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Notes -
Minor update on the US-PRC tech competition.
Culture war significance: it matters for the grand strategy understanding and the narrative of the US as the Main Character of History. Personally, I had stopped regularly engaging on this forum when it became clear that the US is, in fact, not such a Main Character (at least for the moment), but just a great power with massive momentum and cultural influence. Not being American, I mainly only care about American cultural affairs insofar as they have global spillover effects. Local legislation news and woke-MAGA strife are overwhelmingly noise for the world, unless they reach some critical volume like peak woke or BLM did. Some American tech, and related politics, is very much not noise. The chip war in particular is very high-signal, so I follow it closely.
It seems something happened behind the scenes after those events in October, when the US Department of Commerce went with the Affiliate Rule, China retaliated with REE+ export controls, and soon enough, by November 1, we've got the usual Trump style Deal. (There's also a subplot with Nexperia/Wingtech, that demonstrates Chinese supply chain power and European ineptitude again, with a similar outcome of the Western actor retreating). Suddenly, on Dec 8, we get the news about Trump permitting the sales of H200 to China (context and understandable rationalist perspective here). China reacts somewhat paradoxically, if your theory of their mind is just «they're desperate for our chips» – as per the FT, «Companies seeking to purchase the H200 would need to submit a request explaining why they cannot use domestically produced chips and undergo an approval process», in continuation of their earlier scrutiny, rejections and negative publicity directed at H20s.
10 days later Reuters breaks the news – which were not quite news for those in the know – about Chinese successes with their EUV effort. The article is somewhat confused, as almost all reporting on Chinese AI and IC tech is; from my private sources, the situation has already moved further on multiple components, like optics and metrology.
What I want to emphasize here is that it's not just trivial «industrial espionage» or IP theft. Their light source project is led by former ASML head of light source technology and «Light source competence owner for metrology in ASML research» Lin Nan. I think that he returned not just for money, nationalism or career opportunities, but because China offered him a more ambitious challenge – he seems interested in solid state lasers, which ASML, constrained by market incentives more than strategic considerations, gave up on. For sure, straightforward IP theft also happens - CXMT's DRAM/HBM progress is apparently propped up by Samsung IP which was, well, illicitly transfered by former employees. And there's very substantial domestic talent pipeline, though people are prone to dismiss their patent/paper counts; they lack brand power, «Changchun Institute of Optics» doesn't have the same zing to it as Zeiss, though you may see it in the news soon.
All in all, China is moving far faster than even I imagined. Now we get reports – straining my credulity, to be honest – that ByteDance doesn't expect Nvidia to sell move than a few hundred thousand cards in China, not because of any trade barriers from either side, but because adequate domestic competition will come online in mid-2026 already. Almost certainly it'll be worse and less power-efficient, at least. But clusters with Chinese hardware are eligible for electricity subsidies, and that may be enough to tip the scales? This logic is corroborated by the surprisingly low leaked price of H200s – just $200.000 for an 8-card module (not sure if that's before of after 25% Trump Tax, but in any case very low, maybe lower than in the US proper, at least pre-tax). Meanwhile that's 5 times more bang for the buck than H20s offered. On the other hand, for now Nvidia is selling old stock; new production is being discussed, but at this rate I don't expect the price to increase. One can reasonably ask if this makes any sense, given that the demand in the US outstrips supply. I think it does, both for complex strategic reasons (mainly ecosystem lock-in, which is in fact a big deal, as I explain here) and simply because the US AI market is becoming a very convoluted circular Ponzi scheme where Nvidia de facto subsidizes companies to buy Nvidia wares. That's more of a potential market meltdown recipe than a revenue source. H200 sales to China, for what it's worth, unambiguously pull in dollars, and both Jensen's fudiciary duty and Trump's deficit-slashing mandate (and to be blunt, likely Trump's corruption) create a strong incentive to greenlight them.
Anyway, what looked like Chinese bluffing and negging at the time the sale of H20s was debated looks more and more like genuine, coherent industrial policy. China is pretty sure it'll have sovereignty in the entire stack of AI development, soon enough, that it will even be capable enough to export its AI hardware products, and the US is acting as if that is likely true – as if the competition is about market share and revenue. They are obviously compute-constrained right now, so DeepSeek V3.2 only catches up to around GPT-5 level, with the usual complaints in the paper. They don't appear to mind this enough to bow and scrape for more American chips at any cost. A large component here is that what they need, they can often rent overseas openly –
– but I think it's primarily about confidence in the domestic supply chain.
Long before all these events, in September, we had a debate with @aquota here, when the topic was selling China relatively worthless H20s. (For my previous take on H20s specifically see here).
He argued:
To which I've replied:
It seems to me that my read on the situation from back then, both the big picture and its implications for compute strategy, is now shared by both the USG and the CPC. The former is trying to regain its position and revenue in the Chinese GPU market and slow down Huawei/Cambricon/Kunlun/etc. ecosystem development by flooding the zone with mature Nvidia chips that will be adopted by all frontier players (eg DeepSeek again – they have a deep bench of Nvidia-specific talent and aren't willing to switch to half-baked Ascend CANN). The latter is more worried about preventing the US from doing that than about gaining moar FLOPS in the short run.
In conclusion, I want to congratulate Americans again with having found a true peer, for the first time since the decline of the British empire. Germans, Japanese and my own people had failed to provide enough stimulation, so Americans have grown lonely and fat at the top.
Aquota said:
I do not, in fact, "understand" this. Like, that may be the case and we'll just have Pax Sinica. I'm okay with it but I'm not Sinophilic enough to expect it. Even reduced to "just a great power", the US is poised to remain a historical force.
For now the loss of the indisputable Main Character status is being processed traumatically, with anger, denial and exaggeration of the costs of that loss if it were to really happen. But as its reality sinks in, this trauma may become fertile grounds for some cultural Renaissance in the United States. Less capeshit, more self-awareness. I may even come to care about it for reasons aside from global consequences.
…Of course, we can still entertain the hypothesis that all of the above is some interesting ephemera and this final dash of the Chosen Nation towards AGI-powered Rapture and completion of history is the real story of the times. I won't completely discount it, we shall see.
Does it even matter who wins this industrial competition? It might as well be a football game between foreign nations to me, and you. I just want to be, a swiss. To live comfortably without an overlord. If pikes no longer suffice, nukes.
When the japanese and south koreans copied and then bested american cars and german optics and swiss watches, did the americans and germans and swiss subsequently sink into poverty? No, they just got richer. It has never been a zero-sum game. Believers in zero-sum games end up playing negative-sum games.
I don't know what the Swiss thought of it, but Americans absolutely had a psychotic meltdown about Japanese competition. I think you don't get how intoxicating the sense of supremacy is. Switzerland is just a nation, its manufactures are just manufactures, it operates on the logic of comparative advantage. Americans have an ideological stake in being Number One.
This is out of date if it was ever true at all. Maybe you could say this about a broad subset of the American Right when the Neocon movement was at its peak circa 2002 or so. But the Left has never really subscribed to that at all, and the modern Right is increasingly dominated by its own brand of oikophobes due to woke backlash.
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Half of congress in the 80s had literally fought Japan in the Second World War, anti-Japanese hostility was far from purely economic.
China was at best a secondary antagonist in the Cold War (and no longer after 1972). Korea is little remembered, before the memory of almost all living Americans and the present state of North Korea means that most people have no idea of how involved the PLA was. So the last ‘real war’ that was USA vs China was what, the Boxer Rebellion?
It could change if Xi panics and decides to abandon the slow game for Taiwan (which would be surprising) by staging the most audacious possible invasion involving a first strike at American bases, but even in the event of a ground invasion (unlikely) I consider that relatively unlikely.
Some grand global game of competition in which AMERICA NUMBA ONE just doesn’t really exist in the minds of most Americans in the way it does for the Chinese or even for, say, the French. American identity is tied to more amorphous things that don’t really have anything to do with global affairs like the Wild West and country music. A Dane or Swiss will gladly lecture you on why Denmark or Switzerland is the best country on earth (both would be mostly correct). Americans don’t really do that except in a very tongue in cheek Team America World Police way and even that is mostly limited to the middle class.
Italians abroad will talk about Ferrari and Columbus and pasta. Americans abroad don’t really lecture anyone about Google and Microsoft and Chevron. It’s not shame in the German way, but it’s not really pride either; global economic and cultural hegemony just isn’t central to American self-conception.
Eh, the political class really does have Main Character Syndrome, in the sense that you hear things like "Venezuela is evading sanctions." Um, yeah? Venezuela is not, in fact, part of the US. US law does not apply in Venezuela.
The deliberate pretension of inability to comprehend this sort of thing is something the political class will have to come to grips with as the relative strength of US power wanes.
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Americans don't do that because we don't need to. We know we're number one, we know everyone else (especially the French, who hate it, but excepting the Chinese) knows we're number one, and there's no point in arguing about it.
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I agree with the general point about the US losing its broad supremacy. In many fields, America is well behind with little prospect of catching up and there is indeed an unseemly amount of American reflexive dismissal of inferiority. Too many clowns on twitter posting about blowing up the Three Gorges Dam. There's an alarmingly casual attitude to conflict in the information sphere of today's world, as though it's something you can just start and end as you please. War is the most serious matter there is, it must be considered coldly and carefully.
Won't the US enjoy a quantitative and qualitative superiority in AI though, based on the compute advantage, through to at least the 2030s? Chinese models are pretty good and very cost-efficient but lean more towards benchmaxxed than general intelligence. GLM-4.7 for instance, supposedly it has stats comparable to Opus 4.5. But my subjective testing throws up a huge disparity between them, Opus is much stronger. It one-shots where others flounder. That's what you'd expect given the price difference, it's a lightweight model vs a heavyweight model... but where are the Chinese heavyweight models? They only compete on cost-efficiency because they can't get the compute needed for frontier performance. If Teslas cost 40K and BYD costs 20K and Tesla doesn't just get wrecked by BYD, then it would show that there's a significant qualitative gap. In real life of course BYD is wrecking Tesla, they have rough qualitative parity and so cost-efficiency dominates. But Chinese AI doesn't seem to have a competitive advantage, not on openrouter anyway, despite their cost-efficiency they lack the neccessary grunt.
If AGI isn't a big deal and it ends up being a cost-efficiency game of commoditized AI providing modest benefits, then China wins. Zero chance for America in any kind of prolonged competition against such a huge country. America is too dopey to have a chance, letting China rent Blackwell chips is foolish. Too dopey to do diplomacy coherently, too dopey to shut down the open-air fent markets, too dopey to build frigates... America is probably the ablest and most effectively run country in the Western bloc overall. That is not a very high bar to meet. The US would need to be on another level entirely to beat China. It's that same lightweight v heavyweight competition.
But if AI/AGI/ASI is a big deal, then America enjoys a decisive advantage. Doesn't matter if China has 20 AGI at Lvl 5 if the US has 60 at Lvl 8. I think a significantly more intelligent AI is worth a lot more than cheaper and faster AI in R&D, robotics, cyberwarfare, propagandizing, planning. And just throwing more AI at problems is naturally better. There will be a huge compute drought. There's a compute drought right now, AI is sweeping through the whole semiconductor sector like Attila the Hun, razing (raising) prices.
China doesn't have the necessary HBM, the necessary HBM just doesn't exist. Even America is struggling, let alone China. Even if China had enough good chips to go with their good networking, there's no good memory to go with them.
In a compute drought, the compute-rich country is king. In an AI race, the compute-rich country is king. China would be on the back foot and need to use military force to get back in the game.
I don't think GLM is really that high. In my experience it may be more comparable to, like, Xiaomi V2-Flash or Minimax M2.1. Chinese ecosystem is uneven, and GLM team has massive clout thanks to their Tsinghua ties. I believe they're a bit overhyped.
It probably will have the advantage, but a) unclear what this advantage gives you practically, and b) the divergence from compounding this advantage keeps getting postponed. Roughly a year ago, Dario Amodei wrote:
Well, American companies already have millions of chips. We're nearing 2026. Multiple models trained on those superclusters already got released, RL cost is now in high millions, probably tens if not hundreds of millions for Grok 4 and GPTs, and likely Claudes. Result: Opus is not really far smarter than V3.2, an enhanced version of a year-old model Dario writes about, with total post-training costs around $1M. On some hard math tasks, V3.2 Speciale is not just like 20x cheaper per task but straight up superior to American frontier at the time of release. The gap has, if anything, shrank. Wasn't «gold at IMO» considered a solid AGI target and a smoke alarm of incoming recursive self-improvement not so long ago? V3.2-Speciale gets that gold for pennies, but now we've moved goalposts to Django programming, playing Pokemon and managing a vending machine. Those are mode open-ended tasks but I really don't believe they are indexing general intelligence better.
Maybe we'll see the divergence finally materializing in 2026-2027. But I think we won't, because apparently the biggest bottleneck is still engineering talent, and Americans are currently unable to convert their compute advantage into a technological moat. They know the use cases and how to optimize for user needs, they don't really know how to burn $1B of GPU-hours to get a fundamentally stronger model. There's a lot of uncertainty about how to scale further. By the time they figure it out, China has millions of chips too.
There is an interesting possibility that we are exactly at this juncture, with maturation of data generation and synthetic RL environment pipelines on both sides. If so, we'll see US models get a commanding lead for the next several months, and then it would be ablated again by mid-late 2026.
V3.2 was a qualitative shift, a sign that the Chinese RL stack is now mature and probably more efficient, and nobody paid much attention to it. Miles is former Head of Policy Research and Senior Advisor for AGI Readiness at OpenAI, and he pays attention, but it flew under the radar.
Another reason I'm skeptical about compounding benefits of divergence is that it seems we're figuring out how to aggregate weak-ish (and cheap) model responses to get equal final performance. This has interesting implications for training. Consider that on SWE-rebench, V3.2 does as well as «frontier models» in pass@5 regime, and the cost here is without caching; they have caching at home so it's more like $0.1 per run and not $0.5. We see how even vastly weaker models can be harnessed for frontier results if you can provide enough inference. China prioritizes domestic inference chips for 2026. Fun fact, you don't need real HBM, you can make do with LPDDR hybrids.
But all of that is probably secondary to social fundamentals, the volume and kind of questions that are economical to ask, the nature of problems being solved.
I think all of this is stages of grief about the fact that the real king is physics and we have a reasonably good command of physics. Unless AGI unlocks something like rapid nanoassembly and billion-qubit quantum computers, it may simply not change the trajectory significantly. The condition of being a smaller and, as you put it, dopey society compromises "compute advantage". Great American AI will make better robots? Well, it'll likely train better policies in simulation. But China is clearly far ahead at producing robots and can accelerate to tens of millions in little time given their EV industrial base, gather more deployment data, iterate faster, while American startups are still grifting with their bullshit targets. Similar logic applies in nearly every physical domain. Ultimately you need to actually make things. Automated propaganda is… probably not the best idea, American society is too propagandized as is. Cyberwarfare… will American AGI God really be good enough to hack Huawei clusters after their inferior Temu AGI has hunted for vulnerabilities in an airgapped regime for a few months? I think cyberwarfare is largely going dodo in this world, everyone will have an asymmetric defense advantage.
Obviously, that's still the most credible scheme to achieve American hegemony, conquer the light cone etc. etc. I posit that even it is not credible enough and has low EV, because it's an all-or-nothing logic where «all» is getting elusive.
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AI technological knowhow diffuses much faster than AI-driven technology, though. Lets say China is a year behind the US in AI research and engineering when the US reaches AGI. How long does it take the US to integrate it wholesale through its economy, replacing pretty much all labor? China will have its own frictions, but plausibly China can cut through physical, infrastructure, legal, and cultural constraints faster than the US. It's not clear which effect would dominate, but it's not preordained that the US would win.
Even a true singularity, if possible, doesn't seem to change that. At some point the US may well have an ASI that has solved all the fundamental physical, engineering, and mathematical issues of the universe while still requiring human doctors, teachers, drivers, soldiers etc. to perform actual labor, while China at the same time is stuck with a year-behind AI that nevertheless has still replaced human labor in all relevant real world domains.
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The new Chinese ASIC accelerators designed for 8bit FMA are going to be a game changer. Nvidia acts like it's still king but soon new way cheaper chinese tech is going to be online and NVIDA is going to eat dirt.
I don't believe that any specific accelerator will change the situation much. “ASIC” is a meme, Nvidia's Vera Rubin are probably very close to optimality, they're no longer GPUs in a meaningful way.
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Google's had that for a decade.
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You can make an absolute fortune on that prediction, if it comes true.
Sorry, risk aversion. The probability that would let you say "that's pretty likely" is not the same as the probability that would make it make sense to sink a lot of money into something. If I thought it was 80% likely, for instance, I certainly wouldn't take that 20% chance of losing my shirt. At best I might slightly change the distribution of money that I was going to invest anyway.
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I don't really understand where you think America, or any other nation, is going to fit into the picture at all if your predictions of Chinese dominance come to pass. What is China going to buy from the US in 2038 in your view? They have a long track record of having an industry come into their sphere and then replicating as much as their can of it and then push out the competitor before exporting their version to any market that will take it. What are other trade partners supposed to do with a nation that's long term goal is to not buy anything from their partners? In the mean time I understand the economist position that says this is an obvious surplus, china sends us goods for pieces of paper, why look this gift horse in the mouth? But What happens when this happens to every industry?
I don't follow Noah too closely but in this piece recently I think he's spot on.
With the American hegemony other nations have options. Americans are happy to let other nations lead in some industries and rely on them long term. We're happy to buy Korean appliances, Japanese cars, European fine crafted goods and Columbian cocaine. If you want to build out a niche the American empire is happy to let you have it and integrate into the global family. This is not how China acts. China doesn't tolerate this kind of interdependence. I don't really see how you think allowing them to take up the dominant position in every industry is long term sustainable. Even in your post you talk about how China is already doing industrial policy to try to make sure that nvdia's position is obsoleted as soon as possible through energy subsidies.
The US is self-sufficient in almost everything. It does not need to trade with China in order to remain a great power.
And more specifically, the US can likely maintain itself as the hegemon of the western hemisphere and remain the richest country on earth. It does not need china.
100% yes
How? A significant % of that wealth was built on leveraging Chinese industrial production and being the primary/a majorly significant trade partner to the rest of the world.
American consumerism is built on buying cheap Chinese stuff. China has overtaken America as the primary trade partner in a huge % of the rest of the world, and that trend isn't getting better for America, especially thanks to Trump's trade policies.
How will America be the richest country on earth when it's consumers dollars don't go as far, and a large % of the world won't buy things from there anymore.
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I think this is somewhat incoherent.
Your narrative is a bit out of date. How will Europeans pay for Chinese imports if China has no need of their exports (in «fine crafted goods», services or anything)? Maybe they just won't, if China can do all that fine crafting cheaper and better. But they will face the same issue with American imports, indeed already are facing:
American Hegemony is not about building some happy global family with a division of labor. From software down to extractive industries, American Empire wants to be like Emperor Qianlong said: «our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce». Currently, the Chinese economy is pretty export-dependent, but Xi would prefer it to be otherwise – Dual Circulation is a big pillar of his policy, and in purely thermodynamic terms, if literally everything is cheaper in China, you can ignore standard macroecon, largely eschew exports, subsidize domestic demand and make Qianlong's boast a reality.
The main difference is that China got there with industrial policy and human capital, and you're trying to get there with tariffs and coercion and a Wunderwaffe. But the end result is the same for non-live players.
Back then, I asked for what the end game of AGI race is, and you said:
A center of commerce in what sense? The US currently has a very low fraction of international trade in GDP – around the level of Pakistan. The US wasn't a global center of commerce during its ascent either. You pat yourselves on the back for importing some junk but it's not really spreading a lot of your wealth around, it's only large in absolute terms. China is simply already doing what you want to do once you get «AGI», and by 2038, if AGI plans pan out, your narrative will be laughably quaint.
Moreover, what's wrong with that? Both nations are large, decently situated and can, in theory, produce all goods in prolific abundance within their own borders more economically than imports would be; and China is entitled to a larger and more diverse internal market on account of population size. There are some hard natural endowments – Australia has more accessible mineral wealth, Atacama desert has excellent solar resource, I don't know – but commodities are cheap. Maybe they'll become less cheap? What remains scarce after labor and R&D are commodified? Land? Copper? Wombs? We need to think of how the world would operate when major nations are capable of industrial autarky, because modulo some Butlerian Jihad we will have to deal with it anyway.
Finally, what exactly is your concern? The US imports more than it exports not out of some moral commitment to subsidizing globalism, but just because it has very credible IOUs to sell. You basically print USD and export inflation. The EU can't do that. China can't do that. Chinese industrial competence doesn't have a direct effect on that, they cannot deny you the ability to print paper and buy Columbian cocaine. Trying to rationalize the take – you deserve hegemony because what, it'll mean unquestionable military supremacy, hard guarantee of your IOUs, and therefore indefinite ability to exchange goods for paper?
Yeah, I think it's less sustainable than «China is a very large and very productive autarkic country». They've been exactly that for centuries, and the world managed fine. In the limit of this trajectory, they will only need to export enough to cover the raw commodities imports necessary for their internal economic activity. That's not a lot, in dollar terms. The more interesting question is what else we all will be trading in 2038.
A lot of your links seem to be broken and affixing themotte's url in front of them.
I guess I should have noted that I oppose Trump/American Autarky designs in the strongest terms. The man is without vision or sense and deviates wildly from decades of American policy.
It should probably be noted that this policy of autarky didn't exactly turn out well for China over the following two centuries ending in their century of humiliation. The period itself was also an aberation as China was center to a vast trade network before the Qing. Do you have some theory of the recent rise of China that does not require the liberalization of its markets? Explanations for its backwardness coinciding with their close? I suppose this time could be different, China woke for a few decades, learns all the world's secrets and then returns to slumber dead to the rest of the world. But I think the Chinese are smart people, they won't repeat that mistake.
And no, the American hegemony has not historically been about autarky, We've historically traded security guarantees for access to international markets.
Tariffs are industrial policy and of course China imposes tariffs and had before the trade war. This is simply a game of Russel conjugates. I again oppose Trump's buffoonish actions but to think the CCP doesn't employ coercive tactics in trade is pretty surprising. This is a place with a habit of outright banning outside competitors, not just tariffing them. market access for IP bargains, forced technology transfer, straight up state sponsored industrial espionage and Cyber theft(APT10, PLA Unit 61398, Equifax hack, ect). It's just not the case that China has risen in some saintly within the rules manner.
This conflates a few different worlds. My model for an ai future if ai drops marginal labor cost to the base electricity needed to complete the task(but doesn't go infinite intelligence like the yuddites expect) isn't every nation turning inwards, like civilizational wire headers. I find that a bleak image frankly but I suppose some may and China may be one that does if that comes to pass. I don't find that future particularly likely really. And if it goes all the way to AGI then all I know is I want someone with my interests to have been the one to do the alignment work.
This map just seems to be a measure of economy size relative to nearest neighbors, no? Mongolia isn't a huge player in the international trade Arena, it's just landlocked between two countries with economies that are much much larger than its.
this is an interesting point and framing, thanks. I hadn't been thinking of the precise scenario where labor costs drop to marginal much. It does seem far-fetched but we are in the time where far-fetched things happen. I still find things shaking out this way unlikely and if they do I think the world would be unstable. When labor is very cheap and raw materials, even if they can be harvested much more efficiently, are the scarce thing then what is the offense/defense equilibrium?
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The CF40 piece is interesting but doesn't address my point. They're arguing PPP calculations understate Chinese purchasing power, that Chinese people get more stuff per yuan than World Bank stats suggest. I'll grant it all for the sake of argument because the PPP discussion is boring and one can look elsewhere for it. My claim was about income distribution, not purchasing power. Household consumption being 40% of GDP means households receive 40% of national income to spend. The rest goes to the state and corporate sectors, funding the investment-heavy model. Even if every yuan buys more calories than we thought, that doesn't change the share going to households versus the share going to industrial buildout.
This matters because the investment heavy model requires external demand. Household savings fund the investments through financial repression - artificially low interest rates transfer wealth from savers to state-favored borrowers. The resulting production has to go somewhere, and domestic consumers don't have the purchasing power to absorb it because their savings were the input. Rebalancing toward consumption has been official CCP policy since 2006. In that time, household consumption has moved from
35% to38% of GDP. They know the problem. They haven't solved it because the mechanisms that suppress consumption are load-bearing for the political economy.He has a vision, though we can debate the merits of that vision, I agree he's a pretty vulgar individual and his execution is often appalling. But was “decades of American policy” sustainable? The permanent deficit only makes sense if you can serve the growing debt indefinitely. Why should we assume that this can hold? As I've said multiple times, Trump is correct in his diagnosis even if ham-fisted with treatment. If America becomes materially productive, it will diminish European share of the pie, you can't sustain your consumption with just soy and LNG exports, something has to give. Or what is the idea, make AGI and sell tokens instead of IOUs, in exchange for TRUMPF machines? I guess that can be argued, but far as I can see, nobody argues for this. Do you argue for this?
It wasn't so much about trade autarky as about comprehensive intellectual isolation and stagnation, the Qing did not understand the world outside China's borders and honestly bought into the idea that they'll naturally be productive enough to not worry. Qianlong still had some clue, thanks to Heshen, who was ultimately executed for vast corruption, leaving the Qing blind for decades. Then, it was too late and they grew too dysfunctional to modernize like Japan. By First Opium War, Daoguang emperor didn't know where Britain is. It was a pathological regime preoccupied with managing a quaint and unnatural arrangement of Manchu superiority. I definitely won't say their trade policies made sense but it is just a small part of overall Manchu awfulness. Though to be fair, Manchus were following the Ming with their tryhard Confucian disdain for trade. By 1736, China had mostly lost its ironworking. Insularity is the dominant Chinese policy for many centuries. We need to go back like 1000 years to see China that's even remotely as trade-oriented as the modern one. And yes, none of this is plausible in the modern world with high-density information flow.
Anyway, what does it matter? People complaining that “China is making trade impossible” don't mean anything like Ming-style ban of maritime commerce. They mean precisely the opposite, that Chinese exports are too cheap and abundant, and call it unfair. What exactly do you want them to do? Enforce the internal demand for more expensive foreign goods, such as subsidizing private consumption of Macbooks? Get worse at manufacturing? Make their subsidies as ineffectual as European ones? Focus on welfare spending, until they get old, slow down their value-add climb, and fall behind far enough to balance trade? It's just hopeless demands to change their value system, they won't change it. Keep raising tariffs if you don't want to compete on prices. 100% on EVs, 200% or whatever on solar panels, outright ban on Huawei… seems to work, keep going. American deficit with China is already shrinking.
American hegemony itself is a very recent phenomenon, and may have run its course. America was a relatively prosperous and absolutely powerful nation before it became “a hegemon” and so massively involved itself in Old World affairs, for intrinsic reasons of having a large internal market, little red tape, and good geography.
Your security guarantees don't look very credible and monetizable now.
I don't oppose any of that, it's fair game so long as it works. By coercion I mean buffoonery like forcing allies to invest in American production or Lutnick's machinations around TSMC (again, “security guarantees” come into play). China simply can't do any of that, irrespective of morals. It can only offer terms of the deal and expect consent. JVs were not coercion. Expropriation of Trina Solar, meanwhile, is coercion with extra steps. But whatever, this is sliding into moralism, everyone will price in those tactics and act rationally.
Pretty much, but that doesn't change the conclusion. The US is a vast economy. China is becoming comparably vast (or is already bigger depending on how you count), and specifically on goods production it's just no contest. Such economies gravitate towards autarky, both for security and macroeconomic reasons and because of basic logistics.
I repeat that Chinese household consumption is underrated due to in-kind transfers (such as all this public infrastructure), while American consumption is overrated due to Baumol disease. CF40 doesn't just argue that they're even richer than PPP suggests, and consume on par with developed economies (just not the US). It argues that they spend 20 times less on healthcare and get comparable outcomes. Americans cannot not consume some of these items, their floor for cost of living is just too high, you physically cannot survive in a modern city for $137 a month for two people over 3 years, and for the Chinese the ability to do that is subsidized by in-kind transfers. There can be a spirited defense of American consumption pattern, about allocation efficiency or whatever, but the crux is that while the Chinese are directly extracted from to build up physical capital and trade competitiveness, Americans are indirectly extracted from to make pharma/hospital/insurance company etc. stonk go up, charitably – fund R&D and reinvest into tech. The latter is accounted for as “consumer spending”, the former is not, both are effectively non-optional capital transfer from civilians to the national backbone, largely physical in their case and largely financial in yours. I think that when all is considered fairly, both nations have about 50% “real consumption” share of GDP.
Right. That's the big question, isn't it.
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Any theories, here? Does every country decide to just sit back, possibly import raw commodities and energy that aren't otherwise attainable, and live in blissful abundance?
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Here's another article to add to your arsenal and broadly echoes what you're saying: China is making trade impossible
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Huh? Isn't that the supposedly pea-brained Austrian Economist take? Why are neolibs copying other people's homework now?
It’s a mercantilist take; as far as I know, the Austrian school has nothing against trade deficits and indeed would support even unilateral free trade.
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When you're trading with an actor with ulterior motives free trade assumptions break down, even neoliberals know that you ought not actually sell the rope that will be used to hang you.
Depending on how you define “neoliberal”, not necessarily! As always the devil is in the details—I’m sure some self-described neoliberals would advocate for a measure of protectionism in industries relevant to defense and national security, for instance—but one plausible neoliberal response to a foreign country engaging in so-called anti-competitive trade practices (e.g. dumping) would be “Keep the goods flowing; why should we say no to their foreign aid?”
This is of course always the rub.
I think this is best described as just the classical naive econ model. As far as models go this is at the very least middling, with most popular variations from it being the result of poorly thought out motivated reasoning for doing things that people want to do for other reasons. Still, one should not rely on game theory to keep the scorpion from jabbing you to death or however that fable goes.
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And I know the obvious critique. If America can't compete in semi-conductors on a level playing field or any other industry then they should lose and China should make these things cheap as the pie growing move. But this isn't a level playing field. No one does more industrial policy than China. The CCP has an autarkic goal and pursues it at the cost of many things.
They systemically suppress domestic consumption through keeping deposit rates so that households earn below inflation returns so that those savings can be pumped into industrial buildout. The Hukou system creates workforces with limited rights in their migratory cities suppressing their wages to reduce labor costs. They spend very little on social safety nets. the end result being that Chinese household consumption is something like 40% of gdp vs 65% in the states.
You can say that's just them running their economy lean and that decadent westerners should lean down their consumption to compete, but if they did then you really would run into an environment where demand is too scarce. I know you've mocked that idea in the past but it really would be a problem for industrial buildout if no one was buying the stuff China or everyone else was producing.
I simply don't think this is even true, it's more self-serving imperial propaganda to present failures as a moral choice. Most of your consumption value is rent-seeking like high rents. Chinese consumption is not that low, read this. Even Chinese safety net is not as low as is often said, it's on par with other middle-income nations.
You're not doing anyone a favor by being corrupt.
It's paywalled. What does PPP have to do with the fraction of Chinese household income that goes to consumption?
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Is this how you do all your argumentation?
No, as you can see mainly I rely on other means. But this Baumol-diseased "consumption" that Americans pride themselves on is indeed largely propaganda.
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One of the unique realities of both British and American imperialism is that Empire was and is not central to the national identity of either people.
British Imperial identity was, as many historians have relatively well argued, invented wholesale in the last thirty years of Empire. In fact, the greatest and only real grand celebrations of Empire occurred between 1918 and the Second World War, when Britain’s relative global power had been in decline for more than fifty years. At the true height of Empire in the mid-19th century, identity was more English than Imperial, and international competition was more focused on the French than anyone else (even as the opium wars raged, as the scramble for Africa slowly began, as British money surged into South and Central America, as settlement in Australia grew rapidly etc etc etc). Pomp and ceremony in the colonies, even India, was very limited until the 1920s.
Similarly, in America, most American identity has nothing to do with America’s global power or prestige. America is much larger and more geographically diverse than England, unlike that country it doesn’t really even need to trade with its regional peers. Unlike those final days of the British Empire, most American media doesn’t really reference American imperialism. Most stories are set solely domestically, while even most international ones treat the rest of the world the way a pre-imperial American might have a century and a half ago, with a certain distance, a foreignness from petty domestic conflict (see Indiana Jones versus James Bond, for example). Most Americans have no major opinions on foreign policy.
America is often called a reluctant hegemon. I disagree, it’s an incidental one. The empire is not important to the American psyche, to American identity. I won’t comment on the Russian or Soviet empires, but I get the feeling they may have meant more to their inhabitants, at least some of them, than the American Empire does. In part, this is reflected in the fact that even most Americans consider the wars in which America participates done either for moral reasons or self-interested ones. Economists say that American hegemony makes the world safe for profitable American companies, but most of these still make the vast majority of their revenue in-country. I think, on balance, this is like an Englishman in 1910 extolling the virtuous export of Britannic Civilisation, namely a very nice just-so story to explain how things came to be so.
This is true even for more politically aware, heterodox thinkers. People will say America goes to war for powerful banana companies, for oil, for revenge, because of the Jews, because of some leader’s personal grudge. An earnest interest in world domination and American political hegemony is considered laughable, even if it’s mentioned in a PNAC leaflet everybody treats it as a ruse. Nobody believes in it. “America’s mission is to export liberal democracy to the world”. No, I don’t think even Hillary Clinton believes that.
But America can cope spiritually with the collapse of its global power better than most other historical empires for one reason. Because an invasion of the homeland is so unlikely, and because the domestic market is so large, and because they have so many resources, Americans can simply stop caring about the outside world if the news gets worse.
It’s the rest of the world that will be less lucky, and which will experience radically more upheaval. The Chinese will need to solidify their offer for new vassal nations though, because currently it isn’t particularly compelling, and they have a quality around them that seems to make a lot of enemies, which means their hegemony might be resisted more than the present arrangement.
To what extent is there a British non-imperial identity though? I doubt one can divorce Britishness from the project of colonialism.
The Empire never came up in my schooling or childhood at all. Part of that was tact, of course, but it was also because the formative events of British identity are broadly:
Not only was the Empire not really considered important, but neither were Napoleon, America or the Industrial Revolution. They were just stuff that happened.
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You should wait to post this until it actually happens. China might get nearly equivalent chips in bulk by mid 2026, but it's a tough problem and things could easily go wrong. Doing a victory lap based on industry rumors is premature. This reminds me of the perennial Wunderwaffe posts we get from pro-Russian accounts on here, where this new missile or drone is just totally going to swamp Ukraine and this whole slow warfare will turn into a blitzkrieg. And then... that doesn't happen.
Alternative explanation: Jensen Huang won the game of "be the last person to talk to Trump", since he knows Trump is a waffling buffoon and Huang just wants to maximize Nvidia's stock, US security concerns be damned. Then on the Chinese side, the CCP doesn't really care about this CUDA vs CANN stuff nearly as much as it cares about its industrial policy of "make EVERYTHING in China", and a wave of Nvidia chips could disrupt that beyond concerns about ecosystems.
Oh good heavens. No, you don't have to be a traumatized, angry denialist to understand that maybe it's a bad thing for the US to give an extremely bottlenecked resource to its main geopolitical rival.
That's a funny perspective to me. Russians have negligible industrial base, atrophied Soviet military-industrial complex, and mainly export stuff like oil, gas, grain and fertilizers. We also simply don't have many smart people remaining, and instead have a population of jingoistic TV-watching cattle that needs steady supply of copium in the face of a protracted war that's going badly. Of course we have televised fantasies about Wunderwaffes. The US is, for all its grandeur, similarly a corrupt Soy and Gas Empire that struggles with building physical things relative to its consumption and ambition, we see whining about the Rust Belt, Powerpoints with 6th gen fighter jets and «Trump class battleships», and the whole AGI project is supposed to restore the claim to primacy. And even in Ukraine, Americans heroically grappled with the costs of exporting this or that long range wundermissile or Smart Shell, and thought that their Wunderwaffes like HIMARS, or Palmer Luckey's gadgets, will make more of a difference than commodity drone parts from Aliexpress procured by both sides. They did not.
China is the factory of the world and the source of almost all new process innovation and, say, the bulk of Californian top patent holders. The Chinese are not advertising their ion implantation techniques, procurement plans, fabs, they are quietly doing business and actively avoid international publicity on these matters. No, I don't think this is a Wunderwaffe. Yes, we'll see what they can actually produce in 2026.
This is still denialism of the erosion of fundamentals, I think. Classic stabbed-in-the-back-by-Jews [of Asia] doctrine. Huang founded Nvidia over 30 years ago, I don't believe he's a petty merchant optimizing for quarterly reports.
Good grief x2.
The goal of the CEO of any American company is implicitly if not explicitly the maximization of shareholder value. Selling chips to China is just how Jensen Huang can achieve that better. The idea that Huang is doing it as some grand geopolitical play (and where his company's bottom line is a secondary concern) is a bit hard to take seriously. Like, he might be doing that, but you'd want to have a decent amount of evidence to convince people that it's not just the cynical moneygrubbing play.
No, we do not need allusions to Nazi conspiracies of the Jews to say "the CEO is probably just trying to make more profit".
You're so confident. On what time horizon? One quarter? One year? Decades? As long as the company gets to exist? Do you realize that Jensen is a founder, and founders are not equal to board-appointed CEOs?
If the only way you can think of this is myopic mercantilism, then you are indeed culturally and civilizationally inferior to the Chinese and deserve to lose, get dunked on and consigned to the dustbin of history. You're inferior people, xiaoren. The Teacher had said:
Get bent already.
…But I think people like Jensen and Elon — tellingly, not Americans, but those who have adopted the nobler American ideal — are different. Jensen says:
I don't think Jensen wants to sell out to China to make line go up. He wants to keep playing the infinite game.
But inferior men can only interpret a superior man's vision in terms of profit.
I still don't understand how exporting chips to China is supposed to help the US in the long run when the Chinese long run plan is to not import chips.
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Jensen speaking here is mostly just CEO boilerplate. Obviously they'll say "oh yeah, we're in for the long haul", but that's not much in the way of evidence. I'll grant that founders have a bit more of a tendency towards pie-in-the-sky goals like 20 year plans and maybe geopolitical stuff, but Huang is still subject to the whims of shareholders. He doesn't even have extra insulation like Zuckerberg with a screwy voting shares system. And Elon makes plenty of boneheaded short-term decisions.
Can you stop it with this nonsense please?
Can you stop with this nonsense please? He founded Nvidia, he navigated it strategically through every industry transition, proactively shaping them, he made a gamer hardware shop into the most valuable company on Earth and the kingmaker in the AGI race, he clearly intends to keep it in the running through all future transitions, and he understands Chinese competition very well. He knows that they're in a tough spot and Mellanox is not an adequate counter to Huawei's networking. He's trying to save not just his company but your asses, because he's existentially invested in them.
When he says that he's playing an infinite game rather than just chasing a quick buck that'd leave his headquarters irrelevant in under 20 years, this deserves infinitely more faith than your jaded dismissals of “CEO boilerplate”. You need to acknowledge that your standards of judgement and your theory of incentives are only fit for business done by inferior men. People are not created equal, opinions of people are not of equal worth, Jensen's opinion >>>>> median American's opinion.
Oh the high and mighty. The dude ran a company making hardware for gamers and crypto miners and got lucky that it ended up being civilizational important and that they bet on EUV big. He is by all measures obviously an excellent business man, impressively ahead of the game on this latest DRAM shortage. But none of that is evidence of some kind of long term view. Spare us the Ubermench talk, I thought we were supposed to be the nazis in decline.
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Umm... it is the Ukrainan side that relies on wunderwaffes - like the mythical flamingos - that are dirt cheap, produced at large scale and supiciously missing on the battlefield. I don't think someone here has praised russian weaponry. What they have is cheap-ish stuff produced in masse. The pro-ru people here generally underestimate the ability of ukraine to kinda hold together.
If Britain and Argentina are two bald men fighting over a comb, then Russia and Ukraine are two butch lesbians fighting over a condom.
Time for a new flair, methinks.
Of course, my anime waifu that exists only to flatter me.
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