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Culture War Roundup for the week of December 18, 2023

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What will be left of Ukraine after Russia and the West are done with their proxy war?

It's hard to get good numbers as both Russia and Ukraine lie about everything. But it feels that Ukraine is exhausted and will soon lose this war. My heuristic for this is reading between the lines of the news. Every optimistic story about Ukraine's war effort in the last year has failed to bear fruit. And nuggets of facts go unchallenged, such as the average age of Ukraine's soldiers now being 42.

The U.S. estimate as of August (according to Wikipedia) is that 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed with another 120,000 wounded. I would treat this as a floor, personally. The Ukrainian forces at the start of the war were 200,000 regular soldiers and 100,000 paramilitary. I think it's safe to say these troops have been utterly gutted. The size of the Ukrainian army is reportedly 800,000 today but at this point it must be nearly entirely conscripts. Conscripts with an average age of 42. To channel George Carlin, think of the average 42 year old. How would they fare in a trench? Now realize half of Ukrainian soldiers are older than that.

Millions of people have fled Ukraine. The population (as of 2022) had already declined from 51 million to 36 million within the 1991 borders. It is likely much lower today. We will soon see the first instance in more than 150 years of a country losing half its population. (Either the Potato Famine or the Paraguayan War seem like the last potential candidates for this happening).

What people don't realize is how incredibly RARE this is. The population of other war-torn regions such as Afghanistan and Iraq has skyrocketed. You can't even see the conflicts on a population chart. Syria had a brief decline but has rebounded and is now higher than ever before. The population of Russia dipped during WWII by about 10% but by 1955 had rebounded again to an all-time high.

The combination of low fertility, huge emigration, and war deaths will depopulate Ukraine to a degree that hasn't been seen in modern times.

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine? Yes, it's very convenient that Ukraine is willing to destroy itself to hurt Russia. But, as a utilitarian, I am very skeptical of the benefits of "grand strategy" type decisions like this. The world is complicated. If we let Putin have the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine will he then demand the Polish-speaking parts of Poland? No. It's not like this war has been a resounding success. Furthermore, he could die tomorrow.

But the deaths suffered by Ukrainian conscripts (and yes Russian conscripts too) are very real. We are trading the deaths of real people for theoretical future benefits. And we are destroying an entire country in the process. Why not go to the bargaining table and end this cruel and pointless war?

Furthermore, he could die tomorrow.

Pretty unlikely, his ancestors lived long lives despite living thought Siege of Leningrad and he has much better medicine that them.

I'll defer to the actuaries when it comes to Putin's life expectancy, but just wanted to make an interesting point about the siege.

The siege might have actually lengthened lifespans for those who survived it. Certainly, calorie restriction has a noticeable positive effect on lifespans. But there might be more than that even.

Lifespans increased during WWII in Britain. More recently, European life spans increased during the Great Recession.

Counterintuitively, hard times can lead to .... longer lives? https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9358630/

Obviously, there are limits to this if the times get too hard.

I'll defer to the actuaries

actuaries give very little extra info if you know parents' and grandparents' lifespans. Agree on the calorie restriction, though.

What will be left of Ukraine after Russia and the West are done with their proxy war?

A nation-state centered around Ukrainians, generally democratic and politically European, rather than a subject-state or administrative unit centered around Russians ruled by autocratic collaborators.

It's hard to get good numbers as both Russia and Ukraine lie about everything. But it feels that Ukraine is exhausted and will soon lose this war. My heuristic for this is reading between the lines of the news.

Yawn. You could read that interpretation since the very start of the conflict, given it's been one of the most prevalent propaganda narratives the whole time.

Your confirmation bias will continue to be well fed for the next year, as was predicted nearly half a year ago by the people who recognized the logistical limitations of the western artillery ammo shortage and production-mobilization lagging behind the Russians.

Every optimistic story about Ukraine's war effort in the last year has failed to bear fruit.

Only if you selectively choose the optimistic stories you remember, just as your numbers arguments only bear fruit if you selectively recall your numbers.

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine?

Because they like its perseverance more than they like Putin's.

There are multiple angles to this, ranging from the domestic political rewards of supporting Ukraine versus costs for wanting rapprochement with Russia, international angles of posturing withing various international organizations and forums, ideological views of various elites, security considerations for military establishments, economic incentives for politically-justifiable retoolings or expansions of military-industrial complexes, and so on.

There's also the point that Putin's kind of a dick, who tried to blackmail and then crash the European economy in the opening year of the war with energy cutoffs that have triggered long-term and painful economic shifts in the European industrial economy. Revenge and retaliation as a form of future-deterrence also play a role.

Yes, it's very convenient that Ukraine is willing to destroy itself to hurt Russia. But, as a utilitarian, I am very skeptical of the benefits of "grand strategy" type decisions like this. The world is complicated. If we let Putin have the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine will he then demand the Polish-speaking parts of Poland? No. It's not like this war has been a resounding success. Furthermore, he could die tomorrow.

The war has been an abject disaster for the Russian state because the Ukrainian nation fought back, with western support, and did so despite obvious and predictable great cost. The deterrence model you appeal to only applies on behalf of the costs already imposed, and threatened to continue to be imposed, which your proposed compromise undercuts by indicating that resistance is neither indefinite or desired by yourself.

Moreover, Putin both started the war with war goals far beyond the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine (hence the attempt at a coup de main centered on Kyiv), and retains war goals far beyond the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine (which, notably, have never voted for association with Russia except when supervised by Russian military forces).

But the deaths suffered by Ukrainian conscripts (and yes Russian conscripts too) are very real. We are trading the deaths of real people for theoretical future benefits.

You are (allegedly) a utilitarian. Trading real costs for theoretical units of value (utils) is the core conceit of utilitarianism as a model.

And we are destroying an entire country in the process.

'We' are not, unless you are speaking in association with the Russians invading Ukraine. The moral, ethical, and legal responsibility for the Ukraine War, the Ukraine War's continuation, and the Ukraine war's future costs are on Putin, who made the destruction of the Ukrainian national identity a core premise of his war from the start.

Why not go to the bargaining table and end this cruel and pointless war?

Because Putin continues to maintain maximalist war goals of in yet another continuation war against Ukraine, with stated and demonstrated objectives of waging a war of national destruction against the Ukrainian nation to subordinate them on revanchist grounds that apply to multiple other partners and allies of the broader Western coalition.

War is always cruel. War doesn't become pointless simply because you don't agree with the point.

A nation-state centered around Ukrainians, generally democratic and politically European, rather than a subject-state or administrative unit centered around Russians ruled by autocratic collaborators.

That's exactly what we will have if we reach peace right now. Except this state will have more living Ukrainians in it.

Your confirmation bias will continue to be well fed for the next year, as was predicted nearly half a year ago by the people who recognized the logistical limitations of the western artillery ammo shortage and production-mobilization lagging behind the Russians.

My initial bias was that Russia would score a quick victory. Then, influenced by my American media diet, I thought that the Russian economy would collapse and that the Ukraine counteroffensive, backed by advanced American weapons, would be effective.

When that didn't pan on I questioned my assumptions.

Reading the comments here, I believe that I have arrived at a more realistic stance than most people, who think things like reconquering Crimea are on the table still. I hope there is a cease fire because I don't think the war is winnable by Ukraine without unacceptable costs from the U.S. Confidence level: 80%.

You are (allegedly) a utilitarian. Trading real costs for theoretical units of value (utils) is the core conceit of utilitarianism as a model.

That's the problem isn't it? How do value these fuzzy future utils that rest on things like predictions of future actions of dictators? My prejudice is to take a "greedy algorithm" approach. Let's prefer the utils right in front of our face over hypothetical future utils (which might even be negative utils!). If you know finance, think of it like a present value calculation with a high discount rate.

People are FAR too confident about the future.

Yawn

Also. Please don't be a jerk, especially to people who are making an effort to argue an unpopular opinion.

That's exactly what we will have if we reach peace right now. Except this state will have more living Ukrainians in it.

What makes you think Putin would accept a ceasefire proposal along the current line of control? All I have seen indicates to me that he is fully prepared to fight a years-long war of attrition until Ukraine runs out of either artillery shells or people, because he thinks at that point they will collapse like the Germans in 1918 and he can have the glorious march to Kiev he was denied at the start of the war. I don't see any incentive for him to stop halfway besides saving the lives of Russian soldiers dying in the trenches, and after all what's a few million dead compared to reuniting the motherland?

Reading the comments here, I believe that I have arrived at a more realistic stance than most people, who think things like reconquering Crimea are on the table still. I hope there is a cease fire because I don't think the war is winnable by Ukraine without unacceptable costs from the U.S. Confidence level: 80%.

I can only speak for myself, but I still support sending aid to Ukraine and I never thought that reconquering Crimea or the breakaway Donbass republics was feasible, only status quo ante bellum at most. As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight and there are no American boots on the ground (the odd volunteer excepted) though, I don't see any reason to deny their requests for assistance; we can stop the day Ukrainian public opinion turns against the war.

What makes you think Putin would accept a ceasefire proposal along the current line of control? All I have seen indicates to me that he is fully prepared to fight a years-long war of attrition until Ukraine runs out of either artillery shells or people, because he thinks at that point they will collapse like the Germans in 1918 and he can have the glorious march to Kiev he was denied at the start of the war

Isn't this just a general purpose argument for extending the war forever? Obviously the opponent would only compromise if he was weak. And if he's weak we can win!

Algorithm for perpetual war

  • Opponent is losing: Don't stop now, he's toast. March on to victory.

  • Opponent is winning: Don't negotiate from a state of weakness.

Honestly, I don't know. Maybe Putin wouldn't accept peace even at the current borders. Maybe he would. Maybe he'd give it all back in exchange for international recognition of Crimea. Why are we afraid to try offering an olive branch?

Isn't this just a general purpose argument for extending the war forever?

No. It's a specific-person argument relevant to the key decision maker based on past actions and demonstrated intentions.

Algorithm for perpetual war

Opponent is losing: Don't stop now, he's toast. March on to victory. Opponent is winning: Don't negotiate from a state of weakness.

Your algorithm lacks basic considerations such as not reflecting the considerations of what objectives are being pursued, the considerations of Putin that Resolute Raven was referring to, not factoring in the game theory of the nuclear weapons.

It also lacks the characteristic of having been made by the person you are responding to, rendering it a straw man that does not address their actual position.

Honestly, I don't know. Maybe Putin wouldn't accept peace even at the current borders. Maybe he would. Maybe he'd give it all back in exchange for international recognition of Crimea. Why are we afraid to try offering an olive branch?

I don't know- why are you afraid?

May other people aren't afraid, they just deem it an irrational and even harmful olive branch based on the multiple other olive branches Putin was offered that Putin discarded, ignored, or used as weapons in the course of his path to the present.

Which returns to your propensity to ignoring the history of involved actors and repeated iterations of conflicts and compromises as a factor in other people's considerations of how to deal with said actors.

To pick just one related to territorial claims, the history that Putin himself recognized Ukranian territorial integrity before he decided not to, before he said he had no further territorial claims on Ukraine, before he sponsored an uprising he claimed he had nothing to do with, before he launched an armed intervention to secure separatist republics he claimed he had no territorial ambitions on, before he annexed them but claimed he had no territorial goals on the rest of Ukraine, before he declared the annexation of not only territories held but territories never captured, to current highly costly efforts to continue conquering territory not held and never held previously.

That's exactly what we will have if we reach peace right now. Except this state will have more living Ukrainians in it.

It won't, because it won't exist, because you can't reach peace right now.

Among the reasons you won't have peace right now is because the Russians are uninterested in peace right now that results in a European-Ukraine as opposed to maintaining what they know to be untenable and belligerent-unacceptable capitulation terms that would result in a Russia-dominated Ukraine that they know the Ukrainians will not accept.

Which is unsurprising to anyone with a vague awareness of the geopolitical calendar and the logistics of the conflict, because they would already be aware that Putin's predictable windows for a stronger hand in actual negotiations is late next year, after the results of the US presidential election are known, after a fighting year where the Russians are anticipated to have an artillery ammo supply advantage, where it's not clear if Ukraine will have enough for an offensive rather than grinding defense, and where the Russians will have a general year-long opportunity to making propaganda hay of a nominally one-sided conflict even as they are already spinning up various military-posturing dynamics to otherwise further their inevitable-victory narratives to try and have a stronger hands in relevant negotiations late next year than they do this year.

My initial bias was that Russia would score a quick victory. Then, influenced by my American media diet, I thought that the Russian economy would collapse and that the Ukraine counteroffensive, backed by advanced American weapons, would be effective.

Admitting a susceptibility to propaganda narratives for nearly the entire duration of the conflict isn't the defense of your reading between the lines that you think it is.

By contrast, the sort of people who recognized the logistical limitations of western artillery ammo were also the people predicting a long drawn out conflict (guerilla or west of the Dneiper), had no pretensions that the Russian economy would collapse, and warned against dramatic territorial expectation-metrics for the offensive.

When that didn't pan on I questioned my assumptions.

You adopted new, and in the current case old, propaganda narratives.

Reading the comments here, I believe that I have arrived at a more realistic stance than most people, who think things like reconquering Crimea are on the table still.

Your belief is irrelevant to your lack of realism, assuming that by realism you are alluding to an accurate understanding of reality of the conflict.

I hope there is a cease fire because I don't think the war is winnable by Ukraine without unacceptable costs from the U.S. Confidence level: 80%.

False appeals to probability are common in pseudo-rationalist posturing, but it only betrays a lack of understanding of what other people consider unacceptable, and acceptable, costs.

You are (allegedly) a utilitarian. Trading real costs for theoretical units of value (utils) is the core conceit of utilitarianism as a model.

That's the problem isn't it? How do value these fuzzy future utils that rest on things like predictions of future actions of dictators?

It's not a problem if you are not actually a utilitarian, but are adopting a utilitarian persona for gravitas while disclaiming the central conceit of considering abstract and future value considerations.

In such a case, the feigned confusion is an appeal to authority, in much the same way the classic 'I don't understand how one could disagree' is an appeal to the unstated reasonable-informed observer rather than an admission of personal limitation.

My prejudice is to take a "greedy algorithm" approach. Let's take the utils right in front of our face before hypothetical future utils (which might even be negative utils!). If you know finance, then think of it like a present value calculation with a high discount rate.

Your prejudice is a poor model for international conflicts in general, and Russia and Putin in particular, who neither collectively or individually follow your preferred paradigm.

Models that are not used by, not followed by, and do not predict the decisions or actions of others are useless for understanding others.

People are FAR too confidence about the future.

Clearly.

Also. Please don't be a jerk, especially to people who are making an effort to argue an unpopular opinion.

Still yawning. Repeating the latest iterations of a nearly two-year old propaganda narrative with even shoddier justifications is not a commendable effort to argue an unpopular opinion. It's simply repeating the latest iterations of a nearly two-year propaganda narrative without acknowledging or dealing with why the opinion earned it's unpopularity. In other words, trite.

But the deaths suffered by Ukrainian conscripts (and yes Russian conscripts too) are very real. We are trading the deaths of real people for theoretical future benefits. And we are destroying an entire country in the process. Why not go to the bargaining table and end this cruel and pointless war?

Because Putin has shown 0 interest in meaingfully negotiating, his minimum position is "I win, you lose" and this is obviously unacceptable to Ukraine/'the west'. Putin has shown again and again and again that any compromise will be taken as a sign of weakness that emboldens him to push further. If you wish to minimise human suffering, focus on winning the war and defeating Russia to the point where it stops launching such stupid and wasteful wars in the first place.

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine?

Because 'the west' broadly empathises with the desire of Ukrainians to not be Russians, I certainly know that I'd be fighting and dying if I was in their shoes and would appreciate all the help that I could be given. While there are certainly those who are seeking to control this war for more cynical ends (looking at you, idiots in the US state department) they are by far and away in the minority, popular support for Ukraine in the west is driven much more by sympathy for the plight of their fellow Europeans, resisting aggression and a desire to reassert the taboo against major wars in Europe. Russia and its foreign cheerleaders have taken great pains to try and depict this war as one between NATO and Russia, with the Ukrainians cast as pawns in the greater struggle, but this is a complete misreading of the situation designed to flatter the egos of the Russian people and portray the west as villains. The reality is that if the Ukrainians didn't want to fight, they wouldn't fight and certainly they would not fight with the tenacity and resourcefulness that they've shown.

It's hard to get good numbers as both Russia and Ukraine lie about everything. But it feels that Ukraine is exhausted and will soon lose this war. My heuristic for this is reading between the lines of the news.

"My source? It was revealed to me in a dream."

The narratives around this war have been as changeable as a wind sock, turning to match each gust of changing fortune. I wouldn't bother trying to guess how this will all end, nobody can tell from where we are now.

When Putin defeated Chechnya, what happened to the Chechens? Were they ethnically displaced? No. Well, were they culturally Russified? Not really. But surely they lost the ability to adjudicate their own matters in their own republic? Nope, they enforce an Islamic dress code and still kill gays…

It’s western propaganda that Russia wouldn’t negotiate with Ukraine, or that Ukrainian culture would be damaged by Russia. There’s no evidence for it. There’s plenty evidence of the exact opposite.

Chechens are a Muslim hill tribe with a culture and language alien to that of Orthodox Russians, not fellow East Slavs and members of the triune All-Russian nation. There is no room in that conception for a Ukrainian nation whose destiny is different from that of Russia and there never has been. If Putin got his wish they could keep their folk songs (except the ones about fighting Russians, perhaps) and quaint clothing and go on speaking their peasant dialect regional language at home if they so desired, but that would be the extent of their autonomy.

Note that the “destiny” of a people who declare sovereignty has never been important for Ukraine or her oligarchs, as they waged war against the ethnically and linguistically Russian inhabitants of eastern Ukrainian when they declared themselves sovereign (after a Western-influenced unconstitutional coup). This despite it having widespread support from the people, as shown by third party polling. Before and after Ukraine literally shelled a region with cluster munitions for declaring sovereignty, they waged cultural genocide against indigenous Russian speakers by making it illegal for shopkeepers to speak Russian or for newspapers to be published in Russian without publishing in Ukrainian first.

Note that the “destiny” of a people who declare sovereignty has never been important for Ukraine or her oligarchs, as they waged war against the ethnically and linguistically Russian inhabitants of eastern Ukrainian when they declared themselves sovereign

Some time ago I read a book about the early days of 2014 war by a Russian militant which made it quite clear, to me, that this narrative (or that Ukraine literally shelled a region with cluster munitions for declaring sovereignty") is bunkum.

What happened was that, in the post-Crimea high, a small group of Russian radical imperialist nationalists conducted a filibuster operation that, due to the general weakness of the post-Kuchma/Yanukovich Ukrainian state and army, managed to turn a heretofore-fairly-weak anti-Maidan operation that had aimed for federalization into a secessionist enterprise, this reaction then being furthered by the ongoing warfare. What is unclear is how much support from official Russia they had, but at least some sectors of the regime seem to have offered them backing.

This despite it having widespread support from the people, as shown by third party polling.

While there probably was real support for secession in Crimea, I don't think that applies to Donetsk. Of course situation might have been different in the pre-2022 years in the then-Russian-controlled area due to people moving to/from the area for ideological reasons, but I'm not aware of any polls in the Donetsk/Luhansk areas giving any credence to widespread separatist support, apart from the obviously farcical status referendums of 2014 and 2022.

they waged cultural genocide against indigenous Russian speakers by making it illegal for shopkeepers to speak Russian or for newspapers to be published in Russian without publishing in Ukrainian first.

Considering how widely Russian is still spoken in Ukraine, and particularly before 2022, this is not a particularly efficient genocide. Ukraine does privilege Ukrainian to Russian, currently, but that's not genocide, cultural or otherwise.

(Also, below, you state "Ukrainian culture does not exist as separate from the history of Russians, though. That’s why it is nearly identical to Russian culture, religion, and language" - well, if that would be the case, why would Russians consider it such an onerous requirement to speak Ukrainian, identify with Ukrainian culture, join the OCU instead of UOC (MP) etc?)

Which do you think would be easier, incidentally - being an Ukrainian-only speaking in the areas of Ukraine currently occupied by Russia, or being a Russian-only speaker in Ukraine?

imperialist nationalists

What? That's like being libertarian socialists.

The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology polled Donbas residents in 2014. The findings are tilted pro-Kyiv in two ways: it’s literally the results from an institution in Kyiv shortly after a coup, but more importantly Kyiv was mentioned whenever the polling was done — those who are wary of Kyiv or anti-Kyiv are obviously going to be less likely to answer an institute from Kyiv. If you look at page 35 Figure 1, 31% want either succession or joining with Russia, an additional 23% wanted to be made an autonomous republic within Ukraine, and 35% want to remain in Ukraine without autonomy. Of that last 35%, only 9% wanted the status quo, whereas 26% wanted expanded powers.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2454203

If the results are this pro-autonomy despite the bias in favor of Kyiv, it’s reasonable to assume that the actual figures are more pro-autonomy. Sadly, there’s no way to get that figure.

cluster munitions

NYT say they have, as do HRW. You think it’s bunk because of an obscure book written by an obscure Russian, probably from an obscure passage you haven’t linked.

Yes, that poll shows a clear majority for staying within Ukraine (with autonomy or expanded powers, or without), which is completely different from separation and/or joining Russia.

NYT say they have, as do HRW. You think it’s bunk because of an obscure book written by an obscure Russian, probably from an obscure passage you haven’t linked.

To make it clear, I wasn't talking about cluster munitions, but about the idea that Ukraine just attacked innocent Donbass people for "wanting sovereignty", a term that means very little in itself. Ukraine defended itself by force of arms against armed filibusterers and (later) local separatists who wanted to violently enact separation and annexation to Russia (declared to be the aim by DPR/LPR from the start), ie. something that had just repeated in Crimea previously. Any other country would have done the same, according to capabilities.

If you want to read the book ("obscure", sure, but would one expect a pro-separatist Russian manifesto to be a NYT bestseller in any case?), it's here.

The poll is an extreme upper ceiling on support for remaining in Ukraine, which is sufficient to prove to even the most skeptical of skeptics that there is huge public support for independence / annexation among Donbas residents. Reminder by the way that Euromaidan was an armed, illegal ousting of a constitutionally-elected president.

More comments

Chechnya

note that Chechens fought wars with Russia and won the first one. If they would just surrender they would be unlikely to get so extensive autonomy.

It’s western propaganda that Russia wouldn’t negotiate with Ukraine, or that Ukrainian culture would be damaged by Russia.

Putin personally wrote how Ukrainian culture does not exist as separate thing from Russian one (and how in general Ukraine does not exist as a separate thing)

Ukrainian culture does not exist as separate from the history of Russians, though. That’s why it is nearly identical to Russian culture, religion, and language.

Ukraine does have a lot of different culture and memes, far more libertarian while Russia has been authoritarian. Kamil did a few threads on how they have different poets/writers.

So you are claiming that "It’s western propaganda that Russia wouldn’t negotiate with Ukraine, or that Ukrainian culture would be damaged by Russia" because existence of Russian culture and language is dubious and there is nothing to damage?

I guess his point is more that if average Ukraine supporter from West hears a Slav shouting "Putin, go fuck yourself" they would not be able to tell if it's shouted in Russian or Ukrainian. When Afghans fought against Soviets, they thought (more or less correctly) that Soviets are going to make women wear miniskirts, ban Islam, make population eat pork and drink alcohol. If Russians captures Ukraine, are they going to replace Ukrainian Borscht with Russian Borscht? What's the difference?

If Third Reich occupies you country and makes you switch to German language, then your accent reveals non-German origin. But for Russians, Ukrainian accents are indistinguishable from accent spoken by Russians in Voronezh or Krasnodar.

Zelensky-produced TV series "Svaty" ("The in-laws") is purposefully staged to do not show if it setting is Russia or Ukraine. A easy thing to do, I occasionally found this reading Wikipedia.

for Russians, Ukrainian accents are indistinguishable from accent spoken by Russians in Voronezh or Krasnodar.

Somehow I doubt said accent is going to be called "Krasnodarsky" and not "Khokhlyatsky".

Shokan'ye and the soft "g" are quirks consistently associated with Ukraine in my memory.

I guess his point is more that if average Ukraine supporter from West hears a Slav shouting "Putin, go fuck yourself" they would not be able to tell if it's shouted in Russian or Ukrainian.

By that logic China and Japan have a single culture as I am unable to distinguish their languages. And I expect that it true for typical person from USA, Europe or Africa.

I think average person can pick difference between Chinese and Japanese overall sound picture by listening random speeches in each language for a minute

If you can't tell apart Japanese and Chinese that's because you never put any effort into it, they are very distinct. "Putin go fuck yourself" is nearly identical sound-per-sound in Ukrainian and Russian.

"Just bow before the golden statue, you don't have to mean it."

On the first level, it's always rational to give in to threats of force when you are uncertain that you can resist, and never more so than when all you have to do is give up some wispy theoretical thing like "sovereignty". Just calculate the probability weighted present value of future benefits and select the decision branch that maximizes it, right?

But game theory is baked into human nature: tit for tat is optimal in some games, but we go even further to ensure deterrence. Break into my house and I'll shoot you; invade some Roman lands and they'll destroy Carthage; blow up a battleship in harbor and America will bend every resource to your complete submission or annihilation.

In repeated games, vengeance is rational, and resistance in the face of impossible odds is logical.

It’s western propaganda that Russia wouldn’t negotiate with Ukraine,

The Western position has never been that Russia wouldn't negotiated with Ukraine. The Western propaganda has been that the Russian negotiating position with Ukraine has never been sincere or particularly serious, given that even pre-war Russian positions amounted to a capitulation of the sovereign ability of Ukraine to run its own foreign policy.

Note that being propaganda does not mean one cannot derive from the truth, which in this case can be compared to various Russia negotiating positions related to Ukraine.

or that Ukrainian culture would be damaged by Russia. There’s no evidence for it. There’s plenty evidence of the exact opposite.

This is, of course, why the Russian pre-war narratives centered around the falseness of Ukrainian identity vis-a-vis their membership as part of the Russian culture, the inadverdently released pre-written victory propaganda celebrated the re-consolidation of the Ukrainian territory into the Russian cultural sphere, the first winter of the war attempted to trigger a mass diaspora and broad depopulation of Ukraine's main remaining population centers via the attempt to target the essential civilian electrical grid, and why occupation-administration's education system is set up to re-educate Ukrainian children into Russians... or at least the youth who weren't kidnapped and scattered across the Russian adoption system without records for future tracking or recovery.

I don’t think the war is actually winnable in any near future. And this brings up a lot of potential problems.

First of all, we’re draining resources fighting this war by proxy. Not just the weapons, but fuel, and aid. We don’t have infinite oil reserves to keep Russian oil off the market for the next ten years. Russian and Ukrainian grain was very important to stabilize grain prices globally, that’s not happening because Russia is embargoed and Ukraine is too busy fighting to plant. We can probably do it for a couple of years, but once we get to the place of fighting by proxy for ten years, these kinds of problems are going to get worse.

Second, it’s a distraction from other problems. China wants Taiwan. And if we’re distracted by Ukraine, taking Taiwan becomes much easier. I don’t see us trying to have a two front proxy war with both China and Russia. We don’t have the weapons or materials to support both.

Third, I don’t think we can keep interest on the home front for continuing to support Ukraine with billions a year.

I don’t think the war is actually winnable in any near future. And this brings up a lot of potential problems.

First of all, we’re draining resources fighting this war by proxy. Not just the weapons, but fuel, and aid. We don’t have infinite oil reserves to keep Russian oil off the market for the next ten years.

Good news- the Western oil sanctions are not intended to keep Russian oil off the global market, nor do they.

Rather, the Western oil sanctions are intended to undercut Russian profit margins, which is why Russia spent much of the last year functionally subsidizing lower energy prices by selling greater volumes at the lower prices.

Russian and Ukrainian grain was very important to stabilize grain prices globally, that’s not happening because Russia is embargoed

Russia's gain (and fertilizer) is not embargoed on the global market.

and Ukraine is too busy fighting to plant. We can probably do it for a couple of years, but once we get to the place of fighting by proxy for ten years, these kinds of problems are going to get worse.

Good if bitter news on this- the global food situation will get better, not worse, as the Ukrainian war goes on, as global producers have more time to adopt to alternative fertilizer sources, which was the most significant loss. The supply chain loss has already occured in irreversible fashions do the destruction of relevant parts of the Ukrainian fertilizer industry that were located in the industrial east in the opening phases. The fertilizer-chain disruption costs are already built in, and would not revert even if the war ended before the next planting season.

Add to it the loss of the Pakistani rice crops in Asia from last year's flooding, and the food-supply disruption has already occured, while the rebalancing is already starting and will increase over time.

Second, it’s a distraction from other problems. China wants Taiwan. And if we’re distracted by Ukraine, taking Taiwan becomes much easier. I don’t see us trying to have a two front proxy war with both China and Russia. We don’t have the weapons or materials to support both.

Good news again- the weapons and material from any potential Ukraine patron are fundamentally different from those that might be used to support Taiwan, by virtue that Ukraine is a conventional ground war and Taiwan is a naval war.

If China is in range of the sort of ground combat systems being provided to Ukraine, it has already achieved the localized naval superiority to manage a landing of its invasion force, and thus has the naval capacity to keep the arms shipments of land-systems from reaching Taiwan to affect the conflict.

Third, I don’t think we can keep interest on the home front for continuing to support Ukraine with billions a year.

Compared to routine expenditures by the west without political pushback, public disinterest is a reason why Ukrainian aid will continue, not a reason it will falter.

If you wish to minimise human suffering, focus on winning the war and defeating Russia to the point where it stops launching such stupid and wasteful wars in the first place.

We, the West, cannot win this war and should not try. It simply is not going to happen. All this rhetoric has done and all it can do is make an angrier, more threatening Russia with a bigger chunk of a more devastated Ukraine.

Firstly, the Russians will scale up their war effort symmetrically with our commitment to Ukraine. This is what they did in the past, mobilizing more troops back in September 2022. If we send more weapons, they'll increase their mobilization. The weapons we've sent have already exhausted much of our stockpiles, as has been admitted by many of our senior leaders.

“We built up this mountain of steel for the counteroffensive. We can’t do that again,” one former US official explained. “It doesn’t exist.”

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/09/21/western-help-for-ukraine-is-likely-to-diminish-next-year

https://www.the-express.com/news/us-news/121416/us-warning-ukraine-war-funding-weapons-supplies-dwindle-nato

So we cannot even send aid without seriously weakening readiness. Western military '''industry''' is very slow to produce new weapons and it seems that Russian military industry produces more than all of us combined in certain key areas. Artillery is the king of battle and the Russians have a lot more of it:

They've got superiority in shells: https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-ammunition-manufacturing-ukraine-west-officials-2023-9

They've got superiority in drones: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/11/30/ukraine-produces-50000-fpv-drones-per-month-russia-300000/

They've had superiority in aviation through the whole war, the Ukrainian air force is reduced to flinging a trickle of standoff missiles from inside SAM cover. It's hard to see what a few F-16s can do to change this situation, seeing how many SAMs the Russians have, along with their many air superiority fighters.

Secondly, Ukrainian manpower is rapidly being depleted. They're drafting women now (only with a medical background to start with), along with the old and infirm men. Even if the Arsenal of Democracy actually worked properly, there is not a sufficient number of fit Ukrainians left to use the weapons we give them to take any significant ground, let alone their 2022 borders, let alone 2014 borders. Encouraging their best units to attack into deep defensive belts against an enemy with air superiority and more artillery probably had something to do with this. Russia started off with more manpower and retains this advantage. How can Ukraine possibly win the war if their counteroffensive got nowhere, now that their manpower is reduced and aid is running out?

Thirdly, Ukraine is not a strategically vital front to us and the Russians know this. They enjoy escalation dominance and if they were losing they could deploy nuclear weapons and compel the Ukrainians to back down. Ukraine is vital to Russia, it's the Black Sea, contains many of their coethnics, it's a country they fought immensely hard to retake back in WW2 and their direct neighbour. Britain, France and especially the US are far from Ukraine, it simply does not matter in the same way as it does for Russia. There's no scenario where they can credibly threaten nuclear weapons to counter Russia. Poland does care deeply but has little power. The knowledge that they know it's more important to them is a great source of Russian strength, since they know they just have to wait for us to give up.

The front with China is far more important to the West holistically and deserves a higher priority. Taiwan is strategically vital in terms of bases, semiconductors, leverage over East Asia. Spending more effort in Ukraine distracts us from the real issues. The nightmare scenario is depleting reserves in Ukraine, losing there and then losing in Asia as well.

The reality is that if the Ukrainians didn't want to fight, they wouldn't fight and certainly they would not fight with the tenacity and resourcefulness that they've shown.

True, they've certainly fought hard. But victory in this kind of war, where both sides are determined, goes to the side with more men and munitions. I also note that there aren't nearly so many videos of Russians being dragged out of their homes by draft officers.

We, the West, cannot win this war and should not try. It simply is not going to happen. All this rhetoric has done and all it can do is make an angrier, more threatening Russia

Also, Russia got substantially weaker and Europe got reminder how cooperation with Russia ends.

They enjoy escalation dominance and if they were losing they could deploy nuclear weapons and compel the Ukrainians to back down.

This is not going to happen.

Ukrainians are not going to counterinvade actual Russia.

Russia got substantially weaker

The Russian military was weaker at the start of the war than now, there was a lot of confusion, inexperience and ineptitude. It was also smaller and less experienced, with less military-industrial production capacity.

Furthermore, we've drained reserves of munitions that will take years to refill. So has Russia. But China hasn't lost anything.

Europe got reminder how cooperation with Russia ends

If the narrative is 'don't cooperate with Russia (where cooperation is trading with them) or US vassals like Ukraine will blow up your energy infrastructure' then this is not an especially convincing anti-Russian argument. Germany is also in a recession driven in large by higher energy costs.

Ukrainians are not going to counterinvade actual Russia.

The Russians define Crimea as actual Russia. Crimea is officially a Ukrainian war goal. I agree that the Ukrainians aren't going to threaten Crimea but theoretically if the Ukrainians were winning, they would be invading actual Russia insofar as it would plausibly trigger nuclear use. It's a conditional claim that makes Ukrainian victory a serious problem.

See the Rand Report where they agree, listing this as a major concern, more important than Ukraine getting more of its land back: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html

The Russians also defined the newly captured territories as actual Russia. I somehow doubt reclaiming them would trigger nuclear use. The definition of "sovereign totally Russian historical territory" has depreciated as of late.

Note that the response to strikes at actual, 1991 borders Russian territory was not "nuke them".

OK, so the Russians pulled out of Kherson after defining it as legally Russia. They intended to come back and secure the territory because their army was not decisively defeated, they chose to withdraw because holding a beachhead across a river is hard (as Ukraine is now experiencing with its Dnieper adventure). Furthermore, Kherson is not as 'actual Russia' as Crimea is. Crimea is not as 'actual Russia' as St Petersburg but it's very important to the Kremlin.

Ukraine also managed to break some windows in Moscow, a raid at Belgorod and they blew up some airbases. Sure, none of that deserves nuclear counterattack.

But say that the counteroffensive had performed as promised, an armoured thrust securing Tokmak and Melitopol, land bridge to Crimea cut off, armour racing through rear areas, encirclements, supplies cut off by HIMARS, all of the OSINT predictions actually coming true... Say the Russian army was reeling and lacked confidence in defending Crimea. Then there is a decent chance that they'd drop the hammer because what else is left but defeat, collapse and a trip to the Hague?

It is reasonable to assume that collapse -> losing Crimea and a trip to Hague. However, I don't see how purely losing Crimea is supposed to bring Kremlin to Hague. Last time I checked, Kremlin is in Moscow.

However, I don't see how purely losing Crimea is supposed to bring Kremlin to Hague.

Losing this war means downfall for Putin and co, that's what I was trying to get at. Or there's a high enough risk that they'll act as though their lives are on the line.

Then there is a decent chance that they'd drop the hammer because what else is left but defeat, collapse and a trip to the Hague?

brutal internal oppression and throwing out of window anyone who points out that war was Putin's fault seems much better than pulling out nukes

And at least nukes are not the only option left.

Which probability of nukes flying would you consider acceptable risk for banishing Russian armies (and by that point, armed population) from Crimea? Some can say if nukes start flying, it's not theirs fault, but Russia and they were always right in pointing that Crimea is not Russia. But it's not answer. Putin's regime is not going to survive fall for Crimea, that's for sure.

Putin has shown again and again and again that any compromise will be taken as a sign of weakness that emboldens him to push further. If you wish to minimise human suffering, focus on winning the war and defeating Russia to the point where it stops launching such stupid and wasteful wars in the first place.

I'm generally a fan of not paying the Danegeld. But there are limits.

Both sides in WWI were surely using this logic. "The surest path to end this war and save lives is a swift victory over the bloodthirsty Kaiser / imperialists".

Putin has had his nose bloodied. Badly. And what other Russian-speaking areas are left to take? Meanwhile, tens of thousands are dying each month. In my mind, these very real deaths outweigh any theoretical strategic considerations. This is not an absolute principle, but real-politik that involves actual casualty numbers (high) and actual risk of future Putin action (in my opinion overstated).

Anyone who believes in the absolute principle ends up in the WWI scenario where "beating the enemy" is the only thing that matters while millions die.

Because Putin has shown 0 interest in meaingfully negotiating, his minimum position is "I win, you lose" and this is obviously unacceptable to Ukraine/'the west'. Putin has shown again and again and again that any compromise will be taken as a sign of weakness that emboldens him to push further.

His own point of view is more like the "gun rights pie". From his perspective, he's already compromising by not demanding the whole pie, all the way to the old Iron Curtain.

The west not splintering russia into half a dozen different countries of roughly equal size at the collapse of the USSR was a big mistake. In our world Russia was clearly the main successor state of the USSR, instead it should have been splintered to the point where no single new polity could make this claim, killing the soviet ravanchist dream once and for all.

Why not ask the same questions about Russia?

Apparently their own demographics are in quite the slump. That article was April ‘22, and I have seen no evidence that the trend has reversed. Russia continues to experience the same uncomfortably slow economic pucker. It’s not a great time to be an educated, well-off Russian man, especially if you’re in conscription age. The combination of low fertility, huge emigration, and war deaths may depopulate Russia to a degree that hasn't been seen in modern times…except across the border in Ukraine.

And yet.

Putin continues to prosecute the campaign, making the exact same trade: real people for theoretical future benefits. He is quite directly destroying an entire country in the process, even before considering his own people. Clearly, he’s not your sort of utilitarian, or he’d be at the bargaining table.

Why should this supposed irrationality only benefit tyrants? There is real value in not letting the bully get what he wants. I won’t ask the Ukrainians to pay for it, but if they remain willing, I’m happy to back them up with the almighty dollar.

huge emigration

how does this comment has 8 upvotes, with two references which supposed to prove what?

huge emigration

Russia had positive net migration for every single year from 1991 (even earlier) to 2022. https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/net-migration#:~:text=The%20current%20net%20migration%20rate,a%2012.69%25%20decline%20from%202020.

At USSR collapse, Russia had three times more people than Ukraine. By 2022, it was closer to five, and difference in younger cohorts is even greater.

Why not ask the same questions about Russia?

Yes, Russia's demographics are also dire, though nowhere near as dire as Ukraine.

That said, Russia has vast natural resources while Ukraine does not. They seem to be able to trade these resources with China, India, and other countries quite easily. Many predicted that Russia's economic production would collapse. It has not.

Putin continues to prosecute the campaign, making the exact same trade: real people for theoretical future benefits. He is quite directly destroying an entire country in the process, even before considering his own people. Clearly, he’s not your sort of utilitarian, or he’d be at the bargaining table.

What bargaining table? But yes, I agree Putin is a villain. All the more reason to not to share his indifference towards human suffering.

How about the middle ground, then?

When Ukraine fights, it's a humanitarian tragedy which ought to be avoided. When Russia fights, it's a humanitarian tragedy which ought to be avoided. You are asking us to act on one but not the other. Supporting Ukraine--so long as they maintain their will to fight--is more responsible.

Yes, I believe that Russia should immediately come to the bargaining table willing to make large concessions. I hope nothing in my comments suggested that I support Russia.

My preferences are in this order:

  1. Peace with Ukrainian win (defined as 1991 borders)

  2. Peace with Russian win (defined as current borders)

  3. Continuation of the war (likely hundreds of thousands additional deaths)

  4. Escalation of the war (millions of deaths)

My disagreement with (apparently everyone?) on this board is the desirability of 2 vs. 3. What I really didn't expect was people expressing preference for 4 over 2.

Nevertheless, this whole experience has been eye-opening. I now see why people leave the Motte with long screeds about why they are leaving. I believe that, even here, most posters are incapable of expressing disagreement constructively. I believe that I've made a series of interesting contributions today. I expect to see them hugely downvoted.

Peace with Russian win (defined as current borders)

Who defines them? And if Ukraine goes for peace as defined by any specific borders giving up territory to Russia (maybe except Crimea) then I expect Putin to annex next oblast within 4 years.

Who has supported an escalation of the war? The most concrete proposals for escalating the war from the western side have been demands for direct NATO intervention, which I haven't seen anyone make here. What people have reminded, multiple times, is that there are no particular signs of withdrawal of Western support just leading to Russia calling it quits, at least very easily.

The most likely scenario at this moment that would lead to millions of death would be West withdrawing support and Russia relaunching a full-scale assault but Ukraine fighting on to the bitter end, which doesn't seem impossible.

The amount of charity/humility on TheMotte is certainly far lower than it was when /r/slatestarcodex was created. In the long run we're getting the outgroup engagement that we deserve (none).

If to "deserve" outgroup engagement one must proceed on the assumption that the outgroup is not wrong, nobody deserves it except quokkas who will soon convert themselves anyway.

One must proceed on the assumption that the outgroup is not wrong

Practicing humility and extending charity is not the same thing as assuming your out-group is not wrong. You can politely disagree with someone while assuming they're not an idiot and without making unnecessary rhetorical flourishes to demonstrate how dumb you think they are.

Thank you for stating your preferences like that. I'd taken your original argument as an isolated demand for rigor via Ukraine's surrender; that's an argument I have seen elsewhere on this board. My apologies for misunderstanding.

I do wonder--how much of the pushback has been from people making my same mistake?

Regardless, I'll second @urquan. Making observations about the downvotes is a surefire way to attract more. I'd guess it's because people view it as an expression of entitlement. Speaking as someone who draws a lot of flak, I can only note that they don't actually mean anything. Your contributions are valued.

I do wonder--how much of the pushback has been from people making my same mistake?

Probably a lot. Most people view "calls for peace" as "enemy fifth columns".

Making observations about the downvotes is a surefire way to attract more. I'd guess it's because people view it as an expression of entitlement.

That's insightful. I think you're right about the entitlement. In my personal life I'm fairly high status. So how dare people not agree with me on the internet!! I've just gotten a taste of what the typical liberal poster has to deal with on this forum. (Or the typical conservative anywhere else).

I think in general this forum helps me clear up sloppy thinking, even if it's just intellectual masturbation. I feel like this episode was somewhat frustrating because people seemed to be responding with emotion and bile, or failing that, I didn't understand their arguments well enough to change my thinking. Normally when I get pushback, I have made some fundamental mistake. If I did this time, I don't see it.

I think you're doing a good job representing an unpopular position and your contributions are valuable.

That said, I think you should delete your last paragraph. Complaining about downvotes just summons more downvotes. And take it from someone who has written such screeds, writing about how you're mad at the motte will just generate worse blowback. If you need to step away, just step away.

I think you're doing a good job representing an unpopular position and your contributions are valuable.

I would disagree. The OP is repeating old arguments and narratives rather than addressing the history or context, simply projects a personal value system and uses rhetorical conflation of positions and strawmen to avoid addressing them.

That said, I think you should delete your last paragraph. Complaining about downvotes just summons more downvotes. And take it from someone who has written such screeds, writing about how you're mad at the motte will just generate worse blowback. If you need to step away, just step away.

Or block people, as they already have been.

I think you're doing a good job representing an unpopular position and your contributions are valuable.

Thanks!

That said, I think you should delete your last paragraph. Complaining about downvotes just summons more downvotes.

Probably a good idea. I'll keep it up to keep the historical record intact and provide more evidence that whining about downvotes = getting pooped on.

What will be left of Ukraine after Russia and the West are done with their proxy war?

Something akin to Pakistan, which is also an impoverished, US-aligned, authoritarian de facto rump state without authentic nationhood, ideologically founded on the rejection of the cultural and historical origins of her own people. In fact, Pakistan's situation is actually better in that regard, because at least religiously they are markedly different from India.

Or look at a similar country, El Salvador, which was a US-backed military dictatorship torn asunder in a lengthy civil war. After everything was destroyed and shot to pieces, the generals responsible for it all moved to Miami, where they went on to live comfortable lives as rich pensioners.

Does this mean eventually Ukraine will elect a Nayyiyyb Bukyyeyyle, who will rocket their safety and standards of living upwards through a revolutionary policy of incarcerating criminals?

without authentic nationhood

What the hell does this even mean? At this point Ukrainian nationhood certainly looks more authentic to me than whatever hodgepodge the Russian government has cooked up from the various conflicting and strategically applied parts of Russian history from the empire to Soviet times to the 90s.

To illustrate the difference, the Halychynan/Galician people indeed have a distinct national character different from the Russian. But Galicia does not equal the entire Ukrainian state, the very name of which simply denotes ‘borderland’, a geographical region, and not a nation. Any argument I’ve encountered from Ukrainian nationalists put forth as evidence of their authentic nationhood strikes me as retconning, LARPing or just fantasy. I cannot take seriously the notion that Ukrainians are the true descendants of Vikings / ancient Slavs / noble Cossacks warriors /whatever, also devoted supporters of LMBTQ rights, liberal democracy and White European unity, whereas the Moskal are a tartarized/turkized Ingrian horde. This is as fantastical as Pakistanis posturing as true Muslims and thus claiming to be a real nation as a result.

The current Western propaganda war regarding the Ukraine would sort of make sense if NATO and the EU were composed of white nationalist ethnostates. But the opposite is true, which makes the whole thing a gigantic farce.

But Galicia does not equal the entire Ukrainian state, the very name of which simply denotes ‘borderland’, a geographical region, and not a nation.

So? It's hardly the only state/nation whose name comes from a geographical designation - I mean, "Netherlands"? "Austria" ("Eastern Realm"?) "Norway" (most popular theory still is that comes from "North Way"?)

I cannot take seriously the notion that Ukrainians are the true descendants of Vikings / ancient Slavs / noble Cossacks warriors /whatever, also devoted supporters of LMBTQ rights, liberal democracy and White European unity, whereas the Moskal are a tartarized/turkized Ingrian horde.

Is that any more ridiculous than Russia simultaneously being the descendant of Rus states (totally an unified entity and the Rus also were totally Slavs and not Vikings) and the defender of Christendom in the way of the Czar and also the descendants of the glorious Red Army on an antifascist crusade?

I would consider it this way - the history of Europe shows that when different regions spend long times under different rulers, they tend to develop different consciousness by default. Why are Czechs and Slovaks two nations, even though everyone acknowledges they basically speak the same language and were a part of the same country until 1991? Because one spent centuries under German and one under Hungarian rule, basically.

The same way, at the very least large parts of Ukraine were under Polish/Lithuanian rule while others were under the Duchy of Moscow/Czardom of Russia, while much of the rest was under neither but under the various remnants of the Golden Horde (Crimean Khanate etc.) and was settled by Slavs only later on. While Russia later took most of those areas, evidently at least enough national consciousness remained for Ukrainians to vote for those advocating Ukrainian nationhood at least in some form in the Constituent Assembly elections of 1917, something I've never quite seen any Russians stating that Russians and Ukrainians were unquestionably one nation at that era to explain.

The current Western propaganda war regarding the Ukraine would sort of make sense if NATO and the EU were composed of white nationalist ethnostates. But the opposite is true, which makes the whole thing a gigantic farce.

The Western stance is based on preserving the postwar norms like non-annexation - nothing in the Western stance really demands a white nationalist ethnostate, and I do not see why it would do so.

Why not Vietnam, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, etc.? Why did you choose those two examples from a long list?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_proxy_wars

Russia is directly involved in the conflict, so strictly speaking it cannot be called a proxy war. If we really stretch the definition, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts may be called American-Soviet proxy wars (unlike, say, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which meets the definition perfectly).

In Japan or Thailand there was no such internal conflict and no foreign intervention, between the two German states there was never a war, so I wouldn’t count those.

Korea offers a better parallel, with the huge caveat that US troops have been stationed in the South from the beginning, so again, calling it a proxy war is quite stretching it.

South Vietnam, on the other hand, indeed is a good parallel. However, I wouldn’t say we’ll ever reach a point in the near future where US military aid to the Ukraine will be completely cut.

But anyway, it’s not the proxy war aspect that I had in mind.

What will be left of Ukraine after Russia and the West are done with their proxy war?

Ideally Ukraine will be a part of NATO as its allies fund its reconstruction. Even better if it means the death of current Russian regime. No better message for every other tyrant eyeing the lands near them.

It's hard to get good numbers as both Russia and Ukraine lie about everything. But it feels that Ukraine is exhausted and will soon lose this war. My heuristic for this is reading between the lines of the news.

"Both sides lies" is a meaningless platitude. Perun covered this exact topic 2 weeks ago and argued that Ukrainians are still incredibly supportive of fighting Russia, though they recognize that its going to be hard and grinding. Russians are harder to poll due to fear of state punishment for the "wrong" opinions, but even then, there's less support on the Russian side for fighting the war to its conclusion than there is on the Ukrainian side. He also doesn't ignore all the things "between the lines", talking explicitly about the average Ukrainian soldier's age issue in the linked video.

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine? Yes, it's very convenient that Ukraine is willing to destroy itself to hurt Russia. But, as a utilitarian, I am very skeptical of the benefits of "grand strategy" type decisions like this. The world is complicated. If we let Putin have the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine will he then demand the Polish-speaking parts of Poland? No. It's not like this war has been a resounding success. Furthermore, he could die tomorrow.

Supporting Ukraine is an affirmation of the post-WW2 status quo in which war for the sake of expansion will not be tolerated. Russia may fear Ukraine slipping from its control, but the reason Eastern Europe did that is precisely because Russia has acted on this notion of spheres of influence. Moreover, every dead Russian, while tragic, and every spent ruble on military equipment is part of the cost that Russia will have to deal with. No better cost-effective solution for depleting the resources of an expansionist and corrupt system.

Moreover, you know why Putin won't demand the Polish parts of Poland? Because Poland is in NATO. That's precisely the threat of Ukraine after the 2014 revolution, it may join America's umbrella and then it can never be touched.

Peace would be nice. But, and I recognize that I have less stake in the issue given that I'm not losing people myself over the issue, I believe it would still be good for the Ukrainians to continue fighting. I support giving them as much as they ask for and more.

That's precisely the threat of Ukraine after the 2014 revolution, it may join America's umbrella and then it can never be touched.

Correct. When the rules say, "every option to influence other countries is allowed except the only one you're good at", your unspoken assumption is that your vis-a-vis will hold back and not just exploit their advantage in every other category, but they proceed to do exactly that, there's an overwhelming desire to just say, "fuck your rules, I'd rather die as a rabid wolf than live as a domesticated version of myself".

Which also kinda explains why Ukraine won't just fold like @jeroboam wants it to.

When the rules say, "every option to influence other countries is allowed except the only one you're good at", your unspoken assumption is that your vis-a-vis will hold back and not just exploit their advantage in every other category, but they proceed to do exactly that,

Well, Russia has problems to win with one of poorest (maybe the poorest) country in Europe that has meager supply from NATO.

Turns out that Russia is fairly bad also at this.

When the rules say, "every option to influence other countries is allowed except the only one you're good at"

Those other options are literally all of soft power. I understand the distaste for letting charisma and popularity dictate all things, but if Russian soft influence can't compete, that's hardly anyone else's fault. Get good, as they say.

Even better if it means the death of current Russian regime. No better message for every other tyrant eyeing the lands near them.

I very much dislike the current Russian regime, but I also very much dislike the Ukrainian one. Ukraine is more free in many ways in Russia, but the current Ukrainian regime came to power by overthrowing a democratically elected leader, and once it had come to power, it attempted to use military force to prevent aggrieved supporters of that overthrown leader from seceding. To me that is much the same "tyranny eyeing the lands near them" as what Russia is doing.

Is there any good reason to not see it this way?

it attempted to use military force to prevent aggrieved supporters of that overthrown leader from seceding.

Are you referring to the 2014 Crimean referendum? I have qualms about a referendum on a topic directly impacted by the Russians importing their own into that land and deporting the Tatars for centuries, but even setting that aside, Crimea was recognized by all side to be part of Ukraine. It is not the same for a nation to insist its territory remain part of it and a nation to invade another with the goal of yoking the recipient because it has strategic interests to do so.

It is not the same for a nation to insist its territory remain part of it and a nation to invade another with the goal of yoking the recipient because it has strategic interests to do so.

What makes the territory belong to the nation in the first place? Either it is raw force, in which case there is no point debating the morality to begin with, or it is some sort of argument from legitimacy. But how can one argue for the legitimacy of preserving previous territorial integrity after a violent revolution overthrows a person whom a bunch of the country had voted for?

Clearly borders themselves do not have a legitimacy that transcends all other considerations. If they had, then the breakup of the USSR would have been illegitimate to begin with. So we probably agree that in some cases changes of borders are legitimate.

So the question is, did the government that come to power in 2014 in Kiev have a legitimate claim to all of the territory that it claimed, despite the fact that many people living in that territory did not want to be ruled by that new government?

I do not insist that the answer is necessarily "no". But consider this scenario, by way of comparison. Let's say that Trump gets fairly elected in 2024, no fraud. A variety of anti-Trump groups then rebel and overthrow the Trump administration by force. Trump flees the country. Soon afterward, a bunch of secession movements break out in red states. The new DC government claims that the territorial integrity of the US cannot be violated and threatens military force to stop the secessionists.

In this example, who would be right and who would be wrong?

Of course, it would be fair to say, it is not quite so simple. Consider a version of the above scenario that continues with some nuclear power's military forces entering Texas on the grounds of helping the secessionists. Who is right and who is wrong then?

At the least, I will claim that this is not a simple black and white moral question.

I would certainly hope that the post-Maidan government sought to ratify its legitimacy after Yanukovich fled. If parts of Ukraine desire to secede, that desire should probably be listened to. But I don't consider it unreasonable for the government to assume that anyone wanting to do so has to engage with the existing systems in place to depart, not automatically be considered independent since a non-democratic change just took place. I understand the concern that they wouldn't agree, but there is nothing wrong with at least trying.

Considering that previous referenda (1991, 1994) in which Crimea overwhelmingly voted for independence and then greater autonomy from Ukraine were ignored by the central government, what grounds did they have to believe that they would fare better this time after a government got couped in that was explicitly against their ethnicity and chosen political representatives? (And then, consider the reasonably widespread repressions against the pro-Russian population that even Amnesty noted before almost getting cancelled for it.)

I wasn't aware of this, and I think my comment suggested my lack of knowledge about the Crimean independence issue. This is a fair rebuttal to the point. I don't think this changes my view that Kiev and Moscow's relationship to Crimea aren't equivalent enough to call both of them tyrants in the same measure, and I do endorse the idea that if Crimea wants to be free, Ukraine should seriously consider letting them be as such.

I'm not familiar with the repressions you're speaking of, got a link?

The main repressions story I was thinking of was this, but there was also an older report just shortly after Euromaidan. The "almost cancellation" incident, however, actually was a much later story about the Ukrainian army garrisoning in civilian objects from after the war broke out, which I had mentally conflated with the previous ones; sorry about the mistake.

I'm not familiar with the repressions you're speaking of, got a link?

See ¶¶ 99–103 of this PDF from a commission of the Council of Europe. The Ukrainian legislature has decreed that a publisher cannot print a Russian-language newspaper without simultaneously printing an equal number of copies in the Ukrainian language. Obviously, it is not likely that a Russian-language newspaper will have many Ukrainian-language readers, so this just forces Russian-language publishers to either waste huge amounts of money on translating and printing newspapers that won't be read, or stop printing altogether.

¶¶ 85–92 point out some other bad parts of the same legislation—e. g., it is illegal for a Russian-language tour to be given to a non-foreigner tourist, and the Russian language can be used in cultural, artistic, recreational, and entertainment events only if it is "justified by the artistic or creative concept of the event organizer".

(I say "Russian", but ¶ 39 explains that the law applies generically to all "minority languages", which most prominently include Russian, Byelorussian, and Yiddish. It does not apply to "indigenous" languages, such as Crimean Tatar, or to official languages of the EU, such as Romanian.)

This is the standard American viewpoint. I think it's helpful to see it posted here and I value your contributions in general which are usually fairly straightforward statements of mainstream PMC thinking. (I think this is your intention and I intend this to be a compliment).

One of the things I like about the Motte is our ability to debate things outside the Overton window without escalating into purity spirals. Your comments help keep us grounded.

That said, I find myself becoming more and more disgusted with the consensus on Ukraine. It seems Pollyannish beyond all belief. Especially the idea that Ukraine is going to reconquer the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine or Crimea and then what? Deport the citizens? Occupy as a hostile force with US aid? Neoconservative nation building has resulted in so much death and destruction and for what? Sometimes I think we just have to let countries do what they will.

Now, there are times when I think it makes sense for the US to flex its muscles a little. But only when it can do so in a LIMITED way with BOUNDED casualties. For example, the US should intervene if Venezuela decides to invade Guyana. We could do it with zero US casualties and very few Venezuelan ones. I'd say the First Gulf War would be the outer limit of justifiable intervention.

To allow Ukraine to be destroyed for a theory is not worth it IMO. We had our chance to win, and we couldn't do it. Russia beat the sanctions and stopped the counterattack. Now it's a meat grinder. How many more young men must die for a theory of US world order?

Especially the idea that Ukraine is going to reconquer the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine or Crimea and then what?

Those are parts that all sides agreed were Ukraine's back when the USSR broke down. I have no reason to think Ukraine is going to engage in pogroms or other repression against its ethnic Russians. If they want to leave, so be it, but I'm not expecting a reverse Holodomor.

I have no problem withe ethnic Russians in Ukraine asking to secede. But that land first needs to be returned to Ukraine, and then we can go on.

Sometimes I think we just have to let countries do what they will.

This is the naturalistic fallacy. Since imperialist powers have a tendency to naturally want to expand, we ought to not interfere too much, or so it goes. I reject this argument entirely. We can and frequently do insist that people not follow through on natural desires - rapists do not get to escape punishment simply because they felt the very natural desire for sex. This holds for nations and their leaders just as much.

To allow Ukraine to be destroyed for a theory is not worth it IMO. We had our chance to win, and we couldn't do it. Russia beat the sanctions and stopped the counterattack. Now it's a meat grinder. How many more young men must die for a theory of US world order?

What theory are you even referring to? The idea that Russia will collapse? I said that would be nice, not that it would happen. If Russia fucks off and gives Ukraine everything including Crimea back, I'm happy with that too. Russia's regime imploding would be superogatory.

Secondly, it is unfortunate that the Ukrainians are disproportionately suffering in this conflict. But that's literally how reality works - war affects the people near it, not the people away from it. If China invades Taiwan, the Taiwanese will suffer more than anyone else. If they all fled, people would call them cowards for not being willing to defend themselves.

Thirdly, you should watch Perun's videos on Ukraine. He's done a fairly good job of arguing that Ukraine can win (not easily, but still) if the West provides far more support. Russia is holding for now, but they can't do it forever. Either more people will have to be recruited, or more spending will have to go towards the war. My understanding is that they plan to spend a third of their total budget on the war in 2024.

It may take years, but I do think that Russia can be defeated. At horrendous cost, yes, but the tree of liberty requires the blood of patriots and tyrants.

Hey I'm getting a taste of what it's like to be a liberal on this forum! Lot's of pushback and it's getting tiring. But I'll soldier on.

But that land first needs to be returned to Ukraine, and then we can go on.

It's just so far out of the realm of possibility that Ukraine captures Crimea, let alone the other lands that were taken. It would cause hundreds of thousands of military deaths on both sides. And hundreds of billions of dollars. Minimum.

What theory are you even referring to?

The theory that if we don't stop Putin here he'll take over Poland, then the Baltics, then the world! It's Hitler at Munich all over again unless we DO SOMETHING!

It may take years, but I do think that Russia can be defeated. At horrendous cost, yes, but the tree of liberty requires the blood of patriots and tyrants.

Yes, if we spend a couple trillion dollars and send in troops we can push Russia back to the 1991 borders. Maybe there won't even be a nuclear exchange. How much of the cost are you personally willing to bear? Would you spend $10k of your own money, $100k, volunteer in Ukraine, fight in Ukraine?

It's just so far out of the realm of possibility that Ukraine captures Crimea, let alone the other lands that were taken. It would cause hundreds of thousands of military deaths on both sides. And hundreds of billions of dollars. Minimum.

I don't have any illusions about the sheer difficulty of even coming close to Crimea, let alone actually taking it. This war is going to be slow, I accept that. I recognize that a lot of people have died and many more will continue to die. As for money, the US is drowning in it. If that can be thrown around to send Russia on a path away from its current one (and hopefully not one even worse than this), that's a wise investment.

The theory that if we don't stop Putin here he'll take over Poland, then the Baltics, then the world! It's Hitler at Munich all over again unless we DO SOMETHING!

I have no idea who you're even referring to or how popular this conception even is. The stronger argument you should contend with is the message this sends to every other wannabe conquerer in the world, in particular China.

Yes, if we spend a couple trillion dollars and send in troops we can push Russia back to the 1991 borders. Maybe there won't even be a nuclear exchange.

The odds of nuclear exchange are very, very low. You should look up Russia's nuclear doctrine, it states that it won't use those nukes unless its actual core territory is threatened. What it has taken in Georgia might qualify, Crimea and the other Ukrainian gains are highly unlikely to count.

How much of the cost are you personally willing to bear? Would you spend $10k of your own money, $100k, volunteer in Ukraine, fight in Ukraine?

If I could donate $10k and be guaranteed that enough people would do so to ensure Ukraine is stocked to the gills on modern military tech? I think that would be a reasonable offer. I have human impulses that keep me from doing as much, but I can't really justify those. I am unlikely to have $100k any time soon, but depending on how much of my savings that would translate to, sure.

As for volunteering or enlisting? I'm a homebody. Not really my thing, and I wouldn't change that any time soon. But I admitted as much in my original comment to you, I said I have very little personal stake in the conflict. The closest is having a Ukrainian friend.

I'll take you at your word. I'm honestly a bit flabbergasted that someone would spend $10k (a large amount of their net worth) on trying to win a war that they have little personal stake in, even acknowledging that it will take years and kill presumably hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

I'll take it as a sign that passions run very high on this issue.

For my own part, I think the US should immediately broker talks between Russia and Ukraine to end the war, but I am not willing to donate $10k to help make it happen.

I'll take you at your word. I'm honestly a bit flabbergasted that someone would spend $10k (a large amount of their net worth) on trying to win a war that they have little personal stake in, even acknowledging that it will take years and kill presumably hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

I have significant personal stake in it (I live in Poland).

I think the US should immediately broker talks between Russia and Ukraine to end the war

Maybe we should hold it in Budapest? ( see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum )

Putin's promises are basically worthless and they refuse to climb down from maximalist goals of destruction of Ukraine as a state.

As a person with a stake in it, what percentage of your net worth have you pledged? Are you willing to fight?

Maybe we should hold it in Budapest?

Yes. Peace is so valuable that we should be willing to engage even with dishonest actors.

Russia has lost 100,000 soldiers so far. By the time they lick their wounds, Putin will be dead, and the world will be freaking out over some different crisis. But the dead soldiers will still be dead. They won't get the chance to marry or watch their children grow. Their mothers will still mourn the child who grew up to become a young man and then had his future cut short.

People are not chessboard pieces. The cost to war is high and the benefits uncertain.

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Well, it's not as much as you imagine. My expenses are low and I work a tech job, so $10k isn't too problematic for the time being. But that's my commitment to the current international order. I find that order valuable and want it to continue existing, so material support makes perfect sense.

That's precisely the threat of Ukraine after the 2014 revolution, it may join America's umbrella and then it can never be touched.

...Without touching America. Which is another way of describing the crystallization of tensions between nuclear-armed states that can only be resolved by armed conflict, of steering toward a situation where conflict is both inevitable and increasingly existential.

I have no idea what your point is. I don't see any issue with America exporting security to nations it doesn't border, especially when those nations have neighbors who have less-than-ideal respect for things like the sanctity of national borders in the current status quo.

I have no idea what your point is.

Why not declare all of Russia except the room Putin currently occupies "under America's umbrella", where it can never be touched?

America's Umbrella works because it's a declaration that the things under it cannot be interfered with, "or else". "Or else" is an acceptable circumstance under some scenarios. The acceptability of an "or else" scenario can be directly manipulated by technology and engineering, among other things. Overuse of "Or Else" greatly incentivizes such engineering.

Overwhelming advantages have existed before, and have observably gone away before. thinking that they can't go away seems to make them go away faster.

Overwhelming advantages have existed before, and have observably gone away before. thinking that they can't go away seems to make them go away faster.

I don't think it can't go away at all, but it seems to me like the US is sitting in a pretty comfortable lead against Russia and China. It also has a great many people working on ensuring that gap doesn't shrink and ideally expands much more. That's ignoring all the nations in the world which benefit from the US-backed order and thus also support it, either by having market ties or even agreeing to buy American military goods at a scale which makes those units cost less.

We place our bets and take our chances.

What do you think would happen if the West didn't support Ukraine?

Putin would have taken the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine and incorporated them into Russia. Then he would sabre-rattle in the Balkans but do exactly nothing because the Balkans are part of NATO.

Then he would die of old age unlike the hundred thousands of young men who died horrible deaths in this war.

If there's one thing that this war has shown, it's that (a huge amount of) Russian-speaking Ukrainians do genuinely see themselves as Ukrainians, not Russians, and would prefer to live under Ukraine. After all, it's that constituency that, for the most part, is forming the refugee wave to the rest of Europe - the Facebook groups for Ukrainians in Finland have been full of "I just arrived from Donetsk... I came from Mariupol... Is it safe to return to Kharkiv?" and so on. As such, Ukraine would still be depopulated (anyone in the new border with Russia would have a good reason to leave on the assumption that Russia might want to grab more at any time), it would of course still be considerably weakened, and Western support or no Western support, the indications are that Ukrainians would have fought until loss and occupation, so you might still have hundreds of thousands of young men dying horrible deaths.

Of course, if Russians had managed to take huge regions with comparative ease in this war, it would have made it inevitable they would have then gone for other non-NATO areas of the former Soviet Union - formally incorporating Belarus, new wars with Moldova and Georgia, a bout with Kazakhstan - and would have then settled for waiting for NATO to disintegrate, probably aided by internal anger by countries like Poland over the "betrayal of Ukraine", to try to expand into Baltics (I assume this is what you mean by Balkans). Considerable destabilization in Eastern Europe in any case, huge loss of unity for the West as Russians demonstrate they can just roll over a Westernizing nation, a new legitimation of annexation as a political concept causing even more destabilization worldwide.

and would have then settled for waiting for NATO to disintegrate, probably aided by internal anger by countries like Poland over the "betrayal of Ukraine"

That's a pipe dream no matter how well the war went for Russia. Russia is weak. NATO is strong.

Nevertheless, I do think initial resistance to Russian invasion was good. There is simply a limit to how many lives I think should be wasted. That limit is far less than the > 200,000 that have already been wasted.

Putin attempted a decapitation strike against the Ukrainian government and plainly stated it is not a legitimate nation and is merely part of Russia.

Putin grows hungrier by the eating. I don't buy "if we just gave him a little and stop resisting so much Putin would stop".

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine?

Do you think any of the concerns you've raised are relevant to why the West supports Ukraine?

No. I don't. I think the West supports Ukraine because it want to punish Putin and weaken Russia. And Ukraine is acceptable collateral damage.

Here's a better question:

"Why should the West still support Ukraine".

It’s likely cheaper for the west to fund Ukraine. While you might say Putin won’t go for more that’s not a guarantee and against a lot of his history.

The EU and the US would need to tie up significant resources in the area as a counterweight to Russia. Or they can just fund Ukraine today.

Every Russian leader for centuries has expanded Russian borders thru military conflict since the founding of Moscow. There is no guarantee that Moscow suddenly modernized and acts within the international order with their next leaders and every cultural indicator that the next guy would probably be like the last guy.

But there is nothing new here. The imminent demise of Ukraine has been predicted weekly in some communities since the start (looking at you Davis Sacks). You are right the west is slowing down on armaments which they should not be doing. They should be increasing them. Perhaps even sending in western troops to just end this thing.

While you might say Putin won’t go for more that’s not a guarantee and against a lot of his history.

What exactly else has Putin "gone for" in his history? While the prevalence Russian ethnicity in much of Eastern Ukraine has been used as a bit of a fig leaf, the leaf does exist -- what specific evidence leads you to believe that Putin would be interested in starting WWIII over parts of Poland or whatnot?

He has steadily increased the size of his wars since taking power.

Georgia, Chechnya (twice), South Ossetia, Syria (perhaps justified), Ukraine twice. A few smaller things.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_Russia

All of those wars (except Syria, which everyone seemed to want their fingers in for some reason) were underway in some form since the 90s at least (ie. pre-Putin) -- "continues some pissant conflicts that have been bubbling for years" does not seem to justify the leap to "wants to dominate Eastern Europe at any cost".

Russian colonies that didn’t want to be Russian colonies like Ukraine.

That's a pretty limited set, no? All the ones that anyone might care about are NATO members anyways -- discouraging Putin from fucking about in Georgia or whatnot seems to me worth very few Ukrainian lives.

You are right the west is slowing down on armaments which they should not be doing. They should be increasing them.

The west is slowing arms shipments because it’s running low on them and America has a completely dysfunctional government that can’t make more. Not because it doesn’t want to.

It's hardly just America: the EU has fallen pretty far short of its promised artillery ammunition production, with what seems to be lots of finger pointing at whom should be footing the bills for expanding factories that may be shuttered as soon as the war ends.

As best as I can tell, American contributions are being limited by (1) a mismatch in kind of materiel: a war involving the US depends a lot more on air power dropping bombs and cruise missiles than millions of unguided artillery shells (ironically, both Koreas are equipped for this and have been quietly supplying their sides); (2) an unwillingness to share more advanced technology for fear of losing the advantage of its novelty: we're not giving stealth aircraft or tanks with classified armor because we'd prefer the exact performance be a surprise when we need it; and (3) because we want other parties, notably Western Europe, to increase their defense investments rather than expect Team America, World Police to show up every time they ask.

I think it's fair to add (4) that domestic American politics has reached a point where Ukraine support is no longer unconditional on the part of the opposition party, but subject to negotiations that are politically painful for the current government to concede and (5) that there are some categories of support that the US could draw from WW3 stockpiles, but refuses to (such as re-mobilization of much of the mothball-ground vehicle storage yards)

Of these, however, the most relevant are (1) (war material mismatch, particularly artillery), which is expected to start reversing in late 24/25, and (3) coalition considerations. One of the under-recognized aspects of the Biden Ukraine-supporting-coalition approach has been how much of it has been centered around involving the Europeans, as opposed to a 'fast but American-alone' approach that risked being both insufficient for the time and also giving the Europeans political pretexts to not get on board with the Ukraine support in earnest.' A particular example was the German tank issue- as frustrating as it was, if the US had delivered 'escalatory' western-armor out of the gate, there was a real and non-trivial chance the Germans would have refused to approve Lepord deliveries from anyone.

Some of that is Republican blocking arms. Though I do think we have a lot of arms we could bring to the fight that are abandoned still. We have a lot of tanks, AFV, old F-18 etc that are being abandoned. Some things like artillery we do seem low on.

It’s likely cheaper for the west to fund Ukraine.

If we value the lives and prosperity of Ukraine (and Russia) at zero than perhaps this is true.

Every Russian leader for centuries has expanded Russian borders thru military conflict since the founding of Moscow.

This way of thinking is, in my mind, the "grand strategy" of which I am extremely skeptical. We should be on guard against simple narratives that paper over real life complexity. IMO, the actions of Catherine the Great have zero predictive value for what Russia will do today.

Just-so stories got us into Vietnam and Iraq. Let's not repeat the mistake against a nuclear power this time.

Russian invaders Can value their own lives they are NOT my concern. And Ukranians are adults who can make their own decisions too.

Regardless on the “next leader” the current leader has always found a new and bigger country to invade.

And nuclear power doesn’t mean anything.

These arguments are always dumb though because anything Ukraine is just a repeat of yesterday because nothing has changed. Russia goes nowhere. Ukraine doesn’t go gain much.

The only thing that remains true is Russia hasn’t offerered terms any different than the terms we’ve offered to Japan in WW2. There is no deal on the table of “just the Russian areas”.

I have zero problem with a ceasefire today that came with security guarantees with teeth - nukes for Ukraine or NATO troops as peacekeepers.

Ukranians are adults who can make their own decisions too.

Earlier today Maryana Bezuglaya, a deputy of Ukrainian parliament, ran some polls on her facebook.

"Only for men now. In order not to be mobilized, am I ready to renounce Ukrainian citizenship?"

Results (in progress): 74% yes / 26% no

"The survey is only for women. Would I be ready to become a military account with the possibility of mobilization to rear and defense enterprises (combat positions optional) if it leads to demobilization of those who serve 24 months?"

Results (in progress): 21% yes / 79% no

"Only for women. Am I ready to become a military account with the possibility of mobilization to rear positions and defense enterprises (combat positions only optional anyway) if it opens borders to men?"

Results (in progress): 15% yes / 85% no

"Only for women. In order not to be mobilized to rear positions and to defense enterprises (combatant positions only optional) am I ready to renounce citizenship?"

Results (in progress): 65% yes / 35% no

Yes, facebook polls is not the best source of polling due to possibility of brigading (which definitely happened - poll was posted in anti-conscription telegram group, where I found it). But the fact that a deputy is having this discourse, which is something I wouldn't imagine a year ago, on her public page is indicative enough of the public's concerns and grievances.

And the 'Ukrainian adults' you're speaking of don't have many options to 'make their own decisions'. If one doesn't want to get conscripted, here are his options: illegally crossing the border, while running the risk of getting spotted by a border patrol drone (oh by the way, they are planning to make a 5km no go zone near the border, I wonder why), paying a bribe to a medical professional/conscription officer/border guard (at the start of the war could get away with $2k for a volunteer pass that would allow you to leave the country easily, but now that amount could maybe get you a delay from conscription aka 'the conscription officer will close his eyes while you leave the building'-style, rates for better options now start at $5k), or have his wife/mother/sister do chores for him while he doesn't leave his living space, although that may soon not be an option since a few regions in Ukraine have announced plans for allowing conscription officers to go door to door to looks for refuseniks.

Russian invaders Can value their own lives they are NOT my concern.

I don't see any moral difference between a Ukrainian conscript or a Russia one. I think it's a sure sign of consensus building when some people are treated as subhuman.

And Ukranians are adults who can make their own decisions too.

It is literally conscripts who are dying. They did not make their own decisions to die and many would have fled given the chance.

The only thing that remains true is Russia hasn’t offerered terms any different than the terms we’ve offered to Japan in WW2. There is no deal on the table of “just the Russian areas”.

What deal is the US offering? Surely if there was an effort to negotiate the war could be ended in a way to minimize suffering.

I don't see any moral difference between a Ukrainian conscript or a Russia one.

I see. Russian one is aggressor (yes, in smaller or larger part unwilling) and potential danger to me.

If someone murders people because they were blackmailed or something I have much lesser problem with them being shot.

Also, Russian soldiers can surrender, escape, emigrate, frag officers and so on.

Also, Russian soldiers can surrender, escape, emigrate, frag officers and so on.

I addressed this in a previous comment but you're asking for a level of moral purity that is impossible.

What percent of Nazi officers did that? What percent of Confederate officers did that? Answer: almost none except to save their own skin.

I would bet that if YOU had been born a Russian, or a German, or a Confederate you would have gone along with the consensus. Because almost everyone does.

Saying that Russian lives have no value because they are not the 1% morally pure is crazy to me. Now, Scott Alexander? He might just take the moral action. He gave his kidney to a stranger after all. But unless you have done something equally courageous, I'm going to bet you'd be just like the 99% who follow orders. (And so would I probably as well).

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They can emigrate. And besides the war is popular in Russia.

If a person decides to be a soldier then their path is their choice. Even if their a conscript they can surrender to Ukraine. These options might involve some risks but they do have options. You act like they are non playable characters.

This kind of reminds me of those free range eggs where the chickens have a 2x2 patch of grass that they could theoretically use but almost exclusively don't.

It's a way for people to completely negate the moral worth of another person. Why didn't the Confederate soldiers desert? Why didn't the Nazi? If they didn't surrender, fuck it, they deserve to die. After all, 1% did the "right thing".

Notice, however, that this assumes there even is a "right thing". Had the Germans won, perhaps they'd be arguing the same from the opposite perspective.

Or perhaps in 50 years, any non-vegan will be similar perceived as a moral monster. After all, there are some people today who are vegans. I don't know. I just err on the side of not killing hundreds of thousands of humans unless there is a clear and obvious reason why it's necessary.

In any case, I think we're getting sidetracked. We should end this war for the sake of the Ukrainians even if Russian lives have zero value to you.

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he population of Russia dipped during WWII by about 10%

I don't have much substantial to add but just wanted to note that I hadn't seen Russian casualties during WWII laid out in percentage terms and I was honestly shocked it is this low. If WWII is somewhat a story of the US's vast industrial capacity and Russia vast population capacity combining together it was fascinating to see it laid out in such stark terms.

The relative loss of human life was actually much higher than that on average. And in Belarus and the Ukraine, for example, even higher (25-33%).

Fair point - it's more just a "man Russia had a ton of people" then a "their sacrifice was not massive" obviously the casualties (both military and civilian) in Russia were insanely large.

Also, the largest proportional wartime loss of adult men in the entire USSR was recorded in Georgia, actually.

Low? If that were in Russia today, it’d be comparable to killing every man between 15 and 30. Spread it out over age and perhaps sex and you’re still looking at years wiped out.

Presumably they were furiously procreating during those years as well! So the decline would have been much more if not for that. And young men were hit much harder as they always are. Nearly 80% of boys born in 1922 wouldn't survive until 1946!

Conflict tends to increase the TFR. But I bet this one will be different. Emigration is such an attractive alternative to staying and fighting/breeding.

I'm actually interested to see how the mirror question of this will affect Russian population. Between white collar flight at the outbreak (see our own «» enthusiast), depending on whose numbers you use casualty rates approaching that 10% of population mark (US estimate 120k, UN population at 144mn) with a similar though not quite as bad population pyramid as the rest of the developed world, how Russia as country of Russians will come out of this win or lose will be interesting and likely different from before.

That's the flipside. But the fact that Russia has been able to hold its own despite huge aid from Western countries ($100 billion? $200 billion?) means that once the Western aid is withdrawn, it's over. Russia has 4x the population and infinite natural resources to sell to China.

It was over when the sanctions failed, IMO. Russia is having no problem selling its oil. We live in a multi-polar world now with China able to defy the US with zero consequences.

(p.s. You are off by two orders of magnitude on the casualty numbers. 0.1% not 10%).

Isn't 120k/144m more like 0.1% than 10%?

Yeah, messed that up using the comma separator as a bad indexing point.