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PaperclipPerfector  1yr ago (text post)   32495 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of May 1, 2023

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Right-Wing and Left-Wing Wars

For the greater part of the twentieth century, being "anti-war" was strongly associated with the left, to the point where even identifying as "anti-war" was enough in the eyes of most people to brand you as a left winger. Though every war fought by the US since the foundation of the country has seen an anti-war movement spring up in opposition (of varying size and significance), the anti-Vietnam movement has a special place in American national memory, and opposition to Vietnam was massively left-coded. A few years earlier, Korea did not similarly divide the nation, seeing as it was a much quicker war and one waged in a much less turbulent time, but even so what opposition there was to intervention in Korea was decidedly left-wing. The initiation of the GWoT seemed to confirm this partisan divide, with those who opposed the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq being, again, overwhelmingly left-liberal. I would venture to say nothing defined an early 2000s leftist so much as, and nothing was more non-negotiable for one's participation in the American left of that time, than opposition to Iraq.

Lately, with Ukraine, there is a change. Ukraine is of course not a 1:1 analogue to Vietnam or Iraq, not in the least because no actual US troops are engaged on the ground and don't look likely to be. But while the great majority of Americans are at least sympathetic to Ukraine and want them to win, the emerging trend is that gung-ho support of Ukraine and support for military aid to Ukraine are increasingly left-Democratic coded, and opposition to such aid is increasingly right-Republican coded. While actual pro-Russia sentiment is extremely fringe in the US, to the extent that it does exist it is mostly right-wing.

This baffles some who the 20th century conditioned into a belief that the left is always "anti-war" and the right is always "pro-war" but a broader look should disabuse one of the notion. In fact the pattern does not hold before the 50s.

Opposition to intervention in European affairs in the 1930s and then to entry into WWII was distinctly conservative. This was not entirely the case, and it's certainly not true that most (not even close) isolations were fascists or fascist-sympathizers, and there were also noteworthy left-wing isolationists like socialist Norman Thomas and progressive Robert La Follette. But for the most part, the people who opposed American participation in WWII were the same people who opposed Roosevelt and the New Deal at home. America Firsters were constantly guarding their right flank against accusations of Nazi sympathies (which were sometimes merited), just like anti-Vietnam activists had to constantly fend off accusations of communist sympathies (which were sometimes merited).

Going back into the 19th century, both the left and the right again have a record of "anti-war" and "pro-war" sentiment. The Mexican-American War was a very popular war in the more conservative southern and western regions of the US. States like Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas filled their volunteer quotas several times over. The war was much less popular in the north. In New England, at the time the most 'left-wing' (not that the phrase was used too much in the US at the time, but it's probably a fair descriptor--in New England abolitionism, Unitarianism, transcendentalism, etc. were more popular than anywhere else in the nation) region of the country, it was downright unpopular, and the whole region managed to raise only a single (understrength) regiment. Thoreau was famously arrested for refusing to pay his taxes in protest of the war. Northerners sometimes saw the war (not wholly inaccurate) as a slaveholder conspiracy to carve new slave states out of Mexican territory, and one New England senator (I can't remember which one) even declared in front of congress that he was rooting for the Mexicans.

A few years later, the Civil War broke out, which was essentially a war between the half of the country that had supported war in Mexico and the half that had opposed it. While there was not much of an anti-war movement in the south, at least until late in the war, there was a significant anti-war movement in the Union states. That was the 'copperheads' who favored a peace with the Confederacy. This movement was distinctly conservative in character, being strongly skeptical of abolitionism and the supposed racial integrationism of the Lincoln administration. New England of course was the region of the Union most enthusiastic in the prosecution of the war, with Maine out of all the loyal states contributing the highest proportion of its male population as soldiers for the federal army.

What are the common factors here? At first blush it may appear simple, that the left opposes war when the enemy is leftist (Red China, USSR, North Vietnam) and the right opposes war when the enemy is rightist (Confederacy, Axis powers, Russia). But Ba'athist Iraq and certainly the Taliban were not leftist powers, and yet the opposition to those interventions was primarily left-wing. Neither was the Mexico of 1846. Another potential explanation is that left-wingers oppose wars where the enemy is viewed as an underdog, which Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mexico certainly were. Technically the Confederacy, the Axis, and modern Russia were/are all also weaker than the US, but it's less obvious and they gave/give at least the illusion of being formidable foes. So I'm actually not sure what the common thread is, or even if there is one. Maybe I'm trying to flatten too much nuance over a 200 year period. Either way, I find the question interesting.

'

Should also be noted that much of the tendentious Republican criticism of Ukraine War seems to be of the "US should not spend that much resources on Ukraine since it needs to put all the resources it can get to prepare for a war against China", which doesn't count as a particularly anti-war position in my books, as such.

Yeah, but can we be sure that's their honest take and not them casting for an excuse to justify their position?

It seems so to me? For the entire duration of how long I've followed American politics - ie. since late 90s - I've seen Republicans, particularly the Republican right-wing, present PRC as a threat, though this was somewhat muted during the War on Terror due to focus on Islam. Insofar as I've understood the Republicans, or at least large sections of the party, genuinely believe that there's going to be an US/China war in the near future and it's important for the US to win since PRC is evil.

This has also been connected to a firm belief that the Democrats are subservient to China or just plain bought by China, no matter how much counterevidence there is otherwise (ie. Biden admin being just as belligerent towards PRC as Trump admin was) - though it's also possible the Republicans keep beating this drum to ensure the Dems don't go wobbly on China, since that would expose them to an immediate Republican attack ("See? Just as we said! They are bought by China!")

One might argue that what truly connects these seemingly disparate examples is less about ideology than opportunism - seizing on prevailing sentiments towards war or peace as a means to further one's own agenda or consolidate power within shifting landscapes. In this light, both left-leaning anti-war movements and rightist pro-war stances are merely tools wielded by savvy players navigating treacherous waters toward their desired outcomes.

But while the great majority of Americans are at least sympathetic to Ukraine and want them to win, the emerging trend is that gung-ho support of Ukraine and support for military aid to Ukraine are increasingly left-Democratic coded, and opposition to such aid is increasingly right-Republican coded. While actual pro-Russia sentiment is extremely fringe in the US, to the extent that it does exist it is mostly right-wing.

Yes, Ukraine cause is now strongly left coded. Someone flying Ukraine flag is going also fly BLM, rainbow and trans flags and pro vaccine signs.

Fact that Ukraine is actually much more Christian and "trad" country by every metric than Russia does not matter, it is all about perceptions now.

This is one part of Ukraine tragedy - being just another culture war flash point, being hated by people who share your values, while having to rely on people who despise everything you stand for.

I have not observed that near me. Going door to door in my town for local primaries, Ukrainian flags correlate most strongly with recent or closely held Eastern European ethnicity. Beyond that it's evenly split, largely because Republicans strongly love videos of Russian shit getting blown up, and identify strongly with Ukrainians defending their homes.

Trump flag + Ukraine flag = "Putin was scared of Donald, that's why he stayed put until Biden came into office."

Ukraine flag + in this house sign = "Putin wants Trump in office so he'll give Ukraine away"

Marine flag + we don't call 911 window sign + Ukraine flag = "All options should be on the table, Biden needs to stop being a pussy"

In my anecdotal door to door.

Marine flag + we don't call 911 window sign + Ukraine flag = "All options should be on the table, Biden needs to stop being a pussy"

I'm reminded of Burt Gummer's truck from Tremors, with the Afghanistan bumper sticker and the license plate that says "UZI 4 U."

Yes, Ukraine cause is now strongly left coded. Someone flying Ukraine flag is going also fly BLM, rainbow and trans flags and pro vaccine signs.

At least in March, 42% of Republicans in the US still supported providing aid to Ukraine. Support for Ukraine tends to be left-coded, but I'd argue that it's not strongly left-coded, and it certainly doesn't seem to necessarily mean BLM, rainbow and trans flags.

Like Ukraine, I believe that being pro-vaccing, including pro-Covid-vaccine, still continues to be comfortably the majority position in the US, and this poll indicates that only 36% of Republicans are "unwilling or uncertain" to get vaccinated. It's not the same number as with Democrats, but it's not the majority.

At first blush it may appear simple, that the left opposes war when the enemy is leftist (Red China, USSR, North Vietnam) and the right opposes war when the enemy is rightist (Confederacy, Axis powers, Russia)

Yeah, it's this.

The outliers are post-9-11 Afghanistan and Iraq, and I'm old enough to remember these: the motivating power of the anti-war movement, certainly in my neck of the woods, was "We oppose whatever a Republican president supports".

So both during and after the Cold War, the left isn't anti-war per se. During it was just led by fifth columnists (so it was anti-"War against these specific countries, comrade"), and after that it was standard domestic partisanship (anti-"any war that Dubya leads").

Mexico 1846 is... a case of trying to impose post-WW2 alignments on stuff that happened a century prior. Mores were so different then that I think, as you say, totalizing conclusions are impossible.

I posit that aiding Ukraine is in fact the anti-war position, just as handing a weapon to a man who's being mugged is "anti-mugging".

I'm sure that's what they said about Korea and Vietnam, too.

The game of "claiming that my warmongering is defensive" has a long history.

Does that mean it's impossible for war to ever be primarily caused by one of the two belligerent parties?

The Romans are said to have "Conquered the world in self-defense."

I still challenge anyone to find me a primary source, contemporary to the war, from the perspective of those starting a war, that did not have at least a vague claim to the moral right to start the war. We have this perception that before WWI, countries just started wars for fun, and it was an accepted thing that happened. But in reality, there was always some moral justification for why this war was morally acceptable. Humans have a basic understanding that war and violence are bad, and need some moral framework that provides them with some flimsy moral highground. One might content that this or that moral high ground was so silly that no one could possibly believe in it, but if it wasn't important it wouldn't be done over and over.

Might it just be that sometimes the leadership of a country decides to go to war because it's the correct decision, or at least appears that way to them, and then everyone who opposes the leadership opposes the war and everyone who supports the leadership supports the war?

I've been trying to get myself to do a writeup of Walter Russell Mead's four traditions of American foreign policy, because he was confronting exactly this question in the late 1990s--the various conflicts involving the breakup of Yugoslavia produced an anti-intervention movement on the Republican side of the Senate, which lost to the pro-intervention faction led by President Clinton. This also seemed, on first blush, to be a reversal of the left-coded anti-war movements in earlier decades.

In short, Mead proposes a two-axis framework, where each quadrant contains the interplay of the axes and also an intellectual pedigree particular to the US. One axis is the usual hawk/dove; the other is nationalist/internationalist. (Here, "internationalists" favor more widespread and ongoing engagement with other nations, while "nationalists" prefer to interact with other nations only when necessary, and reserve most of their attention to domestic affairs.)

Hamiltonians are the dovish internationalists, who have a particular interest in expansive trade and the promotion of American business interests abroad. They don't have strong opinions about how other countries run their own affairs, so long as Americans have robust access to foreign markets.

Jeffersonians are the dovish nationalists, whose central ideal is perfecting democracy at home and avoiding foreign entanglements that might distract or corrupt American national purpose. These are your classic anti-war isolationists.

Jacksonians are the hawkish nationalists, who mostly don't care to have extensive involvement with other nations, but react with vigorous force to assaults on American interests and especially American honor. Unlike the other traditions, Jacksonianism is predominantly a grassroots/populist tradition, not elite.

Finally, the Wilsonians are the hawkish internationalists, who want to promote democracy, human rights, and other American ideals abroad whenever possible. The neoconservatives of the late 70s are a central example, but so are President Clinton's interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the 90s.

At different points in history, these traditions have individually been more or less popular, and have allied with each other in varying combinations. I think the overall framework makes a fair amount of sense descriptively, and a few thoughts towards refinement/critique.

Great comment, thanks!

It's nice to show your appreciation, but we discourage low-effort comments that are nothing more than "Good post."

Jeffersonians are the dovish nationalists, whose central ideal is perfecting democracy at home and avoiding foreign entanglements that might distract or corrupt American national purpose. These are your classic anti-war isolationists.

An ironic name, considering that Jefferson got America into its first war in the Islamic world in order to protect American trade.

An intended irony--Jefferson was a brilliant and creative man, but consistency was not among his virtues. See also his criticisms of centralized federal power, until the topic became "Louisiana is temporarily available at a low low price, act now!"

In this framework I'd say Iraq was hawkish internationalists using 9/11 to pull one over on Hawkish nationalists and get them to do a democracy/market access war that didn't really have much to do with national security. Ukraine is an alliance of dovish and hawkish internationalists that defends an international principle (no annexation of territory in Europe) without U.S. troops. My dovish nationalist Mennonite uncle is opposed because nothing is worth the risk of nuclear war and the young conservatives hawkish nationalists I know are opposed because it's money spent on something that has no obvious benefit to America.

But I don't think it's really that simple. The polarization over Russia post Trump and the legacy of the Cold War probably has a lot to do with why there's an age divide among conservative people I know. Older ones fantasize about America wiping the floor with the corrupt Russian army and the younger ones complain about the cost of foreign aid.

Broadly speaking, I agree (though I might characterize a few of the details differently). One thing to note, though, is that Hamiltonians are not simply "dovish internationalists." They are an American tradition of free-market, business-oriented dovish internationalists; a hypothetical French tradition of dovish internationalism might not have the same trade/economic focus.

IMO, GWB campaigned as more of a Hamiltonian--he made public comments about returning to a "humble foreign policy" in reaction to the Wilsonian bombast of the Clinton presidency. 9/11 changed rather a lot very dramatically, and the immediate Jacksonian demand by the public to do something about Osama bin Laden led to Afghanistan, and the second generation of neoconservative Wilsonians in his administration were a significant factor in getting involved with Iraq. I'd caution against painting Iraq as monocausal, though; there were several goals and motivations involved, some of them at odds with others.

Obama is an odd case; I think he's a relatively rare example of a Jeffersonian President. The problem with that combination is that foreign policy is one of the strongest points of Presidential power, and Jeffersonians are disinclined to wield foreign policy influence, so you have to refuse the temptation to pick up the hammer that is right there and go in search of nails. This is not to say that Jeffersonians are rare--they just show up more often in Congress or think tanks. Also, Obama's administration was not Jeffersonian; a major example that points out these tensions was Libya, where the combined force of Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, and Susan Rice lobbied internally to support the French in the face of Obama's initial indifference.

I've seen some writings indicate that Korean War was one of the most widely popular and unopposed wars in American history, with even most leftists supporting it (apart from CPUSA, of course, but it was at a very low point in public support or indluence), but what little opposition existed was mostly among the Right.

If there seems to be one fair constant in American history, it's that the South loves war and at the very least considerable and consistent parts of Northern states are far more resistant. As far as I've understood, whether it was War of 1812, Mexican-American War (as mentioned), both World Wars, Korea and Vietnam or Iraq/Afghanistan, (white) South eagerly went to war while there were comparatively more New Englanders and Midwesterners that resisted war. I'm not fully sure about the Spanish-American War, and of course the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War were sui generis events.

The switch between Dems and Reps as to which is more of a "war party" just so happens to be parallel to the switch of South from Democratic to Republican. Sure, there were other reasons for this switch, but it seems quite uncommon to specifically consider foreign policy one of the reasons for this switch, even though an argument could well be made that it must have played a part. Of course I'm not sure how the current conflict in Ukraine fits this schema, though it should also be noted that America is currently not fighting a direct shooting war in Ukraine, or at least there's no firm proof it's doing so.

Considering this, I've always kind of wondered about how many paleocons and paleolibertarians in the USA seem to combine nostalgia and admiration for the South as a region with a firm noninterventionist or even pacifist policy. It would certainly seem strange to admire and nostalgize by far the most constantly belligerent region in the United States and similarly advocate noninterventionism, without seemingly even feeling the slightest desire to explain this seeming contradiction.

Sure, I know, the argument is that it was that devil Lincoln and the Northern victory in Civil War that "led to the creation of the American Empire", but still, that same victory - and the marginalization of the South as a region - was followed by decades of relative lack of American intervention in the outside world. There was the Spanish-American War, occupation of Hawaii and such, but still, it took 50 years for US to get into its next major war - WW1, incidentally happening during the presidency of the first Southern president since the Civil War.

Considering this, I've always kind of wondered about how many paleocons and paleolibertarians in the USA seem to combine nostalgia and admiration for the South as a region with a firm noninterventionist or even pacifist policy. It would certainly seem strange to admire and nostalgize by far the most constantly belligerent region in the United States and similarly advocate noninterventionism, without seemingly even feeling the slightest desire to explain this seeming contradiction.

This doesn't seem so hard to me, the south has an honor culture, much of libertarianism thought is intuitive as a kind of retributive honor code.

But that sort of a retributive honor code has also contributed greatly to American willingness to participate in foreign wars, especially after an incident in the style of Maine or Tonkin Gulf attacks.

Interesting that you mentioned those in particular, given that both had shades of false-flagging/undeserved blame towards the enemy.

I've seen some writings indicate that Korean War was one of the most widely popular and unopposed wars in American history, with even most leftists supporting it (apart from CPUSA, of course, but it was at a very low point in public support or indluence), but what little opposition existed was mostly among the Right.

This may be true, I admit I have read next to nothing about domestic opposition to the Korean War. But I would be interested in reading any recommendations that you have.

You're certainly right about the south having traditionally been the most martial region of the country. Even today the south contributes a disproportionate share of recruits to the US military. While as I said, opposition to intervention in WWII was largely conservative-shaded, a snarl is that the south was the most vociferously pro-Allied and anti-Axis region of the country.

I think the geographical distribution of German-descended Americans does a lot to explain that.

The more conservative areas of the country are and have been the South and the Midwest, with the latter full of Germans and the former full of British Islanders. Southern conservatives were anxious to beat the Hun again, while Midwestern conservatives still had a lot of residual sympathy for the Fatherland.

I think it’s worth noting that German-Americans mostly spoke German at home until WWI and so in 1942 a lot of elders in German communities were still not very assimilated.

Not just the elders either. One of my parents’ next door neighbors was born in the mid-1930s; he didn’t speak a lick of English until he started the first grade. His family, neighbors, and fellow church members all spoke mostly German.

But Ba'athist Iraq and certainly the Taliban were not leftist powers

They weren't leftist in the strict sense, but they were a brown racialized Other being aggressed upon by white Christian imperialists. The choice was obvious.

Not that there weren't recognizable proto-wokist streams within leftism at the time, but it wasn't nearly the all-encompassing thing it can seem to be now. In particular race was nowhere near as central to North American leftism before about 2014 as it is now. In fact one of the many things I (pretty leftist at least by current Motte standards) lament about the rise of wokism is the near-total absence of, not only anti-war sentiment, but of any consideration of foreign policy at all, from 2023 leftism.

Not that there weren't recognizable proto-wokist streams within leftism at the time, but it wasn't nearly the all-encompassing thing it can seem to be now.

One of the primary left of center talking points beginning on 9/12 was to watch out for violence against Muslims.

the near-total absence of, not only anti-war sentiment, but of any consideration of foreign policy at all, from 2023 leftism.

A trillion dollars sent to Ukraine isn't foreign policy to you?

You're missing the point. It's got absolutely nothing to do with wokism, and for that matter, by any non-US standard, precious little to do with leftism of any kind.

...we're not actually anywhere near a trillion dollars, are we?

No - total defense spending is around $800 billion a year, and even most of the Ukraine "spending" is largely writing off old equipment we were never going to use or is outdated.

It's weird that our aid to Ukraine is actually the biggest showing of American power since you could argue, the First Gulf War. As I've said before, the military equivalent to the stuff that's in the back of our garage is fighting what was supposed to be the supposed badass un-woke army to at worst, a draw, But then again, I'm old enough to remember basically, 2020 when the 'in' thing to do was compare 'woke' American recruiting ads to the supposedly more effective, nationalist ads for the Russian, Chinese, et al militaries.

at worst, a draw

I'll bet you 0.7 monero that Ukraine does not regain Crimea or the Breakaway/Separatist regions by the end of the war (which is what I would classify as a defeat for Ukraine).

As I recall, opposition to NATO intervention against the white, Christian serbs was also largely leftist, to the extent that it existed (certainly it was much smaller than the anti-Iraq movement and did not draw in mainstream Democrats. But then again mainstream Dems were all for Iraq too until later).

For example, here's an article from 1999 by leftist journalist Alexander Cockburn for Counterpunch denouncing Clinton for 'blowing little children to pieces'. Though he does note at the end the opposition that also existed from paleocons like Pat Buchanan.

I think a lot of it is just underestimating how much of the Cold War left was influenced by support for the Soviet Union. Most Cold War wars were against soviet allies specifically because they were Soviet Allies and the tendency’s aftereffects’ last gasps were probably opposition to the Iraq invasion.

I think later opposition to Iraq and Afghanistan is probably because they were unpopular wars started by a Republican.

It's pre-Cold War but one example of this was Dalton Trumbo who stopped publication of Johnny Got His Gun when Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the Communist Party in the US changed its position from anti-war to pro-war. Because now war wasn't a capitalist racket but instead a glorious workers struggle.

The OG leftists in the western world were the French revolutionaries and they certainly weren't doves.

Dalton Trumbo

Make Amarica Grate Again?

Opposition to intervention in European affairs in the 1930s and then to entry into WWII was distinctly conservative.

Depends on when you look. During the 1930s there was a growing pro-war anti-fascist movement among left-leaning Americans. There was even a brigade in the Spanish Civil War for anti-Franco foreigners. Not coincidentally, many American pro-war/ant-fascist leftists immediately became anti-war upon the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and then became pro-war again when that pact was broken. Some might suspect that their attitude toward war was dependent on its utility to the Communist Party. The Left likes wars in which the Left are the "good guys" and hates wars in which the Left are the bad guys. Go figure.

My far-right friends see the Ukraine war as the Globohomo Lefitst Elite spitting in the eye of a Trad Warrior State.

The growing anti-war sentiment in the US is, I think, directly related the right-coded nature of the military. The Right feels like the military are their people, and that their people are being sent out to risk their lives to line the pockets of effete sexually deviant billionaires who are the lizardy powers behind Globohomo. In the past the right was gung-ho for fighting Communism, but the Communists secretly won and are now pulling the strings.

In the past the right was gung-ho for fighting Communism, but the Communists secretly won and are now pulling the strings.

To be clear, are you saying this is how the right sees it, or are you actually asserting this? Because if you are saying the latter, I'll ask you to substantiate this argument.

They absolutely are, and a substantial amount of treasure is too. There have been American soldiers/mercenaries/people from Langley who died over there since the conflict began. The media isn't allowed to talk about them, but we aren't the media so we don't have to pretend that the US isn't involved or contributing.

My far-right friends see the Ukraine war as the Globohomo Lefitst Elite spitting in the eye of a Trad Warrior State.

FWIW, and I do realize in the US they are basically a rounding error compared to the progressive left, most of the far-left capital-C communists I've seen regard the Ukraine War as two capitalist imperialist powers duking it out.

FWIW, and I do realize in the US they are basically a rounding error compared to the progressive left, most of the far-left capital-C communists I've seen regard the Ukraine War as two capitalist imperialist powers duking it out.

Not true, at least in Twitter world, world more real than reality.

Most self proclaimed communists with hammer and sickle (and trans flag) in their handles are as gung ho anti Ukraine and pro Z as any red, white and blue Russian patriot.

Some because of sentimental feeling for country that builds statues of Lenin and against country that demolishes them, most because they see US-NATO as the major imperialist force in the world that must be opposed by any means necessary.

Dogmatic Leninist position (no to inter-imperialist war, no war but class war) exists, but is small and derided minority.

See this tweet and the angry replies by both NAFO and hammer and sickle crews.

edit: links

I've seen most of them go a step further and "critically support" Russia against Ukraine, citing Putin's denazification justification and the existence of the Azov Battalion. As best I can tell it's motivated largely out of a worldview that sees the US as the arch-imperialist power in the world today, and that anything that weakens its influence is a good thing, regardless if they believe Russia's motivations are pure or not.

Also @Eetan, absolutely fair, I had originally put "regard the Ukraine War as, at best,..." but waffled on it. Absolutely also pro-Russia sentiment there (I think due to both aesthetic preferences for Russia for obvious reasons and equating anti-US with anti-imperialist). Main point is that I think OP was right when he categorized American support for Ukraine as "left-Democratic" coded rather than just "left-wing" coded- the left-left tends to be somewhere between neutral and pro-Russia, it's the center-left and progressive left supporting Ukraine (along with a variety of different groups on the US right, though I won't try to suss out how much of that is pro-Ukraine vs anti-Russia).

Not coincidentally, many American pro-war/ant-fascist leftists immediately became anti-war upon the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and then became pro-war again when that pact was broken.

In fairness, this phenomenon was mostly limited to actual card-carrying capital-C Communists.

Molotov-Ribbentrop nuked the Popular Front. The CPUSA had done a pretty good job burnishing its credentials with left-liberal Americans of more moderate bent through the 30s through its tactical support of the New Deal and anti-fascist activism, especially lobbying on behalf of the Spanish Republic during the civil war. The CPUSA had become 'respectable' by the end of the 30s. But after M-R most of the unaffiliated liberals and leftists that had been part of the Popular Front kept on being pro-Roosevelt, pro-Allies, and anti-fascist while the CPUSA spent an awkward two years denouncing the war and the Allies which quickly burned most of the goodwill it had accumulated over the past decade. In Maurice Isserman's Which Side Were You On he talks about how a lot of communists were actually perversely relieved when Hitler attacked Soviet Russia because it meant Moscow was going to let them be anti-fascist again.

The growing anti-war sentiment in the US is, I think, directly related the right-coded nature of the military. The Right feels like the military are their people, and that their people are being sent out to risk their lives to line the pockets of effete sexually deviant billionaires who are the lizardy powers behind Globohomo.

But their people aren't being sent out to risk their lives! There's a tiny number of American military advisers and the like, mostly working well behind the front lines. American aid to Ukraine is mostly in the form of funding and equipment, much of it outdated and due to be scrapped soon anyway.

And how exactly does the war "line the pockets of effete sexually deviant billionaires"?

I think what flipped the switch on Ukraine is that Trump made “getting us out of foreign wars” a campaign accomplishment. He bragged about getting us out of Afghanistan, bragged about not starting wars etc. and Trump saying something tends to trigger something in the liberal world that makes opposing what Trump and conservatives do a major part of the branding. Had the polarity been reversed, I suspect that we’d be hearing a lot more of the anti-war stuff from the left, much like the similar first gulf war in the early 1990s.

On the face of it, I don’t see any strategic reason for NATO or the Allie’s to really invest in a free Ukraine. It’s nothing special. It’s basically Kansas or Nebraska in Eastern Europe mostly farming (Donbas has a lot of minerals and I think they have oil). To send several billion a month and all kinds of modern weapons (which are probably being reverse engineered in China after being captured in Ukraine) for Kansas of Eastern Europe isn’t a good decision in my opinion. Having a stable relationship with Russia (and prior to 2014 that’s what they had, it was colder than we wanted, but we got along well enough) is far more valuable than anything we could get from Ukraine. There’s just no way that realpolitik would lead anyone to the conclusion that being where we are now (propping up Ukraine even though the parts with the mineral wealth are under Russian control, countries beginning to dump the petrodollar and otherwise distance themselves from the Atlanticist alliance, and losing Nordstream), and probably too drained to protect Taiwan (which makes most f the world’s microchips) I don’t think it wise at all.

On the face of it, I don’t see any strategic reason for NATO or the Allie’s to really invest in a free Ukraine.

I was going to make snide a comment to the effect of tell me that you don't know anything about the history of NATO with out actually using those words, but then I had a sobering realization that our education systems is so fucked that you might genuinely have never learned anything about WWII and it's immediate aftermath.

Simply put there are multiple very obvious reasons both historical and strategically practical for NATO to invest in a free Ukraine.

The obvious historical reason is to uphold the post WWI norm that "you don't get to arbitrarily invade you neighbors and claim their territory as your own if you want a seat at the adults' table". Enforcing this norm is arguably NATOs entire raison d'etre as it was founded in response to fears in the immediate aftermath of WWII that the Molotov half of the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact might try to pick up where their erstwhile allies had started. Stalin's rhetoric and behavior certainly painted him as keen to do so.

The other obvious reason is one of strategic practicality. Every Russian soldier killed, every aircraft shot down, every armored vehicle destroyed, every round of ordnance expended, is one that can no longer be used to threaten the Balkans. What's happening here is that NATO is spending what is effectively pocket change to see a major strategic threat seriously diminished if not eliminated entirely. I don't care who you are, that is the proverbial 100 dollar bill lying on the sidewalk and the NATO leadership would be fools not to take it. Meanwhile there's the economic factor, for all people complain about the Military Industrial Complex, the cold truth is that money talks, and that there is a lot of money to be made in war. My employer recently opened a new ordnance production facility (rather than closing an old one) for what may be the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, that's a couple thousand new jobs for some politician's constituents, do you really think that's not been factored into the calculus somewhere?

Edited to Elaborate

Having a stable relationship with Russia (and prior to 2014 that’s what they had, it was colder than we wanted, but we got along well enough) is far more valuable than anything we could get from Ukraine.

It wasn't actually stable. The interventionist wing of us foreign policy has wanted to oust Putin and take control of Russian & Ukrainian resources for a long time.

There were articles written in 2008 warning about how US foreign policy was going to lead to a Ukrainian civil war that would be followed by a Russian invasion. They State Department didn't stop, they pushed forward.

The 2022 Russian invasion was expected. What wasn't expected was the failure of the sanctions. They expected to crush the Russian economy and insight a revolt to oust Putin. It didn't work and now they're winging it.

So the state department is wrong. Wouldn’t be the first time, nor will it be the last.

I have a hard time buying that our Atlanticist side of things is getting anything of value out of this war. The only thing we can really do at this point is act tough and hope the Ukrainians can hold out long enough to make the Russians stop where they are. I don’t see (at least without NATO boots on the ground) Ukraine actually retaking either Donbas or Crimea. So the best case is a stalemate that requires us to spend vast amounts of our own treasure to maintain. And again, this is a fight for basically a rural farming country with a good sized corruption problem. They’re in it now because they can’t afford to lose face and show the world how weak we actually are. But at the same time, we cannot infinitely send billions a month in aid. It just doesn’t work because eventually we run out of money (or print ourselves into hyperinflation) and public patience probably isn’t going to last that long (I think we can probably only keep going for another year or two).

Worse, doing so now reduces those capabilities to use them later. Ukraine isn’t a prize on the global stage. Taiwan is. But after billions in aid to Ukraine, and our depleted weapons stocks and a public not interested in yet another military adventure to a place they don’t care about, they aren’t going to be able to do the same thing again. Which means that China gets a very valuable piece of industrial infrastructure, the entire computer chip industry, and all of the leverage that comes with it. We’re basically, without thinking it through deciding to fight tooth and nail for Nebraska and ceding New York. Any sober analysis would consider that colossally stupid.

Depleted weapons stocks go both ways. China has reduced capacity to invade Taiwan because they won't be able to count on Russian military aid. The same goes for China's other allies (North Korea, Iran) because their stockpiles are also being tapped by the Russian war effort.

I find this "give up Ukraine to secure Taiwan" sentiment unconvincing. Had the West floundered on Ukraine, China would likely have launched their invasion of Taiwan months ago.

I don't even get the "depleted weapons stocks" thing, really. The memes about the Military-Industrial Complex have me under the impression that they won't stay depleted for long. If firearms history is any suggestion (WRT when a big army has to shuffle off and surplus old shit), the MIC is about to have one hell of a good problem to have on their hands.

On the face of it, I don’t see any strategic reason for NATO or the Allie’s to really invest in a free Ukraine.

I'm pretty sure what you mean is you don't see reason for US / Canada to invest in a free Ukraine. For European Nato countries there are blatantly obvious reasons such as Russia being a hostile country just a 1000 km away from most and neighbouring others (including direct threats by multiple high officials that several Nato countries "are really part of Russia").

It's fine if you think US should be isolationist but don't pretend that you can speak for Europe.

just a 1000 km away

This is a very... American diagnosis of the European psyche.

Europe is smaller, and more crowded than America. And psychologically, Europeans are used to implacable hatred of everyone in the next valley. So 1000km away to a European may as well be on the moon. It is as much "not worth worrying about" as 13000km is to an American. So as far as agenda-setting of national policies goes, Russia may as well be as distant and irrelevant to European countries as it is from the USA.

Estonia, maybe, has cause for concern. But the Western European nations who are gun-running to Kiev? They have zero legitimate interest in Ukraine, just like America.

You're explaining european psychology to a european... Aren't you american?

Why would we let russia expand its sphere militarily at our doorstep? Better to fight them in kiev than in warsaw, better in warsaw than in berlin. Imagine domino theory, except the dominoes are your friends and there's only 2 dominoes between you and the enemy.

If it's in Europe's self interest, then they should do the heavy lifting of money and materiel. US taxpayers will eventually grow weary of subsidizing the defense of people who get far more vacation time and unlimited free healthcare,and are awfully smug about it besides.

One day you’ll determine whether we’re vassals with no agency or hyper-agentic manipulators exploiting your selflessness. In the meantime, do what you gotta do, pal.

Por que no los dos *cherubic smile*

Is it possible to unite the two views? If you look at similar theories of manipulation by jews, or perfidious anglos, or women, it's difficult to argue that they are NPCs as well. You really have to pick either superior or inferior, corresponding to feelings of hate or contempt respectively, and go with it. Or neither, that's always an option, I don't hate or despise americans. I'm just trying to give some semblance of coherence to your antagonism, throw me a friggin' bone here.

I don’t see any strategic reason for NATO or the Allies to really invest in a free Ukraine.

What about maintaining the norm of "Thou shalt not add territory to thy nation by force of arms.", violations of which, rightly or wrongly, were blamed for the horrors of the first half of the 20th century, and which was, rightly or wrongly, credited with maintaining a more peaceful world post-1945?

It’s an important principle to maintain, as we did when Kuwait was added to Iraq by force of arms. However, there was no corollary principle which would keep countries from using force of arms on its own people to keep its territory intact, as post-2014 Ukraine had been doing to its eastern regions.

This points to another problem. We as a world have been maintaining the lines on world maps drawn by the colonial great powers. Those lines were drawn in an era before mineral and oil exploration had made it clear which peoples would become winners and losers in the eyes of a mineral-hungry and oil-thirsty global industrial civilization. Those lines also lumped together disparate ethnic groups and tribes who then fought each other instead of their colonizers and corporate developers. They are more akin to a butcher’s chart than an anatomical guide for veterinarians.

Russia has to spend blood and treasure to secure the rest of Ukraine. We just have to spend treasure to make their cost go up! And we’ve decided the exchange rate looks pretty good.

As for motivation—what makes you say Trump branded as anti-war? This is the “fire and fury” and “if you fuck around with us…” guy. He rushed the US-Taliban deal at the end of his presidency, but the actual withdrawal was delayed until Biden could screw it up. All in all I’d rate his foreign policy as pretty belligerent.

If Trump defined the political alignment on Ukraine, it’s got to be down to Russiagate rather than his actual foreign stances. Attitudes towards Russia and Putin were shorthand for whether you believed the accusations. The party lines were obvious.

As for motivation—what makes you say Trump branded as anti-war?

He's very vocal about how force should be responded to with force, those comments were in that context.

In the 2016 primaries he caught a lot of flack from the neocon wing for speaking out against "stupid wars" and calling Iraq a mistake.

In office he resisted pressure to go into Syria, he sent Jared Kushner to negotiate the Abraham Accords, and he attempted to negotiate peace with North Korea.

For further proof John McCain hated him.

Russia has to spend blood and treasure to secure the rest of Ukraine. We just have to spend treasure to make their cost go up! And we’ve decided the exchange rate looks pretty good.

Who's "we", and what was the calculus? Because I have a strong suspicion that the "we" is just seething third-generation Russian emigrants still mad that great-grandpa was run off the shetl, lobbying and donating until the US's pay-for-play foreign policy let's them use America like a golem to smash their ancestral enemy.

I'm a citizen of the West and certainly no-one asked me about sending all my money to Kiev.

I was thinking of the American military-industrial complex, of which I am doubly part. The Pentagon, Lockheed Martin have some obvious incentives to keep the government buying more HIMARS or whatever.

shtetl

golem

Are you just hinting that support for Ukraine is driven by Jews? There are 50 years of other reasons why Americans like to stick it to the Russkies. Just watch the classic documentary, TOP GUN.

I see this all the time, this kind of comment that Americans hate Russians. I, frankly, am genuinely put off by this.

I always believed my country’s enemies to be the Communists, the Soviet Socialists who inherited their ill-gotten rule from the Bolshevik revolutionaries; my enemies were never the poor Russians in government bread lines in knee-deep snow. I have as little ill will toward the Slavs of the Russian Federation as I do the Khasi people of West Bengal, India, or the Mushuau Innu First Nation people of Canada; that is to say, none at all.

Who said anything about hate?

When Russia does something that reminds Americans of the Cold War, we are more likely to object. Invading a neighbor fits that stereotype. As far as I know, the Khasi or Mushauau Innu lack both the military power and the historical trend.

Really, I will agree with Nybbs that most of the blame falls on Putin. Average Russians don’t seem to get much of a say in their foreign policy.

Of course the problem was the communists, but they didn't ever really go away. They changed their outfit and their choice of lies. The country is still run by a dictator with secret police, it still has a huge stockpile of nukes, it's still attempting to secure an empire. Most of the bad aspects are still there. And yes, this is mostly an issue of the sociopaths in charge, not the regular people.

Putin's government is seen by many, and not without cause, as a partial extension of Soviet rule. But yeah, it ain't the Russian people most pro-Ukraine Americans have a problem with.

I was gonna suggest Red Dawn.

Post-Vietnam, the pattern is that republicans support wars started under republican presidents and oppose wars started under democrat presidents. Vice-versa for democrats. In the case of Vietnam, opposition from the left spiked significantly when Nixon took office. The draft also drove the dynamics in Vietnam - the left opposed Vietnam for the simple reason that young people are disproportionately on the left and young people were disproportionately impacted by the draft.

Prior to Vietnam I think it's harder to find the same patterns because the parties' left-right alignment shifted in the 60s and cultural attitudes about what role the US should play in foreign policy shifted significantly after WWII.

Military has always just been “masculine” which gives it a right code. The right has always been more masculine of a political movement.

Currently the opposition is the right viewing the institutions as being owned by the left today.

I do get the sense a lot of the right anti-war sentiment seems to be gaslighting and knowledgeable ignorance of counter arguments.

Here’s an example

https://twitter.com/davidsacks/status/1653790550037004288?s=46&t=aQ6ajj220jubjU7-o3SuWQ

I don’t see a lot of evidence War could have been avoided by drawing a hard NATO line. All evidence I see both today and historically Russia will expand until they militarily can not. If we didn’t fight over Ukraine they would take the Baltics. If they are strong enough then they would take Poland.

All evidence I see both today and historically Russia will expand until they militarily can not. If we didn’t fight over Ukraine they would take the Baltics. If they are strong enough then they would take Poland.

Nukes change the equation. Poland being in NATO is a signal that the US is willing to use nuclear weapons to defend it. That's not a war they can win - at best, it would be a draw, and even that scenario would be the end of Russia as a civilization.

There’s no nuclear use protocol for NATO. Just a requirement to provide aid. And NATO countries would be launched on if we launched.

If Ukraine was surrendered the next line would have been the Baltics. And area where NATO would have difficult use of conventional military to defend. That would have been the first test to see what lines NATO would use. And putin was going to test it.

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