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PaperclipPerfector  15d ago (text post)   30995 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of April 21, 2025

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So a new peace treaty for Ukraine war just dropped .

Trump’s proposed Ukraine peace plan would recognize Crimea as Russian, accept Russian control over parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, and offer Ukraine vague European security guarantees, unfettered access to Dnieper partial territorial returns, and U.S.-backed reconstruction. It also includes U.S. control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and a U.S.-Ukraine minerals deal. Vance said that the deal is final and in the case of rejection US will stop being a part of peacemaking process.

I think it's basically a great deal for both sides(I admit my bias cause for me any peace would be better than war). Ukraine loses nothing that it de facto has right now and gains territory in Kharkov, it can finally heal and maybe with some smart leadership, international investment and membership in EU it can rise to the heights of neighboring Poland, I doubt that it will and I already written on the motte why, but some chance is way better than no chance.

For Russia and specifically for Putin this is a way to claim victory after his many failures including starting this retarded SMO. Maybe for Russian state it would be better to deal with this close of an enemy once and for all, but it will not happen under current leadership and Putin is no nationalist, so even with total victory we would see semi puppet state in Ukraine that would break of as soon as possible. We are talking about person who still haven't annexed Belarus for christ sake.

I think kremlins are ready to accept this and even slightly worse versions of this deal, cause they already shown signs of it throught whole war, starting in March of 2022 and dictators are more likely to seek limited peace anyway. On the other hand Europe is actually putting some effort into its militarization, I'v seen news about new German ammunition facilities, and could collectively decide to continue the war even if US fully withdraws after rejecting the deal(which is in my opinion unlikely). That could prolong the conflict by another couple of years, probably lead to the Ukrainian territory gains but I can't see how it's worth the devastation that it would cause.

I think a US "withdrawal" coupled with an EU "entry" could curiously be the closest to an actual winning strategy for the Western bloc in this war.

From the start, the war has been defined by a curious dynamic where the fence-sitting audience was in a way more important than the combatants actually fighting. Russia does not want to fight against anything resembling the actual full industrial power of the EU and US; Ukraine wants more of it, and can't bear to lose it; meanwhile, the fence-sitters want Ukraine to win, but they don't actually want to suffer deprivations, and it would take a lot of moral outrage to get them to come to terms with having to cut back on the occasional cute latte or family vacation. As a consequence, Russia has to fight with several hands tied behind its back - it can't produce too many Gaza-like pictures of historical city cores reduced to rubble, maimed children and crying mothers, can't just sink every single ship entering or leaving Odessa, has to allow the lights to be on occasionally, and can't give the Germans a meltdown by just taking out the NPPs already. (And then, of course, there is the actual logistical support backbone that is on sovereign NATO territory and they can't risk touching at all.) To an extent, they can afford going on like this because Ukraine, too, has to hold back - its PR allowance is generous but not infinite, and so we have not seen Belgorod reduced to rubble or random high-rises in Moscow 9/11ed. I reckon even some matters of inanimate logistics are dominated by this - Russia has not knocked out the bridges across the Dnipro because the symbolism of destroying such a recognisable piece of civilian infra could also result in a watershed of Western support, and Ukraine has given up its attempts on the Crimean bridge because if it did blow successfully the Russians might figure Westerners would be less shocked and appalled if it blew up major bridges across the Dnipro in return.

If the West goes all in against Russia, this consideration is out. Of course in a few years, if the war stays conventional, the West would still win easily - but I would expect the immediate effect to actually be a swing in the favour of Russia, as they could immediately and trivially knock out all centralised power in Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe and firebomb Ukrainian cities with no regard for optics, which would significantly hamper the main workhorse of Ukrainian resistance that is the ability to mass-produce FPV drones in nondescript basements and commercial spaces hidden in residential areas. The end effect would be a scouring of Ukraine and significant damage to everything on all sides, and depending on how the escalation spiral plays out around going nuclear the West might even still chicken out and settle before its industrial might is fully retooled towards war.

On the other hand, if the US makes a point of staying out, the dynamic from before more or less continues unchanged, except now Ukraine also has all of Europe's military heft on its side. Russia will be left wondering at every step whether they can really afford to do the militarily necessary, or it will produce pictures that will push the US public and Trump over the edge after all, and it is probably in fact true that even a few civilian casualties in Germany will piss off the US much more than the same casualties are doing in Ukraine. As a result, their fear will force them to continue their current piecemeal strategy of poking at the Ukrainian front, while Europe gradually cranks up its production and gains experience until eventually even the belated decision to firebomb Kiev would not really make a difference anymore.

Russia has been more than happy to bomb historic buildings and civilian targets like shopping malls, apartment complexes, and hospitals. It hasn't moved the needle. They've also been happy enough to bomb bridges and electrical infrastructure almost continuously. There was supposed to be a minor truce at one point I think where they wouldn't bomb some electrical infra, but it fell apart almost immediately. They have limited themselves in attacking civilian ships and nuclear power plants though, as the risk of a nuclear meltdown is just bad for everyone. And yeah, they can't bomb logistics in NATO countries like Poland due to diplomatic repercussions, but otherwise Russia is fighting pretty much as hard as it can. I don't know why you think Russia is fighting with "several hands tied behind its back", as its not true for the most part. Russia even blew up that dam a while back (although they tried to muddy the waters and make it look like Ukraine could have done it).

So why do you figure are even cities like Kharkiv, which are in glide bomb range, still habitable and only minimally damaged? Why are Ukrainian civilian casualties still many times lower than those in, say, Gaza, despite the much greater scale of the conflict? Why are other dams on the Dnipro still standing, and why do you figure Russia would feel the need to "muddy the waters" if they don't actually care about the perception of the Western public?

Russia cares about worldwide public opinion to some small degree, it's just at a much lower level than you seem to think. If you asked the median Ukrainian if they thought Russia was fighting with "several hands tied behind its back", they'd almost certainly laugh at you. With the electrical bombings trying to freeze civilians to double tap strikes, there's a reason why citizens of the former brother-state of Ukraine are now calling Russians "orcs".

Russia is supply-constrained in many of its munition types nowadays. It doesn't have infinite rockets to just level every building. It's used its stockpiles and has to wait to produce more, then launch them in salvos. Even artillery shells are getting somewhat scarce (relative to the typical Russian way of war) which is why they bothered to get a bunch from North Korea.

Russia cares about worldwide public opinion to some small degree, it's just at a much lower level than you seem to think.

He seems to be portraying the Russians as caring about it to the extent it could cause an increase in support for Ukraine, why would their actual level of caring be lower than that? It's completely cynical basic strategic thinking.

If you asked the median Ukrainian if they thought Russia was fighting with "several hands tied behind its back", they'd almost certainly laugh at you.

That has no bearing on whether or not they are actually going all out on them. The US collapsed most of the Iraqi civilian infrastructure when they invaded back in the day, this is what not caring about international opinion looks like.

Because most people won't care that much no matter what happens, as long as the Russians don't do something completely crazy like bombing nuclear power plants or nuking cities.

That would imply the Russians care more than what he's portraying not less - even though most people would not care, they're not doing a fraction of what the US did in Iraq, or what Israel did is doing in Gaza.

What? Are you saying Russia's occupation of Ukraine has been substantially less brutal than the US occupation of Iraq?

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Russia has been more than happy to bomb historic buildings and civilian targets like shopping malls, apartment complexes, and hospitals. It hasn't moved the needle.

Israel doing it many more times over might have helped their PR. Wouldn't surprise me if they even pulled some strings to trigger 10/7.

I think a US "withdrawal" coupled with an EU "entry" could curiously be the closest to an actual winning strategy for the Western bloc in this war.

If this happens, I actually have an outline of a long-post lined up for how this is consistent with the Biden administration's Ukraine strategy from the earliest years of the war, including it being a potential reason for why Biden took some oft-criticized decisions such as slow-rolling the expansion of aid / escalation options in the way he did. IE, why did the US wait so long before providing [X] asset or crossing [Y] redline.

Long-story short, the US strategy was a long-term strategy that prioritized developing a support-coalition that would survive exit of given members, including the US, after political turnover over maximizing short-term gains the US could provide on its own without European concurrence/co-contributions.

The "4d chess" interpretation of the Trump administration's policy is that they are leveraging a forcing function for greater European integration and remilitarization which are both good things. The thing is the "4d chess" hypothesis for explaining Trump's behavior has been wrong every time. This is also revealed by the Signal leaks which reveal Vance's genuine distaste for defending European interests.

I don't really think this peace offer is real. Both Zelenskyy and Putin have been doing a goofy game trying to pin the other one as "the one who doesn't want peace" in the eyes of Trump. Most of Trump's public ire has been directed at Zelenskyy so far since much of the US right has nothing but searing, red-hot hatred for him. But Trump wanted to get a "deal" of some sort within the first 100 days and Putin's wargoals are still quite maximalist, so it was inevitable that Russian attempts at can-kicking peace negotiations would get old at some point. This is probably just a play by Putin to keep pinning the blame on Zelenskyy by leaving out the crucial component of security guarantees.

and offer Ukraine vague European security guarantees

This is the rub. Russia has always cared more about Ukrainian "neutrality" than they do about the exact position of the border - the demands immediately before the invasion related to "neutrality" and not territory, and the Istanbul negotiations broke down over the issue. Russia has said that troops from NATO countries in Ukraine is a red line - and if you accept the Mearsheimer realist view of Russian goals then it should be one. If they are willing to accept peacekeepers from European NATO countries then that is a major move. And the vagueness from the Trump administration on this point suggests that they are not. And on the flip side, Ukraine has no incentive to accept a deal that doesn't leave them more defensible than they are now, given the risk of Russia reneging and restarting the war in the future.

The hard part of negotiating a Russia-Ukraine deal is the security arrangements. By default any arrangement which makes it easier for NATO to defend Ukraine from a Russian attack in future is something that could, in theory, make it easier for NATO to attack Russia from Ukrainian territory. If the security arrangements are TBD (as they have to be if the countries that will actually be guaranteeing Ukraine's security were excluded from the negotiations) then there isn't a deal.

I think that it is clear why Ukraine wants security guarantees. Putin already broke the Budapest Memorandum so I would totally expect him to alter the terms of any future agreement whenever it suits him.

I am less sure if Russia is justified in feeling threatened by NATO. There have been two incursions into Russia from Europe, Napoleon and Hitler, and both failed miserably (but at a high toll of Russian/Soviet deaths). Of course, the deaths of these wars would be small fries to what would happen if NATO marched towards Russia's MRBM bases and Putin would either have to use these nukes or lose them. Anyone arguing that NATO should invade Russia to bring freedom and democracy to them is out of their fucking minds in a way which makes Trump look like a wise fucking Zen master by comparison.

By default any arrangement which makes it easier for NATO to defend Ukraine from a Russian attack in future is something that could, in theory, make it easier for NATO to attack Russia from Ukrainian territory.

Why not just attack from NATO territory in Poland, Finland (only decided to forego neutrality because of the Ukraine invasion), or the Baltics? They are closer to the presumable targets anyway.

Why not just attack from NATO territory in Poland, Finland (only decided to forego neutrality because of the Ukraine invasion), or the Baltics? They are closer to the presumable targets anyway.

Because nukes.

Any geopolitical discussion on what Russia needs to survive as a state that does not acknowledge or address the role of second-strike nuclear deterrence is not a serious discussion.

Because nukes.

And how is that any different between attack from Ukraine vs attack from eg. Latvia?

There is no meaningful difference. Any existential invasion from any direction remains deterred by second-strike nuke capability.

So you agree that having western troops in Ukraine is irrelevant for Russia’s actual safety because if they attack in force, ”Nukes fall, everyone dies”?

Typically though, you want to avoid situations where your two options are “lose and die” and “press the small red button marked ‘The End of the World’”

Why would they lose and die when losing and dying is followed by the end of the world for the attacker who forces them to lose and die?

This is where we get to the sillyness of pretending nukes don't matter or adopting inconsistent nuclear deterrence paradigms. Somehow nukes would be used for the end of the world, but not the end of nuclear state to hostile invasion which will result in the death of the people with nukes regardless.

But you notice that in either case, they still die.

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The Southeastern border region of Poland is pretty mountainous which would make an armored thrust a lot more difficult. Then you would have to fight through 400 miles of Belarus before you got to the Russian border, and another 200-400 miles of Russia before you a start to get to the important rail network terminals around St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Invading from the Baltic states, you either have the same problem of fighting through Belarus, or you would have to confine your offensive to the very small section that is the Latvian border, because Lake Peipus makes most of the Estonian border unusable. If you did that and are successful you could potentially cut off St. Petersburg pretty fast but it would be a slog to get to Moscow.

Any attack from the Baltics would also have two additional logistical problems: First you would have to concentrate your entire invasion force in a pretty small area of Latvia, making it vulnerable to a tactical nuclear attack or a conventional thrust into your staging areas. In the event of a conventional thrust you are backed up against the ocean, and risk having your invasion force overrun before it can even start moving. Secondly, Russia owns Kaliningrad and has a substantial force garrisoned there so you risk being attacked from your rear and potentially pincered between two Russian forces. You could deal with Kaliningrad before your invasion, but that could take a while and gives your game plan up weeks or months early unless you are planning on a first-use nuclear strike to deal with it.

Invading from Ukraine has none of these problems. You can attack through the Sumy region along a wide front line and it’s just a straight shot of about 350 miles over flat open steppe and major road systems directly to Moscow. Additionally you can easily divide the Russian force from any potential Belorussian force.

Invading from Ukraine has none of these problems. You can attack through the Sumy region along a wide front line and it’s just a straight shot of about 350 miles over flat open steppe and major road systems directly to Moscow. Additionally you can easily divide the Russian force from any potential Belorussian force.

Thanks, I did not realize that Moscow was that close.

Still, I think that 400km is still a lot of strategic depth, and trying to take that much quickly when your enemy has prepared fortifications seems over-ambitious.

I mean, look at Putin trying to take Kiev, which is half that distance to the border. From my understanding, Ukraine had not made it a top priority to defend against a Russian incursion before he attacked, and yet managed to fend off his initial attempt to take it. I do not think that NATO would manage to take Moscow from Kharkiv in a single decapitating strike, nor am I convinced that taking Moscow would cause Russia to surrender.

And all of that war gaming is contingent on nuclear fission magically stopping to work, because externally threatening the existence of the owner of the world's second largest nuclear stockpile seems like a utterly foolish thing to do.

Nothing Russia has is worth even the risk of getting bogged down in a conventional war like we see in Ukraine, never mind a nuclear war which would quickly escalate to an ICBM exchange.

Thanks, I did not realize that Moscow was that close.

To the point where the Prigozhin mutiny was able to get from the Ukrainian border to the outskirts of Moscow in force in about 12 hours. Admittedly they were not opposed in the way NATO would be.

I am inclined to agree - the Ukrainian border is slightly closer to Moscow than the Finnish or Latvian borders, but not by much. And obviously St Petersburg is closer to NATO now than it would be if Ukraine had been allowed to join. But the question isn't what we think - it is what Moscow thinks. And Putin has repeatedly said that he sees NATO troops in Ukraine as a Soviet-nukes-in-Cuba tier security threat. (While saying, out of the other side of his mouth, that he wants to conquer Ukraine because it is in some sense supposed to be Russian).

I don't think the Mearsheimer realist explanation of Russia's behaviour is correct - I think Putin wants to invade and conquer Ukraine and forcibly Russianise the Ukrainian people because he is a Russian nationalist and that is where his Russian nationalism takes him. But a lot of people (including, importantly, key people in the Trump administration) do buy it. And in any case Putin negotiates in the same way whether Ukrainian "neutrality" is about honestly held security concerns or whether it is a bad-faith move to isolate Ukraine in preparation for a repeat invasion.

Ukraine is in a hard but sustainable position right now. Indeed their position may be improving. With Trump's brilliant geopolitical and economic movements, China is more dependent than ever on European trade. This makes them less likely to ever militarily assist Russia (as that'd be a red line for Europe and prompt them to actually consider joining Trump-Bessent's project of isolating China), and all but ensures that Ukraine will keep getting a steady supply of Chinese materiel required for their accelerating drone warfare machine, which is currently claiming 50-80% of Russian lives on the battlefield (depending on how direct a contribution you count) and is growing less vulnerable to Russian EW. Combined with deep strikes on Russian infrastructure from radars to refineries and depleting stock of Russian armor, this means that deep offensive operations are very hard for Russians, and claiming more territory or even holding on to these gains is increasingly costly. Europe, de facto deprived of the American shield, is also quickly militarizing (see Rheinmetall stocks and so on) and commits to support Ukraine, including advanced drones. I think people don't appreciate but this is pretty bad for Russia, my friends get push notifications about rocket danger instead of heavy wind now.

In light of this, vague defense promises inferior even to ones already proven unreliable (Budapest Memorandum anyone?) from an unstable and untrustworthy and also declining actor (the US), which is threatening long-term allies and itself losing an economic war at the moment, do not seem so enticing as to violate Ukrainian constitution and de facto admit defeat, enraging the electorate. Zelensky is rational to demand better terms, which he won't get, in large part because Putin won't agree to them either. Both Ukrainian and Russian states have atrociously high tolerance for losses and their citizens will keep dying for the foreseeable future.

With Trump's brilliant geopolitical and economic movements

Wait, an ironic interpretation of this statement makes no sense in light of the argument you're making here, so are you saying it was 5D chess all along? I'm getting whiplash here.

It's a harder brand of Russian sarcasm, applied in inherently absurd circumstances.

I think some win-win can be had, especially considering that Trump's platform is incoherent. He said he wanted Europe to spend more on defense and be more independent, and he'll get it. Did he want it ho happen like this? And strengthened EU-China trade too? Probably not. But he'll definitely have something to report as a win to his electorate.

Both Ukrainian and Russian states have atrociously high tolerance for losses and their citizens will keep dying for the foreseeable future.

This seems plausible to me, but much of the rest of your comment I think is subject to criticism.

Ukraine is in a hard but sustainable position right now

I wouldn't rule out this possibility, but on the other hand it looks like Russia is sending back 20 Ukrainians in bodybags for each Russian body they get back from the Ukrainians. This almost certainly reflects who is advancing as much or more than actual casualty ratios, but it is still not great for Ukraine.

This makes them less likely to ever militarily assist Russia

The Chinese are supporting Russia's military industrially. Not only have they been criticized by NATO and European leaders for this, but Chinese firms have been sanctioned. Reporting from last fall indicates that Russia actually established a facility to build military drones in China.

If Europe is unwilling to break from China it is for other reasons, not because China isn't helping Russia.

Europe, de facto deprived of the American shield, is also quickly militarizing

Europe is not "de facto" deprived of the American shield. The Americans have done some saber-rattling to convince the Europeans to open their wallets. They might cut half of the extra forces Biden sent to Europe in 2022, since which time Sweden and Finland both joined NATO, bringing more manpower to Europe's defense than said extra forces. Reducing US forces in Europe by 10% is not the same as pulling out of NATO or anything like that.

And China has also cut off Europe's access to drone components which makes a European pivot to China for defense purposes...fraught. Particularly considering that Ukraine's new and very transparent attempts to link China and Russia together in their invasion are...unlikely to increase the supply of drones to Ukraine. I really doubt Ukraine and Europe can match China and Russia's drone production, so if this is a stagnant war that will end only when the last infantryman is killed by the last FPV drone, I think Russia is still favored here.

Budapest Memorandum anyone?

A non-legally-binding document that contains no security guarantees is hardly worse than "vague European security guarantees" if those are actually on the table.

However, with all of that being said, I do agree with you - I suspect that either Ukraine, Russia or both will not agree to this deal. (I do agree with Lizardspawn that it might be smart for Russia to accept it, banking on Ukraine refusing it.)

Russians cannot pick up bodies, there are too many drones attacking retrieval teams, so our corpses rot in the fields. This may affect exchange rates.

Not only have they been criticized by NATO and European leaders for this, but Chinese firms have been sanctioned. Reporting from last fall indicates that Russia actually established a facility to build military drones in China

Kaja Kallas

Typical Baltic yapping. These people are too used to American backing and have failed to become cognizant of their weak position. There are hundreds of different attempts by both sides, so all kinds of things happen, but I know that it's actually hard for Russia to procure even components in China right now, regiments have to use drones very prudently, while Ukrainians spam them by the thousand, and seem to have no issues in procurement. But China itself doesn't need to rely on these garage techniques and could make better loitering munitions by the million; with actual support, Ukraine would fall in a few weeks, and Estonia probably too. I almost wish to see it happen because racist arrogance of peoples incapable of defending themselves inherently begs for punishment. Morally though, I have to support the status quo to the detriment of my people.

The Americans have done some saber-rattling

Americans are delusional as well if they don't understand how much the credibility of their defense commitments has suffered from Trump and Vance's posturing with regards to Denmark. This has nothing to do with withdrawing some US troops or asking for higher defense spend by other NATO members, though this part doesn't help either (and there are many more parts).

Europe is not entirely deindustrialized, they can make their own drones, in addition to Chinese-Ukrainian ones.

Typical Baltic yapping.

Is Germany considered a Baltic state now?

regiments have to use drones very prudently, while Ukrainians spam them by the thousand, and seem to have no issues in procurement.

This is a fairly common perception in wartime that needs have no bearing on actual procurement numbers.

Americans are delusional as well if they don't understand how much the credibility of their defense commitments has suffered from Trump and Vance's posturing with regards to Denmark.

Perhaps, but that has no bearing on whether or not there are still American troops in Europe - and there are, tens of thousands of them. One of the linked articles said there were about 100,000 Americans in Europe - that's larger than the entire German army.

Europe is not entirely deindustrialized, they can make their own drones, in addition to Chinese-Ukrainian ones.

I believe this is technically true, yes.

Is Germany considered a Baltic state now?

I mean the first link. But Annalena Baerbock is even worse than Baltic.

that needs have no bearing on actual procurement numbers.

So do you have numbers? I consulted with a person who does procurement for Russian troops, the impression there is that Ukraine out-drones us by at least 2x in terms of drones that are actually combat-capable and not just advance the counter for the responsible bureaucrat, sitting in some warehouse.

So do you have numbers?

Not any recent. But the older numbers I have seen or recall tended to indicate either parity or a Russian advantage - maybe with exceptions were Ukraine had a localized advantage at a certain front for a time. There was much moaning about China providing Russia with many more drones than Ukraine. If Ukraine has surpassed Russia in drone deployment I would sort of have expected to hear about it, although I don't know any Russian procurement officials.

Now, with all that being said - didn't Russia ration arms in periods leading up to offensives in the past? I would not be surprised if they were stockpiling drones for an offensive. But who knows.

If China is actually weaning Russia off of drones then I think they are making a hubristic mistake. Or, possibly more likely, they actually are stung by European whining about their assistance with China and are attempting to do an about face. Which would be interesting if true - perhaps they are rattled by 20000000% tariffs after all.

If China is actually weaning Russia off of drones then I think they are making a hubristic mistake.

It's not strategic. Factories that sell to Europe want to keep selling. The most powerful move the EU could do would be to build a domestic Russiatech Drone industries and rrun it on the same components as RU.

I would take the deal if I were Ukraine. It's unlikely Trump will support a peace deal that benefits Ukraine more than this one. There's a risk he might withdraw all support. Waiting until 2029 for the next PotUS will cripple the country.

But if I were the president of Ukraine, I would think twice about supporting a peace deal like this. You could spin it into a victory, but there are too many people around that would rather spin it into a defeat to win the upcoming election.

Do you have any evidence that Zelenskyy would rather indefinitely feed Ukrainians into the meat grinder than risking losing an election?

Circumstantial evidence, mostly, like his persecution of the previous president and attacks on independent media that doesn't participate in the telethon.

offer Ukraine vague European security guarantees

Well this is the rub really isn't it. For any deal to not be completely worthless to Ukraine, it surely needs some real guarantee against the re-invasion of whatever is left at some future date, which seems to be only provided either by NATO membership or the continuous presence of Western troops in Ukraine as a part of any 'security guarantee'.

EU membership would serve this role. Just as much of a deterrent I presume.

I wouldn't completely discount the idea of a vague security guarantee as "useless." That's more or less what we have with Taiwan, and that's managed to keep the peace for over 50 years so far. Obviously Ukraine would want something more explicit, while Russia would prefer an explicit guarantee of independance/non-interference. But sometimes the only political viable compromise is a vague muddle.

That's more or less what we have with Taiwan, and that's managed to keep the peace for over 50 years so far.

It seems to me that this is effective because "Will American forces open fire on Chinese troops if they try to invade Taiwan?" is still an open question, and the possibility that the answer is "yes" has thus far been enough to deter invasion. However, "Will American forces open fire on Russian troops if they try to invade Ukraine?" has already been answered in the negative.

I don't look at it in terms of certainties, but in probabilities. It's not like a videogame where war is automatically declared when you declare on an ally- it's always subject to the whims of politicians and public sentiment.

So yes, this time, NATO countries chose to stay out of it, although they did provide massive amounts of material aid. I note the steady escalation as we went from financial and medical aid, to obsolete weapons, to eventually sending top-shelf military equipment. There's also been a divide in our politics, with Trump and the republicans being much more isolationist, while the Democrats want to get more involved. I could see a future where there's a cease-fire for a bit, a Democrat in the veign of LBJ gets elected, and the Republics flagrantly violate the cease-fire in a way that really pisses off the American public, like the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Or it could go the other way. I have no idea! I don't think Putin does either. Just saying that he'd be a fool to completely ignore the US and assume he has carte-blanche to conquer all of non-affiliated Europe just because Biden and Trump chose not to get involved in this specific instance.

Of course, what I would really like to see is a massive build up of our munititions stockpiles, so that even if we don't get directly involved, we could just send enough shells and missiles to stop the invasion. it's embarrassing how badly we're getting outgunned by 50-year-old Soviet tech.

Ukraine had a vague security guarantee at the time of its independence. And we've seen how well that worked.

It's worked out reasonably well. Ukraine got a ton of aid to keep their country going, while NATO was able to avoid a direct fight with Russia. Not ideal, but i can imagine a lot of ways it could have gone worse.

Honestly the best thing Putin could do is accept it. Ukraine will never accept it, so it is a safe bet.

This actually creates an interesting dilemma. Say neither Putin nor Ukraine want Trump's deal (-100, -100). If both refuse the deal, Trump might halfheartedly continue to support Ukraine so can continue to butcher each other (-50, -50). If only Ukraine refuses, Trump withdraws all support from Ukraine (R: +100, U: -200). If only Russia refuses, Trump will increase aid to Ukraine out of spite (R: -200, U: +100).

This is isomorphic to the prisoner's dilemma, except that "cooperate" is "refuse Trump's deal" and "defect" is "accept Trump's deal".

I am not sure that I buy that a deal can be made so terrible that both sides would prefer to slaughter each other instead -- sure, there are parts where the US wins (at the expense of the other parties), but given how negative-sum that war is, there should be the possibility of a zero-sum deal which is preferable to both sides. Of course, it also helps to negotiate with both sides (as well as other stakeholders like EU) to see what precisely they want instead of just announcing a your peace plan and demanding that everyone accepts it.

What would their alternative be? Ukraine is being pressured along the entire front. They haven't had a proper attack since August, in which they claimed an equivalent of less than 1% of the land they have lost while attack an area that the Russians barely were defending. Ukraine is facing a demographic crisis not seen since the collapse of Rome.

Ukrainian nationalists seem to be wildly detached from reality. They want a national socialist state financed by Keir starmer after their war has a miraculous turn around in which they go from being pressed back to smashing through the Russian lines and Russia collapsing. At some point they have to stop speaking in slogans and start focusing on what is practical. Their negotiating position isn't improving with time.

What would their alternative be?

Crybulling. Zelensky is master of that.

Wouldn't crybullying require that you're actually in a dominant position while pretending not to be?

No, just being able to manipulate authorities. Kindergartners learn it

Being in a dominant position follows from it, unless the authorities are powerless.

Or there can be a new teacher, but the bully still uses the same tricks that worked on the old one

Ukrainian nationalists can just maintain their position of maximum fuck Russia or bust. It's not a war of extermination, they can survive the dissolution of Ukraine as a state and it's probably going to feel better knowing they "fought to the last" rather than becoming a cucked rump state.

It's not a war of extermination, they can survive the dissolution of Ukraine as a state

It's not clear that Ukraine as a people can survive continued war. Their demographics were already terrible and tons of dead and fleeing reproductive-age people occurs to me as likely to be fatal. Then again the worst case scenario has already basically happened, so yeah, I guess they may as well ride the thing to zero. Sucks for the ones who wanted to live though.

Apart from Ukraine being conquered by Russia and forcibly assimilated, what would "Ukraine as a people to survive" mean here? Even if their population levels are drastically reduced, well, there are nations half the size of Ukrainians surviving as a people, even triple or quarter the size of Ukrainians. The Paraguayans were able to survive the War of the Triple Alliance. It would mean huge amounts of death, to be sure, but that's still different from national extinction.

Ukraine as a people definitely can't survive Russian victory - Putin has made clear that he considers Ukrainians to be misguided Russians who need to be forcibly shown which country they actually belong to, and is implementing this policy in Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

They did survive years under Russian Empire rulers of which had the same views as Putin. Also in Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine Ukrainian language is a second official one and you can choose to learn it in school.

Russian Empire was basically unable to utilize state power to anywhere close to the degree that a modernized state could, though it was starting to make up the difference already in the years before the Bolshevik Revolution.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine heavily ethnically Russian, and weren't the Ukrainians pursuing a similar policy of forcible assimilation? (I may well be wrong.)

Ukraine has often been part of Russia and their distinctiveness has always seemed to me tenuous at best. FWIW I developed this opinion over a decade ago after spending some time with Ukrainians in the US who were very insistent that they're totally different from Russians and gave me several examples which left me entirely unconvinced. Basically everything came down to regional vocabulary differences. That's not a matrioshka doll, it's a $ukrainian_word_for_exact_same_thing! Based on my mostly-uninformed assessment, Ukrainian can't really be called a dialect of Russian but they have like 2/3 overlap and from a cultural standpoint they're nearly indistinguishable. Easy for an outsider to think, I suppose.

I agree, which of course gives the Russians the right to claim their territory and then ethnically cleanse them. The Americans and British don't even speak different languages, so obviously the UK should ethnically cleanse the US as well.

Who has any right to land? Either you can defend it or someone else will have it. There's only 'is' here, no 'ought'.

Casual encounters and visits to England and Ireland might also leave one convinced that they are basically the same nationality on the basis of not only language but also surface aspects (left side of the road, two faucets, crap insulation etc.), and yet... (or England and US/Australia/Canada/whatever.)

Well, yes -- part of Ireland is already the UK and if the rest were to unite with the UK I wouldn't be losing sleep over the erasure of the Irish as a people. Scotland already did, and it's still there. Wales too. Sure they'd like to be independent but that's clearly a want, not a need.

Do you make any distinctions between Germany, Austria, the 17 Germanophone Swiss cantons, the Alto Adige, etc.?

Sure; such things can be subdivided fractally. But if I heard all those people were henceforth to be under a single government I wouldn't be thinking "Oh no the unique Austrian culture will now be subsumed into Greater Mitteleuropa!" It would make a lot of sense for them to share a government IMO.

Though, the Swiss have a long history of self-government which is unlike anything to be found in Ukraine, so I doubt they'd be much interested. Else they'd be in the EU.

Ukrainians pursuing a similar policy of forcible assimilation

That started because of the 2022 war, when people chose to stop speaking Russian because the Russian army was shelling them and then the government started e.g. removing Pushkin statues.

Ethnic data's difficult because terms like native language actually mean ancestral language, so people will e.g. claim to be natives of a language they don't speak. Of course, you also get wild 20% swings in different censuses as identities are relatively meaningless. A rather small amount of Easterners claimed to be ethnically Russian, but used Russian in all situations. N.b. I was a staunch "Ukrainian isn't a "real" identity" type (but very supportive of its independence, because many Ruses would lead to many courts and renaissance, like in Italy and Germany's golden ages. The languages are very close, effectively a few hundred unique roots and different 1:1 changes in the realization of others. Anyway, I never felt a need to use Ukrainian and never encountered it in day to day life.

That started because of the 2022 war

No, it started after the 2014 invasion of Crimea. As far back as 2019, the Council of Europe's "Commission for Democracy through Law" issued a scathing report on Ukraine's oppression of the Russian language.

The Commission notes that the State Language Law submitted to its examination in the present opinion also fails to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of strengthening and promoting the Ukrainian language and sufficiently safeguarding minorities’ linguistic rights. On the contrary, the State Language Law extends to other areas the differential treatment that the Commission considered in its 2017 opinion as very problematic from the perspective of non-discrimination. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the State Language Law includes several provisions which impose limitations on the freedom of expression and the freedom of association as enshrined in the ECHR. While limitations to these freedoms may serve legitimate aims, the Commission recalls that all limitations must be proportionate. The Commission in the present opinion has found that several articles of the State Language Law require further clarification in order to be proportionate to the legitimate aim.

Article 25 allows publishing of print media in two or more language versions, one of which must be Ukrainian, provided that all language versions are identical in size, format and substance and are issued on the same day. Exception is made only for media issued in Crimean Tatar or other indigenous languages, and those issued in English or other official EU languages (which do not need a translation into Ukrainian). The Law requires that the print media in Ukrainian constitute no less than 50% of selection in each print media distribution point. These rules will apply to national and regional media in two and a half years from the Law’s entry into force and to the local media in five years (Section IX, point 1).

In addition to the very problematic differential treatment provided for in this Article (see supra §44), these provisions raise the question whether the high administrative and financial burden they impose on editors of mass media will not “cause substantial disruption and could have a chilling effect” (see supra §88) on publishing in minority languages, and if so, whether this limitation of the freedom both to impart and to receive information can be considered to be necessary – i.e. also proportionate – in a democratic society.

In view of crucial importance of the freedom of the press in a democratic society, the Commission recommends that the legislator repeal this requirement.

More comments

I pray that this is the end of this conflict, but I don't know that it will be. Formal recognition of Crimea is probably a non-starter for Ukraine, while I don't see much of value for Russia in this deal. The better Crimea strategy in my mind has been suspended animation and a decision to be made later. Ukrainian optimists can sell it as "Rebuild, join the EU, become wealthy, and then Crimea etc will want to join us and not Russia."

Formal recognition of Crimea is probably a non-starter for Ukraine

Why? Crimea is, and has been for the past two centuries, culturally, linguistically, and economically Russian. It was only part of Ukraine because Krushchev did a Kruschev in the 1950s and it didnt matter as they were all part of glorious Soviet Union. It became awkward after the fall of the wall, but they hashed out a compromise where Crimea operated as an autonomous region of Ukraine instead of a integrated one, the state that persisted for 30 years until Russia formally annexed it.

I don't condone the whole "starting a war" thing, but Crimea has never been Ukrainian in any but the most nit-picky sense, and blowing a peace deal over it would be catastrophically stupid.

Because formal recognition would completely obviate the postwar consensus that national boundaries are inviolable. Russia made no claim to Crimea at the time of Ukrainian independence, nor for 20 years thereafter. If countries can dredge up historical arguments for why they need territory that hasn't been a continual subject of dispute and get international recognition of the conquest, it opens up the door for any irridentist claim.

US/NATO waged war and took Kosovo from Serbia, and then formally recognized the resulting statelet.

Not to mention the whole dichotomy of:

Violating national territorial borders—very problematic, big yikes, you did a heckin imperialism, this unseats the rules-based international order

Bombing the hell out of a country, invading it with 900,000 soldiers, executing the leaders, dissolving the government, building an entire new puppet government at bayonet-point that is more friendly to your national interests, re-invading every time it looks like that puppet government might fall, all leading to countless civilian deaths—100 percent wholesome Keanu Chungus

Crimea only became demographically majority Russian after WW2. Sure, it wasn't ethnically Ukrainian either, but the Crimean Tatars of the current day identify strongly with Ukraine, for understandable reasons.

Formal recognition of Crimea is the biggest thing an intact non-puppet Ukraine has to offer Russia. I can't see Putin accepting any deal without it.

Neither can I.

But I'm not sure there's enough there to satisfy Ukraine.

Seems like Ukraine has already rejected it?

Russiagate continues to ripple through history. The Crimea concession will undoubtedly be framed as a personal favor from Trump to Putin instead of the grim acceptance of reality that it is. There’s nothing Trump can suggest be conceded to Russia that won’t be seen this way.

And to think, just last weekend I posted some of my thoughts and predictions on last-Friday's foreshadowing. I wouldn't have been surprised if this came even weeks later, but nothing here changes my position in general.

I'd agree with you that this is a good deal for Russia, but I'd disagree that Puti is no nationalist. I think nationalist reasonings would be the reason Putin does not accept this- either by outright refusal or waiting long enough that the Trump administration walks away or most likely by trying to blame the Ukrainians. The 'we're winning and we'll keep winning and if Trump walks away that's good for us to keep going until total victory' is a political force, and Putin is a strategic procrastinator unless faced with clearly bad decisions of setback or worse setback.

This is not that. This is 'good' versus 'could be better later.' If US is willing to recognize Crimea now, there's no inherent reason why Trump wouldn't be willing to recognize Crimea later, or Russia might not demand other (European) countries do as well. Things like preventing Ukraine from having unfettered access to the Dnieper is a point in and of itself for permanent long-term maleffects to Ukraine. Similar with threatening Ukraine power system prospects.

We'll see if the war ends with this. I have my doubts*, but it is within the scope of possibilities. On the other hand, so is kabuki for several more weeks. (The offer mentions sanctions since 2014. This does not specify, but likely includes, European sanctions. However, Trump notably has not exactly included the Europeans, who could veto such a relaxation, in his Putin negotiations.) So would a temporary cease fire that returns to fighting.

*I'll actually go further: I hope it stops, but that hope on my part has a tendency is itself subject to interpreting incoming information with confirmation bias.

Sanctions offers may be lifted intended to pressure Russian elites. I doubt they have the influence to bully Putin but it’s a start.

The real question is what happens when rejected. I mean if Ukraine refused there’s things Trump can do. But anything that would be on the table for trump to help Ukraine has already been done.

If Russia has access to swift, European sanctions really don't matter.

Tangential, but SWIFT's barely relevant anymore. There's no compelling or procompetitive reason to pay 5% fees and wait days when CIPS is instant and essentially free (cents to transfer millions of dollars, or small sums). The future of settlement's here: DPI. Brazil's Pix showed the way, China's CIPS now has integrations with some 20 countries and they're fusing their own systems together. Brazil used to have an ecosystem of Visa equivalents and banks charging high fees, now it's all free and instant through Pix, because of legitimately better technology. The US' protectionism for rampant rent seeking practices of its banks is a barrier to grow only rivaled by suburbia. Imagine if the US were able to leverage efficiency factors like this, if you could just freely scan people's phones for payment etc.? (Actually, I'm pro cash, security and tax issues but payment processing in the US is hellish.)

I typed up fluff I wanted to edit into a coherent comment, but something just came up. I'll edit it later.

Isn't SWIFT a European network?

Depends on how you define it, but it's also a red herring: there are more to sanctions than SWIFT.

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