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ZorbaTHut  1yr ago (text post)   35167 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of September 19, 2022

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tl;dr some quick attempts to get inside the mindset at the Kremlin concerning events in the war, in the run-up to Putin's speech expected in a few hours. Everything below could be immediately and awkwardly falsified if he announces some desperate escalation like general mobilisation or a nuclear strike against a Ukrainian military target.

Ever since the Ukrainian successes in the northeastern campaign, I've been trying to get inside the mindset of the Kremlin to figure out what their likely response is.

One thing that is almost certainly true (and easily underestimated) is that they are in their own psychological bubble, and there is no elite team of intelligence operatives whose primary job is to give Putin objective analysis. Human minds don't work that way: we easily form fenced-off epistemic communities that downplay our shameful fears and play up our pride. You can even see this reading the reports of US decision-making throughout the Cold War, when interservice rivalry ran hot and the USAF nuclear strategy advisors were giving opinions based not on what was in humanity's interests or even the USA's, but instead what would get them the most planes and status compared to the army and navy. And of course, you can see it easily on reddit, even getting a rush of ideological whiplash as you flit from one politically aligned sub to another.

(What about people like Girkin? Well, he's a doomer, and an outsider, and his criticisms are mostly quite careful. As far as I've noticed, he talks about the conduct of the war, not the wisdom in initiating it in the first place; or he says that Russia should be more committed, without once questioning whether the war is winnable even with full commitment.)

Given all the above, I think a useful and necessary starting point for understanding Russia's position is to try to imagine what your view would be if Russia's strategic situation was a lot better than you probably currently think it is (this is one reason why contrarian posters are valuable to any subreddit that takes itself intellectually seriously).

What does this involve? Maybe it means you think that Ukrainian morale is weak. Maybe you think that the EU is less united than it appears, and winter will be harder than Europeans are prepared for. Maybe you think that the United States is being opportunistic and will drop Ukraine without looking back when the conflict starts to swing back Russia's way. Above all, you're probably convinced that there won't be another breakthrough like in Kharkiv oblast: that was a one off, heads have rolled, and now discipline and morale have been restored to the troops. Reinforcements are coming in, Iran is sending useful drones, and the forthcoming referenda will encourage a surge of volunteers from the DPR and LPR.

Let's say that you, like Putin, were in the grip of this relative sunny outlook. What would follow from it for your reflections on the wider strategy of the conflict?

Above all, I think you would be aiming to take the long view of things, because the fundamentals are on your side. Forget today's battles and next week's offensives - focus on longer-term military-industrial capacity, and associated active measures in the Russian and foreign populations. You probably don't want to risk a general mobilisation - that might compromise your longer-term war fighting ability - but you want to get as many new volunteers as possible, ideally from less economically active areas of the country. And finally, nuclear weapons wouldn't be on the table; after all, you're winning this war, albeit more slowly and less gloriously than you'd hoped. Why would you risk alienating friends and allies and giving NATO a chance to intervene?

But you might ask, at what point does this Pollyanna-Putin outlook begin to crumble? When does the filter bubble burst, and Putin has his Downfall-style meltdown? When Ukraine liberates Kherson? Lysychansk? Donetsk? Sevastopol? I think the only answer we can give here is that people in general are very bad at facing up to uncomfortable realities, and can keep themselves from accepting painful truths for their entire lives if necessary. Or think of psychologist's Leon Festinger's now famous work on cognitive dissonance on doomsday cults: when the doomsday prophecy fails, people will go to great lengths to avoid accepting that they've been duped. I expect Putin to go out the same way, with his final thoughts being confidence that Russia can still be victorious, even as he has an unfortunate fall from a window.

("What about you doglatine? Why are you so sure that Putin's the one in the filter bubble rather than you?" Answer: Well, I've been trying to make clear predictions throughout this conflict both online and to my circle of geopolitics friends - this post is in that same vein - and I'd say I'm fairly well calibrated so far in terms of events on the ground. Part of the appeal of making explicit predictions is to try to break yourself out of these epistemic lagoons in the first place. All that said, I recognise that of course I'm in a filter bubble, sometimes through deliberate choice (once the novelty value wears off, it's just not fun to consume propaganda you disagree with). But even if my intentions were pure, filter bubbles are all but inescapable. Usually the best you can hope for is to get good at spotting the early signs of a bubble collapse so you can make a clean exit with your life savings and a modicum of your dignity intact. But that's far easier said than done)

In any case, I am curious what others think.

I think we shouldn't assume that there are any moderates ready to take up Putin's job. Getting rid of Putin should not be our goal.

The second largest political party in Russia (behind Putin's United Russia) is the Communist Party. They support the war in Ukraine.

Zhirinovsky led Russia's 3rd largest political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, until his death early this year. Far from being liberal or democratic, the party is generally considered to be fascist if not megalomaniacal imperialist.

https://twitter.com/GodCloseMyEyes/status/1500973674811346946

All these parties are considered pawns of Putin to some extent but they have more of a presence than the genuine liberals. As I understand it, they're still reeling from the disaster of the 1990s.

Putin is the moderate candidate. If Russia loses we'll very likely get a much more exciting, much more dangerous leader. Since when did non-total military defeats in authoritarian countries ever lead to a strengthening of liberal forces? The specific conditions of a defeat and coup would be extremely unpromising - what patriot is going to work with the West given that our weapons were killing their troops just a few weeks ago? What is the point of replacing Putin if our options are communist Putin or fascist Putin?

I expect that Russia will begin to mobilize and start taking this war seriously, as they have made motions towards recently. There is no good reason for power to still be on in Ukraine, they have a great deal of ballistic and cruise missiles that could be striking power infrastructure. During the Iraq War the US intensively bombed Iraq's infrastructure until electricity output was at 4% of pre-war levels. There is no good reason for Russia to be outmanned by a smaller, less populous country. They have a large force of reservists. There appear to be motions towards recognizing Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson as parts of Russia. That would let them deploy their reservists 'legally'.

Conditional on them taking the war seriously by deploying the rest of their army and destroying Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia will start winning decisive victories. The war thus far has been an offensive war half-heartedly fought against a numerically larger, well entrenched defender. It's easy to see how the defender has an advantage in such a conflict. If all else fails, Russia has 2000 tactical nukes to Ukraine's 0. There's no level of grit or clever Western technology that can stand up to firepower of that magnitude.

Support for the war in Russia is fairly high.

https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/07/my-country-right-or-wrong-russian-public-opinion-on-ukraine-pub-87803

The physical fundamentals really are on Russia's side, the constraints are mostly imagined within the Kremlin.

Edit: Live speech from Putin: https://youtube.com/watch?v=iCdPPYtJeag

I think he's just announced partial mobilization.

Just a minor nitpick, but the communist party in Russia isn’t really communist, they’re the conspiracy theorist wing of Russian nationalism.

Could you expand on this? Sounds interesting.

What is the point of replacing Putin if our options are communist Putin or fascist Putin?

This is why I think current Russia is a lost cause for the world, little more than a gangrenous sore on planet Earth. The only real solution is complete and utter cultural eradication of "Russianness" until the current subjects of the federation are themselves left cursing very name of Rurik.

  • -17

That seems....extreme, unlikely and counterproductive.

When you've had as many of your DOTA games ruined by Russians as I have (who play on EU servers as even Russians don't want to play with other Russians) you'll understand why I feel the way I do.

I was curious and downloaded my game history to check and I have a large 15% lower winrate when there is someone with a Cyrillic name in my team (an almost always sufficient, but not necessary condition for Russianness) compared to when I don't.

Write like you want to include everyone in the conversation. More generally, don't be a troll. Your offense is arguably more subtle than the name-calling you get downthread, but no less a violation of the rules. Banned for a week.

Hey now, navalgazing is a great blog, and one of the best offshoots from the old slatestarcodex open thread

Name-calling breaks several of our rules. User banned for a week.

I agree that BC's take is bad and should feel bad, but responding with insults (even accurate ones!) is not within the local rules.

What makes Russia such a bad influence on the world is not it’s “Russianness”, it’s the fact it’s a post communist state. All communist states are quite frankly very evil in their behaviour towards their own citizens and others. It is therefore communism that clearly must be crushed worldwide if what we seek it a more peaceful world

If all else fails, Russia has 2000 tactical nukes to Ukraine's 0.

Use just a single one of those and Russia loses every single ally it has in the world (well, maybe not North Korea and Syria but with friends like those, who needs enemies).

You lose allies when you suffer strategic losses, not when you succeed in ruthlessly waging war.

Using nukes at this stage would be a strategic loss.

It would be a tacit admission that despite having every advantage on paper, the vaunted Russian military is incapable defeating a 3rd - 4th rate power on it's own borders.

Isn't Russia framing the conflict as Russia vs the American Empire?

Still not great if the narrative can be spun as "Russia can't even knock over a recently-added podunk tentacle of the American Empire."

That admission is going to have to happen one way or another, if the facts demand it.

Strong agree. Recall that non-proliferation has succeeded partly because we've managed to effectively taboo nukes' use; South American and Africa are 'nuclear-free zones'. The reaction of almost every non-nuclear power in the world should be to either condemn the use of a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear power in the harshest possible terms, or nuclearise as quickly as possible.

The reaction of almost every non-nuclear power in the world should be to either condemn the use of a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear power in the harshest possible terms, or nuclearise as quickly as possible.

Or both.

I think we shouldn't assume that there are any moderates ready to take up Putin's job. Getting rid of Putin should not be our goal.

All these parties are considered pawns of Putin to some extent but they have more of a presence than the genuine liberals. As I understand it, they're still reeling from the disaster of the 1990s.

The Duma is the inversion of the Roman Senate. The Senate lost all its powers but was still formed independently. The Duma has kept all its powers, but its elections have been a "special operation" since at least 2007. Putin's replacement can be given two chairs, as Russian prison slang goes:

  1. keep the "special elective operation" going and eliminate the Freikorps out of politics, with United Russia unexpectedly electing dovish MPs and communists and LDPR losing their seats to liberal parties

  2. uncork the political debate and remove all traces of "special elective operation", give old and new parties at least a year of glasnost 2.0 before the elections

Option 1 is super safe in the short term but has a risk of backsliding. Option 2 is risky, but I guarantee you it will transform Russian political landscape, and your worries about CPRF and LDPR will become obsolete.

Russia has 2000 tactical nukes to Ukraine's 0. There's no level of grit or clever Western technology that can stand up to firepower of that magnitude.

You say that, but...

What do you think happens after Russia Turns Kiev Odessa and Lviv into mushroom clouds?

Firstly, tactical nukes would be used against formations in the field, not cities. That's what strategic weapons are for (of which Russia has 4000).

If Russia decided to vaporize Ukraine, the West would do nothing because Russia also has the capability to vaporize Europe and North America. That's what those strategic weapons were designed to do in the first place. I don't see why the US would commit national suicide by waging war against a nuclear superpower.

As I write this comment, I'm listening to Putin's live speech as he claims that other nations were threatening to use nuclear weapons against Russia, where he stated that 'the wind could blow against them.'

Firstly, tactical nukes would be used against formations in the field, not cities. That's what strategic weapons are for (of which Russia has 4000).

In the context of anything except a global thermonuclear exchange, there is effectively no distinction to be made between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Either would be a massive escalation of force and perceived risk. And even the yields on smaller tactical nukes make large civilian casualties/devastation inevitable. Little Boy would qualify as an unusually small tactical nuke in the modern context, and it killed 100k+

Little Boy would qualify as an unusually small tactical nuke in the modern context

I don't think this is correct. Browsing wikipedia indicates that if anything, Little Boy (15 kt) is slightly on the higher side of yields (many which can be dialed down to around 1 kt or less).

Let's bring this to the concrete level.

The Iskander can be mounted with a 10 kilotonne warhead. If you fire that at a city it will obviously do a lot of damage. Most people within about a kilometre and a half radius die of burns, shockwave and radiation. If the city is made of paper and wood, it will obviously burn down and cause a huge number of deaths.

If you fire it a military target like an airbase, it will destroy the airbase but not much else.

Go into nukemap and see what sort of casualties you get dropping 10 kt nukes on random parts of the countryside in eastern Ukraine. I get 10 deaths, 120 deaths, 150 deaths, 190 deaths, 700 deaths... We are not talking about huge numbers of deaths here. The Saudi bombing of Yemen (assisted by the US) has apparently killed 20,000 Yemeni civilians. Many hundreds of thousands more have starved to death, though direct responsibility is hard to ascertain.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_(2014%E2%80%93present)

Now if you drop an 800 Kt SS-25, a strategic weapon, on Kiev you get 600,000 dead, which is a large number! These are genuinely different issues. You can't say they're the same.

Ya its actually kinda surprizing the norms around nukes have stayed "No nukes ever" Vs. Nothing above a certain Yeild, no civillian targets...

a 1-5 kiloton over-pressure would be so bloody usefull for taking out reinforced bridges, bunkers, and airbases... Conventional explosives generally suck at airbases especially, they're so spread out and they're constantly moving the planes around so its impossible to really take out an air wing without a whole operation with lots of scouting

tactical nukes would be used against formations in the field

Most people probably overestimate the efficacy of tactical nukes against armoured formations. No-one knows for sure, of course, but there was a lot of analysis done in the Cold War when it was assumed that NATO would need to use tactical weapons to blunt any Soviet invasion of Western Europe. There are two big problems with using them in a battlefield capacity. The first is that most armoured units aren't conveniently bunched up in very tight proximity like buildings in cities, so the same kind of bomb that would devastate an urban area might only knock out a dozen tanks. The second is that armoured vehicles are very good at surviving heat and blast effects - one Cold War study found that tanks require approximately 45 psi of overpressure to be reliably rendered inoperable. The 10kT warheads on Russia's SSC-8 creates a fireball approximately 400m in diameter (probably fatal to tanks in the affected area), but once you get half a click away, overpressure has already dropped to 20 psi.

On top of these inherent limitations to battlefield use of small yield nuclear armaments, it's also worth remembering that the battlefield situation in Ukraine is VERY different from that which NATO was facing in 1970. Back then, NATO expected to be dealing with massed armoured columns attacking in accordance with Soviet Deep Battle Doctrine. The topography of Germany means that the majority of these would be funneled through a few relatively narrow corridors, most famously the Fulda Gap, thus creating favourable conditions for the use of battlefield nukes. Additionally, even if tank columns survived the nukes themselves, the expectation was that the roads, bridges, and infrastructure near the blast would be damaged so as to slow the progress of subsequent reinforcing units. All of this is very different from Ukraine, where the actual number of troops and armoured vehicles involved have been comparatively small, and largely dispersed across a massive front.

Ultimately, the best way way to use small-yield nuclear weapons to obtain results on the battlefield is to use them to systematically knock out an opposing force's command and control and logistics capacities within the theatre of operations by targeting communications, bridges, airfields, power supplies, etc., essentially doing with nukes what America did to Iraq with precision bombs in Desert Storm. However, this kind of effort is unlikely to be effective in piecemeal form; in order to permanently degrade Ukraine's ability to wage war in a given theatre of operations, Russia would need to be looking at the use of multiple bombs, perhaps more than a dozen. And since many of the relevant targets would be located in or close to built-up civilian areas, casualties among the civilian population would be high (the human body, unlike tanks, doesn't tend to do well with 20 psi of overpressure).

All of which is to say that a handful of small-yield nuclear bombs used exclusively against military targets is unlikely to create sustained military advantage for Russia, while incurring significant diplomatic penalty. In order to be decisive even within a theatre of operations such as the Kharkiv front, Russia would need to use multiple weapons and target military infrastructure and supporting civilian infrastructure, with attendant massive diplomatic costs. If they adopted this second strategy, they could almost certainly obtain a decisive advantage in the short-term, but the cost would be complete international opprobrium and the breaking of the nuclear taboo (this latter ultimately being advantageous for Russia as one of the five official nuclear powers). Moreover, it is likely that there would be overwhelming political pressure at that point for the United States to intervene at least conventionally in the conflict, significantly raising the risks of escalation to general (nuclear) war between Russia and the United States.

There are no easy nuclear options for Russia.

The second is that armoured vehicles are very good at surviving heat and blast effects - one Cold War study found that tanks require approximately 45 psi of overpressure to be reliably rendered inoperable.

Don't forget that shitty Warsaw Pact armor is designed specifically for fighting in conditions of nuclear warfare.

Absolutely, you would need to use dozens of weapons or more. They would be effective at destroying entrenched infantry and break up any large-scale counterattacks which require concentrated forces. But the Russians have thousands of weapons.

But why does everyone think would be overwhelming pressure on the US to intervene and join a nuclear war?

Imagine you're the US president. There's a nuclear war going on between Russia and a country you're not obliged to defend by any kind of treaty. The country with the single biggest arsenal in the world is using somewhere between 0.2-1% of its tactical nukes. The remaining 1990 tactical weapons are held in reserve, ready to be used against you. The remaining 4000 strategic weapons are obviously pointed at you. The whole Russian arsenal is on very high alert because this is a major crisis.

Why do you join and make yourself a target? Do you think the Russians, after just launching nuclear strikes, will back down now? After they've done extremely costly signalling to show their desire to win? What benefit does joining a nuclear war have for the US? Why is it worth it? Everyone here seems to think the US should or would intervene but I can't understand why!

The US is not a sensible target for Russian nuclear weapons unless it is likely to use nuclear weapons against Russia. However, in the event of Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the US and it allies have a lot of extreme measures they can use that are short of nuclear war or even direct attacks on Russian soil:

(1) Massive, apocalyptic cyberattacks that cripple Russian access to the internet.

(2) Attacking Russian satellites to destroy Russian TV and communications capacity.

(3) Closing off Russian access to the sea at all points.

(4) Closing off Russian civilian air access to all possible points.

(5) Closing off Russian civilian land access to all possible points, including Kalingrad, which would face food shortages etc.

(6) Expelling Russia from the United Nations Security Council. China would almost certainly abstain at worst and maybe vote for Russia's expulsion, since association with Russia would be massively toxic. Russia's suspension from the UN would also be an option. This would mean that, in future, Russia would face Korean War type scenarios, where the UN Security Council could vote to mobilise the UN against Russia and/or its allies (assuming it still has any after Pressing the Button).

(7) Extension of sanctions to countries that still trade with Russia, which after Pressing the Button may not be that many. While India would be out, somewhere like Cuba might still be in, and would face apocalyptic sanctions.

(8) Intensification of sanctions in all respects.

This is why, unless Putin is colossaly stupid, he will not Press the Button, even on a limited scale, let alone bombing Ukrainian cities. Much of the world still likes Russia and there is a lot of incentives for the West to keep their powder dry on extreme measures. Once Russia ends the nuclear taboo, it loses both of those, and goes into a forced pariah status that is unprecedented in human history.

You may say "Are China/India really going to give up on Russia in this situation?" Think of it from their perspective: right now, using nuclear weapons to any extent is taboo. This means that e.g. India doesn't have too much to fear from nuclear war with Pakistan, and China doesn't have to worry about the US using tactical nukes to defend Taiwan. If Russia breaks the nuclear taboo without massive consequences, then that sets a precedent for Pakistan or the US to do so without massive consequences.

That's all pretty fucking horrifying, and probably will transpire, nukes or no nukes.

Looking into Putin's early career, I've just read an interesting interview, admittedly from a suspect source: an Israeli-Russian arms dealer who filed some lawsuits against Putin-affiliated companies for scamming and forcibly removing him out of his businesses in the 90-s-00's. (and beating him half to death). He talked on a USA-funded Radio Freedom. A terse intro in English.

The point is, he says the same thing I've seen from many other people personally acquainted with early Putin: that he is absolutely, purely amoral. This image reminds me of Achilles Desjardins from Peter Watts' trilogy. Except Achilles was very smart and rational.

To be clear, I do not subscribe to this interpretation: Putin clearly has some attachments, some scruples, it's just this sentiment is reserved for «his people». And I don't mean Russians or something, but literally his little mafia team. Then again, even Achilles Desjardins mourned his cat.

With time and age, men become dumber, emotionally unstable, insecure, fall into echo chambers, come to believe in nonsense. But they still have habits and customs to guide them. Old Putin, Putin we have today, may be both stupidly irrational and completely devoid of conventional morality that could have prevented self-defeating extreme moves on its own.

Two short excerpts:

[...] But then an unpleasant thing happened: they called me and told me that there had been a general meeting of shareholders, and they signed the documents for me, which was probably true. According to the general practice, there are a lot of such things even now, when some part of the company's shares is assigned to a bum or to someone who is sure not to come, for whom they sign, and everything is fine. Because if you start dividing shares, there are a lot of questions from other co-owners. But this way they put it aside and put their signatures on it. It's a common practice, in fact, such an "unallocated stake".

I was offered to buy documents with which I could go to the police and to court. I came to the meeting, waited in the cafe "Victoria" in front of my house. It's a cafe with a counter, and then a restaurant and separate offices in the restaurant. I waited for the guy who called me. Another guy came up, said this one wasn't coming, if you need papers, come and see. I went into a separate office in the restaurant, got hit in the head, a hole was made in it by hitting me from behind.

– When was this?

– December 2003, after Dima Skigin died. They hit my head, kicked me hard, ripped my pancreas, ruptured my intestines. It was highly unpleasant. Along the way I was told several times: "Sigma, Sovex - just forget it, good man" - in the process, so to speak, of the beating. Well, I ended up in the hospital, they cut me open, did a laparotomy, I can show you the scar from here to there. They operated for four hours and still saved me, although it was not clear on that subject. When I recovered, took off for Israel. I tried to find out what happened to the company, because it was a silly situation: on the one hand you seemed to have shares, but on the other hand they were useless.

[...]

– Aside from civic position, or rather, one of its manifestations, there's another goal here. Whether or not you can punish someone is another question, but you can point the finger: this is a bandit, and this is a thief, and this is a crook. Just, you people, know that, and then how you deal with them is your problem.

– For whom exactly do you want to point with fingers?

– For people here in the West, among all else. Because a man with money comes, and until recently very few people were interested in how many old ladies were hacked to death with an axe for this suitcase of money. So I would like to point to the facts, and then people will decide for themselves how to treat this. You can shake hands with them, or not.

And regarding Vladimir Vladimirovich himself, he is a person who is, how should I put it... When we met with him, and, understandably, I was considered a CIA and Mossad agent – an Israeli, an arms dealer – I was struck by a feeling in him that is hard to convey verbally. He is not human in our understanding. It was not something infernal or like he's demon-possessed, but, apparently, something very strongly broke inside him, there were no human reactions. I don't even know how to describe it. I had various acquaintances at that time in St. Petersburg. There were people who loved women, money, cars. But they were very much alive, they had certain inner limits, set for themselves: I'm going to do this, but this here I won't do, else I won't respect myself. Vladimir Vladimirovich showed that he was not burdened at all. Either the KGB school had taught him that, or something else, but it was clear that there were no ordinary human standards – no gratitude, no boundaries. I'm trying to find a metaphor.... Well, some beyond-scary bandit wouldn't strangle a girl with her own ribbon for a candy bar. After all, it's kind of awkward. But here it was clear that there was only expediency and nothing else.

That's the horror of Soviet man in general, who has lost the notion of good and evil in principle, and this man had no such inner conceptions at all.

– Can you give me an example when this became clear to you about Vladimir Vladimirovich?

– No, just from the general stylistics, when certain phrases were uttered.

– It's just that there are completely different opinions. He made an extremely positive first impression on many people. In the '90s he said the right things about the development of small businesses, the free economic zone, banks, and so on and so forth.

– I think that both Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky fell for this. Because a man unwittingly models his interlocutor in accordance with himself. As they say in the criminal world, there are some "understandings," some framework, within which a person will constrain himself. But here, as it seemed to me at the time, there is no such framework at all. And it also seemed to me at the time that the man has some kind of fetish for money, with money as an abstract idea. Maybe as a way to protect oneself from this world. It was clear that he also joined the KGB in order to have the organization propping him up. In general, it was clear that he was trying to protect himself, and that for him this sacred fetish of money was simultaneously a protection from all possible trouble. And if you add here a common idea, popular in Russia, that "everything can be afforded for money"...

I have long had a mental model of Putin as a cautious but ruthless Russian nationalist, who is occasionally led into overconfidence by high oil prices, as in 2005-2008 and 2011-2014. Basically, Brezhnev with a trim waistline, who also was led astray from his normal caution by high oil prices in 1973-1979.

Thus, I interpret Putin's nuclear posturing as for domestic consumption, to assuage the wounded pride of the Russian people. "The West is threatening us with nukes, but WE have nukes too!!" is as much national pride as Putin can offer Russians right now. Pathetic? Yes. Sensible given his goals and means? Yes.

I would also be stunned at the US, China, and their allies doing such things without Russia breaking some huge taboo like using nuclear weapons. Even Russian "strategic bombing" of Ukrainian civilian areas would probably only increase Western aid to Ukraine and investment in fucking up the Russian economy through e.g. reducing the demand for oil.

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The issue in question was 'overwhelming political pressure at that point for the United States to intervene at least conventionally in the conflict' which I think you agree is off the table, especially considering the 'at least'.

By the way, you can't expel Russia from the UNSC, they have a veto. There's no legal mechanism to expel permanent members of the UNSC.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-06/can-russia-be-removed-from-the-un-security-council/100969106

It depends on what you mean by "intervene at least conventionally". If the US navy and its allies block all naval vessels from leaving Russian territorial waters, is that a conventional intervention or not?

As for the UNSC, there may be no legal mechanism, but that wouldn't mean much in a situation where Russia has broken the nuclear taboo.

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The US has a longstanding position against the military use of nukes by other people, and has made firm and public "serious consequences will follow" statements to that effect. Admitting that this position was a bluff is credibility-destroying, and frankly, credibility is more difficult to build than cities.

Has the US promised to defend Ukraine under its nuclear umbrella? No. It's as simple as that.

You don't fight nuclear wars to defend countries if you don't even promise to do so beforehand.

I believe you may have overlooked the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, where the US promised to do precisely that.

A random detail of interest--the US Ambassador to Hungary at the time was the father of the current US Secretary of State.

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The costs for using nuclear weapons (pariah status worse than the DPRK at best, utter annihilation at worst) make them rarely a positive square on the reward matrix, unless the alternative is equally grim. This makes them particularly bad at anything that isn't critical deterrence. See Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy by Sechser and Fuhrmann, chapter here.

Putin might think that the West is not going to sanction him any more than it already has. And that the West will not invade/seize control of the nukes/de-nucelarize Russia because that means total war.

What is the appropriate escalation for the West for 1 nuke used against Ukraine? One nuke against Russia?

Putin might think that the West is not going to sanction him any more than it already has.

There is A LOT of space here. For start USA holds about 300 000 000 000 $ hostage. For China and India that may be enough to start full scale blockade.

And there is plenty of space like taking military action, full scale military gear delivery or actually volunteer units in NATO gear going into action. Or actions by special forces.

For start USA holds about 300 000 000 000 $ hostage

Come on now. I agree that there's still some way to go to the bottom even purely sanctions-wise, and perhaps Putin still fears it (although by this point he probably should fear shunning by other anti-Western parties more). But we know those 300B go to Ukraine just like my Tesla stonks go back to USA and NS2 goes to hell and Russian conscripts trying to flee into your country go to Donbass.

Edit: oh you don't mean frozen Rus reserves it seems. I should sleep more.

In good news: one of my friends made it out, we've met up.

More likely asymmetric escalation - something like blockading Russia or committing NATO airpower directly to the war in Ukraine. NATO doesn't want a nuclear exchange, but it is also strongly incentivized to make it clear that nuclear blackmail doesn't work.

What is the appropriate escalation for the West for 1 nuke used against Ukraine? One nuke against Russia?

Kaliningrad returned to the Polish Maybe?

It was never Polish. A Baltic ethnicity, Prussians, lived here before Germans assimilated them.

I am not expecting that it would be wanted by Poland (however you define it) or Poles or Polish government.

Then make it Kaliningrad People's Republic, nominally free but doing everything EU (or USA) wants.

There are methodological problems with the chapter in that a lot of the unsuccessful threats they discuss are totally irrelevant to nuclear warfare. Nobody would believe that France would think about nuking Serbia if they didn't accept the Kosovo peace plan in 1993! Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to that scenario, as they are to the US vs Afghanistan in 2001.

In fact, they admit that coercive nuclear threats were explicitly made in the case of Suez (by Russia) and Cuba (by the US). Both these cases saw the threat-making party succeed. The US did indeed take costly actions to make its threat credible to the Soviets in the case of Cuba, dispersing its nuclear bomber force amongst civilian airports and keeping planes in the air 24/7. In the case of Suez, Khrushchev threatened nuclear attack against France and Britain.

That chapter makes a similar argument to: 'we examined 200 occasions of gun-owners making threats to see if having a gun made threats more credible. We found that most of the time they didn't have any effect - most of the time guns weren't present or even mentioned. There were two instances in which guns were actually being pointed at the other guy - in these occasions the threateners successfully compelled their targets. But most of the time owning guns doesn't help in securing obedience.'

The argument is technically valid but silly.

I think you're are seriously underestimating the likely response. If "never get involved in a land war in Asia" is the first rule of war "never underestimate mongrelized rednecks' willingness to fight" ought to be the second. World Wars one and two could have been avoided by heeding such advice.

If the US is so eager to die for Ukraine, why not tell the Russians that? 'If you nuke Ukraine, we'll nuke you'!

Furthermore, if you don't understand the distinction between tactical nukes and strategic nukes, then how are you qualified to pontificate on nuclear strategy? Why would you suggest that the US will sacrifice its major cities for the remnants of Ukraine, a country it's not even allied with?

I'm not convinced the US would die.

If the performance of the Russian Army, Navy, and Airforce is any indication of the state of their Strategic Rocket Force, I sincerely question they can actually hit the US hard enough to kill us.

Even so that's not the point, the point is that if your entire battle plan relies on your opponents being a bunch of idiots who'll roll over if you say "boo", your plan is a bad plan and you deserve to loose. Russia very clearly bet on the Ukrainians not being willing to fight, and now they are paying for it in blood.

Putins legacy turns into Hitler. China embargos Russia. Russia becomes a state without friends. Potentially owns a completely depopulated Ukraine.

China will never turn on Russia, they're going to be at war with the US in Taiwan probably at some point this decade (possibly this spring if they want to capitalize on Russia already being committed)... And they need Russia's 4000 nukes in their back pocket if they're going to have an effective deterrent against the US's vast stockpile.

Otherwise the US could escalate to tactical nuking of Sea and military targets, while china's limited stockpile of 300 would be running into US anti-missile systems, and the maneuverability of Aircraft carriers (which at 30+ nts could probably escape main blast area in a 10 minute flight time)...

Unless they have the backpocket threat of 4000 Russian nukes, those 300 become 100-150 you can spare without losing deterrence, becomes a few dozen that actually hit any targets... At which point the US could be tempted to take out those manmade Islands and costal military facilities.

Chinese might have a lot of more nukes than 300, because unlike Russia or USA they never reported to anyone.

Russia has limited (though nonzero) value to China as a semi-ally. That's why China has given very limited assistance to Russia over Ukraine. Being the ally of the country that broke the nuclear taboo is more costly to China than anything Putin can offer them.

For one thing, why would Russia use nuclear weapons to protect China? Why risk the destruction of Russian civilisation to help out Russia's principal rival in Asia? Russia's nuclear arsenal exists to protect Russia, not to destroy it to save another country.

A much better protection against US nuclear is the taboo against using nuclear weapons in any capacity, which... Russia would have broken. Thus, it would be in China's interests to enforce that taboo, including perhaps by blockading Russia, cyber-attacking it, punishing any nearby country that maintained trade or diplomatic links with Russia etc. That way, the US would know that China is a Peace Loving Country, and that there would be severe consequences for any US use of their nuclear advantages.

list Russia and China's geostrategic conflicts in asia... THere are basically none.

Russia's far east is largely irrelevant whereas it as strategic insecurities in central asia in the "Stans" and major geostrategic and economic Concerns in Europe.

China by contrast lives 100% in concern for its access to trade routes through the pacific and south China sea, and the US' effective strangle hold on them through the first Island chain. as well as the ease with which their trade could be strangled off in the indian ocean or the Strait of Malaca.

There is nothing 1/1000th as major a concern on the border between Manchuria and Siberia, or what... Mongolia?

There might be some aging Kremlin types worried that the yellow peril will extend Manchuria northward, or some weirdo in Beijing delusional enough to think it might be a good idea...

But their mutual existential geostrategic threats to any economic or political survival are so obvious and glaring that there's no chance in hell either can afford to lose the other as a partner.

Its wishcasting to imagine either will willing cast aside the only pottential ally that makes either remotely capable of standing up the american empire

China is a big player in the Stans which worries Russia.

China and Kazakhstan recently signed broad security agreements, China has troops in Tajikistan. China sells a lot of arms to the region. (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are skirmishing, like Armenia and Azerbaijan with Russia unable to exert influence.)

The Belt and Road Initiative (which was added to China's constitution) involves land routes to China from Central Asia in order to survive a loss of sea routes. China is the biggest trade partner in the Stans. Kazakhstan's Nurly Zhol and Uzbekistan's New development Strategy have been fused into the BRI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is replacing the (Russia led) Eurasian Economic Union as an umbrella only missing Turkmenistan. The actual activities are more massive than this:

  • China's building a railroad through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to reduce transit times to Europe (the transsiberian was at capacity) (but the planned route goes through Ukraine, which China's not happy about) and allow for direct imports and exports to Central Asia without going through Russia

  • Huge investments in gas infrastructure directly to China, sidelining Russia as a transit point besides as a produer: https://eurasianet.org/analysis-can-central-asian-gas-exporters-rely-on-china

  • China halted investments in Russia after Russia blocked Kazakh fuel exports - a conflict between China and Russia over Central Asian policy...

Anyway, true geostrategic conflicts are immaterial at this point because Russia is under China's thumb. Chances are, Putin's successors will be Chinese plants.

Just one example: Russia is a perennial ally of India. India is a perennial rival of China.

Another example: there are two major powers with borders, strategic/economic interests, and strong potential influence in Central Asia. Russia is one of them. Influencing this region is a zero sum game. If it's becomes part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then it is no longer part of the Russian sphere of influence. Of course, Russia's interests may coincide with China's for a time, and perhaps even now, but long-term, Russia does not want to be dependent on identifying its interests with China's.

And there's no historical basis to regard China as a potential ally for Russia. Such an alliance has never worked, even when they shared a common ideology.

Is China a major rival for Russia right now? No, I didn't say that. They are rivals insofar as only one of them can be Asia's number one superpower.

Most importantly, China is not worth risking total nuclear war with the US. Nothing short of Russia's survival is. Thus, Russia's status as a nuclear power has very little use to China.

Your crazy. Nuclear War is a graver risks to China than any desire to get Taiwan. China doesn’t want a new world order where Nuclear War is an accepted reality therefore they would turn on Russia.

Exactly which is why they'd need russia on side for any invasion of Taiwan to act as a deterent so the US doesn't do a first strike with tactical nukes against their sea based and coastal assets

US has no doctrine of protecting Taiwan with nukes. Russia normalizing use of nukes is an existential risks to China.

Besides Russia nuking Ukraine there’s a risks they would nuke others like Berlin that would put on full nuclear war and a nuclear winter for China. There is no world where China wants nuclear winter happening over Taiwan.

The US pursues "Strategic ambiguity".

They won't launch the minutemen missiles at chinese cities over taiwan, nor are they obliged to. But its very possible they'd use tactical nukes to take out China's artificial Islands in the south china sea, or disrupt Chinese staging bases.

China needs a deterent to that since they'd struggle to escalate in kind.

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That strikes me as perhaps the best case scenario for Putin in such circumstances.

So far the pro-Russian propaganda has been leaning heavily on "acktchyually, we are the ones supported by the majority of the world, by the numbers - just look at China/India".

That's a bold strategy Cotton, let's see if it works out.

...at which point the best case for Putin and his supporters such as yourself is the one @sliders1234 outlined above.

More likely scenario is that the Sejm finally says "fuck it" and lets the polish army of the leash. I've got a bunch of meat-space friends in the polish military and they've been itching to retake Kaliningrad and march on St Petersburg for years now and who are you to claim that they should not

Please inform your Polish friends that at least one Pole considers their stupidly bloodthirsty attitude to be a betrayal of their duties. A leash would indeed be fitting if they daydream about being an attack dog for western interests.

  • -10

I don't think they would characterize themselves as being "attack dogs for western interests" so much as "putting the fascists in their proper place".

Russia has just mobilized twice as many people as entire Polish army + reserve. This is even before the utter hardware disparity. In terms of competence and experience, I’m sorry to say that I have no reason to believe that they are any better than Russians: no smart Pole has enlisted in Polish military in 30 years, there was too much opportunity elsewhere. There might be good amount of morale and bravery, or there might not, same as in Russia.

In short, if you want to win this, you’d need to send your friends from Joint Base Fort Whatever en masse, instead of expecting that more Slavs will grind each other to dust.

Superior discipline and firepower have, when taken together, a geometric effect on overall military strength, well trained, well equipped troop, will stand up to many more times their lesser brethren than linear arithmetic would seem to indicate.

-Col. Corazon Santiago

*sets paper on fire*

But I don't want to win this, I want more Slavs to grind each other to dust!

I mean, my point is that of course US is very happy with Slavs grinding each other to dust, but I think it would also like to actually win.

Are you suggesting the only reason the US/Europe is involved here is a racial hatred of Slavs? This seems...far-fetched at best.

There is no good reason for power to still be on in Ukraine, they have a great deal of ballistic and cruise missiles that could be striking power infrastructure. During the Iraq War the US intensively bombed Iraq's infrastructure until electricity output was at 4% of pre-war levels.

The US also was pretty clear about it's intent to rebuild it, and this was at a time when cyberweapons weren't available that could achieve similar effects. As the joke went before Iraq, the best way to American investment was to declare war on America.

The good reason for the Russians not to go after Ukrainian power power generation is because it's very easy for someone else to give the Ukrainians the means to go after Russian power generation, both directly or via cyber attacks. This is a similar parallel to why the Russians did not destroy the oil pipelines going through Ukraine and instead have kept paying oil transit revenues through the war- because if they destroy Ukrainian pipelines, it's not very hard for someone to give Ukraine the ability to do so to Russian pipelines.

To paraphrase a different war, it would be a very naive belief to hold that the attacker will be the only one attack the other party's cities, and that the defender will not do the same if they have the ability to. The reason Ukraine has largely limited its engagements in Russia has been of western concerns of escalation driving Russian mobilization. If Russia mobilizes and escalates the war instead of taking a loss, the western concerns limiting Ukrainian operational freedom be undermined as well since what they ward against- Russian mobilizing- is already occuring.

The US also was pretty clear about it's intent to rebuild it,

Are we talking about the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 Gulf War? Because I'm pretty sure it (also) applies to the former, in which case American rebuilding wasn't on the table.

I'm also sure that the Russians plan to rebuild destroyed capacity in the areas they plan to capture.

In WW2, the Germans refrained from using their advantage in nerve gas because they feared that the Allies would use gas against them via aerial bombing. The Allies held escalation dominance over Germany in that they could make things worse for Germany than Germany could do to them. Compare the effectiveness of V1 and V2 attacks to the UK's thousand bomber raids, incinerating German cities.

Today, Russia holds escalation dominance over Ukraine. Even if the Ukrainians hit back as hard as they can, unless we're giving them a full nuclear triad the Russians can hit harder. At lower escalation levels the Russians can also hit harder, since Ukraine is a smaller country with a smaller number of targets and a smaller arsenal.

Furthermore, is it really wise for the West to be blowing up Russian pipelines during a global energy crisis? That fuel is going somewhere. Removing it from circulation will reduce global supply.

Today, Russia holds escalation dominance over Ukraine. Even if the Ukrainians hit back as hard as they can, unless we're giving them a full nuclear triad the Russians can hit harder. At lower escalation levels the Russians can also hit harder, since Ukraine is a smaller country with a smaller number of targets and a smaller arsenal.

Escalation dominance is, of course, why the Ukrainians have not raised their capabilities to resist since the war started, because escalation dominance prevents retaliation at lower levels.

Alternatively, escalation dominance theory runs into the reality of deterrence, which works when the opponent's capacity to retaliate is enough that even though you could hit back harder, it doesn't matter because you don't want to be hit in that way in that context, and that overwhelming annihalative capacity doesn't actual deter people from fighting back if you attack them, and that people will often fight back in kind.

Russia's ability to nuke Ukraine harder than Ukraine can nuke Russia is irrelevant to the reasons why Russia wouldn't want to do something that could be done back to them if they did so. Nukes do not stop Ukrainian from counter-artillery fire, nor do they magically prevent Ukraine from retaliating in kind in other ways.

Furthermore, is it really wise for the West to be blowing up Russian pipelines during a global energy crisis? That fuel is going somewhere. Removing it from circulation will reduce global supply.

Okay. In other news, water is wet. It still doesn't change that were Russia to knock out Ukrainian energy infrastructure, other people would happily help the Ukrainians do it back to the Russians. The Europeans can afford it, the Americans will profit from it, and the Poles would probably do it even if they couldn't afford or profit from it.

the Poles would probably do it even if they couldn't afford or profit from it.

reducing risk of getting again invaded by Russia is worth a lot.

WW II when allied Russia and Germany invaded resulted in 16% of Poles being murdered, to say nothing about economical and political losses.

reducing risk of getting again invaded by Russia is worth a lot.

Sure. So is deterring the Russians from knocking out your energy generation by targetting theirs. Note that you are increasingly far from the claims of escalation dominance being relevant in negating deterrence.

reducing risk of getting again invaded by Russia is worth a lot.

The Russian recent actions have demonstrated that this is a fools errand, It seems clear at this point that the only way to reduce the risk of Russian invasion is to cripple Russia's ability to invade anyone. Every Russian soldier killed in Ukraine, every plane shot down, armored vehicle destroyed, and Russian naval vessel sunk, makes Poland, and the rest of Eastern Europe safer.

Today, Russia holds escalation dominance over Ukraine. Even if the Ukrainians hit back as hard as they can, unless we're giving them a full nuclear triad the Russians can hit harder. At lower escalation levels the Russians can also hit harder, since Ukraine is a smaller country with a smaller number of targets and a smaller arsenal.

It certainly looked that way back before the most recent invasion. But the actual course of events has shown the Russians can't hit harder unless they go nuclear; if they could, they would. If they go nuclear, they risk WWIII with the US and Western Europe directly involved. This does not give them escalation dominance.

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