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naraburns  nihil supernum  1yr ago (text post)   31637 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of January 16, 2023

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I apologize if HBD is discussed a lot here; I wonder if there may be some understated positives to it (though also potential for it to be used by bad actors).

Could it mean that since IQ is independent of the actions of black Americans, it lower pressure on them and whites?

  • -32

Hello, and welcome (?) to the Motte!

Your question is insufficiently developed for a top level post; really your question is kind of incoherent, but if you want to refine it a bit you might be able to ask it in the weekly Small Questions thread.

When it comes to topics like the biological differences between humans and human populations, though, it would be a lot better for you to develop your own thesis (with evidence) for discussion, than to just drop in with "so let's talk about a high-heat topic please?" The way you've posted this just ends up looking like trolling.

Maybe someone researched this already - can you recommend decent way to donate funds to Ukrainians?

https://u24.gov.ua/

While not something I believe is useful because the fate of this war is clear, one could buy and ship military stuff directly, for example https://old.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/sl7dir/did_you_know_that_you_can_order_a_6x6_apc_by/

https://old.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/sl7dir/did_you_know_that_you_can_order_a_6x6_apc_by/hvq7hck/

There are more retired but actually well armored tanks than Ukraine ever owned, Italy alone has more than 600 to give https://qr.ae/prCVC3

In fact there are more retired tanks than there are regular tanks that the EU or even China currently own.

One can collaborativelly constitute an army maximally cheaply, however as usual real effective altruists mostly do not exists.

if you figure something good out, let me know, please

https://bank.gov.ua/en/news/all/natsionalniy-bank-vidkriv-spetsrahunok-dlya-zboru-koshtiv-na-potrebi-armiyi

Or what 5HM said, go help some refugees directly. House them, help them find jobs etc.

This is probably more suited for the small questions thread but if I were trying to donate to Ukraine as a state I'd use their crypto address as the cleanest solution. That link seems correct but obviously if you're sending any real amount of money please do some more due diligence and make absolute sure it's not a scam wallet. Or do you mean refugees?

I would add, it is probably more efficient to donate to local groups to you that help with refugees, or even better to volunteer with them if possible, than it is to send money abroad into an endless pit of no-accountability. Your money is much more likely to end up helping someone in that case, and I'd imagine most Ukrainians would be happy to know that refugees abroad are taken care of.

Hell, probably the biggest help I can give Ukraine is work overtime and pay more taxes. At the end of the day the private donations to buy one Bayraktar or whatever are less important than the billions my government is pissing away, they're valuable as public symbols that pressure governments into participating.

The Big Serge has a good overview of the RU-UA war. The TL;DR is that Ukraine has burned through multiple iterations of armaments and is now reduced to begging for active NATO matériel, hence Germany's reticence to send Leopards. One should understand that Europe's and even America's production capacities have atrophied badly over the decades. Losing hundreds of tanks - the number that Ukraine is asking for - isn't something you replenish within a year.

Serge's prediction that Ukraine will lose the war "gradually, then suddenly" seems plausible given Russia's attrition strategy. If we assume that Russia will win this war, then the question needs to be asked.. how much will actually change? Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important and the population is likely to be hostile to Russia, meaning that to integrate it into Russia proper will be difficult if not impossible.

I keep hearing hysterical rhetoric that the West must win this war or... something something bad. It reminds me of the flawed 'domino theory' that was used to justify the Vietnam intervention. While I don't think NATO will ever proceed towards direct intervention á la Vietnam, I can't help but think that too many of the West's elites have trapped themselves rhetorically where Ukraine's importance is overblown for political reasons (so as to overcome domestic opposition towards sending arms) and it has now become established canon in a way that is difficult to dislodge.

Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important and the population is likely to be hostile to Russia, meaning that to integrate it into Russia proper will be difficult if not impossible.

This is an oversimplification, there's no such thing as the "Ukraine population": different people have different believes. This is like saying the "USA population" believes X. Sure, some do, but not all.

You can say the majority of the population is likely to be hostile to Russia (I have my doubts about that), but some will not.

Why do you have doubts about the majority of Ukraine being anti Russia?

Ukraine is not one but two countries, split roughly in half, see pasts presidential election polls to contemplate the seggregation

Because if you look at historical polls and elections you can see Ukraine has been pro-Russia a substantial amount of its short history, in particular the regions in the east, and in particular the regions in the east that speak Russian. If you look at recent polls like "Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war" you can see these regions as not particularly eager to continue fighting, it's only the western regions that want to fight, and in particular Kiev. If you look at a density map you'd see the south-eastern regions are particularly denser.

There's also the referendums where a significant part of the population voted to join Russia. Even if you consider them a complete sham, there are interviews of people voting clearly wanting to be part of Russia.

I believe people underestimate the desire for peace and having a normal life, and also the devastation of war. Which is why I don't find surprising at all the westerns part of Ukraine so eager to continue the fight: they haven't seen any of it. The regions who have been devastated by the conflict the most are the ones most eager for it to stop.

Moreover a lot of things can change, for example there's talk of Poland absorbing part of the western region of Ukraine, other neighboring countries could also do the same. If that happens Ukraine will be left without the most anti-Russian population.

Plus, Russia is already helping the new territories it has annexed, that could sway opinion in their favor.

And finally there's a lot of information in Telegram channels which if true would paint in a greener light the Russian forces and the Ukrainian ones much less so, which will eventually move public opinion.

In just don't trust Western mainstream media to paint an accurate picture of what Ukrainian people actually want.

for example there's talk of Poland absorbing part of the western region of Ukraine

That is coming only from blatant pro Russia-propaganda. Notably, in Poland it is treated less seriously than proposals to take Moscow by land invasion. And the second one is proposed by narrow group of edgy teenagers.

If you treated either of this "talks" seriously then you need to reevaluate sources of your info.

That is coming only from blatant pro Russia-propaganda.

I do not follow Russian sources. If you want me to follow up on my sources I can do that, but to dismiss everything if that turned out to be unsubstantiated is a fallacy.

I do not follow Russian sources.

Maybe in this case they has fallen for some absurd claims? Or Korwin is trying to find new topic for hot takes?

Either way as someone from Poland this has basically zero support and is about as likely as annexing Kaliningrad.

I am curious what is your source of that claims.

but to dismiss everything if that turned out to be unsubstantiated is a fallacy.

Definitely, but confidence in such source should be reduced.

I do not follow Russian sources

They didn't say that you did.

And I did not claim that they said that I did. But if I'm not following Russian sources it means I got the information from a non-Russian source, and I can tell you they are generally reliable.

It's possible that my source is right. Just because something happens to be used in Russian propaganda doesn't mean it's wrong.

That's probably coming from Ukrainian nationalists too, who have also accused Orbán of wanting a piece of Ukraine..

who have also accused Orbán of wanting a piece of Ukraine..

In case of Hungary it may be not utterly baseless due to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zakarpattia_Oblast and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarians_in_Ukraine

..didn't they also accuse Poland of trying to get a piece of Western Ukraine on account of it previously having been in Poland ?

Russian state TV had claims that Poland will partition Ukraine, though they were rather lying about plans to cooperate than accuse. I think.

There were also unverified but relatively credible claims that politicians in Poland had offers from Russian officials about participating in invading/partitioning Ukraine, for many years.

Obviously that would be idiotic for multiple reasons. At least it turns out that sometimes people manage to learn something from history, even politicians.

Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important

It depends what you mean by that, indeed a russian takeover wouldn't directly change the world but Ukraine and Russia are the largest food exporters in the world IIRC.

Ukraine also has (had?) a monopoly in noble gas.

Ukraine was a key driver of Soviet science, engineering and military tech, see e.g the antonov which would BTW enable cheaply to have a potent successor to Hubble if anyone cared as usual.

However Ukraine has lost all its technological glory since the population will to stay in the USSR has not been respected https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_Union_referendum

However Ukraine has lost all its technological glory since the population will to stay in the USSR has not been respected https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_Union_referendum

Very slippery. Are you unfamiliar with Ukrainian history or were you being mendacious?

However Ukraine has lost all its technological glory since the population will to stay in the USSR has not been respected https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_Union_referendum

Well, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Ukrainian_independence_referendum had 92% of support after it become obvious to everyone that USSR imploded.

Ukraine also has (had?) a monopoly in noble gas.

Certainly not. They were a major producer, but there are other sources including the United States, and US production ramped up after the annexation of Crimea.

As for Ukraine's "will to stay in the USSR", that would have been rather tough given the events subsequent to the referendum that resulted in the dissolution of the USSR. Ukraine was a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States until 2018.

Certainly not. They were a major producer, but there are other sources including the United States, and US production ramped up after the annexation of Crimea.

They may be thinking of neon specifically. IIRC, pre-2022 Ukraine exported half of the world's industrial-grade neon.

I am also thinking of neon specifically. I'm fairly sure that "exported half of the world's industrial-grade neon" refers to exports only; it does not take into account neon sold domestically (which is significant in both the US and China, at least). They still had a big chunk of the market but not quite so catastrophic as it seems.

It's pretty important to understand what was being voted for here. Just understanding the context of the original asked question offers clues:

Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of a person of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?

This is connected to Gorby's drive to salvage the rapidly decaying Soviet Union by reforming it as a decentralized state. In other words, if you're voting "Yes", you're not voting for "old" Soviet Union, you're voting for a new decentralized state, where the autonomy of the individual republics would be greatly expanded.

However, as the site says, there was an [additional question in Ukraine](Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?):

Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?

Note well: the Union of Soviet Sovereign States. This already presumes the existence of a whole new kind of an entity. Moreover, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine stated:

The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Декларація про державний суверенітет України, romanized: Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnyi suvernitet Ukrainy) was adopted on July 16, 1990, by the recently elected parliament of Ukrainian SSR by a vote of 355 for and four against.[1][2]

The document decreed that Ukrainian SSR laws took precedence over the laws of the USSR, and declared that the Ukrainian SSR would maintain its own army and its own national bank with the power to introduce its own currency.[2] The declaration also proclaimed that the republic has intent to become in a future "a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs," and that it would not accept, nor produce, nor procure nuclear weapons.[2]

What exactly was the difference between this and independence? Beats me! This referendum was accepted by 80% of the votes, and as others point out, after the Gorby's reform plans fell through, Ukrainian voters confirmed formal independence with 92 % of votes.

Presenting the 1991 Soviet referendums as some sort of a yes/no vote on independence with no votes winning is quite misleading. It was all part of an ongoing process leading to Ukrainian independence, and indeed can be considered more as further indication of the popularity of independence, rather than opposition to it. In any case it seems obvious that early-90s Ukrainian voters wanted more sovereignty from Moscow. That, quite clearly, has not been Moscow's intent.

Russia had continuously been getting involved into larger and larger wars and territorial conquests. If Ukraine wasn’t fought over then tomorrow it’s Estonia. The domino theory actually was occurring with Russia.

Poland’s probably too strong today for Russia to war but if Russia had the ability to take Poland I would have little doubt that Putin would choose that after taking Ukraine.

Poland’s probably too strong today for Russia to war but if Russia had the ability to take Poland I would have little doubt that Putin would choose that after taking Ukraine.

Conquering and occupying a country of 40 million people who aren't inbred idiots, in this day and age ?

Look how well that worked out in Iraq - whose resistance movements had no great supporters abroad.

It's as inane as that time when BAP got drunk and suggested if Russian army wanted it they could be in Berlin in three weeks.

I don't necessarily think Estonia would have been next considering its explicitly under the American nuclear umbrella, but a place like Finland could have been plausible, especially if Ukraine went smoothly to free up the Russian army to deal with Finland before it could join the alliance.

My guess would have been Ukraine -> Moldova -> Finland.

There's a classic imperial overstretch dynamic that Russia has had since 2008. Beating up Georgia seemed fun at the time, but it soured relations with Ukraine and indicated to pro-Western Ukrainians that they needed NATO membership if they wanted to be securely in power without the threat of a Russian invasion/insurgency.

A quick win over Ukraine would have created a massive crisis for Moldova. If the Moldovan policy response had been to move closer to NATO, that could have resulted in another Russian invasion.

Then, with Finland planning to join NATO, why not reunite the Karelian people?

It's the same dynamic that has been the bane of many empires. It can be managed by sometimes accepting humiliations, e.g. the US withdrawal from Afghanistan was humilitating but good for the US's long term interests.

Oh yeah, I completely forgot about Moldova. They almost certainly could have been next, given the situation in Transnistria and the fact that a decent chunk of the population is relatively pro-Russian.

I don't see how Russia ever would've been bold enough to attack Finland. Not only are there practically zero Russians in Finland, the country is thoroughly ensconced within western Europe culturally (even if not militarily/diplomatically). The international sympathy it would draw if it were the victim of Russian aggression would dwarf that of Ukraine. Also it has a very competent military, and a state that is vastly more coherent and capable.

I agree that a Russian attack would be very unlikely, unless circumstances were to change a lot. However, it would be more likely given Russian successes in Ukraine and Moldova.

I think you significantly over-estimate how much the international system cares about northern europe. There is certainly an argument that Western Europe would have cared far more, but this would have been far more due to the dynamics of Finland being a European Union member but not a NATO member. Were Germany and France unwilling to help a non-NATO EU member- or worse, try but fail- all pretense of strategic autonomy from the US in favor of the EU would have been shattered.

It's hard to say how such a campaign would have gone- 'how' the Russians have a hypothetical win in Ukraine to embolden/allow them to try such a thing matters- but for all the very real good things that can be said about Finland, it remains a country of less than 6 million, compared to Ukraine's 40 million, with only one strategically relevant invasion corridor along the south. A much greater size disparity, in a much smaller space where Russian artillery really could pay to its strengths, in the midst of a regional crisis as the European interests disagree over how to relate to Russia after a dominant success in Ukraine...

Too many variables to make a strong claim, but 'the international community would not stand for it!' isn't one I'd bet on.

Russian intervention in Ukraine was also linked to its successful intervention in Georgia in 2008, via at least two ways:

(1) The success of the annexation of Georgian territory bolstered Putin's confidence in such interventions.

(2) The breaking of the post-USSR acceptance of SSR borders by Russia gave a reason for Ukrainians to fear the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas. Of course, the Georgia-Russia war was also a reason for non-Pro Russia Ukrainians to fear an attack if they got into power.

(1) The success of the annexation of Georgian territory

Now that again, but slowly.

The success of the annexation of Georgian territory

Sure: The success of the annexation of Georgian territory (the country, not the US state).

Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke from Georgia in 1990-1992 when Putin was insignificant.

Russian forces stay here but these regions are not incorporated into Russia, that's what annexation means, Abkhazia apparently would consider armed resistance if Russia tries to annex it.

Ok, if you prefer, the Russian recognition of South Ossetian independence and the successful ethnic cleansing of Georgians in South Ossetia by a Russian client statelet, ending any hopes of it becoming reintegrated into Georgia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_South_Ossetia

Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important and the population is likely to be hostile to Russia, meaning that to integrate it into Russia proper will be difficult if not impossible.

Ukraine is extremely important when it comes to base level goods like grain and iron. If Russia manages to capture just a decent chunk of Ukraine it could considerably strengthen any leverage it has over NATO and the EU. On top of that Russia as a government seems to be open to Asian immigration. It doesn't need to integrate Ukrainians, though it certainly can to an extent. Russia can just ethnically replace the population. Where the western elites have trapped themselves rhetorically as well.

Ukraine has little value from an economic standpoint. When you look at the amount that Ukraine produces, you'll see it's very little. Wheat for example: 20 million tons at $300/ton or just $6 billion/year. That's about 3% of the world supply or about 1% of the yearly revenue of Wal-Mart. If Ukraine production in all categories went to zero overnight, the market would barely even notice.

Possible counterpoint: Commodity prices went up because of the invasion.

Counter counterpoint: Commodity prices went right back down again now trade at pre-invasion levels.

It's not about dollar revenue, it's about control over natural resources. Ukraine has some of the most arable land in the world as well as holding significant shares of the total amount of high quality iron ore reserves and various other metals. If Russia holds power of the lion share of these various resources in conjunction with China they can turn the western dominated 'economic sanctions game' on its head. Just like Russia did with gas.

*edit, I should have added that the geographic location of Ukraine is also very relevant, considering the ease of European access to said resources.

they can turn the western dominated 'economic sanctions game' on its head. Just like Russia did with gas.

I'm almost positive I'm being heavily downvoted for being a contrarian (oh the irony!) but this is the kind of misconception that I'd like to counter.

Russia's gas supplies were quickly replaced after some painful short-term disruptions. The world has centuries worth of coal which Germany is so giddily burning right now. One commodity can be replaced with another.

Likewise, Ukraine's wheat production or rapeseed or iron isn't important. Reduce world exports 10% and the price will spike, followed by a demand response, and shortly thereafter a supply response, and pretty soon the price of wheat will be right back where it started. I'm heavily invested in commodities and have watched all this develop before and will again.

I don't see the misconception. The point being made is that in a war of commodities having control over resources is important. Controlling more of X is better than controlling less of X. It's not about the sky falling on the heads of those who get economic sanctions applied to them. Of course markets adapt to their conditions as best they can. But the more or less leverage you have, the more or less impactful the sanction.

I think these tend to be short term issues. The world has plenty of arable land to feed itself it’s just that it cheaper to use ukranian land than unused land elsewhere. In the short term shutting down ukranian production means big price spikes because hungry people pay what it takes. In the long term you just start producing elsewhere on lower quality land and prices are 5-10% higher than before.

In the long term you just start producing elsewhere on lower quality land and prices are 5-10% higher than before.

Maybe, but spike in food costs and permanent 5% increase is not "the market would barely even notice". And that may be enough to trigger new waves of migration counted in tens of millions.

"wheat is 10% more expensive" is noticeable for people in USA or Europe but they will at most complain and may push them to vote differently. It is different where people spend 50% of budget on food where that may be enough to trigger riots, famine and mass migration.

The world has plenty of arable land and is also a very small place when Russia and China are throwing their weight around. The argument here isn't that the sky will fall. The argument is that the leverage the west has over the rest gets weaker. Potentially getting turned on its head.

Ukraine has little value from an economic standpoint. When you look at the amount that Ukraine produces, you'll see it's very little. Wheat for example: 20 million tons at $300/ton or just $6 billion/year. That's about 3% of the world supply or about 1% of the yearly revenue of Wal-Mart. If Ukraine production in all categories went to zero overnight, the market would barely even notice.

...what?

Ukraine produces about 33 million tons of wheat, which is a bit over 4% of global production, but it exports about 19million tons, which is 9% of global exports. Taking nearly 10% of wheat exports off the global market is not 'market would barely even notice,' it's 'arab spring food riots,' because most of the most volatile countries in the world are not food self-sufficient.

Similar deal with other crops. Ukraine only produces about 3.5% of global corn, but what it does produce is 12% of the global export market. You're looking at even larger fractions of other items- 17% barley, 20% rapeseed, and around 50% of global export share of sunflower meal and oil. These are non-trivial shared of the global food market.

https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf

This gets even worse when one considers the Pakistan flooding, which has wiped off a considerable share of the global export rice market off the market for this year.

Russia can just ethnically replace the population.

Russia has its own demographic crisis looming. One potential reason for this war is to secure the grip on or even outright absorb ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Replace them with who? The Chinese are allies but not family and the various Russian minorities may be growing faster than the ethnic Russian population but they're not large enough to replace Ukrainians and have their own issues.

I don't know if you are an ethno-nationalist but these priors of racial families don't need to apply if folks writing policy happen to not be ethno-nationalists. If Russia opens the gates to large scale Asian immigration, which doesn't have to come from just China but the various Asiatic regions surrounding Russia, they can easily be underway to repopulate the region. In a few decades time there will be no reason to even consider Ukrainians to ever have existed in the first place, as far as Russia is concerned. Ukraine, not that anyone would ever call it that, could just be a regional melting pot of various immigrants of diverse ethnic backgrounds that exists within Russia. And if we cut the same historical corners as is being done in Europe and the US, we can say that it was never anything more than that in the first place.

I don't know if you are an ethno-nationalist but these priors of racial families don't need to apply if folks writing policy happen to not be ethno-nationalists.

I don't think you can boil down Russia to a simple ethnonationalist picture, but they've been talking about defending Russian minorities for years and how Ukraine (especially the eastern half) was basically Russian in a very ethnonationalist way.

If Russia opens the gates to large scale Asian immigration, which doesn't have to come from just China but the various Asiatic regions surrounding Russia,

If. But do we have reason to think that Russia has the disposition of Canada here? Their demographic problem has been obvious since the chaos of the collapse of the USSR but they haven't done anything like Canada's...robust 1% immigrant intake from what I know.

I mean, yeah, if. By the same token there was no reason to think Russia would actually invade Ukraine. Despite having 'issues' with them for the better part of two decades. Some things don't happen until they do. Same was true for mass migration into Canda.

I don't think anyone can logic their way into the correct position here. The main point I'm making is that Russia has options. Arguing whether they will or wont is, to me, irrelevant to that point.

By the same token there was no reason to think Russia would actually invade Ukraine

I don't agree with this claim and find it highly dubious.

As I said to another person it was predicted - down to the year!- by Peter Zeihan.

Beyond that, John Mearsheimer also argued back after Russia conquered Crimea that Russia would likely continue its imperialism in Ukraine, though his accuracy may have been let down by the belief that Russia was too smart to go for maximalist goals and annex the country (though, in his defense, mayhaps Russia wasn't actually trying to annex the whole thing but to overthrow the government and replace it with a puppet combined with perhaps claiming the more Russian regions).

If you wish to go back to before the first invasion...I reject that too. Russia has always been clear that it considers NATO expansion aggravating, even back in the more conciliatory Yeltsin days. American strategists like Kennan specifically noted this and lamented expansion for the dangers it would bring - even when Russia appeared prostrate. Putin was also consistently against it and consistently concerned with Ukraine in particular. Crimea was obviously of strategic importance. The idea that Russia would act after the revolution/coup and US officials on the ground triumphantly crowing and trying to pick Ukrainian government officials isn't fanciful. How do I know? Because Bush pushed for Georgian and Ukrainian entry into NATO and his own European allies blocked everything beyond a tepid claim that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join without any backing. Why do you think this was except for fear of Russian action?

(Which then promptly came against Georgia btw)

Same was true for mass migration into Canda.

This is also a very dubious claim. Canada is a settler state. Open immigration predates the modern era. What's new is unconstrained mass immigration from non-whites.

It's the same situation as Australia; it has always been a land that took migrants. The cultural change is the nature of the migrants and the consistency of huge inflows.

Now, it's true that that was driven by the demographic decline but Canada and Australia already had a "hook" they could hang this new brown immigration on - "we're a nation of migrants".

You can't craft that narrative today; especially while talking about unifying or protecting the various Russian peoples as a goal.

The main point I'm making is that Russia has options.

And I think those options are vastly more constrained than you imply.

Ukraine is huge. To demographically replace it would take huge numbers of people* that are a) untrustworthy (Chinese) b) too small (Russian minorities) c) not necessarily popular amongst the very people Russia wants to rule - if Russia gains anything it'll be the Donbass. Are Russian speakers - allegedly happy to join Russia - going to be happy being ethnically cleansed from their own land? I thought the whole point was the unification of ethnic Russians!

* Canada needed 300,000 people to keep up with its one percent per year target, Ukraine is slightly larger than Canada at 43 million to 38.

I don't agree with this claim and find it highly dubious.

If you didn't cut the claim up into pieces then it would be easier to digest.

This is also a very dubious claim. Canada is a settler state. Open immigration predates the modern era. What's new is unconstrained mass immigration from non-whites.

Yes, it's new. Which was my point. How is the claim dubious? The immigration numbers into Canada today are completely unprecedented. Settling unsettled land is not the same as migrating into a city like Toronto.

It's the same situation as Australia; it has always been a land that took migrants.

Every land, by definition, has always been a land that has taken migrants. Or by definition could be called a 'settler' state. This is exactly the kind of corner cutting history I mentioned in an earlier comment. The point being made is the obvious difference between what is happening today and what was taking place earlier in time. Since you have already acknowledged the obvious differences I am at a complete loss as to what you are trying to say.

And I think those options are vastly more constrained than you imply.

They're not. You could bring up every single one of these arguments in relation to muslim immigration into Europe. Still doesn't change the fact that it can take place. It doesn't matter how incompatible the Koran is to French liberal egalitarian values. You just need to move people around. Moreover, you don't need to replace every single person in the country. You just need to have enough working age people to fill in the bigger industries. Your argument is simply not serious or thought out. We are talking 10 million tops. At a migration rate of 500k a year we are talking 20 years. Which is exactly why I said that it could be done in a few decades time.

I thought the whole point was the unification of ethnic Russians!

Nowhere did I mention 'the unification of ethnic Russians'. This is bordering on not being worth my time.

Who are those Asiatics "surrounding " Russia you talk of — like, Uzbeks? And do you suppose the Chinese will flock to war-torn Russia-controlled Ukraine?

Russia already has very lax immigration policy and conducts population replacement, the popular sentiment among politicians is that Slavs are inferior workers and voters who think too highly of themselves. There's just nowhere near enough people in Central Asia to make it matter for purposes of repopulating Ukraine, and even Central Asians will be reluctant to say the least. I get the feeling that your model of the situation is informed by, like, 19th century racial stereotypes — Yellow Menace and stuff.

Along with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and anywhere else.

I suppose migrants will flock to the regions that offer some economic salvation. I don't think I'm making predictions grander than any of the predictions already made by market speculators about the potential gains to be made through investing in war ravaged Ukraine after most of the fighting dies down.

Better paying jobs, higher quality of life. Indoor toilets. And all the other stuff that makes the third world move to or as close as they can to the first.

Russia's primary money maker is exporting fuel and other natural resources. The parts of its industrial sector that rely on Western inputs are going to suffer from sanctions or, worse, be made unproductive.

Not a great environment.

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Wait, Russia wants to conduct population replacement? And who do they want to replace their population with? I was under the impression that the country was fairly racist and slavic-supremacist.

Wait, Russia wants to conduct population replacement?

In effect yes. Or at least people who matter in Russia do and act on this intention. You can consider this analysis to be representative of the underpinning rationale. Immigrants are an economic necessity in the simplifying Russian economy (simplifying, to some extent, because of adaptation to uneducated slave labor), see. Russians don't want to work for subsistence wages, don't breed enough, and we sure can't entice people from nations with high human potential to come over.

Moreover, even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, Russia continues to be in need of foreign workers. Marat Khusnullin, RF Deputy Prime Minister, in an interview with the RTVI television channel at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, emphasized that "...the lack of migrants is a great risk for the country's economy, and now is the main problem in construction. Nearly 50 per cent of migrants work in the construction sector. And unfortunately there is a low level of productivity in construction which makes it impossible to do without migrant labour in the next one to two years. Russians, unlike migrants, are not prepared to work 12 hours a day at a construction site for around 50,000 rubles at the most. The average wage makes up 25 per cent of the cost of construction and up to 50 per cent in some cases. Using the labour of migrants reduces the cost of construction. [46].

Of course, one must recognize that experts arguing for it are mostly blank slatists with leftist politics (and their sponsors are capitalists who couldn't care less about identities of worker bees), so they're not really thinking of this in terms of population replacement where populations are substantial entities. Like the late demographer Vishnevsky (also known as Rabinovich) argued,

Russia does not need Chinatowns or African villages, but a real migrant adaptation machine. [...] When there was a mass migration of peasants to cities in the USSR, essentially they were the same Africans. Yes, the language was the same, the people were identical, but very different cultures clashed. There was a system of "digestion": elimination of illiteracy, workers' schools, cultivating a desire for education. It was not always good, but it was implemented on a large scale and more or less functioned, allowing many immigrants from the countryside to master the urban culture. The authorities recognised the need for this work and allocated funds. Teachers were enthusiastic and felt they were missionaries, bringing culture to the masses, and their work was not tedious. If we managed to re-create something like this in relation to migrants, there would be a result. But there is no demand for it. Meanwhile, it would be fatal to hesitate: the larger the population of a country, the more migrants it can digest. Right now we have one hundred and forty-three million people, and when we finally recognize what needs to be done, there may only be one hundred million left.

So, if done well, there's no loss here, Russians and non-Russians are fully fungible.

And who do they want to replace their population with?

The same offer you've seen above, Central Asian Turkic peoples mainly.

I was under the impression that the country was fairly racist and slavic-supremacist.

Sure, that's what one can get from listening to Western Neo-Nazi Putin Stans and from resentful Washington "policy experts" of Baltic stock (who are, ironically, wielding quasi-woke anti-colonial discourse and Pride badges to obscure their own SS roots) alike. Or from our pal Kamil Galeev, who seeks to advance his tribe and admits gleefully to exploiting gullible Westoids by feigning admiration of their naive slogans. There's plenty of trivia to substantiate the accusation. «Russians have a slur for every nation and ethnicity they've interacted with», so popular on Twitter (who doesn't?). «Russian landlords discriminate against non-Slavs» (of course, Americans of all people know how this goes and just why the market may reward making inferences from a person's ancestry; except their supposedly most-oppressed minority is American, genetically different but of the same language and faith and comprehensive civilizational background, and not straight out of an impoverished society stuck between tradition and modernity, in the middle of a tribal conflict, rife with opiate abuse, underground Salafi mosques and ISIS sympathies). «Here's a list of a dozen minority surnames of military dead in Ukraine, this is evidence Ruskies have smuggled an ethnic cleansing into the war!» Or, like, «there was an unironic Neo-Nazi march in Moscow... just 10 years ago!» People who seriously parrot this crap are either ignorant or knowingly deceptive, just happy to get some rhetorical ammo for their preconceived attitude with regard to Russians.

In reality, Russians are about as racist and supremacist as is typical for Eastern Europe. Of course, far more ethnic Russians than Western Europeans are racist as hell, but they have about as much systemic power to act on this prejudice as Appalachian Whites. Many, especially of the older generations, are thoroughly brainwashed by the false Communist era messaging of давно поперемешались все/нет никаких русских – «we've all been mixed up long ago anyway/there aint such thing as an [ethnic] Russian» – message that fails to convince peoples with healthier ethnic self-identification and thriving diasporas. All have to respect the authoritah of «ethnics»; not a single one among well-known people in Russia is more dangerous to offend than Ramzan Kadyrov, privates serving on a strategic nuclear site can be wantonly bullied and robbed by a random local ethnic bandit, and for your average small business owner local Dagestani mafia matters at least as much as local cops. Putin tries to appeal to our schizophrenic «multinational Russian people» by saying he's a Lakh, an Ingush and so on. He sometimes courts with Russians too, saying that we should try to attract diaspora Russians even more than other immigrants. And of course there's the 'Triune Russian People' pretext for the war.

But that's about it.

Interesting. It seems like there’s not enough people in the stans to actually replace Russia, and even the would be replacement theorists know it.

Stans have high (and increasing, post-USSR) TFR, so in the long run something may work out, but yeah, this far it only slows down the process of decline, even in Russia alone. Which is why the suggestion to repopulate Ukraine with those guys is preposterous.

The Russian birth rate is 1.5 which is more or less the same as Western Europe and higher than much of Europe. Russian demographics aren't really that bad. Considering that Russians die younger, they are in far better shape than Italy that has a lower birth rate combined with people who are retired for decades.

The Russian birth rate is 1.5 which is more or less the same as Western Europe and higher than much of Europe.

The simple answer is that Western Europe (and Japan and South Korea) is in trouble too, so this isn't comforting at all. Being around the same spot as other demographic decliners sounds good until we zoom out.

Considering that Russians die younger

Russia is also the one part of Europe trying to fix problems via mass military conquest and action. Wars are best fought with young men and a consistently (very) sub-replacement birth rate means that that pool is not going to replenish as much or ever be as big.

(This is actually why Peter Zeihan predicted Russian imperialism by 2022 - because he thought it would be the point of demographic no return - in one of his surprisingly nakedly correct bombastic predictions. He...makes a lot of them)

And while it may be beneficial to avoid as much of a short-term financial crunch it's still sub replacement and countries still need people for work and consumption.

It also goes without saying that Russia has challenges that Italy/other US-aligned states doesn't that matter here like:

  1. Sanctions on Western companies working for it which means Russian industry & workers will have to pick up more slack - if they even can.

  2. Sanctions on resource exports that Russia uses for money (and to support welfare )

(This is actually why Peter Zeihan predicted Russian imperialism by 2022 - because he thought it would be the point of demographic no return - in one of his surprisingly nakedly correct bombastic predictions. He...makes a lot of them)

Peter Zeihan is interesting to me. I enjoy watching him, but very much from a 'where can I poke holes in the argument, and what is left.'

There are a number of things I'd give him high marks for, but also a plethora of areas where I go 'but this specific prediction does not follow from the supporting argument.' I'd tend to call him directionally correct, and strongest at the macro-level where he's a bit more forward leaning/seeing than a lot of contemporary wisdom, but weaker when he goes from theory into actual policy impact. There are things where he's absolutely grounded- Peter was identifying the policy paralysis/failure implications of the Chinese COVID response before the public breakdown of Chinese COVID policy- but there are places he misses the boat, either for not recognizing other pre-requisite factors (piracy is not going to instantly pop up to cripple global naval trade; a failure of the Chinese economic model does not mean a collapse of the Chinese state). Sometimes these are part of his bombastic showmanship- the man's job at this point is to shock you into paying attention to his underlying points- and parts are more general analytic failures.

I'd put him in the category of 'you need to be able to support wheat from chaff', but once you do Peter is interesting because he's comfortable bucking the conventional consensus and saying the parts out loud that leading conventional wisdom in the future. Over the last decade it's been interest as a number of things Peter has been saying when they were controversial are uncontroversial now. It's not that he's alone in saying them- the future implications of demographic trends has hardly been a secret- but he's rare in being consistent, public, and most important making specific predictions (some nations will make 'now or never' policies before demographic issues) and translating broad knowledge into actionable advice (demographics + regions at most risk for instability -> specific industrial relevance). He has enough expert/rare knowledge it identify specific indicators or specific disruptions- the Ukraine war's impact to neon production to chips is an example- and a willingness to share perceptions that aren't typically held/propogated by the prestige/establishment media (a recent video on the prospect of nuclear breakout by American allies- not a common media topic).

He's not always right, but he's consistently enjoyable with genuine insights often enough to be worth paying attention, if only to try and define why you disagree with his arguments.

Peter Zeihan is interesting to me. I enjoy watching him, but very much from a 'where can I poke holes in the argument, and what is left.'

Yeah, I enjoy Zeihan but I do go find some reviews to read after I'm done with his books. I have a much longer "digestion" period for his work than most others.

He's managed a blend of demographic studies, manufacturing and geopolitics in a way that makes him very attractive as a popular-facing commentator (if you start with Zeihan you'll get a broad outline of the questions, if not the answers). But he goes a bit over the top and the trouble is that his reach is so broad and he projects so much certainty that - unless you're a domain expert yourself- you're not sure when he's on firm ground (in terms of things like US demographics it's not a big risk but what about when he starts talking about things way out of his field like the politics of Tanzania?). You have to go back and pick through all of it without the distorting effect of his charisma.

I get that part of it is just his humorous writing/speaking style and it clearly seems to work for him since he seems to be permanently on tour. But some of the stuff he says is simply too much

(piracy is not going to instantly pop up to cripple global naval trade; a failure of the Chinese economic model does not mean a collapse of the Chinese state)

Case in point.

It's one thing to say China will collapse as a nation - that's already eye-catching enough. Saying things like China will collapse this decade, "for sure" (which I've heard him say)...too much for me. Most academics I read don't talk this way.

I think this is a very fair critique, and specifically the point of recognizing the effect of his charisma and tour model. He is, at the end, in the business of convincing you to either buy his book, pay him to show up and talk, or both. Having that sort of overriding interest doesn't make everything he says suspect, but as you say it needs to be digested.

Many people have compared this to the Winter War. Soviet performance was similarly inept there, but they did basically win in the end, getting relatively modest territorial concessions though rather than total control of Finland. Maybe that's the best thing to expect here too.

It appears that Finland in 1939 had much more limited materiel support and commitment from the "big players" than Ukraine today: Germany had then a treaty with the Soviets and intercepted the Italian aid (arms and planes). The US was neutral, but there was some private fundraising. The Allies (France and UK) sold planes that didn't arrive in time to affect the course of war. (However, the threat of an Allied intervention via Sweden was very likely a factor in Stalin had to take into account.)

Sweden provided significant support (guns, ammo, and Wikipedia page says the Swedish volunteer air wing in Finland operated a third of Swedish air force's fighter planes). Also some Hungarian support. However, Sweden and Hungary were regional powers at best.

In contrast, Ukraine has near full materiel support of NATO and EU in quantity if with some limits in quality. (Hi-tech indirect fires like HIMARS and gigantic funding packages from the US and EU: yes. Western-made fighter planes and main battle tanks: none yet). But there is a noticeable difference between the incumbent president signing a lend-lease contract vs ex-president soliciting donations for a humanitarian aid fund.

they did basically win in the end

I've never given much credence to the notion of the winter war being a Soviet victory. They had to settle for the demands they levied at the start of the war, which were a paper thin pretense for starting a war that would let them seize the whole of Finland.

If I went to steal someones wallet and came away with a black eye, 3 missing teeth and a torn note clutched in my bloodied hand, I don't think I'd consider that a victory.

If the lines of conflict were frozen today, would you consider it a victory for Russia?

Not particularly, failure to meet objectives, massive cost in casualties, prestige, manpower, etc. Failure to seperate/expose the west as weak, now heavily reliant on a not particularly trustworthy ally.

I also think that freezing the conflict indefinitely ala a Korean war style situation wouldn't be advantageous to Russia. It seems that the primary goal (of the Russian leadership at least) has been to prevent Ukraine from leaving "Russias orbit" and showing that it's possible to succeed under alternative systems of government/life is better on the outside. The west actually has quite a strong record of succeeding in this regard, at least once a conflict has become properly frozen.

Victory as compared to January 2022, not as compared to some hypothetical in which tanks roll into Kiev unopposed in February.

No, because of all the reasons I listed above.

The date doesn't particularly matter here, because victory is determined based on the goals of the various combatants and those haven't meaningfully changed.

This seems like a non-central definition of 'victory', not least because it depends on mind-reading.

If Mexico developed a bold plan to roll tanks through the American South all the way to Washington, but somehow managed to take and hold (only) Texas, would you consider this a loss for Mexico?

Victory in war is largely a subjective concept, particularly in limited wars, how you perceive an outcome of a war depends on how you assess the goals/outcomes of the various groups impacted by the war.

My assessment on the war in Ukraine is that any gains the Russian government could make here is far past the point of the juice being worth the squeeze. It's possible for Putin to declare that the Russians have achieved an arbitrary goal in Ukraine, so that he can "win" and declare a victory, but it would be phyrric at best,more likely a victory in name only. Russia has wasted an absurd quantity of lives, money, materiel, prestige, etc, on this war and there's nothing they're going to get out that's going to make up for the cost.

The Winter War is in my opinion a very good example of a Pyrrhic victory.

I keep hearing hysterical rhetoric that the West must win this war or... something something bad. It reminds me of the flawed 'domino theory' that was used to justify the Vietnam intervention. While I don't think NATO will ever proceed towards direct intervention á la Vietnam, I can't help but think that too many of the West's elites have trapped themselves rhetorically where Ukraine's importance is overblown for political reasons (so as to overcome domestic opposition towards sending arms) and it has now become established canon in a way that is difficult to dislodge.

Ukraine is fairly small economically, yes, and its production capacity will not fall to zero if it is under Russian administration, yes. So it would seem that Russia's victory (of dubious probability) would not change much. But that ignores Ukraine's importance as a corrupt western-friendly country with concentrated, exploitable resources such as fossil fuels. For the US, as a whole, or the EU, as a whole, it is seemingly unimportant. But for a few well-connected people, it represents a large portion of their personal cashflow and financial interests. So, it is indeed, in an isolated way, very important.

It is also very important because of the west's extremely lax refugee standards which means countries will be flooded with Ukrainian men looking for work using the crisis as an excuse.

Ukraine as a country isn't particularly important and the population is likely to be hostile to Russia, meaning that to integrate it into Russia proper will be difficult if not impossible.

Ukraine has a deep ethnic split between Ukrainians and Russians that goes back to the border between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Polish-Lithuanian_Commonwealth_at_its_maximum_extent.svg

You can see it was still reflected in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election results.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Ukrainian_presidential_election#/media/File:%D0%94%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80_2010_%D0%BF%D0%BE_%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%85-en.png

And Putin is still following the pattern:

https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/0003/production/_127630000_ukraine_invasion_south_map_x2_nc.png.webp

Putin's ideal outcome is to take the entirety of the provinces Russia currently controls most of, then add on Odessa. He'd also have a land bridge to Transnistria. Basically make Ukraine a land locked country.

A lot of the ethnic Russians left after the domestic conflict broke out in 2014. Between Russian speakers returning and Ukrainian speakers leaving, he probably wouldn't have much trouble integrating that strip.

Integrating the rest of Ukraine is clearly impossible. He'd probably like to leave the rest of the country independent and de-militarized. It's just not part of his vision of historic Russia.

Relatedly, the internal boarders of the commonwealth between Poland and Lithuania from the Union of Lublin in 1579 are the current border between Belarus and Ukraine.

Ukraine has a deep ethnic split between Ukrainians and Russians

This dichotomy lost its importance by 2016. Having lived in Eastern Ukraine, everyone lost any faith in Russia seeing the Donbas turn into a looted mafia run hellhole, with militias forcing people to sign their assets away etc. Culture, language etc. are meaningless compared to not wanting to be impoverished worse than the 90s. The Ukrainian army is very happy to use Russian, Azov's main language was Russian and had many Russians from Russia in its ranks. Many are now switching languages, building negative associations with Russian, due to the war.

One confounder is Zelensky himself, commonly found on Russian TV, who ran on a campaign to ease tensions and move on from the Donbas conflict. In spite of this, he surprising ended up not vetoing (middling) anti-Russian language laws. I haven't been able to determine why he switched then - but it does echo popular opinion in the East too. Here Zelensky sings on a Russian New Year's special: https://youtube.com/watch?v=lkdDQX06ISI The channel currently does nothing but war propaganda, featuring some audience members.

I've written about identity in Ukraine in other posts: https://www.themotte.org/post/269/culture-war-roundup-for-the-week/50553?context=8#context

These claims are very odd. To point out a couple

This dichotomy lost its importance by 2016.

do you have some sort of empirical evidence of this other than your anecdote. I have seen many videos that would show contrary. For an empirical example this poll by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in (sep2022) states that "The poll showed that 57% of Ukraine's ethnic Russians" do not support making territorial concessions to Russia while almost 90% of Ukrainians do not as a whole. That is as significant difference in opinion to me. This poll did not include all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea oblasts either.

I haven't been able to determine why he switched then - but it does echo popular opinion in the East too.

Again the poll by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology "At the same time, it is mostly supported by residents of the West and the Center (respectively, 79.4% and 66.2%), the least - residents of the East (38.8%, while 55.8% do not support)."

In spite of this, he surprising ended up not vetoing (middling) anti-Russian language laws.

I don't find this surprising in the least bit

Consider half the country uses Russian as their main day to day language, but not even a fifth claim it as their native language (which also means something different than in English), and 57% of that less than a fifth of "Russians" have an opinion on a poll? That's less than 10%. Of the "Ukrainians", you'd be hard pressed to find any (besides in the far West) who don't have a Russian grandparent (or 3). Along the same lines, even in Siberia or Vladivostok, half the people you find will have a Ukrainian or Polish grandparent. This does not impact what ethnic identity they write in surveys.

I find it much more probable that Russia is going to lose gradually then suddenly, because it is less supported by outside forces and their weapons are obviously obsolete.

Ukraine is being supplied both by NATO and captured Russian gear. So it's doubly problematic.

It's not at all obvious. One of my cousins volunteered for the war in April and immediately found himself in a training center and then at the front. My own brother was mobilized in October and he still comes home for the weekend. The capacity of the training and supply centers cannot cope with 300,000 mobilized. Probably, Russia can train about 80,000 people per month, maybe 100,000.

And the meaning of the war of approximately equal in quality armies lies in quantity. Ukraine successfully advanced near Kharkov, not because Himars and not because Javelin. But because they were able to bring their army to almost a million people (And NATO provided them with equipment, equipment and artillery) against 300 thousand Russians.

The reduction in the numerical advantage of Ukraine after mobilization led to the stabilization of the front line and a small advance of the Russian army. But if Western countries are able to ensure the mobilization of Ukraine about 150-200 thousand soldiers per month, then at some point they will achieve a numerical superiority sufficient for a new successful offensive. And it does not look impossible for NATO countries.

They will have to give a significant percentage of the current stocks and equipment in service with NATO countries, but this is not impossible.

As for what? Well, because since 2014 a lot has been invested in Ukraine. Authority, money, prestige. All this is worth something. It does not matter for what reason politicians have committed themselves to support Ukraine. What matters is that they took it. Secondly, after the end of the war, Russia will obviously take vengeance. If there's a guy in Iraq who wants to shoot Americans, he'll get whatever weapon he wants. ATGM, MANPADS, explosives. And if he is competent enough, then the Kinzhal missile to fight aircraft carriers.

Wagner, significantly reinforced, will continue to attack European colonies in Africa and this will require a large number of resources to counter. For NATO countries, it is much more profitable to continue the conflict in Ukraine, so as not to get a conflict with Russia around the world. It's just that NATO only spends money in Ukraine. In other hypothetical conflicts, NATO will waste money and the lives of their soldiers. This is a significant difference.

And most likely politicians in NATO understand this. And I would expect a really huge supply of the Ukrainian army in the coming months. It is strange that Germany does not want to supply its tanks now, but I would bet that the US will be able to convince them in time.

Does Ukraine have the men to keep pushing into the army? It seems like they've probably exhausted their supply of able-bodied conscripts.

Lol. With a population of 70 million, Germany mobilized about 18 million people during the Second World War. And Germany needed industry and economy to support the front. Someone had to make tigers, panthers, fokewulfs, shells and wheat. Ukraine does not need any industry or economy. Hence they can mobilize a larger percentage of people. They certainly have more old people, but they have fewer children. So with a population of 36 million (optimistically) people, they could well mobilize more than 9 million. They have many refugees, but almost all of the refugees are women, so migration has little effect on mobilization potential.

The refugees that have shown up in my area (rural-ish Canada) definitely include families and single men -- it doesn't seem overly disproportionate towards single women. There's been a lot of incentive for males to get out of the country -- does anyone have actual stats on this?

In Germany, we have quite a few refugees, including in our town. They are all women and chlidren. There are no men that I know. Perhaps some very old ones, but I haven't seen them.

Men have been banned from leaving Ukraine since February 2022. Someone could pay a bribe (And people who can afford to go to Canada can also afford to pay a bribe), but it is likely that the gender ratio of refugees as a whole is highly disproportionate in favor of women.

But even if it is not 9 million but 4 million. The mobilization potential of Ukraine is still far from being exhausted.

I haven't enquired as to how they managed it, but these guys definitely left post-invasion, and have been accepted as refugees by Canada.

The point being that while in theory there's no difference between theory and practice, in practice there is. While the stats I seek probably aren't available from the Ukrainian government, they might be from countries accepting Ukrainian refugees. This would be much more useful than "it is likely that the gender ratio of refugees as a whole is highly disproportionate in favor of women", which happens to be contradicted by my lying eyes.

But even if it is not 9 million but 4 million. The mobilization potential of Ukraine is still far from being exhausted.

But either way the vast majority of this cohort will have no better combat usefulness than the equivalent Russian mobilizee -- of which they surely have just as many to throw in the meatgrinder?

But either way the vast majority of this cohort will have no better combat usefulness than the equivalent Russian mobilizee -- of which they surely have just as many to throw in the meatgrinder?

Except that Ukraine has a better chance of getting equipment for those men. Russia has to make everything for itself.

In modern warfare this is not an insignificant difference.

Russia also has to worry about potential state protection; an autocrat's army is never just for external opponents and even the Russian people may have limits on what they'll tolerate if the war is manifestly going poorly and Putin is squeezing more and more people in its name.

Russia has to make everything for itself.

Russia has been making everything for itself for 100 years -- can they no longer do it? I don't know, and unless you are involved in the Russian MIC, neither do you.

even the Russian people may have limits on what they'll tolerate

As may the Ukrainians, one might suggest?

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With all due respect, this is one of those cases where your lying eyes can be expected to give a not terribly accurate picture. Most Ukrainian refugees went to Poland, and the vast majority are in Europe. The group that went to Canada is by definition atypical.

Oh sure -- that's why I'd like to see some actual statistics.

But in the absence of statistics, choosing whether to believe my lying eyes vs internet randos and/or motivated parties, well...

All my friends from there are still alive and mostly not conscripted. Yeah they can keep going. They can triple their forces if need be.

All my friends from there are still alive and mostly not conscripted.

..and how many of them are out of the country ?

One hears stories of teenage Ukrainian boys getting draft notices in Prague and not being seen since, but one also sees Ukrainian men in the workplace who seem perfectly healthy and in no rush to go off fight the Asiatic hordes.

I mean specifically Ukrainians in the country.

You didn't make it clear enough, though. You said 'from there', not 'there'. Important distinction. I've met a lot of guys 'from there' while working various shit jobs 'over here'.

Tactfully, I'm not asking them if they're draft dodging.

I'd be interested in seeing a good report on UA draft, % evasion, actual number drafted, and how many they've shot for desertion.

Russians are the only ones with incentives to be interested in that, so possibly some of the more clever nationalists has a good writeup based on open data and leaks.

Strelkov, who for all his craziness seems to me to have demonstrated the best intuition regarding the dynamics of this war and the modes of operation and capabilities of each side so far, advanced a theory I thought interesting on Telegram yesterday. According to him, the Western coalition is deliberately trying to bait Russia into believing that the next two weeks are a now-or-never window to start another offensive - the failure of Ukraine to start any serious large-scale counterattacks, the published timelines for the delivery of the next packages of Western weaponry, the inexplicable publicity of the US supposedly strongly advising Ukraine to pull out of Bakhmut already, and the show of Scholz still refusing to send Ukraine tanks but it only being a matter of time until he has to bow to pressure all are meant to create a picture that now is a high point of the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian preparedness and from March onwards Ukrainian conventional firepower is on track to eclipse Russia's for good. (...and for some reason we may never now all details of, proactive nuclear escalation by Russia has been taken off the table.) All of these are inconsistent with a posture you would adopt if you were actually going through a concerning stretch of weakness, and so this would suggest that the West believes that it can win against whatever Russia throws at it now (and all things equal we may be past the "more war = more free economic stimulus" point and winning sooner is better).

Interesting perspective, but that's almost certainly attributing more coordination and Machiavellian aptitude to the organization than NATO actually has. It's still the traditional worry about "escalation", along with Germany's domestic politics making it a perpetual stick-in-the-mud.

the flawed 'domino theory' that was used to justify the Vietnam intervention

Let me see. The domino theorists said if the communists win in one country, they'd try to take over more. But in fact, in your universe, that wasn't what happened. There was no attempt by communists to take Korea (half-success), Viet Nam (success), Cambodia (success), Cuba (success), communist takeovers all over Africa, communist ownership of Eastern Europe (including brutal suppression of any attempt to create even minimal independence), invasion of Afghanistan, and so on, and so forth. In fact, it sounds weird why anybody would support such a flawed theory, given the facts that communists never intended to spread their ideas internationally, promote World Revolution and actively sponsor revolutionary forces all over the globe. It's all pure "hysterical rhetoric".

communists win in one country

To be precise, in a particular region. The Domino Theory is that once communism has a foothold in a region, it will spread across that region unless halted by extreme measures, like tough anti-communist dictatorships or supporting civil wars against the communists. So, if you want to avoid those extreme measures, don't let communism gain a foothold.

Communists took over Russia, then most of the former Russian Empire and Outer Mongolia, then Eastern Europe. (Confirmation of the Domino Theory)

Communists failed to advance across Korea in 1950 and didn't spread into Japan. (Confirmation of the Domino Theory)

Communists succeeded in advancing across Vietnam in 1974-1975 and took over Cambodia/Laos. They did not take over more of SE Asia due to the US's willingness to back very tough anti-communist governments in Thailand, Indonesia, the Phillippines, Taiwan etc. (Confirmation of the Domino Theory)

Communists took over Cuba, then took over Nicaragua. They did not spread over more of Central and South America due to the US's willingness to back very tough anti-communist governments in the region and do everything possible to undermine communists in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Chile. (Confirmation of the Domino Theory)

Communists took over Guinea in 1958, the Republic of the Congo and Somalia in 1969, and by 1975, African communists had taken over Benin, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The spread of communism across Africa was slowed by the tolerance of the South African and Rhodesian regimes by the US and its allies. It was finally stalled by supporting anti-communist guerillas in Angola and Mozambique, who took up the efforts of the Cuban soldiers who had been pivotal to communism's spread in many of these countries. The last triumph of communists in Africa, Burkina Faso in 1984, was stopped by a military coup in 1987, which many link to France (Confirmations of the Domino Theory)

This empirical evidence for the Domino Theory is not decisive - for instance, you could argue that US involvement in Vietnam actually precipitated the revolutions in Laos and Cambodia - but the historical evidence is at least prima facie on the side of the Domino Theory. It became unfashionable for the same reason that the idea of communist infiltration because unfashionable: after McCarthyism, the US intelligentsia began to view US conservatives as a bigger threat to them and their social democratic/democratic socialist ambitions than the communists, and the Domino Theory was seen as a US conservative charade.

I am generalising about the US intelligenstia, of course. For example, Sidney Hook was a democratic socialist who nonetheless never succumbed to the temptation of seeing US conservatives as a bigger threat to democratic socialism than Soviet communists.

in my opinion that is not good analysis at all.

Losing hundreds of tanks - the number that Ukraine is asking for - isn't something you replenish within a year.

yes, it is. Ukraine is asking for 300 tanks. The US alone has over 6,000. The trickle of weapons extends the war.

If we assume that Russia will win this war,

you need to define what winning this war means when discussing outcomes. Rarely do I see people other very pro-UA or pro-UA thinking either side will reach all their objectives. As for the importance of this war, it is the largest European war since WW2. That is significant in and of itself.

The "jaws of victory" he's drawn on the map look a lot like the plans drawn ten months ago. Russian armed forces failed to spring the trap then, what makes Big Serge think they will succeed this spring?

Since Russia’s surprise decision (surprising to him, he was proclaiming that the Ukrainian army had already been defeated before this point) to voluntarily withdraw (lol) from west bank Kherson in the first week of November

Again, a lack of territorial progress from either side is a clear sign that russia is winning the attritional war. The ukrainian units are 'shattered', 'destroyed' and 'pulverized' until, presumably, the russians have to voluntarily withdraw again.

While the Ukrainian military exists at least partially as a continuous institution, its combat power has been destroyed and rebuilt multiple times at this point through western assistance.

A fanciful but necessary theory given he has already described the total destruction of the ukrainian army multiple times.

This led to General Zaluzhny’s now-famous interview with the economist in which he asked for many hundreds of Main Battle Tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and artillery pieces.

Oh wow, the ukrainians ask for weapons, I'll have to update my priors on that one.

My suggestion would simply be that NATO does not believe in Ukrainian victory.

This is not just completely wrong, it shows a real failure to conceptualize the opposition. Even he must realize Ukraine has been outperforming from day one, and kept going. NATO wants to keep things cheap and avoid humiliating russia.

Ukraine has burned through multiple iterations of armaments and is now reduced to begging for active NATO matériel

That's technically correct but deeply misleading. Ukraine always has been at very deep disadvantage against Russia in almost every armament there is. Western supplies helped to reduce this disadvantage a little, but they were not even nearly enough to close the gap, and for ammunition, the supplies were always below what is being spent on the battlefield and what is necessary for overcoming Russia's size advantage. Not because the West doesn't have it - but because the West is reluctant to get deeply involved. There's nothing to "reduce" and "multiple iterations" have always been way below Ukrainian needs. So there's absolutely nothing new there. Ukraine begged for Western support since day one, and the West didn't give them enough since day one, and still doesn't.

Germany has been reluctant to send heavy weapons since day one, and even a cursory look at the ties of German elite with various Russian business enterprises and "German-Russian friendship societies" can give an ample explanation why. Exhibit 1, Boris Pistorius, Germany's minister of defense. Who has argued against sanctions on Russia, was member of parliamentary "friendship society" maintaining links with Russia's "parliament", and is a close ally of Gerhard Schroeder (of Gazprom fame). One can only wonder why such leadership is not sending modern tanks to Ukraine...

Does not sending tanks prove collusion for any other country, or is it just for Germany?

Not sending tanks does not prove collusion, collusion explains not sending tanks. German elites were in bed with Russia way before the question of tanks has arisen - and, tbh, nobody was really bothered by it too much, exactly because they didn't foresee they'd have to send tanks. But now, when it is obvious that Russia is not what the kumbaya squad though it was, that collusion explains why they are so reluctant to change their actions.

The American ploy of 'if you send Leopard 2s to Ukraine, we'll give you Abrams on the cheap' - isn't it a rather transparent attempt at fucking the German economy even more ?

I don't think the price of a dozen (or even several dozens) tanks plays a significant role in the trillion-dollar budgets/GDPs here. It's sounds like a B-movie plot rather than something that actually happens. The US is trying for a long time to get Europe to do 2% of military expenses that they agreed to, and I think it still didn't happen, Germany barely getting to 1.5. With this level of spending, I don't thing fucking the economy is a big concern.

Also, from what I understand, the manufacturer of these tanks said that they can't make too many more than they do now anyway, at least soon, so I am not sure who is being fucked by replacing them with Abrams, if that indeed might happen. Also, according to the Wiki, Germans plan to replace them anyway by 2030, which again makes the plan of fucking the German economy by temporarily replacing some tanks not a viable plot.

Also, Germans until this point objected to Poland sending L2s to Ukraine too, which does not have any potential to affect German economy at all, except maybe Poland buying more modern tanks to replace the old ones (where Leopards would be the first choice since they already have everything set up for them) - again, nothing fucking German economy here. And now Netherlands wants to buy some L2s from Germany to give it to Ukraine - again, no fucking the German economy I can detect here. I am not sure whether the Germans would agree - but I think it'd be a good deal for them, unless there are some non-economic reasons not to do that.

Europe has cca .. 3600 Leopard 2s. If eventually say, 1000 get sent to Ukraine, to replace the destroyed Ukrainian T-64s, that'd mean a lot of lost contracts for Germans.

so I am not sure who is being fucked by replacing them with Abrams, if that indeed might happen.

The war stimulated defense spending, it's reasonable to expect they'd have attempted to revive the manufacturing.

If 1000 gets sent to Ukraine, the war will end pretty soon after. But right now we're not even near that level of commitment, good thing if they manage 10% of that. So far I understand it's more like 1%: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/01/22/germany-okays-a-dozen-polish-tanks-for-ukraine-hundreds-more-could-follow

But I don't see how it's "a lot of lost contracts for Germans" - if these tanks are already bought, the contracts are already paid for. Now imagine they all get sent to Ukraine and stay there (either somehow destroyed, or hanging around keeping the peace after the victory). I imagine they would need eventually to be replaced. Since the rest 2600 are Leopards, and having similar tanks is easier than having different ones, for obvious reasons, that mean the same Europeans now come to the Germans and say "give us more of those Leopards, we need to replace those we sent to Ukraine". I'm not sure I understand - how is this a loss for Germany in your book? Of course, if somehow Americans had a Jedi trick that would make the owners of those 2600 to replenish the missing 1000 with Abrams, that would be a lost opportunity for Germans - but I don't see how it would suddenly happen. As far as I know, militaries don't just jump to an entirely different supplier on a dime. If they planned to replace L2 with Abrams, that decision wouldn't be caused by giving tanks to Ukraine - it'd be taken independently, and there would not be additional loss to Germans to allow the tanks to be given to Ukraine - if country X intends to no longer buy Leopards, it'd not buy regardless of what happens to existing Leopards, whether they go to Ukraine now or sold to Saudi Arabia in 5 years.

Not a parsimonious explanation. If collusion explains not sending tanks in the case of germany, how do you explain the reluctance to send tanks for similar countries (US italy france etc) ?

It is a sufficient explanation, not the only explanation.

If in february you were adamant there was collusion (because of German-Russian friendship societies etc), you would have predicted a degree of support for ukraine from germany that would be considerably less than what actually happened. The belief is epistemic dead weight.

US does not want to get involved in a war in Europe. Or at least some part of the US doesn't. That's the same story since WW1. If you ask why US wants to be involved in Libya or Iraq or Somali, but not in Europe - I don't have a good answer for you, it is what it is.

As for the rest of them, its a combination of Russian ties (Germany was leading the way, but Russian money and Russian energy dependency is all over Europe, it's not unique to Germany at all, though France has much less energy dependence due to the developed nuclear production - I always was fascinated how unexpectedly sane French approach in this area has been) and again, reluctance to get involved in a far away conflict that they feel they don't have much stake in.