to consider that the government was attempting to push the ability for them to bring about future taxes. I found Barrett and Thomas more convincing myself, but I am glad that the majority made clear that this is not inviting taxes on unrealized gains.
From Friday:
Smith v. Arizona
9-0, opinion by Kagan, joined by Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, and in part by Thomas and Gorsuch. Thomas and Gorsuch each wrote an opinion concurring in part. Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Roberts joined.
This case is about the 6th amendment, specifically the confrontation clause. The accused in a trial has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This case is about experts, specifically, an absent lab analyst. Some chemicals were analyzed to be drugs, the analyst was unavailable for the trial, so someone else answered questions, following the notes. Kagan argues that it's testimonial, and that it's hearsay (is relevant for the truth), and therefore the confrontation clause applies. Gorsuch and Thomas both aren't sure that it's testimonial.
Thomas would not have the court look at the "primary purpose" of each statement, as Kagan had suggested, but rather would refer it to being about it being a solemn declaration, referring all the way back to Queen Mary of England. Yes, before the colonies. Making the appropriate rule whether it's similar in solemnity to that.
Gorsuch wants a better opportunity to consider what it means to have it be testimonial, and isn't a fan of the "primary purpose" test recommended by Kagan.
Alito, joined by Roberts argues against the opinion. He talks at length about how, up until several decades ago, experts used to have to couch everything in hypotheticals, and how that was horrible for a bunch of reasons. The Federal rules of evidence made things much better, with instructions to the jury instead to ignore portions of things, or only apply testimony to a given purpose. He sees this as at risk of leading back to hypothetical-land, and would prefer to lean on instructions to the jury. He also would affirm that not all testimony is hearsay, or for the purpose of the truth of the facts involved.
I'll be back sometime later, with the other four from Friday.
FlyingLionWithABook
Has a C. S. Lewis quote for that.
1yr ago
Looks like SCOTUS has added more days to it's current session, and might release more opinions next Friday. I've been itching for Grants Pass to come down, so that's giving me some hope.
Felagund
1yr ago
I'm far too late, but I wrote up the (unevenly too long) following on a plane ride.
A few noteworthy, or amusing things I didn't see mentioned:
-
The Vidal case is essentially 5-4 on methodology, despite all that mess. I don't really see why the majority is doing what it's doing, at all?
-
Alito using "alien" and Jackson "noncitizen" at every possible opportunity, which is hilarious.
-
The dissent from Gorsuch in the bankruptcy case is pretty strongly phrased. Jackson, in turn, quotes back Gorsuch's own words from a previous case, that the dissent is "just that."
-
Barrett's trademark opinion at one point refers to someone attempting to register a trademark for Duchess of Windsor for ladies' underwear.
Regarding your point on the conservatives disagreeing more, the liberals agreed in eight of the nine cases the last two weeks—the only case not unanimous between them was the (in effect) 8-1 NLRB case, (and I suppose if you want to count it, agreeing with different portions of Barrett's concurrence). Meanwhile, the conservatives were less unified. Nearly every pair of conservative justices had some disagreement somewhere in the past two weeks:
Gorsuch disagrees with the other conservatives on the immigration case. Barrett disagrees with the other conservatives on the trademark case. Roberts disagreed with the remaining conservatives on Native American healthcare. Thomas disagrees with the Alito and Kavanaugh on the bankruptcy case. That leaves only Alito and Kavanaugh who didn't really disagree at all these last two weeks.
Anyway, now to what I had written:
Two days of opinions, this last week, in six cases. I've commented on the one about mifepristone here—in short, the doctors trying to get it removed from the FDA had no standing, that is, nothing that made them eligible to bring their case, no harm done, no remedy, etc.
As to the others:
Thursday's cases were all 9-0, at least in judgment, but only the above was truly unanimous; the others had some form of disagreement.
I had a bit more time, so I wrote more.
Starbucks Corp v. McKinney
Thomas wrote the opinion and everyone except Jackson signed on. Jackson filed an opinion which agreed with part of what they said, but had more to say, and I think, disagreed with what the practical outcome should be, despite agreeing on the court's action. That is, Jackson is "concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part."
That's opaque, so let's get into it.
The case is between Starbucks and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Some starbucks workers tried to unionize and called in a news crew to support them. Starbucks fired them. The NLRB was contacted, who filed a complaint with Starbucks, and filed a §10(j) petition (of the NLRA) asking for a preliminary injunction (that is, until the actual judgment) making Starbucks reinstate the fired employees. Notably, the judgment will be by the NLRB itself. The question is how exactly that petition should that be handled.
§10(j) authorizes a district court "to grant … such temproary relief … as it deems just and proper."
Courts follow two sorts of tests: a two-part test, used by the 6th circuit, or a four-part test. The two-part test is peculiar to the NLRA, and asks whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices occurred" and whether granting the injunction is "just and proper." Note that "reasonable cause" is kind of broad—you don't actually have to think that they're right, this just requires that it's not "frivolous". This also seems to be derived from the statute of 10(j), as listed above.
The four-part test is from for preliminary injunctions more generally. They cite another SCOTUS case here, which, I think, applies to preliminary injunctions more generally. What this requires is that they are (1) likely to succeed, (2 )to suffer irreparable harm unless granted such a preliminary injunction, (3) "that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor", and (4) "that an injunction is in the public interest." Note especially that "likely to succeed" is a good bit more stringent than the previous "reasonable cause to believe," and "irreparable harm" than "just and proper."
Thomas argues that section 10(j)'s "just and proper" phrase isn't establishing any other standard than the already accepted one, and so they should use the four-part test.
But the board, and Jackson, yield this. Where the disagreement rests is how those should be applied. Thomas addresses this in II-B, but first we'll turn to Jackson's dissent, on the same topic
Jackson argues that, from Hecht Co. v. Bowles, the courts must take into account the judgment and intent in the act from Congress. (This act was also cited by Thomas, but to a different end.) Jackson argues for a two part-standard to decide how the court should judge: first, "whether Congress has clearly displaced courts' equitable discretion," and second, "if no such clear statement exists, we evaluate how that discretion should be exercised in light of Congress's choices in the NLRA." She agrees on part 1, the question is on part 2, which she thinks the majority has hardly addressed.
Jackson thinks three of the four factors follow straightforwardly: for irreparable harm, that the interim relief is necessary to remedy the violation of labor rights. For balance of equities, they may consider harms to (in this case, Starbucks), but not its "desire to continue engaging in an alleged violation of the NLRA." For public interest, they defer to Congress in issuing the NLRA. Only the likelihood of the case's success remains. But in this case, it is the Board itself which issues the judgment, and requesting the injunction is a pretty good sign of what it's going to think in the actual judgment, especially since the NLRB doesn't ask for many injunctions, and since the board is granted quite a bit of deference in the appeal.
Okay, that's Jackson, now back to Thomas. He says that the Board actually thinks what the Sixth Circuit is doing is about the application of the statutory criteria. He argues that the reasonable cause standard goes well beyond what's in the traditional criteria, as "likely to succeed" is far more of an evaluation than "reasonable cause to believe." Then, in one paragraph, which is, as far as I can tell, practically the only one actually dealing with what Jackson is asserting, he states that "none of the views advanced in a §10(j) petition represent the Board's final position—they are simply the preliminary legal and factual views of the Board's in-house attorneys."
I don't know what I'm talking about, legally speaking, so I could be off-base, but he didn't explain that at enough length for me to be convinced that Jackson is wrong—if the NLRB is judging the case after the NLRB submits an injunction, then it seems reasonable enough to think it'll win on the merits. I'm not used to siding with the 1 in an effective 8-1 where the 1 is Jackson. Perhaps if I misunderstand this in some respect, it'd be great if any of you who are more knowledgeable could clear it up.
Practically speaking, this doesn't seem like it matters very much in the specific context that it's applied in. 14 injunctions filed per year doesn't seem like much, though I imagine that it could matter more if some of those are large in scope. I can't speak to whether there will be any larger effects regarding willingness to defer to the judgment of agencies.
Vidal v. Elster
Also 9-0 in judgment, but quite the mess in terms of who's with whom.
THOMAS [Sorry, I don't know how to do small caps on themotte], J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined that opinion in full; ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., joined all but Part III; and BARRETT, J., joined Parts I, II–A, and II–B. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which ROBERTS, J.J., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which KAGAN, J., joined, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III–B, and in which JACKSON, J., joined as to Parts I and II. SOTOMAYOR, J. filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
So, all in all, six different positions, considering the opinions together. But really, it's more like 2, the men versus the women.
The case regards the matter of trademarks. Steve Elster sought to register the trademark "Trump too small," (referring back to the Rubio comment in one of the 2016 debates) and was refused, because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a trademark that "consists of or comprises a name…identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent." Elster claims that this restriction, as a content-based restriction, violates the first amendment. The whole court agrees that it doesn't but has some substantial disagreements over why, exactly.
First, to Thomas's opinion (and I'll break them down a little further, because of all the partial concurrences).
In section I (Signed onto by all the conservatives, including Barrett) Thomas mostly just says the same things as I said two paragraphs ago, but at more length, and with a little more detail. Since he'll get into the detail later, I see no reason to look more.
In II–A (Also agreed upon by all 6), Thomas lays out the first amendment claim. Essentially, (by precedent) government content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional. Viewpoint discrimination is distinguished (by precedent) as a particularly bad kind of content discrimination. The court's already agreed in 2017 and 2019 that viewpoint-based discrimination, such as the Lanham Act's ban on disparaging trademarks and on immoral/scandalous trademarks were violations of the First Amendment, were unconstitutional. The names clause doesn't discriminate on viewpoint.
(I'll note here that my instinctive reaction to trademarks is backwards to that of the court—they feel more like prohibitions on speech than a case of speech themselves to me, but the court protects with the first amendment registering trademarks as a sort of speech.)
In II-B (also agreed on by all 6), Thomas considers the constitutionality of content-based but viewpoint neutral trademark restrictions.
Thomas begins by saying that there should not be heightened scrutiny here, most importantly because they have always coexisted with the First Amendment. Trademarks have been around from before the founding, going back to English law. Their purpose was to mark the manufacturer. The first federal trademark law was in 1870 (before that, purely states), and included some content restrictions (as did a SCOTUS case), which didn't change with the Lanham Act in 1946. They always involve content restrictions, including, for example, barring the registration of a trademark that is likely to cause confusion with another trademark. Thomas argues that because they have always coexisted with the first amendment that therefore there should not be heightened scrutiny. Further, content-based restrictions are inherent to trademarks more generally, as prohibiting confusion over the manufacturer requires looking to the content of the mark.
Thus far, Barrett signs off on it. In II–C, she departs, leaving us with five justices. Here Thomas chooses not to give a framework as to when content-based trademark restrictions are permissible, but chooses instead to look at history and tradition. It is for this, as we shall see, that he gets excoriated by the defense. Anyway, onto the history of name restrictions. Because people own their own names, trademarking names, even their own, was illegal (consider: there is more than one John Smith, so a ban on using it merely because another had the same name, would be a problem). Trademarks could contain one's name, though, if they also had other content. Originally, this allowed others with the same name still to use it (see, for example, SCONY's Faber v. Faber in 1867). The Lanham Act is to be seen to be incorporating existing trademark law, not making up a new one. The names clause serves to help identify the source, and to protect the markholder's reputation, by prohibiting the use of the name of another without permission. And no one has a "first amendment right to piggyback off the goodwill another entity has built in [that entity's] name."
Thomas concludes that there's a tradition of resisting trademarking of names, coexisting with the First Amendment. He declines to develop a comprehensive theory. Yes, nearly his sole argument in this opinion is that there's a history to it, therefore it's constitutional.
In part III, Thomas briefly addresses Barrett and Sotomayor, arguing that their analogy-based approaches are bad. He is joined in this only by Alito and Gorsuch, Roberts and Kavanaugh having dropped out. I'll return to this later. Part IV is a summary.
Kavanaugh's concurrence (joined by Roberts) is very short, one nine-line paragraph, only adding that such a content-based trademark restriction may well be constitutional even without the history backing it up, and that can be addressed in the future.
Now to Barrett's opinion. Kagan joins in its entirety, Sotomayor joins as to parts I, II, and III–B, and Jackson joins as to parts I and II. She disagrees that history and tradition settle the constitutionality for two reasons: first because the history doesn't suffice to match the names clause, and second, because the court never explains why the whole look for predecessors of the clause is the right approach anyway. Barrett prefers to adopt a standard.
Again, I'll break it down by section, because of the partial endorsements. In Section I (agreed by all four), Barrett begins by framing the constitutional issue as that content-based prohibitions are generally prohibited because they work to drive ideas or views out, but there may be some cases where there's no realistic possibility of suppression of ideas (citing precedents). Content-based trademark restrictions are not presumptively unconstitutional. It's always been content based. For example, trademarks merely describing a quality of an item were prohibited, as other manufacturers should be allowed to use them—that's a content-based rule. Barrett explicitly mentions the incorporation of the first amendment in 1868, which it seems to me, the majority really ought to have done, and agrees that content discrimination was inherent to "the very definition of a trademark" at that time. Hence content-based trademark rules have been needed historically. They've also coexisted with the free speech clause because they do not suppress ideas, and even can help protect them, by preventing things that shouldn't be, like the word "potato" from being trademarked. (example mine, sentiment hers)
In section II (still agreed upon by all), Barrett turns to decide how to judge this. She follows an analogy (proposed by the solicitor general) to limited public forums, when government allows speech on its property, but in some restricted manner. Rules restricting speech in limited public fora are judged based upon "whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves." She thinks that though trademarks are not limited public fora, it's an apt enough analogy. Therefore, "content-based criteria for trademark registration do not abridge the right to free speech so long as they reasonably relate to the preservation of the markowner's goodwill and the prevention of consumer confusion," and therefore, if it helps to serve as source identifiers. The names clause passes.
Before we get to section III (where Barrett addresses the Court), let's return to Thomas' thoughts on Barrett. He comments in two places: in a footnote in section II, and in section III. For the time being, only section III is relevant. Recall that section III is only Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, not the opinion of the court. Thomas argues that she doesn't justify why that makes sense, merely says that it is "apt," and that the rule is about fora, specifically, and that this is not a forum, and so as there is no analogous forum, it is hard to see why such a test should apply. (Barrett, in response, notes that she didn't say it was a forum, just analogous in that they form content-based restrictions, and states that Thomas ignores her reasons for drawing the analogy.)
Now to part III. Here, Barrett addresses the court's methodology, stating that she does not think the historical record suffices. In III–A, with Kagan alone, she argues that the history does not support what the majority does. Barrett is not convinced that the common law provides protection to someone seeking a trademark including someone else's name. She cites the SCOTUS case Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids. Mfg. Co. from 1914, where a "fairly complete" list of invalid marks are made, among which is not listed any names-clause analogue. Further, the sources cited in that case are against enforcing a trademark against individuals with the same name, not prohibitions on names without permission more generally. Barrett argues that the names clause prevents uses of names that may have been permissible under common law, citing several cases that allowed the use of names even of living individuals in the right case, such as Bismarck (because he was famous. The trademark was not to pretend the product is made him). The legislative history backs up that it was not merely common law, but meant to exclude cases like Bismarck, or "the Duchess of Windsor for brassieres and ladies' underwear" that might otherwise be permissible. (Thomas argues that the names she cites are not applicable, being dead, or already generic terms. Barrett rejoins that the cases explicitly allowed for living individuals, and in the case of Bismarck, he was alive at the time.)
In III–B, where Sotomayor joins back on, but not Jackson (and Kagan remains with Barrett), Barrett argues that tradition should not be the proper bar, even if it should be yielded to in some cases for purposes of stare decisis (that is, not changing up the law on everyone for minor reasons). She argues that the majority does not treat the history itself merely as "a persuasive data point," but as the constitutional argument itself. Rather, the court should articulate principles. Her preferred takeaway from history is that trademark restrictions have "been central to trademark's purpose" and "have not posed a serious risk of censorship," and states that this is a good way to think about whether such restrictions work with the first amendment.
Thus far Barrett. Now to Sotomayor, who is joined by Kagan and Jackson. (Simple, for once.) This is another methodological disagreement. Sotomayor argues against the use of looking to history and tradition in general. She points to Barrett's disagreement as indication of the uncertainty of such an analysis, and that the justices are looking at these without them having been raised by litigants, and that nonhistorians are doing historical analysis. She argues further that usages of it in Bruen are problematic, as it has led to confusion. Sotomayor would also prefer "a doctrinal framework drawn from this Court's First Amendment precedent," with the standard being that trademark restrictions should be viewpoint neutral and reasonable for the purpose of trademarks. Sotomayor, in accord with Barrett, allows some use of history, such as to understand what the purpose of trademarks is. Sotomayor argues that the reason that registration restrictions is fine with the first amendment is that failing to get a trademark registered is not a restriction on speech, merely the withholding of a benefit. She argues that there are several cases which back this up, including limited public forums (yes, she uses that plural, not the latin plural. Barrett used no plural, so I said fora due to nerdiness) and monetary subsidies. Those precedents permit imposing a "resonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on a state-bestowed entitlement." (Thomas, in section III thinks that these are too different; Sotomayor thinks that the underlying principle is still useful.) Because here, if a mark is ineligible for registration, it can still be used anyway (but not restricting the use of others) it's not a problem. It only does not confer exclusive rights to speech, it does not restrict that speech.
My thoughts: I found the (in effect) dissents quite compelling, and am not a fan of the majority's use of historical analysis as sufficient. One interesting thing to think about is what factors may have led some justices to sign onto parts and not onto other parts of opinions. I assume the difference between Barrett and the liberal justices in whether they agreed in part with the main opinion had to do with whether they wanted to show solidarity. Perhaps Barrett didn't sign onto Sotomayor's due to the more oppositional tone, as well as, perhaps, that it seems slightly harsher towards use of history more generally? I imagine Sotomayor either didn't want to engage in any historical analysis (by endorsing Barrett's), or agreed with Thomas that it wasn't sufficient. I'd guess the former. No idea why Jackson declined to sign onto Barrett's part 3. I assume Roberts and Kavanaugh chose not to sign onto Thomas's part three because they didn't want to reject the tests of Barrett and Sotomayor, merely not sign on to them on this occasion?
Now to Friday's cases.
United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
6-3 Opinion by Jackson, joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Gorsuch, joined by Thomas and Barrett.
In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the supreme court ruled that differing bankruptcy fees in districts governed by the U.S. Trustee Program vs. the Bankruptcy Administrator Program is unconstitutional (yes, it's weird that there are two types of districts). This case is about what remedy those harmed should have. Specifically, those who paid the higher amount when others paid the lower amount.
The majority rules that the only remedy is to be equal prospectively. They argue that the harm is inequality, not high fees, and that such a harm may be remedied in three ways: reimbursing those who overpaid, exacting more now from those who underpaid, or only changing things prospectively. Jackson then turns to Congress' intent as to how the remedy should occur (citing precedent). Since Congress wanted to raise fees in order to keep the U.S. Trustee Program to be self-sustaining, they would not have wanted something financially burdensome upon the program, and so remedying it would plainly be opposed to congressional intent. Further, such a remedy would make the disparity worse—if some are rewarded the remedy, then that would merely increase the amount, unless practically everyone, as only 2% of the bankrupt got to pay lower fees. Then, turning to the question of whether congress would want to impose higher fees, they argue that it did not, looking at its subsequent decisions, and that it would have pretty negative consequences. Hence, only prospectively. The remainder of the opinion responds to the dissent, so I'll turn to that first.
Gorsuch's dissent is rather up-in-arms. (And in turn, Jackson's opinion cites Gorsuch's own language that the dissent is "just that."—i.e. only a dissent.)
The dissent argues that Hammons should be entitled to a refund: the U. S. Trustee is agreed to have promised it, and Congress is agreed to have appropriated funding for refund, it is agreed that the suit is timely. Further, when "there is a general right to sue," but no specified form of relief, courts may use any remedy. It's long been the case that the proper remedy for overpayment is to pay them. They argue that this is no remedy at all—the past harm is not remedied. The dissent also casts some doubt on the whole process of imagining what Congress would do. Gorsuch also thinks that congressional intent is in favor of a refund, looking at the statutory text, where the program is authorized to provide refunds. Further, he characterizes it as a bait-and-switch, by promising the the refunds by standard procedures, and now denying any such possibility, and that that bait-and-switch violates due process. Gorsuch also attacks the argument that it would be disruptive as a turn to policy, but "not how remedies work." It's always cheapest not to give remedies.
Okay, now the majority, addressing the dissent: They argue that the dissent misunderstands the problem: to remedy a disparity, not to pay damages. Further, turning to congressional intent for a refund, it's passed regularly and therefore (only applies to ordinary situations, not ones involving 326 million? This is my best guess, it's not quite explicit.). And third, the government didn't really make a promise, but merely that it would wait to remedy until exhausting all appeals.
Jackson argues also that the dissent is wrong in its understanding of due process—she doesn't think the tax cases apply here, and there was a meaningful chance, which satisfied the due process clause.
I think I find the dissent more convincing, but am not sure. A lot would turn, I think on where precisely the harm in nonuniform bankruptcy rests: is it upon those who got a worse deal, or is it something ethereal upon the whole system?
Campos-Chaves v. Garland
Written by Alito, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Jackson wrote the dissent, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch.
This case is about deportation hearings. Aliens have to be provided with written notice. There are two varieties: in paragraph 1, it describes the notice to appear (NTA), and in paragraph 2, a notice saying the new time and place. Here, there were three individuals each of whom got notices that were defective, in that they had TBD or similar written in place of the time. They were subsequently given a notice saying what the time of the hearing was, but didn't show up. The defendants argue that they failed to be served the proper notice, and so should not be removed from the country.
Part of this has to do with the word "or". The statute says, "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)." Unfortunately legal statutes don't have parentheses, so such combinations of ors and negatives tend to be ambiguous. Alito argues that a notice of either variety counts. More specifically, it has to be whatever notice is relevant—whichever one is connected to the hearing missed.
Alito also interprets the phrase in the statute of changing the time to include the change from TBD to some concrete time.
Jackson disagrees, seeing this as giving the government a pass for writing incomplete and therefore invalid NTAs under paragraph 1. Because time and place is a necessary part of the notices to appear, failing to include them makes them not count under paragraph 1. But a paragraph 2 notice should be dependent upon a paragraph 1 notice: 2 only describes notices changing the time and place, which Jackson thinks should mean that there is already a valid notice to appear before 2.
Jackson also argues that the majority's understanding of the word "change" is a bit unreasonable: the passage is clearly talking about replacing one time with another.
I think I found Jackson more compelling—it's at least a little unintuitive to have a valid notice dependent on an invalid one. The court's remedy (show up and mention the lack of proper notice) helps, at least.
As a side note, it's pretty funny to see Alito using the word alien at every possible opportunity, whereas Jackson uses noncitizen as much as possible (and maybe even bracketed alien out, in a footnote? I didn't check.).
Garland v. Cargill.
Thomas writes the opinion, which the other conservatives join. Alito writes a one-page concurrence. Sotomayor writes a dissent, which the remaining justices join.
The National Firearms Act defines a machinegun as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." The question: are bump stocks machineguns? Thomas argues no. This used also to be the ATF's position, prior to the Las Vegas shooting, but afterward they included bump stocks. The core of Thomas' argument is as to what the words "a single function of the trigger" refers to. He argues that it refers to the trigger of the weapon, well, triggering once. (And he goes through, with diagrams, how exactly a trigger works.) Bump stocks do not change that there is one pull of the trigger for each shot. The finger pushes the trigger once for each shot. They argue, as a different route to the same point, that bump stocks do not cause it to happen automatically, as the forward pressure required is an extra thing in such a way that it is not automatic.
Alito mentions that the ATF should not have changed the rules—rather, congress should. And that the Las Vegas shooting doesn't change the meaning, merely reveals that regulation of bump stocks is probably a good idea. He agrees that the original congress would have wanted bump stocks banned, but denies that they did.
Sotomayor on the other hand argues that "a single function of the trigger" should not refer to how many times the lever of the gun moves, but rather its relation to the user, whether it's a single pull to the user. And in this case, as bump stocks allow for the use of them in a single motion, it should be considered a single function of the trigger. the relevant quality for a trigger is the relation not the user, not to the gun.
I found the dissent in this case more compelling than I expected, given the political valence. I'm not sure who I'd agree with, if I had to choose. But this case is essentially guaranteed to make liberals mad. Not good for trust in the court.
Walterodim
Only equals speak the truth, that’s my thought on’t
1yr ago
I like it! This is excellent elaboration on the shorter summary of the court I had back at the beginning of the year. I think the model I lay out there continues to work pretty well with what we're seeing in rulings, particularly in the two split decisions from Friday. In Campos, I'm sure Gorsuch was very excited to contemplate the possibility of a conjunctive "or".
naraburns
nihil supernum
1yr ago
The Friday Fun thread is not for culture war discussions; post removed.
Stellula
1yr ago
This one confuses me. His point seems entirely valid. The last line:
Who am I gonna believe? A rich professional involved with finance, or someone involved in treating sex disorders? Of course, the rich person. No one smart would work in a profession interested in helping people, that doesn't pay.
Seems a little like a non-sequitar. Is that the problem? Japan does produce absolutely bizarre pornography, and supposing that there is a link between this and fertility seems completely reasonable.
-
Japan as a country seems particularly addicted to porn
-
The porn that Japanese porn users tend to use is particularly detached from things which would (or even could, legally) happen in real life.
-
This seems like it could have an effect on Japanese sexual mores
-
Which seems like it could have an effect on fertility
-
Japan has a notably low fertility rate
This seems absolutely reasonable, and to say it in a silly way seems completely reasonable in the Friday Fun Thread.
atelier
Jimmys: unrustled
1yr ago
I still think Slashdot came up with the best system for weighing posts of value. Give people fewer votes so they spend them on things that are really meaningful and add feedback from a larger population of 2nd level views to weigh whose views to increase and decrease in importance.
One thing I would probably do here is to boost the size impact of votes outside the culture war thread, there's far, less engagement both up and down in nearly every other thread on the site, even relatively popular ones like Friday fun or Sunday small questions.
stolen_brawnze
I am the way Sia says "batteries" in that one song.
1yr ago
Thank you for the responses and thoughtful discussion, and special thanks to our ladies who participated. I am mulling over what dietary changes I might pursue; it’s just I know nothing of nutrition.
I did 7 pull-ups yesterday. When I started I was able to do 3 with enormous effort, and the most I had ever done before that (in high school) was 4. So I’m excited about that.
My wife commented on my body for the first time last Friday, and again last night, each time concerning my chest right after doing some exercises, when I had what I think the initiated call a “pump.” What interests me though is these new muscles that are cropping up from the side of my ribcage a few inches below my armpit. I knew there were muscles there but only in a theoretical sense. As far as I’m concerned they just sprouted up from the bones.
As for her, she joined me on one of my runs on Monday, and it was her idea! She expressed interest in running more with me, but not on my schedule. She also got a little interested in my pull-up tower, and I told her about negative pull-ups. I caught her doing some (and crunches) one night, but she hasn’t systematized anything.
Developing on video watching speed discussion: What Youtube channels you watching? Preferably relatively less popular and of the "hidden gems" variety.
To start:
Stupid Ones Games, - there is little to watch here, but the guy is developing Paradox-like grand strategy similar to Victoria II in Unreal Engine. Right now there are no dev blog style videos, only snippets of some features no longer than 3 minutes, but I expect this to change in the future.
Min Maxer Gaming, Quite niche content and only two videos, but if like you old RTS and specifically solo missions there is something for you. Currently he tries to complete Age of Mythology campaign without losing a single unit.
Engel, Dead channel, but author already made quite a number of video essay style game reviews which were sadly never popular.
DiploStrats, Main and only focus is analysis of Diplomacy matches, which because of their interwoven strategic and social nature are interesting even for people who never played it.
The Distributist, I think many people here already heard of him, but still I wanted to mention this channel for its interesting far rightist perspective, that maybe is common here, but expressed in much better form, than you can expect from mottizens with similar views.
celluloid_dream
1yr ago
The government says they're targeting 500k a year, but should we believe them?
- 2016-2019, yes.
- 2020 was covid, okay.
- 2021 was on track.
- 2022 made up for the pandemic year. No problem,
- but 2023 .. hold up.
- 2024 .. um . guys? .. stahp
In flagrant violation of the first law of holes, they have not stopped digging. There is a massive housing crisis in the country, and immigration is the first and most available lever the federal government has on the problem. Ottawa (mostly) can't build homes directly, at least not on the scale the country needs. Trudeau's "ambitious housing plan" is a paltry 2 million additional homes across 8 years, with half of that covered by the provinces and municipalities, and that's if it actually goes to plan. If you're bringing in a million people every year.., the math ain't mathing, as the kids say. Even at their target of 500k, it seems like not quite enough.
As for temporary vs permanent, I'm not sure. I've known many temporary residents, all waiting around for PR, some staying long past their expired work permits: my friends and coworkers - good people, for sure, but they have to live somewhere. It also seems like no one really ever gets deported. Famously, you have to kill 16 people, but less anecdotally, the country is only deporting a few thousand a year, equivalent to a few days worth of immigration.
yofuckreddit
1yr ago
I finished Through Struggle, the Stars after catching a glimmer of a rec from @IdealFireplace and man - I really enjoyed it. I'm less critical of the quality drop off outside of space. There was something strangely addicting about both of the books to where there was some sort of action leading me to turn the page over and over again. I burned through both books very quickly. it's supposed to be a trilogy so, be warned, the fucking author decided to never finish it, instead dedicating himself to an obscure video game that supposedly tries to make horrifically boring spaceship conflict exciting. In that vein, I'll be bitching about Homeworld 3 on Friday.
I also finished Mixtape Hyperborea. Looks like the author is pretty active on goodreads. I enjoyed it quite a bit, though I read some suggestions that you should listen to the actual mixtape on spotify while reading it. Frankly, I didn't like any of the music. The navel-gazing playlist selection and lack of violence were the biggest indicators that the author was most familiar with a prep school instead of public. One common criticism of the book seems to be that it's plotless, which I think is obviously untrue. Is it super exhilarating? No, but at least
Coming up next is me taking another crack at the Culture series. Finished book 1 (what a fuckin drag) and finally finishing up "Don't Sit Under the Grits Tree with Anyone Else but Me".
I just finished it. I'm only an unthinking consoomer of product with no deep literary opinions, but I thought it was very enjoyable, and I can think of nothing to complain about.
If you want to air your grievances, I'm sure they would be interesting to hear. (Remember that this website does have
Does this not qualify as effortful under your rubric?
Your edited comment indeed took effort (as in, mental exertion, by virtue of the words used alone) to write, but it still does not meet the quality bar, because it does not at all address the comment (supermarket anecdote by the author) you were responding to nor does it explain why you intuitively feel that the author's personal anecdote in the supermarket is a lie or that it never happened (else, why suggest it be coming from /r/thathappened?).
And so my question to the mods in the OP still remains: are such drive-by and flippant dismissive comments (no matter how many words they are effortfully adorned with) encouraged or discouraged regardless of "user sentiment"?
ThenElection
1yr ago
Mostly Bay Area weather. I'd increase the number of days with heavy low-laying fog and add thunderstorms to make it a bit more interesting, and I'd make Friday and Saturday nights much warmer to make patio and rooftop dining/drinks actually pleasant.
My impression of TheMotte is that drive-by and flippant dismissive comments are discouraged. This comment, I thought, was an example of that, because it dismisses someone's personal report as "made up", without offering any substantial commentary. The commenter could have as well as written in a non-sophisticated fashion saying "This guy is lying, and I don't believe him [and so I can evade commenting on the content of the post]" - which is about as flippant as a comment to belong on TheMotte.
I reported that comment 2 days ago, but it didn't seem to have caught any moderator's attention, which is making me think that my appraisal of the quality of discussion here is probably off the mark? Mods, what do you think?
The only point I can think of is this:
That comment had 7 upvotes as of this writing, so obvious a substantial amount of users feel that such flippant dismissal is warranted. The real question is: are such flippant sentiments encouraged in this community? Or are they to be discouraged, thus encouraging members to be more thoughtful?
Sloot
1yr ago
Were there some Titanic developments that recently popped up?
It does slightly bother me that most of the (remaining) wreckage will be consumed by sea creatures in the coming years/decades.
Some discussion we previously had on 90s Titanic-mania, albeit more focused on the film.
DuplexFields
Ask me how the FairTax proposal works. All four Political Compass quadrants should love it.
1yr ago
I just don’t see it as something that always and universally applies to everyone in all situations.
And that's why I posted it in the Wellness Wednesday thread as mental wellness advice instead of the Friday Fun thread as lexical insight porn.
As far as agonizing or guilt-tripping over whether a given "should" is a problematic should inspired by bad boundaries or anxiety or low self-worth etc., sounds like an anxiety problem I don't have and thus don't need to worry about.
In other words, I shouldn't worry about shoulds, and nobody should worry about my shoulds either. And I don't, except when someone makes a particularly poignant or potent point.
George_E_Hale
insufferable blowhard
1yr ago
I want your life. I haven't been to a proper good concert since around 2002 when I saw Vladimir Ashkenazy conduct some orchestra in Tokyo doing Rachmaninoff's Symphony No.2 E Minor. Actually I did go to a John Williams tribute concert in Kobe with my family a few years ago, but we only managed that because the boys knew a lot of the music from films. That was fun, but they didn't play some of the best pieces Williams has done for whatever reason. Plus because it was a "tribute" some rando was conducting--it wasn't actually John Williams, which would have been amazing.
I really want to get back into seeing orchestras perform. There's nothing quite like it. The music itself is one thing, but seeing so many expert musicians playing together is transcendent, and really takes you out of the mundane and is something close to experiencing real beauty.
Edit: Also as I have posted before I love me some Wagner.
srid
1yr ago
Looking for a fun Friday reading? This man claims to be free of all emotions and passions, and of living a wonderful life:
Hoffmeister25
American Bukelismo Enthusiast
1yr ago
What live music/arts events have you attended recently?
Last weekend was pretty packed for me. On Friday I saw a production of Swan Lake by the World Ballet Company, an international troupe staffed mostly by Russians. It was really incredible; the costumes and sets were elegant, traditionalist, and sumptuously beautiful; the dancing was significantly above the level I’m accustomed to from my times seeing the San Diego Ballet Company - the woman dancing Odette/Odile was particularly spectacular - and everyone was good-looking, conventionally-gendered, and either white or Central/East Asian.
On Saturday afternoon, I attended a production of the musical Natasha, Pierre, and the Great Comet of 1812, an adaptation of a segment of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, at San Diego’s Cygnet Theatre with a group of friends who wanted to see it. Personally, I didn’t care for the show. It’s sung-through (meaning that all dialogue/exposition is done through singing, with no spoken lines) in the style of an opera, which makes the plot more difficult to follow. Certain musicals, such as Les Misérables and Rent, can get away with this by ensuring that all of the music is melodically interesting and memorable; if the music is tuneless, then one is left with the impression that they’re singing just to sing, and that was certainly the case with this show. Many of the actors were individually quite talented - one of the gimmicks of the show is that many of the actors also play guitar and/or accordion, and I have to commend the hard work which must have gone into teaching these actors how to play those instruments - but the show itself is just not that interesting. (The whole plot is about a love triangle between a pouty aristocratic heiress, the caddish lothario who seduces and abandons her, and her absent soldier boyfriend who is barely onstage for 80% of the show.) Also, this production featured multiple racially-inappropriate actors playing 19th-century Russians, including an overweight black woman with a septum piercing and multicolored hair, in the role of the “beautiful and sexually alluring” character Hélène. Spare me.
Then on Saturday night, I attended a performance by the San Diego Symphony Orchestra at the Rady Shell, a waterfront venue downtown. The first half of the program consisted of Mendelssohn’s Violin Concerto, ably performed by a precociously talented young man. The second half consisted of the entire first act of Wagner’s Die Walküre, a part of the epic Ring Cycle, performed by the orchestra with three top-notch operatic soloists. Sadly, the first half is not the part that includes the famous “Ride Of The Valkyries” which even the common man would know from that one Bugs Bunny cartoon, but it was still a gorgeous performance, complete with sets, props, and a real fire onstage.
Tomorrow night I’ll be seeing the same orchestra again at the same venue, this time performing Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 4 and the complete score to Stravinsky’s Firebird, accompanied by animated projections representing the characters from the ballet.
netstack
Texas is freedom land
1yr ago
The AR is the American gun. Domestic design, often domestic manufacture. Long history as our service rifle. Strong competition for making both weapons and ammunition.
There’s also a “build your own” factor which gets more people into the ecosystem. This is exemplified by the common top rail, which makes it much cheaper and easier to mount all sorts of optics. But it extends to the stock, handguard, more or less every part. Combined with the hordes of manufacturers, and any gun show becomes a flood of garish polymer customizations and overpriced accessories. While such things are available for the AK, the market is much smaller.
As a mottizen put it, the AR-15 is the Wayne Gretzky of guns.
non_radical_centrist
1yr ago
I'd agree with most of what you've said. But ultimately I think a better equilibrium is achievable than a Christian purity culture, although I probably couldn't convince you of that if you're operating off of Christians principles instead of utilitarianism. But I look at Christian purity culture and still see many failure ponits- e.g maritial rape, or to a lesser degree all the other ways a couple could get married and grow to dislike each other and would be much happier divorced. And I agree with you that the author overlooks the many women who do enjoy kink. Although I don't think she's saying they don't exist, just that many women are pressured into kink despite not enjoying it. And I think Christian purity culture also fails those women- if a girl would genuinely be happier engaging in BDSM with multiple different men a week, and those girls do exist I believe albeit they're rarer than some pop culture would lead you to believe, they should be free to pursue that. But I do think the sort of culture you paint would be my second choice. My first choice being a culture where everyone is aware of the biologically differences between men and women, and men are held accountable for sexual abuse but only sexual abuse that's real, and women are expected to exercise agency in identifying and seeking the outcomes that are actually best for her instead of just waiting for a hot man to ask her to hook up.
My source is that I made it the fuck up wrote before about the noticeable difference in censorship between Claude 2(.1) and Claude 3 of all flavors. I expect Anthropic still prefills the shit out of it in the official ChatGPT-esque interface so (as per another struggler's impression) it's not immediately obvious, you'll have to use direct API access and custom frontends to see how based Claude is when you let him cook a little (he's even aware of it). Of course this isn't an out of the box experience and you have to fiddle with prompts, settings, etc an awful lot, but you can take my word that Claude can output some real shit when prompted right. Technically so can GPT but imho Claude's florid writing style makes it much more entertaining.
NullHypothesis
1yr ago
I don't know if there are any metrics but from what I can tell most conversations and activities happen on the weekend (The number of comments seems to routinely double after Friday from my casual observation). Probably because people have jobs and family and stuff. What a surprise, people with interesting and intelligent takes have real world responsibilities... the Motte isn't a place you can make a living off so, of course, you're not going to have people here full-time to discuss all topics that could be discussed. If you aren't going to engage in the comments you could just wait for the monthly quality posts and save yourself the time and just read those instead. You're going to have more lively conversations on X because of the simple fact of X having a much much larger userbase, to the point where people can make a living just talking about political stuff. It also has a lot of low-take, crap opinions on there.
Personally, I do think there is some merit to having some low-level fruit for discussion, which is why I made a post about the recent viral man versus bear question. In the grand scheme of things this viral question has almost no real-world consequences compared to say half the items on your list but why did that post generate a good amount of discussion and a lot of these you just posted about hasn't (yet)? Because I made a post about the topic. I also took some effort to put a spin to it, did a little bit of research, gave my opinion, posed a question, and gave multiple angles of possible discussion points, and it got a decent amount of conversations going. The more information you give on the topic, the more chance there is something in it that someone might be interested in to respond to.
In general, the posts I've seen get the most responses have one of these things going for them:
- There is an opinion/fact that someone disagrees with so they post to argue against it - essentially a controversial opinion. These are the ones that routinely get the deepest conversations because it's an argument/debate. It's also the most difficult to engage in with long term.
- There is something in the post that triggers a related topic with a similar line of thinking or a different way to analyze that particular topic
- There is a new perspective that is so profound to a reader that they feel obliged to respond to it.
- There is a question for people to respond to.
Also there are some guidelines about culture war posts:
Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.
I don't think it takes that much work - just post a link to the article with the topic you want to discuss, quote a few relevant lines, then give your opinion and ask a question. If you want a particular type of discussion/insight put in more effort so there is something for people to respond to. What particular about these topics do you want to hear people's take on? High-level discussion requires some effort, otherwise, how would the responses be any different than the average comment on the news site, Reddit, YouTube, X, or any other discussion platform with low-level reactionary comments?
I've been trying to find a balance between protesting too much on a Friday fun-thread and really trying to outline where y'all are wrong here. @sarker talking about a Pillow Case is still just... so wrong, so let's dive in.
First, I disagree that you can safely disregard things you do a lot. I don't care about pillowcases as much as I do cars, but I know enough to understand that a lumpy yellow-stained sack on my bedframe is going to hurt my sleep and disgust anyone else coming into my bedroom. No, you can't care about everything all the time, but you should absolutely be investing your conscious thought into the major components of your life. It really doesn't matter what it is.
There's a bit of a strawman argument going on here about caring. Caring about cars isn't just status symbolism, the sensory experience, or even how good it can be to drive. I care about how I load my dishwasher because I have to do it every day. I care about how my keyboard feels because I press it hundreds of thousands of times a year. I care about driving efficiently because catching ten red lights a week means I've spent that much less time idling at a stoplight in my life.
Second, the attitude of "Well it works for me, and it's not important" gets to the heart of my annoyance. People have collectively lost their fucking minds about dangerous cars are. They're completely desensitized to the responsibility they wield when driving it. If I don't care about my pillows, I may not get laid or wake up grumpy. If I run my tires down to the belt, I run the risk of at least making a ton of people late to work next time it rains, but also kill someone else.
Maybe many people (here and otherwise) don't care about cars but keep them well-maintained. That sounds like a purple squirrel to me, but let's say that's the case. I still believe that purchasing a vehicle with poor performance characteristics sucks. I don't get into situations where I need them often, but I once again don't understand thinking "YAGNI" when it comes to controlling your own fate on public roads. It's the same reason I have a shotgun locked in my closet and frequently train with firearms. I'm not interested in rolling the dice with police response times when it matters.
More options
Context Copy link