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naraburns  nihil supernum  3yr ago (text post)   37381 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of January 30, 2023

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What Orban says keeps me up at night simply because he’s right. And what’s really scary is that I don’t think either side can back down. We’re giving Ukraine everything, and talking about even fighter jets. If we give Ukraine everything and they lose, that’s a serious blow to the credibility of NATO as a protector of the current international order. I think this is why China is supportive. If we can’t defend Ukraine, why would we be able to protect our Asian Allies in Korea or Japan? If we can’t actually protect Ukraine despite billions in sanctions and giving the most powerful weapons we have, what sane country is going to trust us to be their defense or to protect their trade or solve their disputes? And without that perception, we lose a lot of power. If you’re not looking to NATO as much for defense and trade protection, why do you care what they say?

And given that neither side can afford to lose, I fear an out of control escalation. NATO leaders know that their power will be diminished by a loss, that’s why Ukraine keeps getting more and more weapons, more advanced weapons, etc. they can’t afford to lose, especially after investing heavily in Ukrainian victory. Putin likewise can’t lose (though I think there’s a fig leaf in that if he gets Donbas in a peace deal, it’s more than he had to start with, while for NATO anything short of the 1990s border is a loss). It’s just not a situation that either side can back away from.

Long series of questions are rarely intended to actually be engaged in good faith, but here we go anyway.

If we can’t defend Ukraine, why would we be able to protect our Asian Allies in Korea or Japan?

Why do you think any American ally believes the Americans were trying to 'defend' Ukraine in the way they do treaty-allies?

Ukraine, after all, has and had no treaty with the Americans. It does not host American forces. Despite much diplomatic discussion, the Americans haven't even been the pre-eminent western diplomatic presence in Ukraine for the last decade- that's been mostly the Germans and the French. The US provided many years of low-key and occasionally mid-key diplomatic support, but not heavy weapons and never combat forces, nor the sort of security guarantees it openly states about others.

Why would allies think that America not having a defense alliance with another country means the US won't honor it's defense alliances with them?

...especially when what only a year ago was still being called 'the world's second strongest army' has been driven into a ditch thanks to American support without any sort of treaty-level involvement?

If we can’t actually protect Ukraine despite billions in sanctions and giving the most powerful weapons we have, what sane country is going to trust us to be their defense or to protect their trade or solve their disputes?

Why would any sane country think one has to do with the other?

Just start from what, exactly, 'defend' is supposed to mean in this context. Sanctions were a retaliation, not a shield- what do you think sane people thought they were supposed to do? Similarly, 'most powerful weapons' is, ahem, not what sane people would characterize a military support chain that, just the other week, finally consented to some modern tanks. Sane countries know that when the United States is very publicly saying it is NOT going to send it's most modern air force, ground force, missile force, other other forms of current kit, it's not a shock when it doesn't.

Meanwhile, people expect the US to protect their trade because the US routinely protects trade with counter-piracy patrols and sufficient pressure on states that might otherwise think of 'taxing' international waters that oil still ships through the strait of hormuz even when Iranian proxies attack Saudi oil infrastructure. They don't start forgetting that because the US didn't do something it didn't claim to be doing (ie. solving all their disputes).

And without that perception, we lose a lot of power.

Evidence that you ever had that perception from your allies.

If you’re not looking to NATO as much for defense and trade protection, why do you care what they say?

Probably because the Americans demonstrated that, without even being directly involved in a conflict, they can decisively ruin the day of one of the strongest military powers in the world with a super-power's worth of military surplus... with just a fraction of the American military surplus.

If you're a potential military aggressor, that's a heck of a lot of reason not to be an aggressor against any American client, or even states the Americans might feel sympathetic enough to support. If you're a potential military target, that's an overkill amount of potential support for your defense needs, and well worth trying to solicit sympathy to the American public.

Evidence that you ever had that perception from your allies.

The value of "perception" and "credibility" is precisely in how they're so nebulous that it's too hard to pin down the concrete cost-benefit math.

They may be nebulous, but they are nebulous concepts held by the allies, not the speaker. Which American ally has indicated they hold the view ascribed to them in the hypothetical?

As-is, no indication was given that any sane ally actually held the view, as opposed to a projection that 'sane allies' would agree with the speaker's framing. This is disputed, because the questions evidenced a lack of perspective that allies would consider relevant.

If we give Ukraine everything and they lose, that’s a serious blow to the credibility of NATO as a protector of the current international order.

NATO only needs to deter Great Power competition. Arguably, only Russia really (US has other alliances for China).

And I think it has done a sufficient job bleeding Russia for a country that isn't even in NATO that Putin's gains here will be minimal. Even if he wins, Ukraine dies on the street and Russia will be bleeding fast in the ambulance. Good outcome for the US.

Maybe the American public will freak out over "not winning" (a war that most probably expected Ukraine to lose handily at the outset) but autocrats are going to look at the situation and I doubt it looks appealing.

The supposedly "brain-dead" alliance hasn't agreed on everything, but it has worked surprisingly well for a nation that Obama and co. wrote off in 2014.

I think this is why China is supportive.

Is China supportive? The reporting on this has been mixed at best but I've seen some stuff that essentially boils down to "sure, we're allied against the West. But this is your boondoggle"

If we can’t actually protect Ukraine despite billions in sanctions and giving the most powerful weapons we have, what sane country is going to trust us to be their defense or to protect their trade or solve their disputes?

Ukraine isn't getting the most powerful stuff NATO has. Ukraine got a bunch of old Soviet equipment from the ex-WARPAC NATO members and it's gotten some stuff a generation or two out of date from the US. They're also only getting some of the wider environment of military organization NATO militaries operate with. They don't have the training, the military traditions, the economy...

Ukraine is NATO supporting a country it has no formal commitments to because NATO countries think it's either the right thing to do, a good realist move, or some mixture thereof. If it doesn't work out, that's humiliating, in a way, but not incredibly moreso than the Afghanistan pullout or the mess in Iraq. Countries with whom NATO or the US have actual treaty obligations will know they have nothing to worry about. They saw what happened with the HIMARs. They know how far ahead of everyone else NATO is. If things don't work out for Ukraine on a strategic level, that's ultimately because the West didn't care enough to do more than throw some pocket change and old equipment at them.

Japan and Korea may develop a niggling fear in the back of their mind about just how far the willingness of the US and NATO to commit to a war in their defense may go, but they also know the situation is sufficiently different that they can re-assure themselves and move on with their day.

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Tanks and planes would just get wasted because Ukraine armed forces aren't really competent.

Competent relative to what standard is the key question here. Much like the old saw about the two hikers confronted by a bear, you don't need to be "fast" so much as "faster than the other guy".

They're giving UA everything good it can possibly use.

Yeah, and all the really good stuff is dependent on a level of infrastructural support and training the Ukrainians can't replicate. Instead, they get the stuff that can be deployed independently, which is usually old or relatively less effective.

Also, if Wagner were near-peer, they'd be wiping the floor with the Ukrainians.

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Wagner might not be big enough to do that, though.

The US needs to win this war because their credibility re sanctions is in the toilet.

:Presses X to Doubt:

There's no damage to the US or NATO that can be done in Ukraine that wasn't already done in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact there is actually a pretty strong argument to be made (both strategic and economic) that expending munitions that had already been paid for against the Russians is better than expending them in exercises or scrapping them after they've exceeded their shelf-life.

Let us be blunt, every Russian killed in Ukraine, every aircraft shot down, every armored vehicle burned, makes Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Et Al safer. If the neo-bolsheviks decide that they would rather throw nukes than live in a world they can't bully their neighbors that's on them not us.

In fact there is actually a pretty strong argument to be made (both strategic and economic) that expending munitions that had already been paid for against the Russians is better than expending them in exercises or scrapping them after they've exceeded their shelf-life.

You can see this in how much of the donations from Europe have been equipment that's still serviceable but getting near the end of its shelf life. There's little point in hoarding such equipment when you can instead put that equipment to use right now against the opponent you kept it for and while doing so, lower your own future risk of retaliation.

There's no damage to the US or NATO that can be done in Ukraine that wasn't already done in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If anything, seeing Russia bungle their lightning invasion/coup makes the maneuver warfare phase of the Iraqi War look even more impressive.

Somehow, the US didn't learn its lesson re: sactions 215 years ago, with the Embargo Act.

Unfortunately, you’re right. If Russia had won a quick victory, then it might be different, but they’re making a convincing show of our sanctions being a paper tiger and so we need to win the war on the ground(without putting boots there, it’s political suicide) to showcase the strength of the US as the leader of the international order.

Convincing who of what?

People who thought that the sanctions were meant to cripple Russia within months weren't paying attention when key parts of the Russian economy- such as energy sales to Europe, non-removal from SWIFT, non-targetting of third-party trade (ie. India and CHina)- were very clearly kept off the table in favor of different sorts of sanctions targeting different things. Similarly, people who thought that Russia would be unable to buy anything from anyone or build anything technological clearly weren't familiar with the practical impossibility. Maybe they believed propaganda hype, but they probably weren't paying attention that much of the hype was coming from the people lobbying for the carve-outs.

What the sanctions have done is considerable, and enough for anyone who dismisses them as being a paper tiger to not really understand what they have been structured to do- which are a number of political objectives targetting international relations of Russia, not a total collapse of the Russian system.

If we can’t defend Ukraine, why would we be able to protect our Asian Allies in Korea or Japan?

From realpolitik perspective the use of war in Ukraine for NATO and USA is not defending Ukraine. It is defending NATO countries and inflicting damage on Russia by helping Ukraine to defend itself.

Also, Japan, really? Attempt to invade Japan would have hilarious effects.

Loss of Taiwan would cut off a lot of important shipping lanes to Japan.

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Control of Taiwan is endangering Chinese shipping lanes in a major way.

In which way?

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But US has never threatened Chinese shipping lanes. We actually built them

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If we give Ukraine everything and they lose, that’s a serious blow to the credibility of NATO as a protector of the current international order.

Well, for now we are far far far away from giving Ukraine everything.

What Orban says keeps me up at night simply because he’s right. And what’s really scary is that I don’t think either side can back down.

Sadly, I strongly suspect this will end up as an extremely extended case of sunken cost fallacy. It will drag on and on with both sides refusing to make any concessions towards peace until it's years later, countless lives lost, billions of dollars spent, destruction everywhere. Only then will both sides be so exhausted that they will be forced into negotiating a peace that makes no one happy, when they could have negotiated a similiar diplomatic postion prior to the invasion with far less cost to everyone.

I don’t think the US can be exhausted. We are not a poor nation. Exhaustion perhaps if Ukraine runs out of troops. But then you still have an option of Polish boots on the ground who have no interest in Russia on there border and plenty of past grievances.

Personally I think the west losing would be a huge negative. It puts a lot of national security guarantees under threat. Even our enemies like Iran benefit from international standards. Russia losing isn’t necessarily bad for the average guy but bad for Putin.

Russia as an offensive force is spent for the forceable future post Ukraine

It might be even worse than that.

Russia is also an arms dealer and plays spoiler internationally. People have to be wondering about the value of Russian arms after all the shit that's come out and, even if they're still confident in the goods if not the Russian Army, there is the question of how much stuff Russia will even be able to produce after a few years of sanctions.

I don’t think the US can be exhausted. We are not a poor nation.

Exhaustion as in "according to polls stopping funding Ukraine gives us 2 extra percentage points"

Public opinion has to have a direct effect

on voting to sway politicians. The American public will never vote for one guy over another because he wants to send 1/1000th less of the yearly budget to Ukraine.

I want to stop funding Ukraine. Think it’s absurd when facing these massive deficits we are borrowing about 100b to fund Ukraine. Yes it isn’t causing the deficit but it sure ain’t helping.

What is your source on the US borrowing $100 billion to fund Ukraine? The total aid according to this article is worth only $50 billion, and most of that is in-kind (old weapons stockpiles etc.) and not financial.

Here says 66b was approved by congress prior to the Omni bill at end of 2022 which promised another 48b.

https://www.factcheck.org/2022/12/u-s-aid-to-ukraine-explained/

Granted, maybe some of it is in kind. But still we’ve committed to use over 100b of assets.

But still we’ve committed to use over 100b of assets.

Note that it is much, much different from "we are borrowing about 100b to fund Ukraine". To the point that "we are borrowing about 100b to fund Ukraine" claim is untrue.

I agree it was overstated but “much, much different” is also an overstatement. A bank for example takes into account assets.

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I mean, personally, as a left-winger, I'm glad some of our bloated defense department budget is finally get put to use for a good reason for once. If we have to "spend" (ie. send basically our leftover equipment in the back of the garage to Ukraine) a stupidly small amount of GDP to turn Russia into a wreck, win-win.

I’m not sure turning Russia into a wreck is a win-win (do we really want a de stabilized nuclear power)?

I just wish we’d cut military spending (including Ukraine spending).

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I really doubt it. Maybe if there were Americans dying on the ground for nothing like Iraq.

But Biden's party hates Putin and the MIC is very good at finding enough slack in the democratic process to continue working, except when there really is an overwhelming, bipartisan counter-reaction (like Iraq).

Rest of the time they seem to get away with throwing arms and funding at the conflicts they want.

I don’t think the US can be exhausted.

I would just say Iraq and Afghanistan.

We won Iraq. It’s a Democracy. Afghanistan still 20 years. So possible but long.

So the people of Iraq, that hate America and wish for nothing more than to see it destroyed, can now vote and this is a win for the US because? Not that this is an actual worry since Iraq, by some think tank standards, has not been less democratic since they starting measuring the country in 2006. And is categorized as "authoritarian", ranking 124th out of 167.

I'm reminded of the color revolution in Egypt and the democratic upheaval in the country that resulted in the most backward Islamic rule in recent times to win control over the country because, contrary to the words of liberal-progressive English speaking university students that could give interviews to CNN on the ground, the voting majority was anything but. This then lead to a hastily organized military coup to correct the record of the peoples will. Democracy indeed.

I guess I am asking what on earth 'you' won.

But I was hardly scratched while you are near death.

Bar the other person not being near death, and you being hardly scratched.

I mean, if we're taking this example as Russia, then 'you' have a very visibly broken nose, an eye and a half swollen shut, a hand already with mangled fingers, and are still banging 'your' head into the other guy's fist, even as the bystanders pass him another shiv while steadying him on his feet.

No one takes Russian claims about not being affected by the war seriously- Russia is going to be in recovery for over a decade, and it's not exactly standing over someone else kicking down anymore either. The war has destroyed Russia as a strategic competitor, let alone regional hegemon, for a generation, and the question is whether the Western support gets bored and goes away in the next few years.

Considering the Americans have made anaconda strategies something of a strategic art, press X to doubt.*

*Or, mea culpa, I missed the proper target of the metaphor.

Let’s be fair Russia still has the Japan route. Hang Putin. Install Navalny (supposedly he’s as bad as Putin but he should have seen enough to change his views now). Have Navalny talk about his ❤️ of gay people. Get sanctions lifted day one. Get the beltway crowd to say it’s a new day in Russia. Perhaps even get America to pay them instead of the ‘90s when I think we just sent advisors - figured it out yourself. For the right talk about how bad China’s system is.

Then you either actually reform or you change a few Moscow elites and regional oligarchs and we go forwards. Renounce any desire for vassal states.

We would be stupid not to take that deal even if it meant sending 500 billion Marshall plan to Russia. Then the whole globe besides China would be western aligned without any potential patrons.

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I think you misunderstood. America is the assailant in this analogy, and America's enemies are the ones being beaten.

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These are always boring semantic debates. If I set out to beat you until you love me, and after an hour of beating I give up because you still hate me, leaving you a bloody unconscious mess on the ground while I’ve scraped my knuckles who has lost?

You have. I'm tempted to say "obviously" but it's clearly not obvious. Chalk it up as another one of those cultural disconnects.

I'd say; I failed but I didn't lose.

It made me look like an idiot, but anytime somebody who was present for the hypothetical whoopin' thinks about cutting me off they'll remember it before making their decision as it were.

These are not semantic debates when the people who instigate them insist that the bleeding unconscious mess on the floor loves them.

And that still took 20 years.

Yes, that's what scares me.

when they could have negotiated a similiar diplomatic postion prior to the invasion with far less cost to everyone.

That the war is an idiotic idea was obvious from start. Sadly, not to Putin.

And when one side is ready to wage war of conquest, than the other can choose war or surrender and occupation - but not peace.

I mean, I agree with your point about Putin but I'm not sure why people are insistent or implying that the US has been actively seeking peace in contrast. The foreign policy of the US for the last thirty or so years (at the very least in this region) has be pursing unreleting, antagonistic hegemony.

So sure, maybe the US was not actively seeking war, but at best they weren't really taking efforts to ensure peaceble relations either.

Antagonistic is too strong.

We offered anyone who wanted to join the west the option to join the west. Many chose that because well the west is better.

When an imperial power offers the option of joining its hegemony to a smaller state that directly borders an opposing empire that is egregiously antagonistic. Offering the option to join the American hegemony to anyone who wants to regardless of the effects that will have on the balance of power is obviously antagonistic.

That seems so clearly antagonistic to me that i'm not sure your statement is in good faith. Can you explain how you think that isn't antagonistic?

First Russia is not a great power. Second there is no military threat of an invasion of Russia.

The US hasn’t invaded Venezuela despite their installation of a government that opposes us in the American sphere of influence.

Russia is openly concerned about western hegemony expanding near its borders. Therefore western hegemony threatening to expand near its borders is antagonistic.

Offering entry into its hegemony to anyone who wants it regardless of context is universally antagonistic.

You can argue that it’s morally justified but it’s clearly antagonistic

This line of thinking makes any government action as antagonistic. And I don’t believe fits with either international law or criminal law.

It completely undermines any part of national self-determination.

Now you can say this is a far weaker example and I would agree. But I find Trudeaus government as antagonistic after his treatment and comments on the truckers. I don’t want that culture expanding to America. I don’t think that gives a Desantis government casus belli for war. The idea that Ukraine signing trade deals with other countries may technically hurt Russia and I guess you can call that antagonistic but it’s not antagonistic in a military sense. Every country would have a military justification if the country next door changes governments with different economic policies.

One could also say the EU has been antagonistic to Great Britain by threatening them with a large number of refugees etc. They had an option of Brexxit.

I believe there is a clear line between economic moves and military moves. Ukraine had only done economic moves. I feel like by using the word antagonism there’s an attempt to make it mean military antagonism when it’s cultural/economic antagonism. The latter every country consistently deals with.

If they were openly concerned about nato putting nuclear missiles in france or alaska, or criticizing russia, would those things count as antagonistic?

If accepting a sovereign country into your alliance counts as antagonistic, the word has been hollowed of meaning. The US and EU are not responsible for maintaining russia's unofficial sphere of interest to their own detriment and that of the people in that sphere. Out of what, the goodness of their heart, sportsmanlike respect for a worthy adversary who's fallen on hard times? The way this would work out in the past a la monroe doctrine is, russia or some other european power would threaten to 'turn' mexico , canada or brasil in a tit for tat move and get the US to back off from their sphere that way. But obviously this is beyond russia's power at present.

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Not sure why they're worrying seeing as there's China, but hey, maybe they live in the past.

Bulk of population of Russia is in its west, not east, exports pipelines

Plus, Russians used to dislike Chinese strongly (I saw opinion polls where Chinese were treated only above Chechens and gypsies), this is only changed due to neccessity.

Do you really think if Russia bent the knee especially with bigger Chinese threats we would turn them down? Like Russia is the crown jewel of having China surrounded.

Hardly. Militarily indefensible, economically more interested in entangling than curtailing, and politically more interested in getting the Americans out of Europe than in being on the American side of a US-China fight. Russia would be a bigger France than France in trying to subvert the European pillar of the Atlanticist alliance in the name of 'strategic autonomy' of Europe from the US, except with even less interest in, well, the things the US and France actually agree and care about.

There are bad alliances where the ally costs more than they could possibly offer, there are bad alliances that have toxic internal dynamics, and there are bad alliances where one has nothing to offer the other. A post-Soviet US-Russia alliance would have been all three.

I mean I disagree with your view of the alliance.

Russia Can offer the US a lot. It flanks China. We offer them economic development or atleast the elite get rich selling us commodities.

Toxic internal dynamics are either Russia interfering in US foreign relations or US exporting you need to say you love gays. Both can be handled.

And three I already said Russia offers the west the ability to surround China.

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Hell, we're even fine w/ Russia not being part of the West. If it wants to be an authoritarian state treating it's people like crap, we honestly don't care that much. Just stop invading other nations, and Putin's kids will have billions to play with in Swiss accounts for generation after he kicks the bucket, but Putin is honestly, too dumb to do that.

Hell, we're even fine w/ Russia not being part of the West. If it wants to be an authoritarian state treating it's people like crap, we honestly don't care that much.

I don't think that's true. *You* might not care that much, the people running various arms of official and unofficial foreign policy absolutely want to stick their nose in every country they don't control yet.

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The only true pathway to peace for Ukraine is NATO accession, which requires defeating the Russians.

From this perspective, the US is absolutely seeking peace.

but I'm not sure why people are insistent or implying that the US has been actively seeking peace in contrast.

And my claim is that USA was not antagonistic enough and that Russians for example fooled Obama into Russian reset (or that Americans fooled themselves into it on their own).

So sure, maybe the US was not actively seeking war, but at best they weren't really taking efforts to ensure peaceble relations either.

What they were supposed to do? One option would be helping Russia to keep occupied areas after USSR has fallen but I am not convinced that it would end better in any aspect.

USA can be blamed for many wars, but here Russia jumped into it on their own due to believing own propaganda and trying to rebuild its empire. Russia is not entitled to USSR-sized sphere of influence.

What they were supposed to do? One option would be helping Russia to keep occupied areas after USSR has fallen but I am not convinced that it would end better in any aspect.

Simply not meddle with regions directly bordering other empires.

Ideally try to maintain polite diplomatic relationships and worldwide power balance between the big dogs.

Russia is not an empire with a real strength, should not be an empire and is not entitled to be an empire.

And even that war would result in less misery than Russia managing to recreate its empire and subjugate central and eastern Europe again.

Why is America/the west entitled to be an empire and behave like an empire but Russia is not.

And I don’t want Russia to try to expand its hegemony either, but America attempting to expand its hegemony near Russia is antagonistic.

Even if you are arguing that Russia is bad and the west is good, therefore an expansion of western hegemony is not immoral - that’s irrelevant to the argument.

I didn’t say is was immoral for the west to expand its hegemony into Ukraine - all I said was that it is antagonistic. Something can be both morally justified, or even morally obligated, but still antagonistic.

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Russia is not entitled to USSR-sized sphere of influence.

It's doubtful that's what they were going for. Eastern Ukraine? Probably. Getting to USSR levels?

This "as Ukraine goes, so does Europe" is a talking point by hawks to try to leverage the domino theory instincts from the Cold War* so Americans can pay the price (at least in ammo, not blood this time) for a nation that most of them previously couldn't find on the map.

* In this case justified by the psychologization of the Russian imperatives as a product of Putin's particular feeling of humiliation at the end of the USSR rather than justified via the evangelical nature of communism.

It's doubtful that's what they were going for. Eastern Ukraine? Probably.

Their initial move was to try to take ALL of Ukraine in a coup de main. Their second strategy after that failed was still to try to take all of Ukraine. This certainly points to them going for more than Eastern Ukraine. USSR levels? Maybe not today, but I see no reason they would stop before that (or at that) if they didn't have to.

Take,yes. Annex...I don't know. Holding the entire country would be very difficult. Trying to force a puppet leader to allow the annexation of the East and creating a land bridge to Crimea? More viable.

This is in line with what Naryshkin let slip too early in that amazingly cinematic National Security meeting: they were definitely going to annex Donetsk and Luhansk. He didn't say they would take the whole thing.

I'm not sure if there's a big difference between "Annex and make a semi-autonomous part of Russia" (as with Crimea) and "invade, occupy, and install a puppet government".

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What they were supposed to do?

Not fuck up Russia in the first place with the Clinton administration's disasterious attempt to 'reform' a post-Soviet Russia and seek partnership instead of hegemony? Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe? Not create and amplify the various revolutions in Eastern Europe, including the various 'Color Revolutions', and more recently and relevantly the heavy American involvement in Euromaidan and Ukrainian politics generally? Not deliberately antagonize Russia by constantly demanding Ukraine and Georgia should be admitted into NATO (despite their questionable strategic value) the same way the US would never tolerate a country in their immediate sphere (Monroe Doctrine) to ally with a hostile power (e.g. China or Russia) let alone one on their border?

Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe?

Nope. If you let Russia reconquer this area again then it may be many things but it will not be healthy.

Not fuck up Russia in the first place with the Clinton administration's disasterious attempt to 'reform' a post-Soviet Russia

Neoliberal policies and selloffs of Soviet industry were an absolute disaster and this should have been predictable but we have to recall that this wasn't a Japan situation where MacArthur and America could totally get their way (though I wonder if they'd have followed the same policies if occupation had happened in the 90s...)

Even at its weakest Russia was never occupied and was a nuclear-armed state. A lot more of their destiny was in their hands.

Yeltsin and co. could have had a less corrupt process for privatizing resources but their country has no long history of democracy and transparency so it isn't surprising it went the way it did. But that's still a failure of Russians and Russian institutions.

This line on Russia also seems a bit paradoxical: the demand seems to be that the US treat Russia as an equal (it wasn't; they lost) but also that the US is responsible for Russia's economic and political malaise , as if it was a vassal or occupied state like Japan or South Korea (which, btw, didn't just uncritically bow to neoliberal policy- if a small Asian country could forge a smarter path...)

This line on Russia also seems a bit paradoxical: the demand seems to be that the US treat Russia as an equal (it wasn't; they lost) but also that the US is responsible for Russia's economic and political malaise , as if it was a vassal or occupied state like Japan or South Korea (which, btw, didn't just uncritically bow to neoliberal policy- if a small Asian country could forge a smarter path...)

It's not paradoxical because I never used the word equal. As with all the other times, I commented on this issue on the Motte, I will say that Russia is and can only ever be a regional power in its current state. I used the word 'partnership' which does not require equal status. This is contrast to 'hegemony' which this absolutely the approach the US has taken in this region and many others. As to the issue of America's responsibility to the current political and economic status of Russia, I strongly recommend reading "Russia's Road to Corruption" a US Congressional report on the issue from the year 2000. At best, you can say this was the result of gross incompetence by the Clinton administration and their economic advisors. At worst, it wouldn't be remiss to believe that that Clinton administration's policies were actively malicious. At some level, it's hard to distinguish between the two.

It's not paradoxical because I never used the word equal.

Fair enough, I was riffing off Brzezinski's take that Russia wanted a level of deference to its considerations that was simply out of whack with its power at the time (which may still be true), but I shouldn't have applied that language of "equality" since you didn't say it. My apologies.

As to the issue of America's responsibility to the current political and economic status of Russia, I strongly recommend reading "Russia's Road to Corruption" a US Congressional report on the issue from the year 2000.

I actually went through this. Well, skimming parts, but reading at least most of it.

This is not really a neutral appraisal of "Russia's road to corruption", it's a partisan Republican attack on the Clinton administration. This is its obvious function from the name on – and the fact that all the Reps indicated as writers are Republicans. It just takes negative developments in Russia in the 90s and then blames everything it can on Clinton admin on very loose grounds, utilizing an everything-and-the-kitchen-sink approach. The things that happened before Clinton admin took power, ie. before January 1993, can be blamed on the Russians, since doing otherwise would of course be putting a blame on a blameless Republican president. Everything after that, though? It's Clinton and Gore.

One chapter of the assessment consists of Clinton assigning the Russia portfolio to Gore (it’s not really explained why this would be so bad, since Gore, through his congressional career, would be expected to genuinely have more natsec experience, and of course it might be noted since Clinton powerful vice presidencies with serious duties have been pretty normative anyway). Gore is then blamed for dealing with Russian Prime Ministers – who would probably be pretty much who you’d expect him to deal with.

There’s little substantive criticism and a lot of reaching – one chapter seemingly blames the entirety of the rise of Russian organized crime in the 90s on the fact of Gore-Chernomyrdin commission existing! - and it’s obvious the point here is that it’s 2000, the election year, Gore was the Dem candidate, and moreover the GOP candidate was the son of George Bush sr., who of course is only praised here.

Probably the most substantial criticism is that IMF kept extending loans to Russia despite its problems, but even here far too much conjuncture is made on first straightforwardly blaming Clinton for this, then blaming basically all of Russia’s economic woes on IMF credit being too easy (at most one could say that this bolstered somewhat decisions that the Russians would have most likely made anyway), and then the claim is that this so discredited Americans in Russian eyes (the same Russians who made these decisions) that Russia just had no choice but to sell weapons to countries it would have probably sold weapons to anyway. Again, the main point is bashing Clinton moreso than be some sort of a real analysis of America-Russia relations in the 90s.

Since the criticism is so loose and unfocused I don’t generally really get what the Republicans even think the Clinton administration should have done. The Republicans claim that Clinton admin basically pushed the Russians towards “state interference” and “centralization” instead of “building a free market economy”, expect the Russian privatizations were bad, because they were done before the Russians had built a market economy. But to do what they want would have almost certainly required a more centralized and structured effort, requiring state interference. Disastrous crash privatizations are what happens when one doesn’t have that.

On the other hand Clinton-Gore gets blamed for ruining US relationship with Russia (wasn’t this one of Bush campaign themes?), on the other hand the report constantly indicates that Clinton-Gore should have meddled much more in the Russian policies, condemned Russian weapons trade with Iran and the Chechnya War, enlarged NATO even faster than it did, dealt with figures other than official Russian state figures like Gaidar and Chernomyrdin (apparently Yavlinsky – that eternal Western hope of a sensible Russian liberal, with 30 years of failure running currently to make a mark in the Russian society) etc. – ie. done stuff that would have ruined the US-Russia relations far more and would have probably led to a good chance of a figure more radically anti-Western than Putin getting in power, possibly sooner than Putin’s anti-Western turn really happened.

Of course, there are actual points here, I am ready to accept that US should have been more forceful about condemning Russian policy in Chechnya, or critical of the way the 1993 Duma standoff was handled, or about Russian corruption, or a host of other things, but even there it’s not really about US interfering too much, is it? The most substantial charges are basically not that Americans interfered with Russia to bring it disaster but that they didn’t interfere enough. It’s an opposite point to what you are arguing!

Once one removes all the Clinton-bashing, what remains is mostly evidence that the fundamental power was Russian post-Soviet corruption. Reading all this actually increases my confidence that 90s were just another case of Russia getting ruined by Russians, and the latter-day assessments that it was the Yanks wut done it are a powerful form of cope.

The US allows Cuba and Venezuela to maintain alliances with hostile foreign powers. It is actually backing the pro-Russian and Chinese faction in Brazilian politics.

seek partnership instead of hegemony

The US tried that in the 1990s, when they gave billions in aid to a country that had recently been an enemy, even as Yeltsin was shelling his parliament, supporting Serbia against NATO (as best Russia could at that point), and using the Russian army to occupy parts of sovereign countries next to Russia.

How much more should the West have given Russia in aid? And what fewer conditions should they have given on internal reform?

Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe

This might have been an option in 1945. By the 1990s, it was too late for Russia to say "We'll be good, honest."

supporting Serbia against NATO (as best Russia could at that point)

If the U.S. was not acting as a hegemon against Russia, NATO would not have been helping Albania annex part of Serbia in the first place. (Ironically, in pretty much the same way Russia is now trying to annex parts of Ukraine but with less historical justification.)

Last I checked Kosovo wasn't part of Albania, it was a corrupt semi-independent disputed territory, and it's not semi-independent because of an Albanian invasion, but because the country it had been part of (yugoslavia)dissolved in a brutal civil war.

That's the problem with partnership when you have different interests.

The 1990s window of opportunity for a US-Russia partnership is a myth. Yeltsin only stepped back from Russia's imperial role insofar as he had to do so to keep the lights on, the bread in stores, and the army from overthrowing him. Insofar as he could, he kept Russia powerful. Clinton and Bush were the same: they mostly supported Yeltsin insofar as either (a) it benefited the US's interests directly or (b) it indirectly helped the US by encouraging Russia to move towards a peaceful capitalist democracy.

That (b) failed was outside of anybody's hands by the 1990s, I think. Russia has ended up without democracy or peace, though there is certainly enough capitalism for Putin and the elite to get very rich.

There is no evidence of heavy American involvement in Euromaiden. The evidence shown is Americans discussing what is going on which is quite normal.

In retrospect America should have looked for hegemony in Russia after the USSR failed and written big checks like a Marshall Plan. As things have played out that was a better game.

It would have looked pretty silly if the US aided Russia just as anti-US generals took over in a coup, as nearly happened in August 1991. Or Yeltsin created a dictatorship, which looked quite plausible given what was happening in 1993.

There was never a golden dawn of democracy and pro-Western elite sentiment in Russia.

I think the US could afford for Ukraine to lose because so few Americans care about Ukraine. Even if Russia gains territory, the US will be able to rightfully claim that Russia is weaker because of the invasion because of the economic, military, and diplomatic costs it has suffered.

Disagree. We have security guarantees across the world. Most of the world system depends on these things.

The US never had a security guarantee with Ukraine, so this doesn't particularly impact the validity of formal security guarantees with NATO or countries like South Korea or Japan.

But we do have informal security guarantees. And weakness in an informal guarantee would still threaten formal guarantees. At this point in the war everyone knows the west has aligned with Ukraine. And we have a side. And we’ve invested now a lot in that side. If we back away now it would make even formal guarantees as something we might walk away from if the price got too high.

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