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The most salient lesson of the post-Cold War era: Get nukes or die trying.
A nation's relationship to other states, up to and especially including superpowers, is completely different once it's in the nuclear club. Pakistan can host bin Laden for years and still enjoy US military funding. North Korea can literally fire missiles over South Korea and Japan and get a strongly-worded letter of condemnation, along with a generous increase in foreign aid. We can know, for a fact, that the 2003 Iraq War coalition didn't actually believe their own WMD propaganda. If they thought that Saddam could vaporize the invasion force in a final act of defiance, he'd still be in power today. Putin knows perfectly well that NATO isn't going to invade Russia, so he can strip every last soldier from the Baltic borders and throw them into the Ukrainian meat grinder.
Aside from deterring attack, it also discourages powerful outside actors from fomenting revolutions. The worry becomes who gets the nukes if the central government falls.
Iran's assumption seems to have been that by permanently remaining n steps away from having nukes (n varying according to the current political and diplomatic climate), you get all the benefits of being a nuclear-armed state without the blowback of going straight for them. But no, you need to have the actual weapons in your arsenal, ready to use at a moment's notice.
My advice for rulers, especially ones on the outs with major geopolitical powers: Pour one out for Gaddafi, then hire a few hundred Chinese scientists and engineers and get nuked up ASAP.
It seems like "on the outs with major geopolitical powers" is doing a lot here. It's not even "be a democracy": nobody is threatening to invade Eritrea (not far from Yemen, also a dictatorship). It's not exclusively Muslim nations either (Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea are in the club).
As best as I can tell, the only consistent rule seems to be "don't be jerks to your neighbors beyond your borders," but I'll accept there's some level of Realpolitik at play.
Yes. I think if Iran were preaching peace with their neighbors instead of having a countdown clock to Israel's annihilation, the world would treat Iran's nuclear program very differently.
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How easy is it to smuggle a nuke, and how long would it remain viable once smuggled?
My impression of nuclear prevention and watchfulness is that it takes a lot of science and infrastructure to refine uranium into a usable state for weapons, and you can't really build all of that stuff without a lot of commotion that foreign powers will notice.
But lots of nations already have all of that infrastructure, and the country wanting nukes only needs the end product. If country A without nukes allied with country B with nukes, would country B be able to use their own infrastructure to do most of the work and then secretly pass them enough weapons grade uranium and/or assembled nuclear warheads to stick into missiles that everyone else thinks are non-nuclear? And then several years later when it became relevant they announce "Tada! We have nukes!"
Or would this be immediately caught while happening and result in massive international penalties for countries A and or B?
yes
also, it would be hard to find country B with nukes willing to sell them one way or another
lets say that Slovenia decided to buy nukes from Pakistan: then people in Pakistan can sell them out (at no risk to themselves) or go into insanely risky operation
if things leak before Slovenia gets nukes then you have decent option of sudden coup one way or another
also, even if Slovenia buys nukes it is not very valuable by itself - you also need delivery methods
also, what Pakistan would need to get (or Pakistani officials) to make it worth it?
basically any part may blow up in face of all involved
There is a rumor that Saudi Arabia put up a lot of the funds for the Pakistani bomb project, and as a result has an agreement that they could get a shipment of nukes if they ever decided to ask for them.
@MathWizard
There’s nothing preventing such a transfer. The problem is, if whoever you gave them to uses them, the victim is probably going to hold you liable for that and respond accordingly. And second, who would you trust with that, long term? Alliances sour, governments change and maybe in forty years they are pointed at you.
According to wiki, it's not just a rumour- it's the opinion of the CIA and the Mossad, has been confirmed by at least one Pakistani ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and is treated as fact by NATO.
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Isn't there probably some deal where Pakistan will sell a nuke to Saudi Arabia if Iran tests one already on the books?
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Worth note that North Korea didn't have nukes for a long time, and they stayed safe even though they did a lot to piss of the US and all their neighbors. And they still only have a few shitty low-yield nukes.
It seems like you you just have to be seen as a hard target. NK did it with mountains a ton of artillery. Ukraine was seen as a much weaker target by everyone.
North Korea was a strategically located part of the communist bloc, which made them pretty tight with the Soviet Union and China. So they weren’t really in too much danger until the beginning of the 90s, and only in critical danger after 9/11. The Kims realized this and made a successful attempt at nuclear breakout.
Didn't North Korea have a stupidly large battery of artillery lined up ready to shell Seoul as deterrent?
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Prior to the last week, I would have assumed Iran was a hard target and thus somewhat untouchable (smaller strikes/assassinations being the limit of messing with them). It's surprising how hard they've been slapped.
But also in some ways, they are still. No one is going to be launching a ground invasion, and the regime is not looking hot right now, but still has power.
It blows me away that despite a close connection to Russia, and increasingly China, they had such terrible IADS. If you can't get invaded, the only way your adversary, who has one of the world's best Airforce's, can cause you serious issues is by air striking you into pieces.
They must have thought their missiles and proxys were a deterrent, which they were at one point. But man it kills me. In PvP video games, if things are going well/fine, you should always be asking yourself "how do I lose" and it doesn't seem like the gang in Iran did that at all.
That being said. It's not hard to imagine a world in which Israel's air campaign culminates eventually as they run low on munitions and a deal of some flavor is worked out. Then Iran spends the next 5 years rebuilding and furiously fortifying. Maybe they get some tips on anti-espionage purges from the Chinese. And then in 2030 were right back to two weeks ago status quo but this time Iran has hardened everything.
This is a devastating tactical victory for the Israelis, the strategic outcomes remain to be seen...
I do not know why we wouldn't continue funding Israel to keep doing decapitation strikes on Iran leadership and maintain air superiority. This is incredible edge at incredible ROI.
Requires no ground invasion and civilian deaths are minimized. I would contribute to this GoFundMe.
Eventually, either Iran ruling committee #133 decides to surrender or the central government looks like a pathetic clown show and the nation disintegrates.
I wonder what kind of pitch deck the Kurds are circulating right now.
"The nation disintegrates" isn't necessarily a desirable outcome.
My understanding is that from a realpolitik standpoint, the issue is that it becomes a fertile ground for terrorists and extremist groups. In the case of Iran, given hiw much support they already provide to Hezbollah/Hamas/Houthis... how much more could a disintegrated nation export?
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Worked fine in Syria.
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I would be careful not to overrate these connections. China and Russia have traditionally been rule followers when it comes to arms exports to Iran, which is to say that they complied with sanctions. China hasn't sold Iran any major systems and Russia only sold Iran four batteries of S-300s. Likewise, there's been much talk of Su-35 fighters being purchased, but no evidence of their deployment.
For comparison, Ukraine is a bit over a third of the size of Iran and reportedly had 100 S-300 batteries at the start of hostilities in 2022, enough to absorb the initial Russian strike and stay in the fight long enough for western-supplied systems like the Patriot to start picking up the slack.
Likewise, while we know that Iran supplied Russia with Shaheed drones (which Russia now produces and develops as the "Geranium"), for all the talk of Iran supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, I've yet to see any evidence of them actually being deployed (i.e. actually having been shot at Ukraine or having been blown up by Ukrainians), unlike certain North Korean artillery pieces (e.g. the Koksan 170mm SPG).
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...Israel claims. While flooding every diplomatic channel with desperate pleas to the United States to join the war, closing the borders and airports so their citizens can’t leave, and passing laws to make it illegal to film ballistic missile impacts.
I don’t mean to bag on Israel in particular here, but this is a wartime situation with all the propaganda that implies. Iran has already imposed wartime censorship and shut down the internet, so the only confirmation we’re getting for any strikes on Iran is from the Israeli military spokespeople. Meanwhile there have been dozens of ballistic missile impacts against high value target locations in Tel Aviv, and the missile defense systems seem to have dropped from a 96% intercept rate to a 50% intercept rate, to a 10% intercept rate. But don’t worry, like Russia in late February of 2022, Iran is just two weeks away from running out of missiles.
the Ayatollah is hiding in some Persian bunker, wondering if the Americans or the Israelis will give him the martyrdom he's being hoping for.
Bibi is on Fox News, talking about his friend Trump.
I think Israel is winning.
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This has long been an error in the Iranian model. Iran simultaneously has been persuing a near-breakout strategy, but also an asymmetric proxy war strategy, betting that the former would deter retaliation against the later.
Nuclear deterrence really doesn't work that way, for the same reason that Ukraine didn't refuse to fight Russia because of nukes, and that fears that supporting Ukraine with material to fight back would lead to WW3 were non-credible. Nukes don't really deter retaliation in principle, only the form. So your point here-
-is absolutely correct. But also nukes weren't needed for it. Iran is a mountain fortress, and the US didn't have the stomach for the much 'easier' Iraq occupation. A conquer/displace/occupy threat was not, and still is not, going to happen, even though nukes are the solution to that level of intervention, and even though said nukes aren't present.
They Tried (TM). It's not that Iran's IADS was terrible- they had a number of modern systems. It's just that any system can be taken apart, and Israel has done a lot of prep work.
It wasn't just the missiles and proxies, but specifically Syria. If Assad hadn't fallen, this wouldn't be happening today, because Assad wasn't just a proxy/ally, but kept the airspace closed. When Assad fell, the Israeli's bombed the old regime (technically new regime's) air defense systems, which has opened up the air corridor they're using now.
At a larger level, Iran's strategy over-estimated Assad's resilience, missing the scholerosis of how the regime military was becoming more brittle rather than more firm when the Syria civil war went long. In turn, neglecting the defense, Iran over-leveraged the offense. Whether you believe they were directly involved/aware of Hamas' October attack or not, and IIRC there were elements of the IRGC/proxy network that claimed they did, Iran via Hezbollah tried to play it to the hilt in what was probably an attempt at a broader intifada.
That strategy fell flat, in a series of events that led to here. Because the West Bank did not rise up as well, the war was focused on Gaza specifically. Because it was focused on Gaza specifically, Hezbollah was used to open a northern front via the artillery campaign. Because Hezbollah was was using so many munitions for the artillery campaign, Iran was dependent on Syria to keep the flow.
But when Israel thwacked Hezbollah via the pager campaign and follow on fighting, Hezbollah was throne into disarray. Because Hezbollah was thrown into disarray, Iran was unable to rush forces to the Syrian capital to stop the rebel offensive. Because the rebel offensive could not be stopped, the logistic chain to resupply Hezbollah was broken. And the air corridor over Syria was opened. And so on and so on and so on.
Pretty much. There are things that could result this in being a bigger strategic and not just tactical victory, but they more or less hinge on the Iranians agreeing to some sort of international seizure of their more highly enriched Uranium, and I'm not sure I see that coming.
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?
The Iraq War coalition was framed as a pre-emptive war on the basis that Saddam did not yet have nukes (the only WMD to 'vaporize), but that he was trying to maintain the ability to create them in the future. The theory- propaganda, if you prefer- was that he was known to have pursued them in the past, there was reason to believe he was trying to maintain capabilities while actively circumventing sanctions, and that the consequences would be in the future if not acted upon now.
It was a casus belli premised on the argument that Saddam could not vaporize the invasion force in a final act of defiance.
I'm wondering if we watched a different Iraq war.
I remember nothing but breathless exhortations about him definitely having WMDs. And that there was evidence because of yellow cake refinement. I don't even really know what that is. But then we invaded Iraq and there was a two or three year search for WMDs that then turned out to be totally fruitless. The only thing approaching WMDs were the defunct chemical weapons stockpiles we gave to them to fight Iran.
For a lot of people it was a huge black pill moment on media credibility.
Agreed on "breathless exhortations", but ... there is a but. Certainly many people walked away thinking the purpose of Iraq war to get rid of Saddam's nukes but I can't really find evidence anyone ever said they had nukes. Overuse of word "WMD" is another move that was both brilliant yet frustrating: conflated anything from mustard gas to nerve agents and nuclear weapons.
Like, here's the press release of February 5 2003 briefing to UNSC by Colin Powell. Powell made many claims: that Iraq was hiding stuff from the inspectors and that Iraq had had a biological and chemical weapons programs in 1990s (true), that Saddam had mobile laboratories (not), that Saddam "remained determined to acquire nuclear weapons" and was trying to acquire various machines such as high-specification aluminum tubes and magnets and machines (not really). Afterwards, it became evident the Saddam's nuclear program was vaporware and had been after the 1990s, but notice how elusive the original claims were here: "Those illicit procurement efforts showed that Saddam Hussein was very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons programme -– the ability to produce fissile material." Tubes, magnets, "Saddam Hussein very focused on", "key missing piece". Sounds very scary indeed, but it was not a claim that Saddam had yet nukes.
There was a set of statements that Saddam was procuring uranium material ("yellow cake") from Africa (GWBs State of the Union 2003 and many statements by Dick Cheney). Again, it was nearly all claims about obtaining uranium, not having weapons. While searching for sources for all this, apparently there's bunch of anti-war websites who love to quote how Dick Cheney said "And we believe he has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons" on Meet the Press aired March 16, 2003. Looking at the transcript that particular phrase looks like bit of word salad to me. He did say (twice!) "reconstituting his nuclear programs", which makes more grammatical sense, probably the phrase he was supposed to repeat. If Cheney was making a claim Saddam had nukes, he was being surprisingly circumspect about it. Its all "what could happen" "if they had a nuclear weapon", "he’s out trying once again to produce nuclear weapon", "it’s only a matter of time until he acquires nuclear weapons". (Later on, the US troops found yellow cake, only it was material IAEA knew of.)
To me, the 'historiography' of media reporting looks like gaslighting twice over. First round in 2003, with a frenzy of statements by admin trying to make Saddam's alleged WMD program appear maximally bad while alluding more than what they exactly said, knowing they were warmongering on flimsy ground and hypotheticals but tiptoeing close to some imagined line they thought was supported by "evidence". Too bad that all the evidence and intelligence was blatantly false or fabricated. Second round of mischaracterization happened after the war, when everyone was angry or disillusioned or both, with anti-war side painting a picture where GWB and Cheney and Powell had said all the maximal claims of Iraqi nukes everybody thought they had heard.
Disclaimer: I was like 10 at the time, so directly I most remember just like, graphics on TV of the invasion with arrows and stuff.
I very much agree. I think what's also missing in the conversation is that it seems to me that the US population was also still pretty bloodthirsty at the time and honestly was relatively easy to convince. A lot of post-9/11 anger still without easy outlets (Afghanistan's insurgency hadn't yet kicked into major gear and was relatively quiet, Bin Laden was elusive, etc) was still in the air. Sure, Bush coined the Axis of Evil but a ton of people ate that stuff right up (maybe we didn't learn the Cold War lessons as deeply as we should have...) All of this means that when Iraq's stability had majorly deteriorated by early to mid 2004, at the same time that year the big post-op intel reports were coming out to the public and were pretty damning. In that context, I think there's a very human motivation to try and wash your own hands and absolve yourself of responsibility, and it's very easy and cheap to say "I was tricked". And even then, there's some major revisionism going on. Polling data and the behavior of politicians both seem to agree that a lot of the regret only started to spike when Iraq and then later Afghanistan war deaths continued to rise, which was well after the facts of Iraq's WMD's were well known. So yeah, people also "backdated" their opposition to the war quite a bit. All you need to do is simply look at the contrast of the 2004 and 2008 election seasons.
I always refer to this video lecture as a counter argument of why, at the time, the decision to invade Iraq can be justified by US/UK head of governement
It detailed the information available at the time for US/UK, then laid out the potential internal political backfire in case of Iraq actually having WMD and used it
After listening to the lecture, to me it always seems like invading Iraq is the rational move at the time with the available intel, while simultaneously and evidently a wrong decision after the fact as we gain more information due to the war
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The most important reason for every sane countries to defence Ukraine is nuclear non-proliferation.
Gaddafi served as the original prime counter-example of nuclear non-proliferation. Obama et al. can still marginally justify the action with human right violation (to which, as a realist, I totally disagree, in my opinion they should protect Gaddafi at all cost, to set the example of what the world are willing to do for you with the virtue of giving up nuclear)
Ukraine now being the newest example of why you should not give up nuke and instead one should seek it. Obama and Trump 1 failed nuclear non-proliferation by not helping Ukraine in the 2014 Crimean war with everything they can, under the context of Budapest Memorandum. If the Budapest Memorandum failed to protect Ukraine's border, what is the point of giving up nukes?
Then 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War started and once again, Biden and Trump 2 failed them by not protecting Ukraine's border after they give up nuke, and in some way what Biden demostrated by not wanting to esculate with Russia, and what Trump 2 is demostrating with his esculating action against Iran, is that nuclear weapons will protect you
With these 2 ongoing conflicts, there is no way any rational non-nuke country support nuclear non-proliferation anymore, any real support of such is basically treason.
It would not surprise me if more are secreatly developing nukes now, and announce the possesion of nuclear weapons in 10-15 years, or even attempt to deceive others by announcing the possesion while not actually have one or announce it to gain time while only being close to getting one.
Edit 1: For everyone how said Ukraine don't have the launch code: There is a saying that government with access to nuclear weapons is more stable from oursiders due to the risk of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist. If terrorists are said to be capable of using nuclear weapons from arbitrary country, a functioning industrialized economy with actual nuclear weapon engineers and nuclear scientist, should be able to make use of those USSR nukes
I’m not sure how nukes stop internal security problems from getting you butchered. Gaddafi didn’t fall to a ground invasion.
Gaddafi did fall to a NATO air campaign stopping and then reversing the civil war's progress, which at the time of intervention he clearly had the momentum in. Had Gaddafi had a nuclear weapon, it's extremely doubtful the NATO air campaign would have occurred, and without that, he would have been doing the butchering.
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I agree that it's hard to look at the current state of global conflict/deterrence and not concluded that having nukes is the dominant strategy for maintaining sovereignty.
But Ukraine couldn't keep the nukes. They didn't have the launch codes, they didn't have the economy to maintain them indefinitely. They definitely didn't have the economy to build out the other two legs of the nuclear triad (especially SLBMs). And finally, there's a 0.0000% chance the big dogs were ever letting them keep them.
Ukraine could trade the nukes for a "deal" or they could give them up later once they got sanctioned into oblivion, at a time their economy was already imploding.
The critical problem of getting function nukes is enriched uranium, delivery mechanism can be a truck, like the recent Ukrinian drone carrier
While they don't have the launch codes, by definition nukes must be weapon grade enriched uranium, the big dogs are likely bluffing
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The Budapest Memorandum doesn't suggest anyone do anything more than complain to the UN when triggered. It's a meaningless pinky-swear to avoid attacking them, not a guarantee of their defense. When someone brings it up at this point, years into the war, I just assume they're a support-maximalist who hopes no one knows what's actually in it.
Ukraine never had launch codes for "its" nukes and when Russia demanded them back its choices were to either comply or have the world force them. They never had any actual leverage and that's why the Budapest Memorandum was a worthless cumrag from the start.
Budapest Memorandum is always worthless in wording, but ideally should serve as the example of what the global powers are willing to commit for nuclear non-proliferation, which, many years later, is little to none
No country even make the claim that they support Ukraine base on the virtue of giving up nukes, instead of they support Ukraine mainly because it is a defensive war close to Europe
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Your point's a strong one, but I don't think your last sentence lands as the flourish you probably intended.
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One question I feel is underexplored is, to what extent would things have gone differently for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Ukraine? It seems plausible enough that in the first few weeks of the conflict, when Russia was actually aiming for the jugular, Nuclear Ukraine could have countered with a credible nuclear threat. However, if Ukraine magicked up a full nuclear triad now, would much of anything change? That is, would it be able to credibly threaten MAD to demand back Crimea and Donbass alone? (I don't think so. It seems pretty obvious that the more realistic form of their current war goals - EU and NATO membership for a rump state minus approximately what Russia has taken, plus or minus some more parts of Donbass - is too valuable to go va banque over, plus the West has an enduring interest in maintaining the nuclear-strike taboo lest the End of History gets undone any further.) Consequently, could it have credibly threatened MAD when Russia grabbed Crimea? ...when it supported the Donbass separatists in uprising? ...if, instead of doing the push for Kiev, Russia only had blitzed for the territory it controls now from the start, declaring that it wants to seize a buffer zone for Crimea and the Donbass separatists? In the worst case, Ukrainian nukes would merely have stopped Russia from making its grand opening mistake (blowing its confidence and certain classes of special force reserves on a useless operation).
Ukraine's fundamental dilemma is that while the EU/NATO exists and is friendly to it, it is very hard for it to credibly signal that it has its back to the wall; but if the EU/NATO backstop were to disappear, it would become very hard for it to marshal the will and unifying purpose to resist Russia.
In an alternate history of nuclear-armed Ukraine, I believe Putin will choose a different country to invade instead
The alt-path will likely start with Ukraine not signing the Budapest Memorandum thus keeping their Soviet nukes, while Ukraine will likely suffer some form of international trade sanction (but not a lot, as the newly created Russia will likely not sanction them to cripple they own nation)
Going into the 2000s, I believe Ukraine will achieve a status similar to pre-2022 Finland, where they will be a Friend of Russia economically, with the promise of not joining NATO, after all, everyone knows there is no benefit for Ukraine to join NATO when they have nukes, thus Russia unironically will feel a lot safer from Ukraine compare to our history
In our history, Ukraine is always a somewhat Russian friendly country before Russia fucked them hard by all the means after 2000, would Russia fuck with the government of a nuclear-armed, Russian friendly Ukraine?
As long as Ukraine demonstrate their discipline on international affairs and don't actively fuck with others, they likely achive at worst the status of Pakistan (who hosted Osama bin Laden without real consequences), likely the status of India (internationally not one give a fuck on what they do internally), at best the status of pre-2022 Finland (Staying friendly to everyone, everyone want them to be the buffer state while giving you some form of trade access), all depends on what Ukrainian can achieve diplomatically
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Ukraine is already striking Russia. I don’t think that, if they had a nuke, they wouldn’t launch it.
How does this follow? Ukraine could do great damage to Russia if it used one nuke or a handful, sure, but Russia could use a fraction of its nuclear arsenal to turn Ukraine into an uninhabitable wasteland. Besides, there is already a level of escalation available to Ukraine that is of the nuke nature without being of the same degree, which is that they could use their ample supply of mid/long-range drones to strike civilian centers with incendiary charges. Why do you figure they do not do that, by the same reasoning, whatever it is?
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This is a super interesting comment.
On a first read, I totally agree. If I'm zelensky, I'd infinitely prefer to be the leader of "the remaining 75% of Ukraine" versus "the shattered remains of the country once known as Ukraine".
But then that completely undermines the entire concept of deterrence. If your neighbor, who you have a long and shitty history with, is invading you with the full might of their army with the goal of totally capitulating you, isn't a high enough bar to use nukes, what is?
Further, it's really interesting to consider the history (or lack thereof) of nuclear war. The USA and the USSR were locked in what I'm sure felt like a profoundly existential struggle to determine the forward looking economic/social paradigm of the human race. One in which (until the maturation of SLBMs) the first mover's advantage could realistically result in complete victory for one side, and nuclear genocide for the other.
And yet, despite all that pressure, and moments where it seemed credible the other side had or was about to launch, the actual human(s) in charge of pushing the button always found a way or a reason to not do it.
And it raises an interesting question about the game theory and logic of deterrence. Under the framework, it's extremely "logical" to both ensure your nation state opponent believes you'll nuke them if they push you too far. It's also "logical" to actually nuke them if they do push too far, otherwise they'll realize you're a phony and they'll fuck with you as much as they want. But! As an individual enjoyer of industrial civilization who enjoys having their friends and family alive and not vaporized or starving to death, it's also extremely "logical" to absolutely not press that button. Sure, maybe someone else will, but hopefully when it finally comes time to do it, they'll think of their families too.
As an enjoyer of industrial civilization myself, I'm glad the second group seems to have been around when it counts.
Well fortunately thanks to Ukraine/Russia, India/Pakistan and Iran/Israel we now have an excellent iterative stress-test of just how far you can push a nuclear power before they push that big red button. Yeeting quadcopter drones into a leg of the nuclear triad? Check. “Accidentally” blowing up the other side’s nuclear weapons with a conventional strike? Check. Chucking ballistic missiles with a 4,000 lb warhead into the densely populated high rise downtown area of the capitol city? Check. And of course the control group for the study, China/USA, where nothing ever happens, but it’s always looming.
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Thanks for your kind words.
I think that you are on to an important aspect with your consideration of the history of nuclear war - this history is also a history of our theory of and intuitions on deterrence, which may not be fully applicable to modern-day situations. Most of our expectations around it evolved in the peculiar setting of two fragile apex powers locked in what felt like an unstable equilibrium in a life-or-death struggle - both the US and the USSR saw themselves as standing atop a slippery slope to complete defeat, as a USA that lost a single direct engagement with the USSR would thereafter just be a strictly weaker, less intimidating USA (and vice versa), and if they were barely stemming the tide of global communism (capitalism) now, how would they fare then? In such a setting, a "not a step back" policy is sensible and credible.
On the other hand, is this true for Ukraine? One can argue that a Ukraine that has lost Crimea, and even Donbass, is in some meaningful sense a leaner and meaner Ukraine - they are rid of the albatross around their neck that were the initially about 50% at least ambivalently pro-Russian population, both by capture and galvanization of those who remain, and backed by a West with a significantly greater sense of urgency and purpose. As 2022~ showed, Ukraine's subjugation is not in fact a monotonic slope but comes with a very significant hump around the 25% mark. What should be the theory of nuclear deterrence for that scenario? I think there is at least circumstantial evidence that it is different - since 199X, aggression towards nuclear-armed countries has not proceeded in line with the Cold War at all, whether it is India/Pakistan or in fact US/Russia.
Could you imagine, in 1980, US-made weapons hitting Russian cities using US targeting and US satellites? I'd say that the reason this is possible is that there is common knowledge that some HIMARS hits on Belgorod do not in fact leave a Russia that is strictly less able to prosecute a conflict against the West in which it is already barely managing. The modern theory of deterrence may look more like identifying the humps that disrupt the slippery slope, and trying to beat your opponent back to one of those humps but no further, versus... trying to push your humps as far up the slope as possible?
I think the term in the literature you're looking for is "escalation dominance."
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I completely agree.
I would add that having defensive alliances between nuclear and non-nuclear states is a great boon to non-proliferation. Being in NATO is very much preferable from owning a few nukes, but if NATO membership was not an option for former east block states (like Poland, whose past experience with Russia/USSR would make them wary), then these states might have started pursuing nuclear weapons after the fall of the USSR.
However, the Ukraine war also shows that nukes are not the "I win" button. Instead, the button is labeled "Fuck you, fuck me, fuck everyone". Threatening to press it outside the most existential crisis of a regime is not credible, for the most part. (The death star gambit, to blow up whichever polity annoyed you most from time to time pour encourager les autres might or might not work.)
An interesting factor here is that a number of not-themselves-nuclear powers in NATO(including Poland, but also Turkey and the Netherlands) have technically-American nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Absent this program I'd expect Poland and Turkey, at the very least, to have their own nukes.
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Alternately, build them with native talent(after all, Pakistan managed it, we can assume most major non-African countries have the ability to do so) and don’t publicize it until you’re done. Or just buy one from Pakistan.
Or just buy the tech from France (and in some way Canada) like how most new nuclear country does it, then assemble a few actual working one before you develope the in house tech and logistic to build more
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