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Culture War Roundup for the week of February 13, 2023

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So, Curtis Yarvin just dropped a long essay about why he doesn't like the West's support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia: https://graymirror.substack.com/p/ukraine-the-tomb-of-liberal-nationalism

Or, at least, that's what I think his point is. As usual with his writings, it can be hard to tell.

FWIW, reading Unqualified Reservations was probably the single most important event in my journey to this weird part of the internet that we call the Ratsphere, even though Yarvin probably doesn't consider himself a rationalist (and I neither do I, really).

However, on this particular point (Ukraine), I find myself quite frustrated. All those words, and he never once (as far as I can tell - I admit that I only had time to skim the article) addressed what I would think would be the most obvious point if you're trying to convince a bog-standard Westerner why they shouldn't support Ukraine: Ukraine was invaded by Russia. Not a "regime change" type invasion, a la USA vs. Iraq '03, not a "peacekeeping" invasion. A "Russia wants some of the land currently controlled by Ukraine to be controlled by Russia instead" invasion. A good, old-fashioned war of conquest for resources. The kind of war that, since 1945, the industrialized West (or "first world") has tried very hard to make sure nobody is allowed to wage, especially not in Europe. And therefore, the West's support for Ukraine is entirely justified by the desire to make sure nobody is allowed to get away with just seizing territory because they want it.

Like I said, maybe he does try to convince the reader why this policy is wrong, but in true Moldbuggian fashion, he uses 10,000 words to say what would be better said with 100.

Or maybe he assumes that anybody paying attention knows why the standard narrative is wrong. Maybe I'm wrong about how and why Russia invaded Ukraine.

As a side note, I do think it's interesting that the both the most radically right-wing Substack author I follow (Yarvin) and the most radically left-wing Substack author I follow (Freddie DeBoer) both think the West's support for Ukraine is bad. Is this just horseshoe theory? They both hate the United States for different reasons and anything it does is wrong by default?

Your first mistake is assuming this article is about "The West". It isn't. It's about the United States of America. The reasons that say, Poland or Finland have for supporting Ukraine are not necessarily the same reasons that America has. America has no specific policy interests in Ukraine other than its general interest in maintaining world domination.

He literally just gave one: an international commitment that nobody is allowed to invade anyone for territorial expansion is a useful state of affairs for literally every nation on the planet except those that hope to invade others for territorial expansion. Smaller nations like Peru or Sudan could not reasonably be claimed to have "world domination", and aren't especially close to Ukraine, but still have a legitimate interest in nations conquering other nations not being a normal state of affairs. Their smallness just means they lack the ability to intervene effectively, not the motive.

A system in which unethical and powerful nations are allowed to conquer smaller nations without intervention, while ethical powerful nations neither conquer nor intervene, is one in which unethical nations systematically grow faster than ethical nations. Natural selection makes this lead to predictably bad results, so it's a bad system.

America has no specific policy interests in Ukraine other than its general interest in maintaining world domination.

"But other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?"

Maintaining Pax Americana is a pretty big policy goal of the US. If another country with nukes decides to embark war of conquest for resources, that risks the breakdown of that peace. If that country succeeds in its war of conquest, and ends up being materially better off for having embarked on it, I expect that more wars of conquest follow. Which I expect is contrary to American interests.

As a side note, I do think it's interesting that the both the most radically right-wing Substack author I follow (Yarvin) and the most radically left-wing Substack author I follow (Freddie DeBoer) both think the West's support for Ukraine is bad. Is this just horseshoe theory? They both hate the United States for different reasons and anything it does is wrong by default?

It's not that surprising. Russia still has vestiges of communism, hence why some on the left support it, or at least are not gung ho about supporting Ukraine. Also, America helping Ukraine is an extension of US interventionism. Likewise, some on the right opposite American interventionism and see Russia as a traditional country and Putin as a strong nationalist.

Russia still has vestiges of communism, hence why some on the left support it, or at least are not gung ho about supporting Ukraine.

I have never seen anyone on the left argue this. Can you provide an example? What I see is more along the lines of reflexive anti-Americanism, where a leftist dislikes America, so criticizes everything it supports.

I have never seen anyone on the left argue this.

This article last year suggests some echoes of the mentality within the Russian Army.

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-analyst-urges-military-socialism-amid-ukraine-invasion-1704540

My reading of the situation is that the USSR has been subsumed into a narrative of Russian Nationalism, with some of the mindset hanging around among older people.

Sure, the Russian Army. But you're arguing that left-leaning people are supporting it out of love of communism, not reflexive anti-Americanism. Can you show me an example of that?

The idea is that Russia has an actual claim on parts of the country. It used to effectively be part of Russia. Khrushchev transferred Crimea in the 50s to the Ukrainian SSR for example. There were and are many Russian-speakers in the eastern provinces of the country who were unhappy that their language and autonomy was being suppressed by the government in Kiev. That's why some broke away and started fighting in 2014. The country as a whole is full of Russian speakers.

Because you know, if I wasn’t no kind of expert, if I didn’t know nothing about snakes, I might just of said: the Ukraine was part of the USSR when I was a kid and the USSR is Russia. Ukraine is basically Russia the way Canada is basically America. America is related to the two of them basically the way China is related to America and Canada.

That's what he's implying here, albeit very unclearly and in such a way as it sounds like he's saying the opposite. If you have actual claims on the country in question, then you have a reason to invade. If the country is populated by your co-ethnics who are being mistreated, then you have a reason to invade. If there are enemy powers egging on said country, then you also have a security threat.

The US does not have claims on Moldova and Georgia in the same way that Russia does. There are not actually large American minorities in Moldova and Georgia, the latter of which came under attack (hence the 2008 war). Note that the account you'll see on wikipedia today and the account of the independent EU-commissioned report written in 2009 are very different!

Can anyone explain how US security is threatened by Russia invading Georgia? It's not, as is revealed by a simple glance at a map.

Not a "regime change" type invasion, a la USA vs. Iraq '03, not a "peacekeeping" invasion. A "Russia wants some of the land currently controlled by Ukraine to be controlled by Russia instead" invasion. A good, old-fashioned war of conquest for resources. The kind of war that, since 1945, the industrialized West (or "first world") has tried very hard to make sure nobody is allowed to wage, especially not in Europe.

If you actually have claims on the land and people in question, then you're fine to move in and conquer the area. The land in question was owned by Russia/USSR 35 years ago and it's peopled by Russians today - thus Russia has a claim to it.

This seems completely opposed to Yarvin's pleas for "formalism" where he says we should stop trying to figure out which people ought to be in charge of what land ("It is very hard to come up with a rule that explains why the Palestinians should get Haifa back, and doesn’t explain why the Welsh should get London back"), simply accept current borders as correct and stop fighting over them: https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/04/formalist-manifesto-originally-posted/

I mean, he did write that back in 2007, so maybe he's changed his mind in the subsequent 15+ years.

Interesting, I didn't know about that. I admit that trying to analyze Yarvin is very difficult since he likes saying things unclearly.

Isn't Yarvin basically calling for history to end? But this has different consequences based on when it happens. In 1988 he would've called for East and West Germany to remain divided, the USSR to remain whole. In 2013 he would've said for Crimea to stay Ukrainian. Suppose in 2030 the war is over and the Russians control Kherson or Kharkov. He'd be saying they should remain with Russia.

I hold to a different position than Yarvin. I think Palestinians have a better claim to Haifa because they controlled it more recently than the Welsh controlled London. If the Russians invaded and conquered Belize somehow, they wouldn't have a claim on it for a very long time if ever.

The 1922 census of Palestine, conducted by the British authorities, recorded Haifa as having a population of 9,377 Muslims, 8,863 Christians, 6,230 Jews, and 164 others. By the time of the 1931 census of Palestine, this had increased to 20,324 Muslims, 13,824 Christians, 15,923 Jews, and 332 others.

By 1945 the population was 33% Muslim, 20% Christian and 47% Jewish.[63][64] In 1947, about 70,910 Arabs (41,000 Muslims and 29,910 Christians) and 74,230 Jews were living there.

Yarvin has always been a campus radical at his core.

I wrote a python script to copy each 2000-word chunk of a Yarvin article into my clipboard so I could paste each chunk into ChatGPT for a summary. Here is what ChatGPT said:

The passage discusses a prank phone call made to former Secretary of Defense Esper by Russian pranksters posing as the Ukrainian politician-oligarch Petro Poroshenko. Esper expresses his support for Ukraine and acknowledges the importance of supporting them with munitions, arms, and intelligence. The passage then questions why so many people have died in the war, which affects not only Ukraine but also Moldova, Georgia, and other places with Russian involvement. The author suggests that the conflict is primarily driven by local oligarchs vying for control and financial gain, and questions the effectiveness of US snake-handling in the situation. The author also notes the current situation in mid-February 2023, where it appears that the Ukrainian military is struggling on the battlefield, and the US is trying to make up for the production imbalance in industrial war by sending the latest tech. The author ultimately questions the motivation of the conflict, and whether it is worth the human cost.

The text is a political essay discussing the idea of liberalism and nationalism. The author argues that nationalism is a complex issue, and liberalism cannot be defined as a rigid ideology but rather as an ethical method whose ethics are questionable. The essay explores the concept of liberal nationalism and suggests that it is a thing, although there is also conservative nationalism that is considered bad nationalism. The author goes on to discuss how liberalism, as a movement, is never able to detach itself from its ruthless and unprincipled cousin, Machiavellian liberalism, and how liberal nationalism is always an expression of Machiavellian liberalism. The author also draws parallels between nationalism in Eastern Europe, the American enthusiasm for Vladimir Zelensky in 2022, and the American craze for Lajos Kossuth in 1852, suggesting that the pattern is not even specific to Eastern Europe. The essay ends with the idea that to study historical leftism as a unity, despite the notoriously fissiparous nature of leftist parties and sects.

This is a lengthy and complex passage that makes a number of points about international relations and the ideologies that guide them. The author argues that nationalism, despite its repeated failures, continues to appeal to people because it gives them a sense of power. They suggest that liberal internationalism, the idea that liberal values should be promoted globally, is essentially a bureaucratic exercise that serves to make officials feel powerful and important. The author then explores the history of liberal internationalism, tracing it back to British foreign policy in the early 19th century, and suggesting that its original intentions were more sound than they are today. The author concludes that contemporary internationalism is not even predatory, and that it is difficult to justify its actions in places like Ukraine.

Does moldbug feel obligated to oppose Ukraine out of contrarianism? I’d expect him to find a blood-and-soil angle palatable, if only that didn’t put him on the same side of the argument as neoliberals. Imperialism is apparently much cooler when someone else does it.

Skimming the actual article, it starts off weak. One part boilerplate anti-Ukraine doomerism: I definitely saw the “war of artillery” industrial argument deployed here months ago, and our resident partisans did a much better job. Two parts shameless speculation on precisely which moral failings could have led the US to such foolishness:

We’ve had enough of you, you hohol swine! For too long have your scammy spammy camgirls afflicted us on the Internet! Never again will we be phished while jacking it! Never again need we hold our boners before those hard, human-trafficked eyes. Never again shall you rug-pull our life-savings off your high-yield broken-English scamcoin! We will kill hundreds of thousands of you, we’ll go full Grozny on towns and cities, the dead will bury the dead…

What a tool.

He segues into a more conventional, for moldbug, rant about demotism liberal nationalism. Suffice to say that it consists of nebulous philosophy and bad historical analysis. There’s a damning contrast between his descriptions of liberal oligarch masters, to whose every whim public opinion may be bent, and his portrayal of the outdated strategies which they choose to pursue. Truly, the enemy must be both strong and weak.

He is more an "IQ nationalist" then an enthonationalist, see his writings on Greek nationalism and decolonization. So him opposing Ukranian indeoedence isn't a big devation, or a deviation at all from his work.

I've rarely seen conflicts in the modern world where one side stands for something as much as Ukrainians, by whatever indication one might look at, seem to be standing for Ukrainian independence, territorial unity and separateness for Russia, at the moment.

While that seems to be true, the tragedy is that they forgot that they are neighbors of a at one point superpower. And despite all the moralizing, the mighty do as they please and the weak suffer. Russia can't have NATO next door.

Why not? The only reason to be fearful of NATO at your door is well, if you're planning to do the types of things Russia has been doing for the past year. Sweden and Finland weren't part of NATO for decades, and they seemingly never felt any pressure that NATO was going to invade, because they weren't acting like a weirdo countries.

Again, this isn't some "Russia needed to become Denmark." All they had to be was a regular second-tier authoritarian power, and Europe would've happily gobbled up their gas, oil, and oligarchical money for years until Putin finally kicked the bucket.

Why not? The only reason to be fearful of NATO at your door is well, if you're planning to do the types of things Russia has been doing for the past year.

Or maybe you don't want a military alliance that is at points hostile to you next door? Do you still remember 2016-2020 and Agent Orange? this isn't ancient history. And for another, if you are paying attention you don't thrust yourself into the US foreign policy apparatus, you get backstabbed or left to rot in your time of need.

Why not? The only reason to be fearful of NATO at your door is well, if you're planning to do the types of things Russia has been doing for the past year.

Or perhaps that people like Bolton are in charge of NATO.

John Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and former White House national security adviser, said on Tuesday that he had helped plan attempted coups in foreign countries.

But who is the mighty and who is the weak here? One could argue this whole invasion is simply the end stage of Russia's downgrade into a lesser-tier power. That "at one point superpower" part of your post is doing a lot of the work there.

One could argue this whole invasion is simply the end stage of Russia's downgrade into a lesser-tier power.

it could be, but that is something we will get to see until this war ends.

That "at one point superpower" part of your post is doing a lot of the work there.

we will have to see. They are throwing bodies at the problem as they do.

Like, yeah, does Yarvin genuinely think that if America had decided to turn its back on Ukraine when the invasion started, there wouldn't have been hundreds of thousands of Slavs? The Ukrainians would have still fought - the early victories over the haphazard thrust to Kiev etc. were achieved without direct new support, after all. The Russians would almost certainly control a larger part of Ukraine, perhaps even Kiev and Kharkiv, but those would have been extremely costly battles and there would be more partisan warfare. Heck, even without US support, it's almost a given that there would be support from other Euro countries. (Yarvin would probably glibly dismiss this just by saying that European countries are US satellites and would do as they are told, but he's wrong.)

Also, when, say, Poles start talking about anticolonialism and such regarding their support for Ukraine, this is probably not the framework that they are actually using to analyze the conflict, even progressive Poles. They're just trying to speak the language the assume their particular American interlocutor would listen to, and in case of progressive Americans, that would indeed be the sort of rhetoric that refers to anticolonialism and presumed American arrogance implied in "westsplaining" etc. If that's what Yarvin is hearing from Poles he speaks to, it probably is because that's what would convince him (or, more likely, other people participating in the conversation that Yarvin, whose circles are evidently quite "blue tribe", is also a part of).

I admit to skimming most of this text, because I find Yarvin to be a crashing bore, but the general feeling is basically like when I've looked at various leftist theorizing on why (implicit) support for Russia against Ukraine is necessary because of Ukrainian Nazism and American interference and the need to create a multipolar world and whatever and am like, sure, whatever, but have you seen what I live right next door to?. Ideology is ideology, theory is theory, wanting Russia to get a good hiding so that it becomes weaker and less of a threat to my country is a natural Russian-neighbor reaction.

Also, when, say, Poles start talking about anticolonialism and such regarding their support for Ukraine, this is probably not the framework that they are actually using to analyze the conflict, even progressive Poles. They're just trying to speak the language the assume their particular American interlocutor would listen to

That's sometimes the case with foreigners, but Poland is a bad example:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prometheism

Was Prometheism specifically conceived as an anticolonial movement (instead of a geopolitical strategy to weaken Russia/SU, as the article indicates), though?

I admit to skimming most of this text, because I find Yarvin to be a crashing bore, but the general feeling is basically like when I've looked at various leftist theorizing on why (implicit) support for Russia against Ukraine is necessary because of Ukrainian Nazism and American interference and the need to create a multipolar world and whatever and am like, sure, whatever, but have you seen what I live right next door to?. Ideology is ideology, theory is theory, wanting Russia to get a good hiding so that it becomes weaker and less of a threat to my country is a natural Russian-neighbor reaction.

I feel like this is one of the fundamental disconnects between the comfortable bourgeoisie types @johnfabian was complaining about and the more pragmatic. Somewhere in my discord history there is one of those JuanCarlo Esposito memes that reads "You're sporting a Ukrainian flag because it looks good on Instagram, I bought a case of tourniquets and donated them because I grew up with my Grandad's stories about life in the Soviet Union, we are not the same".

Does the invasion even happen without the CIA providing intelligence and training for the Ukrainians? Is Minsk II ignored without American armaments and implicit support? Yarvin says we don’t have this war without western deep state meddling, and that seems trivially true. Ukraine as Russian client state saves a lot of lives. If it’s worth it is a separate question, for Americans, Ukrainians, and Poles.

Ukraine as Russian client state saves a lot of lives.

I continue to find myself baffled at the assertion of this counterfactual. Like, yes, maybe in a different timeline, Ukraine and its people just collectively shrugged their shoulders, lowered the bicolor Ukrainian flag and replaced it with the Russian tricolor, but I don't think we can really say with any earned level of confidence that the change of flag would have cost less than 3-4 figures of lives. There is the implication here that Ukrainians have, or should have, a kinship with Russia (similar to the kinship between Sweden and Finland), and I simply do not think this follows. I, in fact, have been under the impression that Ukrainians already didn't like Russia long before the events of the Euromaidan, as they very much wanted nothing to do with the legacy of Communism and the USSR.

But let's grant the hypothetical that Russia got to peacefully absorb Ukraine. What then? Is Ukraine run like the rest of the Slavic East, sinking to the same levels of stunted ecnonomic development and low societal trust, having to somehow cajole Russia into giving it distinct privileges a la Chechnya?

There is the implication here that Ukrainians have, or should have, a kinship with Russia (similar to the kinship between Sweden and Finland), and I simply do not think this follows. I, in fact, have been under the impression that Ukrainians already didn't like Russia long before the events of the Euromaidan, as they very much wanted nothing to do with the legacy of Communism and the USSR.

Definitely not what I meant. Think more in terms of Hong Kong and China, or the varied demands America has placed on Central and South American states vis a vis drug manufacturing; some shared history, but most of it is a big player who gets to tell small players what to do. But since there isn’t any doubt that the big kids wins every fight, we don’t have entire cities reduced to rubble.

I think you’ve also papered over the real ethnic differences that underlie the ongoing conflicts in the Donbas for the past 10 years, although you certainly aren’t alone there. Western Catholic Ukrainians want to join the west and Eastern Orthodox Ukrainians want to reintegrate with Russia. This conflict wouldn’t have happened if splinter states for ethnic Russians were permitted, as the local referenda asked for. This war is not a noble fight between a tyrant and an underdog, but a civil war backed by opposing global powers. Seems bad to me.

According to Wikipedia, 72 % of Ukrainians are Orthodox and 9 % are Catholic (including Greek-Catholics). The numbers were already essentially the same before 2013, ie. before Crimean invasion. It's pretty clear that already then rather a greater share than 9 % wanted to join the west, and certainly far less than 72 % wanted to reintegrate with Russia.

Perhaps before talking about papering over the real ethnic (here: religious?) differences underlying the conflict it's worth it to check what the actual differences even are.

My bad, posted off the cuff and should have been more granular and done a bit more research. The conflict best maps as Catholics + Ukrainian Orthodox vs Russian Orthodox. This link from 2021 has UOC-MP as the largest denomination in the country, which is now 4% according to Wikipedia. Here’s a very nice map of the Ethnic/linguistic composition of Ukraine, notably missing from the exhaustive wiki page on Ukrainian demographics. I’m sure there’s more interesting West vs. East stuff I could dig up, but it’s not worth my time. We’re pwned, and it’s only going to get worse.

(Huh. This is what it must have felt like to be a Quaker during WWII.)

I'm sure there are Eastern Orthodox Ukranian's who wish to reintegrate w/ Russia, but the actual actions of the war show that while there may have been some eastern citizens who may have no liked the shift toward the EU, it seems overwhelming, even in the East, they dislike the whole invading the country thing more.

If the people in the Donbass wanted to split from Ukraine, there are a myriad of political ways to do it, that would actually get you widespread international support. Look at Scotland or the Basque people, for example. However, one way to lose that support is to team up with a neighboring country to start a low-scale terrorist action within your action for nearly a decade, then play the victim once the actual sovereign government punches back.

What of the democratic election of Yanukovych, based on support from the Eastern Russian speakers? What of the Donbas referendums for independence? The context for Ukrainian secession is more Bosnian War than Scottish progressives. This is Eastern Europe, my man; the legends aren’t good, but Грозный.

Like, yes, maybe in a different timeline, Ukraine and its people just collectively shrugged their shoulders, lowered the bicolor Ukrainian flag and replaced it with the Russian tricolor

This is not what being a client state means. The world is full of client states that are not absorbed into their patron, and it seems uncontroversial that Belarus (which still has its own flag) is a very pronounced example of a Russian client state, and even Ukraine under Yanukovich (2010-2014, before Maidan) was argued to be sort of one.

There is the implication here that Ukrainians have, or should have, a kinship with Russia (similar to the kinship between Sweden and Finland), and I simply do not think this follows. I, in fact, have been under the impression that Ukrainians already didn't like Russia long before the events of the Euromaidan,

Who are "the Ukrainians" here? People with citizenship of Ukraine (the country) or people who speak Ukrainian (the language), which is roughly the set of people that one would refer to as ethnically Ukrainian? What you said is true for the latter, but not true for the former; that's why Yanukovich was elected to begin with, and the Euromaidan was not peaceful. To try to deny that a distinction exists between the two categories is a rhetorical tool that is useful for the Western-Ukrainian (ethnic, government) coalition in this war, but the resulting set of definitions does not carve reality at the joints.

I view Yarvin in much the same way I view guys like DeBeor and Rod Dhrer. They couch thier opposition in "concern" for ukrainian lives but when you cut through all the bullshit what it really boils down to a mix of frustration and fear. Ukraine was supposed to be a silly made up country that no one really cared about, national sovereignty was also supposed to be a silly outmoded concept that no one cared about (never mind be willing to fight and die for), the Ukrainians were supposed to welcome the Russians as liberators because "fellow slavs".

The idiots who were confidently claiming that no one was going to fight a war over eurovision January, have spent the last year watching Ukraine go full Brave Horatius and it disturbs them because that's not something that's not something that's supposed to happen in a rational world ruled by inductive reason and comfortable academic theories like "identity politics".

I was musing as I walked through a fairly rich neighbourhood of Toronto today (Riverdale, for reference) that if I had a good reason to cheer against Ukraine, it would be these fucking pricks. Walking past a bunch of single-family homes each worth millions of dollars decked out with Ukrainian flags (and converted Canadian flags; i.e. replace the colours of the Canadian flag with a yellow maple leaf/outer bars and blue interior) didn't exactly radicalize me, but it slightly annoyed me. These types of neighbourhoods are filled with rich, intellectually vapid bourgeois PMC types who aggressively support the newest aesthetic cause (you'll also see lots of trans-inclusive pride flags and "we love our neighbours in tents!" signs) while actively working against the material interests of everyone they claim to uplift. I don't know about Moldbug because I've not read much from him, but I bet you that DeBoer, like me, tends to be annoyed by this segment of the population more than any else (because it's the crowd I most often rub shoulders with).

I suspect much of the people who claim to have high-minded reasons to root against Ukraine are more motivated by baser and petty reasons. As is the same with most political things, I would think.

I was musing as I walked through a fairly rich neighbourhood of Toronto today

Canada has a huge Ukrainian population. It’s rather centered in Prairies, and not the GTA, but it’s possible that they actually might have real ties to Ukrainians?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Canadians

In this particular neighbourhood, not very likely. The actual Ukrainian community here is located mainly ~10ish km away. This is a well-off neighbourhood too, mostly a mix of old money WASPs and new money Chinese.

I suspect much of the people who claim to have high-minded reasons to root against Ukraine are more motivated by baser and petty reasons. As is the same with most political things, I would think.

I've suspected that many of the people who oppose support for Ukraine from the right are motivated by the same thing motivating people who oppose support for Ukraine from the left: anti-Americanism. But, now, they associate 'America' the state with what they call 'neoliberalism' and wokeness so they have begun to adopt the left's attitudes on foreign relations.

I can certainly sympathize.

And therefore, the West's support for Ukraine is entirely justified by the desire to make sure nobody is allowed to get away with just seizing territory because they want it.

But why do we want that? The U.S. had a clear interest in preventing this when the spread of Communism was a real threat. But that's not the case any longer. What interest do we have in guaranteeing the rights of the weak everywhere against the strong? (Without taking position on whether or not Ukraine is stronger than Russia, the implication seems to be that they cannot win without massive assistance from us.) Some countries, perhaps, are Too Big to Fail. Is Ukraine really one of them? Is preservation of the status quo worth any amount of blood or treasure? I'm not persuaded of the automatic moral duty of bystanders to intervene when one country consumes another any more than when one wild animal consumes another. In terms of international relations, the world is a jungle and jungle rules and ethics apply.

But why do we want that? The U.S. had a clear interest in preventing this when the spread of Communism was a real threat. But that's not the case any longer. What interest do we have in guaranteeing the rights of the weak everywhere against the strong?

Interest? Easy- by guaranteeing the rights of the weak against the strong, you can prevent the strong from becoming stronger, and eventually strong enough to deprive you of your rights/sovereignty. In any framework which acknowledges conquest as a benefit to strength (more ressources to conquer more resources), the best way to prevent someone from ever being able to conquer you is to keep them from conquering others- or, failing that, to maximize the costs of doing so to the extent that the rate of return is diminished as much as possible.

Additionally, since the invention of the telegraph history indicates that the US public will be willing to intervene to defend allies or those they sympathize enough with or when someone attempts to seize such leverage that could be used against the United States. Unless you posit that this historic norm will go away, if you expect there to be interventions it's best to do it when it's cheapest (before conquerors conquer a mighty empire) and easiest (when a norm against conquest enables cooperation against would-be conquerors).

Some countries, perhaps, are Too Big to Fail. Is Ukraine really one of them?

Arguably, given the effects that could be expected of food export collapse. Or rather, keeping Ukraine free of Russia can arguably keep Russia from being too big to fail as a global agricultural exporter, and thus denying Russia leverage over the global food supply when they have already demonstrated intent, willingness, and actual efforts to use economic livelihood inputs to pressure, punish, or attempt to coerce other states.

Is preservation of the status quo worth any amount of blood or treasure?

Who says any net amount of blood or treasure is on the line?

There is a linguistic motte and bailey here about the different meanings of 'any mount'- which could be miniscule or massive. Arguments that massive amounts of blood or treasure are being spent rely on selective use of absolute vs relative metrics , categorization overlap (Ukrainian casualties versus American casualties), and of course the general issues of accounting (the treasure spent on a munition slated for decomissioning or a vehicle in cold war storage is not the the replacement cost used to make aid announcements more impressive).

There's also the general lack of consideration of the alternatives. A common criticism of western aid over the last many months has been that 'the West is running out of ammo and systems to give, and needs it for its own defense instead.' But this runs into the point that the only threat most NATO systems are credibly on hand for is... destroying the Russian equipment they would be destroying in Ukraine. Whereas if you give the systems to Ukraine, you not only pay a lower cost in blood and treasure for attriting the Russians via a proxy conflict rather than a direct conflict, but you also reduce the amount of weapons / ammo you need to keep on hand at all times going forward. NATO needs considerably less defensive capabilities now, in 2023 when something like 70-90% of Russian combat capability is committed to Ukraine, compared to the systems and bodies needed two years ago when Russia wasn't in Ukraine.

I'm not persuaded of the automatic moral duty of bystanders to intervene when one country consumes another any more than when one wild animal consumes another. In terms of international relations, the world is a jungle and jungle rules and ethics apply.

Amoral international realism is one of the strongest arguments for the Americans supporting Ukraine, not for refusing to provide aid. The objections to aid generally rely on morality to the neglect of the benefits of alliance management and denying the advent of rivals of sufficient mass or credibility.

In the same way it was in the interest of the British during the Napoleonic Wars and the century of warfare prior to balance against any potential hegemon on the European continent, it is in the interest of any power in North America to balance against any possible hegemon in Eurasia. While China is the primary threat here, Russia represents smaller scale version of the same thing and, more generally, freezing borders in place to the greatest extent possible keeps Eurasia fragmented and unable to unite under a hegemon capable of threatening the US across the Atlantic or Pacific.

Is preservation of the status quo worth any amount of blood or treasure?

No, but in Ukraine's case it isn't our blood and only a miniscule portion of our treasure. Bleeding Russia is on sale right now, so we bought a little.

Why is America hostile to Russia. Or China. Or Iran?

Iran gives a lot of financial support and weapons to anti-American forces in Iraq. IEDs killing Americans in Iraq were from Iran.

Again that’s cart after horse. Why is the US in Iraq to begin with.

Is that a serious question for me to answer? The Bush administration seriously misunderestimated how hard nation building can be. Blame them.

Let's not recursively ask questions driving towards "why are all nations not maximally isolationist?" Because they just aren't. That's not a privileged or default state. For many reasons many countries are in conflict. I don't have a pithy satisfying answer to such messy and varied matters.

It’s actually good to try to go to first principles. To try to act like an intelligent alien. Iraq isn’t a state which borders the US. Sure I know the reason why the US is there, but if someone says Iran is our enemy because of what it does in Iraq then it’s reasonable to ask why Iraq.

In the end of all of this I see little or no reflection on the ultimate reasons for US imperialism - or if it benefits the US citizen

Because the American public, with its default prioritization interest in domestic rather than international politics, is most easily moved to care about international politics on the basis of sympathy for an victim or moral offense, and Russia, China, and Iran give plenty of reasons to be offended. Russia acts like a steotypical drunk abusive wife-beater, Iran still chants 'Death to America' and had a non-negligable role in helping bomb Americans (and other people) abroad, and China was gradually seen as both a cheat and threatening a more sympathetic underdog.

That’s doesn’t explain much. These enemies are enemies that the US elites have decided to prioritise. Saudi is an ally and probably a greater influence in the terrorists who bomb Americans.

Because great power politics is zero sum. There's the best, and there's the rest.

NATO is the best. Russia and China are possible nuclation points for the rest.

So, if russia wants to demonstrate themselves as a decrepit kleptocracy and take themselves out of the running for another 60 years, it's worth a few trillion in funny money bucks.

Why does America need to be a hegemon? It is one of the richest countries in the world - the richest per capita since the 19C. It didn’t feel the need for an empire then.

Your causal links are reversed, there.

America is rich because it is absolutly secure, has maximim prestige, is incredibly credible, and controls the global reserve curency.

All those qualities are confered on the US (and on NATO/NAFTA/whatever other treaty partereners it has to a lesser extent) BECAUSE America is the hegemon.

Thus, much like Rome, imperial china, spain, france, england, and etc; being a Hegemon makes you rich makes you the hegemon. Losing your hegemon cred puts you in danger of losing your riches.

Empires can be expensive and will in effect make the US poorer in the king run. And civilisations need to think about the long run.

This is something people say, but is just not true.

Empire is expensive when it starts to colapse. The solution then, is to not let it colapse.

In any case; the USA is in a unique position where they have managed to defer most of the inherently wealth destroying on the ground work to their hegemonic junior partners; and they get to reap most of the benefit of the expensive part of empire; excepting our little short 20 year neo-con adventure in the middle east.

The 19th century was America's century of conquest. Natives, Mexicans, and almost the British Canadians were displaced or conquered.

Canada held on to its independence by the skin of their teeth. Most of Mexico was conquered. Modern day Mexico is the minority of their territory that escaped US conquest.

Being from Britain, American Hegemony is great. America might be the world's first large Empire with such enthusiastic imperial satellites.

Which 19th century are you thinking about?

Many would argue that the US absolutely did engage in bloody imperial conflicts in 19th century, ranging from the support of the Texas succession against Mexico, the Mexican-American war which was a major war of territorial expansion, the civil war against separatist, the various Latin American interventions, and of course the buildup to the Spanish-American war, which saw the US become a formal empire right at the end of the century.

Moreover, the 19th and then pre-WW2 20th century was absolutely a period of repeated American anti-imperialist actions to thwart, counter, or militarily defeat imperialist actions. The Monroe Doctrine, hypocritical as it was, was generated as a way to deny imperial conquests to those who would have otherwise been able to enforce them. American China policy was not only about getting American access to the China market, but preventing and rolling back other empires from exclusive market and political control. The Spanish-American War was driven in the leadup on a wave of anti-Spanish Empire yellow press and fervor. This doesn't even go to the influences those born in the 19th century had in the mid-20th, where the US even threatened to militarily intervene against the British and the French empires over the Suez Crisis.

If you want to appeal to the 19th century US, it's kind of important to remember that the post-Civil War reconstruction was an aberation, not a norm of pacifism. When the US had the ability, it absolutely was the sort to get involved to defend its interests... and regularly framed those interests in opposition to imperialist efforts.

Yes. That’s totally true, and I should have asked in the post why the US wants to be a world hegemon, or empire, which wasn’t the case at the start.

Because they want stuff that we also want or have?

Why did Rome strive to ensure that the Germanic tribes could never unite? Why did the Roman Senate say "Carthaginem delendam esse"?

Because hegemony requires that any hypothetical threats be destroyed before they gain strength.

Therefore, the US is opposed to China, Russia and Iran. Therefore, a conflict between the US and India is inevitable in the near future.

If you, as a US citizen, want to enjoy the security and wealth that American hegemony provides you, then you must accept the blood that must be shed to achieve it.

But why do we want that?

Possible reasons:

  1. The norm is good in and of itself, in that it prevents the chaos that would come if everyone felt they could reopen the books. Can you imagine what Africa would be like?

  2. The norm is pragmatically good for specific amoral US interests: the US has completed its own expansion into some of the best-placed territory in the world. It needs no more. Its enemies however, do. China is hemmed in by US allies and a secessionist region that it wants back both for ideological and geostrategic reasons. Russia clearly feels geographically insecure. The US would prefer they stay hemmed in or insecure and thus promulgating the norm and the perception of vigorous US reaction to attempts to revise borders has the potential to hobble its enemies and prevent their ascension.

  3. More like 2a: US allies with enemies with revanchist goals will be far more comforted by vigorous US action rather than inaction.

  4. More specific to this war than the general principle: Russia is a geopolitical rival and this weakens them. It arguably weakens the EU too (who buys Russian gas instead of more expensive US LNG?), while strengthening US leadership and thus leverage in Europe - the mythical "EU army" would have died when Germany admitted they wouldn't send tanks until the US did, if it had ever been alive in the first place. Everyone loses here from a protracted conflict, except the US. And maybe Ukraine, depending on how much you value self-determination.

The U.S. had a clear interest in preventing this when the spread of Communism was a real threat. But that's not the case any longer.

Assuming that communism alone and not the threat of Russian expansion was the concern, yes.

What interest do we have in guaranteeing the rights of the weak everywhere against the strong?

Does the US actually do that everywhere? I'd argue that the US tried it in, like, Mogadishu and then immediately lost taste for it at the first sign of trouble. So Clinton sat back and allowed the relatively "cheap" - in terms of prevention costs - Rwandan genocide.

Elsewhere the US actively guarantees the rights of the strong against the weak: e.g. in its support for regimes like Sisi's that literally shot unarmed protestors. Support for the Saudis who were bombing Yemen. I wouldn't say Iran is weak but US sanctions and support for Saudi Arabia and Israel alters the power balance in favor of the latter.

Is preservation of the status quo worth any amount of blood or treasure?

No, but it isn't the status quo, and it isn't US blood and treasure is cheap(er) - for the US.

This situation - for better or worse - is actively causing Russian power to degenerate. One way or another, I don't think we're headed back to the pre-2022 status quo. That's not necessarily a good thing - a desperate Russia is a dangerous Russia - but some planners are apparently willing to take the risk

I actually was of the opinion that Ukraine (hell, Europe's security issues more generally) wasn't a core concern of the US and it should focus on Taiwan since it would almost inevitably cave fast. But, if Russia is so incompetent as to bungle their invasion and are now trapped in a quagmire where US material can constantly bleed them...the logic changes.

I'm not persuaded of the automatic moral duty of bystanders to intervene when one country consumes another any more than when one wild animal consumes another. In terms of international relations, the world is a jungle and jungle rules and ethics apply.

Here is where I have a little more sympathy for DeBoer's position. The US has been plenty glad to be a bystander in dozens of other bloody conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, so what makes Ukraine so special? Yarvin just seems agitated that his ideological opponents seem to be winning.

so what makes Ukraine so special?

It's a big country in Europe and not in the Middle East/Africa, to put it crudely.

Putting aside the "emotional" component of things as well, there's real benefits for the US to be had in this conflict, the US has been throwing pocket change and whatever rubbish it can be bothered to pull out of mothballs in exchange for watching Russia repeatedly shoot itself in the feet and legs.

Yarvin just seems agitated that his ideological opponents seem to be winning.

This, combined with those who reflexively oppose the west, seems to explain a lot of the pro-Russian sentiment in the west for this war.

whatever rubbish it can be bothered to pull out of mothballs in exchange for watching Russia repeatedly shoot itself in the feet and legs.

Eh, no. It hasn't been sending 'rubbish' out of 'mothballs'. Germans did that with a delivery of literally mold-covered east-German anti-air missiles.

Stingers and Javelin ATGMs are still standard issue. The ammunition sent also was of the same type military is still using.

The only piece of 'rubbish' sent by the US was the M777 howitzer, and maybe some shitty armored cars and humvees.

Now it's sending Bradley IFVs which.. are kinda midway, depending on their configuration.

Stingers and Javelin ATGMs are still standard issue. The ammunition sent also was of the same type military is still using.

As I said the last time this argument came up, while Something like 30 Billion dollars might sound like a lot it is quite literally pocket change when viewed in the context of the US Federal budget.

Likewise expending a bunch of ammo/gear that was approaching the end of its shelf-life anyway on actually diminishing a threat to our allies rather than in training exercises or just scrapping it seems like a no-brainer to me.

Uh-huh. Americans just sent their almost expired ammo to Ukraine, which is why they're now sweet-talking South Korea and Israel to start selling off parts of their artillery shell stockpiles.

Yes actually. Volume is volume.

If you can convince other countries to send their existing stockpiles to Ukraine while buying restocks from GD, ATK, and Raytheon that's a win for the US military industrial complex.

No, US is talking about buying shells from abroad, not selling shells to foreign countries.

Indeed, some have said they won't ship shells to Ukraine, but will sell them to various NATO countries who can then ship out their own stockpiles.

Yet despite all this shuffling, apparently there isn't enough 155mm ammo for Ukrainian guns.

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Well cut quote, everything you've listed is covered by "pocket change".

There's a difference between mothballed & obsolete and 'equipment that's still in front line use and will be missed because no one can restart production lines fast enough'.

Wild animals in the jungle is a misleading analogy. A better analogy would be "I'm not persuaded of the automatic moral duty of bystanders to intervene when one human being robs another" (which in these days of "property crime isn't all that big of a deal, especially when it happens to rich white people" leftist thinking is perhaps not as extraordinary a position as I might prefer). Just as human beings who want their property to remain in their possession have a vested interest in making sure other humans' property is protected from theft, countries who want their sovereignty over their territory to remain intact have a vested interest in defeating any defector nations who decide that they should just take that other country's land because they can.

And yeah, sure, these same Western nations have their own history of military conquest for profit. That doesn't make them hypocrites for standing up to Russia in 2022, any more than if my grandfather happened to have been a professional thief, it would be hypocritical for me to become a police officer.

Because that’s what the US empire is founded on, and besides Russia is our enemy.

If you're not willing to take a stand on something when it's easy (Ukraine), nobody will believe for a second you'll do it when things get hard (Taiwan and looming Chinese expansionism)?

Do you actually believe that the US government's actions abroad are motivated by a principled desire to be good and moral? I cannot possibly understand how you could given the history of the US and specifically their military adventures over the past few decades. When I look at the actual actions and even the statements that come out of the US military, the idea that they base their decisions on morality as opposed to the hard calculations and strategic gameplaying of empire is utterly farcical.

Depends on the status quo, not necessarily. But that's a silly argument to make in this situation. Supporting Ukraine required ~zero American blood so far and, by the standards of modern conflicts America has been involved in, very little treasure.

In terms of bang for the buck, this might (so far) be the most successful conflict the US has been involved in since WW2.

The US has not achieved their goals, and the blowback/second-order consequences from the sanctions they placed on Russia are only beginning to come back around. Cutting off a major energy supplier like Russia is going to cause, and already is causing, severe issues in energy markets. The current conflict and the US response to it is playing a large part in the massive inflation we're seeing all over the western world, and these things are continuing to get worse, not better.

Do you actually believe that the US government's actions abroad are motivated by a principled desire to be good and moral?

Yes, to an extent. But there's also the practical dimension.

The US signals to others that it won't let Taiwan be easily invaded by China, by supporting Ukraine.

Removing the moral dimension, supporting Ukraine is still a useful measure, because it shows that a smaller country will recieve support when the bigger nation on its borders invades.

Regardless of how the war ends, Russia doesn't look likely to get anything worth the cost. That's a deterrent analogous to MAD in a cold Nuclear War. Pay the price to bring down an enemy up front, so you don't have to pay it further down the road when it's higher.

The US signals to others that it won't let Taiwan be easily invaded by China, by supporting Ukraine.

Removing the moral dimension, supporting Ukraine is still a useful measure, because it shows that a smaller country will recieve support when the bigger nation on its borders invades.

The RAND corporation, one of the most influential think-tanks in the US government and which put out a paper outlining why starting the Ukraine conflict was a good idea for the US before it happened, has actually started claiming the opposite. The US is going to have a lot of trouble fighting the Ukraine war and defending Taiwan at the same time, and the conflict now risks overextending the US rather than Russia/China. I highly recommend giving the following document a read: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html

But either way there's no chance that the US actually shows that signal to anyone. Have you heard of Yemen? The US is assisting Saudi Arabia, a much larger and wealthier country, as it tries to crush the Houthis. The US' actions historically make the idea that "a smaller country will receive support when the bigger nation on its borders invades" a non-starter.

Regardless of how the war ends, Russia doesn't look likely to get anything worth the cost.

Russia, from the research I have done at least, views this as a fight for survival and self-determinism. What they wanted was a stable buffer zone, and what they are going to get instead is rubble - but that rubble isn't going to be hosting NATO nuclear interdiction systems. What Russia thinks is that the US believes it has the right to launch a nuclear first strike, and that placing those interdiction systems will give them the confidence to do so. From their perspective, a war which knocked their economy back two decades and made them look like fools in US-influenced media would be an absolute bargain compared to the fate awaiting them if they lost.

Do you actually believe that the US government's actions abroad are motivated by a principled desire to be good and moral? I cannot possibly understand how you could given the history of the US and specifically their military adventures over the past few decades. When I look at the actual actions and even the statements that come out of the US military, the idea that they base their decisions on morality as opposed to the hard calculations and strategic gameplaying of empire is utterly farcical.

There is no singular 'they' or 'their' to execute a single decisionmaking framework.

As the saying goes, organizations don't make decisions, people make decisions, and organizations as large and complex as the United States have a lot of people who make their decisions for a lot of reasons. There are absolutely times when the government's decisionmaking is driven by people motivated by principles they view as good and moral- and simultaneously driven by people whose interests are strategic, and by people whose interests are tangential but they're making a compromise, and by people just phoning it in while they focus on another areas like their domestic political interests, and by people who are making quid-pro-quos, and so on. These are not contradictory, these are simultaneous, and a dirty secret is that people in government don't all share the same ethic systems or valuation of specific information.

The US has not achieved their goals,

The depends on what you believe their goals and the expected timeframes are expected to be. The American government by and large hasn't been among those arguing that the Russians would collapse within months under sanctions or that this would be anything but a long war.

and the blowback/second-order consequences from the sanctions they placed on Russia are only beginning to come back around. Cutting off a major energy supplier like Russia is going to cause, and already is causing, severe issues in energy markets.

This depends on you believing this is a bug, and not a feature or means to advance other goals (such as transition to green energy, or forcing European divestment from Russian energy dependence, or advantaging American industrial investment attractiveness versus other regions), or just an acceptable cost achieving other objectives.

The current conflict and the US response to it is playing a large part in the massive inflation we're seeing all over the western world,

'Large' in absolute or relative terms? Likely no for either- both as a % of spending but also in relation to other macroeconomic pressures (especially the still-translating implications of COVID policies), the war is a correlation to issues with deeper causations. COVID stimulus spending and Biden's ironically named inflation reduction act and ongoing investment changes around the world as well as demographic-shift driven investment and consumption dynamics are all independent of the Russian invasion.

and these things are continuing to get worse, not better.

Certainly, but irrelevant unless they would be better for a change of policy, which is not at all obvious would be the case if, say, the western coalition had collapsed in infighting or if the Russians were to win or various other potential alternatives.

There is no singular 'they' or 'their' to execute a single decisionmaking framework.

If you make this claim then you destroy the original argument being made and that I was responding to. The argument you're making is the one that the Russians themselves have - that the US is fundamentally incapable of engaging in long-term diplomacy or strategy. Why should people assume that the US will make moral decisions like protecting smaller nations when the US has no coherent foreign policy? One day you might get someone making a moral decision, and the the next you're dealing with someone from the MIC who wants a more devastating war in order to increase the profit margins of his campaign donators. I will freely concede the point that the US is incapable of acting strategically and should never be trusted to honour agreements or understandings and that this defeats my point, but it bolsters my own argument in the long run.

The depends on what you believe their goals and the expected timeframes are expected to be. The American government by and large hasn't been among those arguing that the Russians would collapse within months under sanctions or that this would be anything but a long war.

I assumed that the goals of the US were those outlined in this paper also put out by Rand - https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3063.html That document contains policy proscriptions which were actually followed, which lends it a bit of credibility in my eyes.

This depends on you believing this is a bug, and not a feature or means to advance other goals

I think that this is indeed an unexpected consequence. US interests are not advanced by a rising tide of populism and economic desperation in Europe - but this also completely destroys the moral credibility of the US. If they're willing to drive Europe into a far-reaching economic depression and energy crisis because it might advance their geopolitical gameplaying, why should anyone give them any moral credibility at all?

'Large' in absolute or relative terms? Likely no for either- both as a % of spending but also in relation to other macroeconomic pressures (especially the still-translating implications of COVID policies), the war is a correlation to issues with deeper causations.

I disagree, but actually disentangling and working out the precise nature of where blame can be assigned is the sort of thing that would be a full-time job and take up a lot of time.

Certainly, but irrelevant

Economic conditions continuing to deteriorate and hence opening the door for populist and nationalist leaders is far from irrelevant. This could have serious potential blowback, and I don't think trying to get a colour revolution started in Hungary is going to fix it.

the idea that they base their decisions on morality as opposed to the hard calculations and strategic gameplaying of empire is utterly farcical.

I don't think that they draw a distinction.