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Interesting developments in Ukraine. Very unclear what's going on, but possibly US supported change of leadership within the near future. That's just a guess.
On Friday the 18th, there were two hit pieces on Zelensky, one in FT and another in Spectator. TL;DR on them is: West is disappointed with Zelensky because he appears to be using the cover of war to attack people who were fighting against corruption in Ukraine and using authoritarian means to go after politicians who aren't seen as fully loyal to him.
That's not new - Ukrainians have been muttering about precisely that for years. But Westerners are reading it now, and as has been pointed out, if you're reading it, it's for you..
There were some Ukrainian and one older Politico.EU articles with a similar tone but all much lower profile. Now the Man wants us to know Zelensky is not the greatest hero since Churchill. Why?
Then, on Saturday, in a surprising move, Zelensky called for negotiations. Here's Guardian reporting on it..
Looking at the previous round of negotiations, those were futile. Without concessions that Ukrainians, especially the nationalists find unthinkable, Russians aren't stopping. In addition last week Trump gave Russia some sort of '50 days' ultimatum.. No idea what that means- threatening tariffs on a country that has had 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on it seems odd.
The last time(end of may '25) they tried negotiating there was no agreement (Russians wanted the 4 oblasts, a little land in them they didn't have yet and ofc Crimea), which Ukraine didn't want to agree too even though they have, at present, a snowball's chance in hell of regaining any territory and are inexorably losing more at an escalating pace. Mind you, this is pretty much 'minimalism' on the Russian side. Ukrainians, just to start proper negotiations wanted an 'unconditional 30 day ceasefire', to which Russians were unwilling to agree because they thought it was just a stalling tactic to get time to build more defensive lines.
There's no reason to believe Russians are going to be in any way more amenable this time -they've taken more ground, their forces are being sustained, unlike the Ukrainian ones.
Town of Pokrovsk (~70k before war) whose supply lines have been interdicted for months now & ofc town itself has been under constant attrition is getting ever more cut off. Russians have massed forces to actually cut off the town and Ukraine doesn't have any reserves to counter that, so there's risk of the city getting wholly cut off.
So what to make of it? Seymour Hersh claims that US wants to replace Zelensky with Zaluzhny. A regime journalist calls that 'Ukrainian disinformation'..
But Hersh also claims US is trying to reach an agreement with Russia while it's still possible. Russians who are confident they can see it through obviously don't want to make any deal that'd be less than full recognition of conquered territory & Finlandization of rump Ukraine. So, why even attempt to negotiate? If Zelensky were to make peace, he'd have to fight the nationalists who won't give up this easily, go against his western sponsors who don't want the war to end either. He clearly doesn't have support to end the war.
It looks like desperate flailing from Zelensky's side. Or is the army personnel/ammo situation so critical that he expects it to be close to collapse within a month? Very little is known about how bad it is for AFU (it's all secret and they rarely say anything). About the best report is this Polish one, which says Ukraine requires 300,000 soldiers to fully staff its combat formations, and that presently there are cca 300,000 men in the trenches.
Looks like Russians have just stormed into the center of both Pokrovsk and Kupyansk. Maybe the Ukrainian collapse has actually begun?
I think the Russian objective is to make AFU as personnel poor as possible and make them withdraw & negotiate rather than create a sudden collapse.
That's probably why e.g. bridges over the Dniepr haven't been bombed (it'd also complicate civilian situation a lot). It really is a quite limited war.
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I don't get this. Supplying water to a town without electric power/pumping stations infrastructure is impossible, are the Russians going out of their way NOT to starve the town into oblivion in 7 days?
Everyone but 5-10% of old people has already left. Also in Ukraine, the water table is comfortably off so you can get some water from wells even if the power is out I'm pretty sure.
Not in the Donbass. My grandma grew up there and they didn't even have a well, they had a cistern.
Weird.
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Interdiction means that a percentage of logistics entering the town are destroyed/disabled, or can only move under poor weather, at night etc. You don't need running water or electricity to keep a fighting position supplied, you can truck/carry in their water, ammo, etc. but if part of that is being interdicted your logistic burden is just that much higher, X% is lost, alongside Y lives per tonne needed to sustain fighting.
The Russians are naturally going out of their way to starve out every town/fighting position they can, which is often a matter of ammunition not food or water of course.
Maybe I'm being too monstrous in my imagination, but if you disabled power infra to pumping stations you'd be able to cut off potable water supply, you can't hide water trucks from satellites/drones. I guess they just don't want to appear THAT evil.
Remember these aren't civilian towns anymore, they're warzones, you're supplying soldiers in an area with enough water to survive, alongside food, ammunition, entrenching equipment etc, and taking fresh men in and the wounded etc back. If Russia could stop every truck into a given area, they would control it and quickly occupy it, it's not defensible, same for Ukraine the other way around, their effective actions around Izium mostly involved Russian units panicking as their supply lines were close to being closed and they ran for it.
For a town close to the front you use trucks, for one on the front you use MRAPs and APC/IFVs, for a fighting position on the edge of town you use runners through your trenches, but again interdiction means that you are degrading but not stopping this, which might largely happen at night, under fog etc. It's absolutely not the case that Russia can stop anything like all deliveries even to these contested areas, but it be high cost for the Ukrainians, forcing them back in the end. Here's a video (that's certainly wrong in bits, but gives you an idea) that covers one of these key town sieges: https://youtube.com/watch?v=igFrblANpQk .
Almost none of the civilian infrastructure is working, these places are wrecked, and the utility pipes are shredded. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to degrade utilities to big cities, but they can be repaired, there's some redundancy and defended by AA assets etc. If your assumption as to why Russia is moving too slowly is that they're being far too soft, that almost certainly isn't the case.
You use former agricultural drones that drop 5l plastic bottles.
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Do you want to explain what you are talking about? And why a single failure nullifies a career of generally decent reporting?
Seymore Hersh did a long and somewhat fanciful article claiming that the US bombed the Nord Stream Pipeline.
It was sourced to anonymous intelligence sources, but reflected a misunderstanding of how the US government functions (claiming certain parts of the US military did it to avoid the Congressional oversight that is also present under a different channel for the alleged organization, i.e. not avoiding Congressional oversight), operational security (claiming simultaneously that significant parts of the US government couldn't be told but also sharing it with key NATO allies), munition physics (claiming an airdrop of a precision submersible munition rather at altitudes that would break it, rather than lowering off a boat), and planning timelines (the bomb had to be planted during a major NATO exercise, when many NATO witnesses would be present, but detonated months later lest the Russians discover it, rather than use a boat closer to the time), and signal technology (the bomb had to be detonated by a signal from a military aircraft that would be conspicuously flying overhead, rather than a boat sailing through the area). It also relied on falsifiable claims (no NATO aircraft was observed launching from or flying around the places and times he claimed) that were falsified shortly after publication, unfalsifiable claims of vague, unspecified, but undefeatable Russian underwater sensors that would detect the bombs a few months after the bomb was planted but not the months prior, and a someone exaggerated view of the technical requirements of blowing up the pipeline (minimal requirements being professional swimming gear and a commercially available boat).
Whether you believe the US bombed the pipeline or not- and there have been people who insisted with straight faces no one else possibly could have the means or motive to and that even considering anyone other than the Americans was a self-evident waste of time- Hersh's account was an incompetent way to go about it. It was incompetence that treated itself seriously, presenting what it clearly thought was a super-professional and competent means that only the Americans could have achieved. In practice it was more Hollywood fantasy than Tom Clancy technothriller in quality, not least because Hersh had a bizar insistence of using any other method of delivery or initiation for a water-based explosive to a target in the water other than use a boat.
It also was not followed in the months or years since by any supporting revelations by any of the many motivated parties who would happily have the Americans receive the blame. Instead, eventually, Germany put the equivalent of an arrest warrant for Ukrainians. Coincidentally, the same week, the Wall Street Journal published an account blaming the Ukrainians.
(They rented a boat.)
A Danish ministry of defense official said he observed US ships with turned off AIS over the future blast site and when he sailed out to ask what's going was told it's all okay and to go away.
Considering that Biden said that Nord Stream 2 was going to be stopped one way or other, what more do you want ? An embroidered order to the naval diver unit ?
Nobody halfway serious believes American denials on this.
We strongly disagree on who serious people are, so that's not surprising.
Would you believe Russian theories about some silly yacht and I dunno, Serbians if their warships were observed lurking over a future bomb site ? No, you wouldn't. You can't expect anyone to believe these paper-thin denial and deflections.
You may not believe or understand why I wouldn't put a given act past multiple different actors. That is your limitation, not evidence of either my position or of culpability.
This sort of (inaccurate) mind-reading and incredulity of alternatives is why we disagree about who the serious people are.
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I think you summed it up pretty succinctly, but you forgot the best conspiracy theory angle - Seymour Hersh was deliberately fed a poison pill that bore enough similarities to his other big breaks to convince him to suspend his skepticism, tanking the credibility of the concept in the eyes of the public!
I still don't think that makes him an irredeemable source though.
I'm not convinced Hersh has any particular credibility in the eyes of the public as large. There's a reason vouches for his career credibility tend to reach back 20 years or more, rather than since the Bush administration. Even the man's more ardent defenders during the Ukraine story were leaning back to the Vietnam War reputation than his post-9-11 middle east pattern.
At least on a public/policy level, Hersh got dropped like most of the Bush-era anti-war movement when it became clear he was going to make the same sort of claims and accusations against Obama and the Democrats as he did against Bush. The sort of 'we could believe it' credibility that that was leant when he was making various accusations against Bush as a warmonger, or that Reagan was the real villains for Pakistan going nuclear, dried up when he was blaming the Syrian rebels for Assad's gas attacks, and accusing Obama of fabricating the Bin Laden raid. Abu Ghraib was real, but the man made so many unfalsifiable claims, and then claimed other things false, that even his fans tend to mumble mumble over the stuff since 2004.
Honestly, I was(/am?) still on the fence about the Assad gas attacks because it would be such an insanely stupid thing for him to do, but I'm more inclined to believe he makes incredibly stupid decisions since he lost in the way he did.
I am convinced it was kabuki by the very fact the White Helmets were involved.
The narrative about Assad the evil eye doctor using nerve gas to make it clear how evil he is compared to the moderate democratic Al-Qaeda affiliates he was fighting is complicated bc the munitions supposedly used to dispense the nerve gas being very short-ranged garage made contraptions that would have required a truck convoy to get within 1-2 km of the targets. The state department map shows that the only place where these could have been safe was Western Ghouta, were funnily enough basically no actual sarin residue was found.. All the places with actual evidence of nerve gas were fairly deep into the area where government did not have solid presence in.
Those who want to see it in painful detail, aerodynamic calculations were made and published.
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People tend to forget that one of the Syrian civil war's proximate instigating sparks- the events that might not have been necessary but helped push uncontrolled protests into violent rebellion- was a sniper campaign against protestors.
This is / was a more common suppression method in the broader autocrat toolbox in the early 2010s, especially Russia-aligned. In theory, you can not only use the the violence from the snipers to take out key organizers, or to frighten / scatter crowds, but you can even use it as a pretext to send in armed forces to 'protect the people,' including escalating your own use of force.
In practice, government snipers backfired terribly in both Syria (2011) and Ukraine (2014). Digital media distribution, more capable phone-cameras, and now adays drones make it far easier to publicize/highlight/share the presence of snipers emplaced for longer periods of time. Once the presence of the snipers is known, it changes the political context and response vis-a-vis an unknown shot from unknown source.
That may / may not be 'stupid,' and the Arab Spring challenged a lot of underlying assumptions, but it an inclination towards a certain sort of murderous brutality.
There were also anti-government snipers in Ukraine, cooperating with the most radical protesters and fired on both the protesters and the government, trying to spark a bloodbath.
Some of the activists were now saying, during the trial that they were shot from behind by unknown people who were in the part of a hotel which was controlled by opposition.
Of course, good people who have been brought up on a steady diet of pro-social propaganda and who have been groomed to be morally invested into a sordid little geopolitical pissing match have to believe that their side would never, ever do anything shady or horrible.
This was even caught on video by BBC journalists who were under fire from their own hotel, of course, it never made the cut and wasn't shown. Would have complicated the narrative of evil stupid Yanukovich and brave, saintly protesters.
^^@FistfullOfCrows it's all kabuki.
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Why do you say failure? Who do you think blew up the pipeline?
The German conclusion is political theater. Ukraine may have had single digits of people with the right expertise to dive 100m down in a strong current. Furthermore the yacht they supposedly took was so small they'd have had problems carrying all the gear this needed.
https://politiken.dk/danmark/art10057566/De-første-dage-måtte-havnefogeden-på-Christiansø-»ikke-sige-en-dyt«.-Men-i-dag-kan-han-godt-afsløre-en-smule
I suspect that country at war may be quite motivated to locate or otherwise obtain experts on relevant topics - even if you have just few of them
or just train them
after all, how many experts were at start of war in Ukraine with expertise at thing like counter-drone drones, long range torpedoes (often called naval drones) or F-16 pilots?
also, someone claiming stuff with poetry/tall-tales like
should not be overly trusted about their accuracy
are these supposed ships visible on satellite images taken at that time? or is there at least curious stop in coverage at that time from USA-controlled suppliers or any other confirmation of that story, such as logs of rescue service going to ships with switched-off radios? BTW, how these ships with switched-off radio were supposed to be detected?
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Even assuming that this is true, could they really have done it without support or at least acquiescence+aftercare from the US? The way the adjacent Baltic states froze Germany out of the investigation and conclusions seems implausible if it was a Ukrainian solo gig that they were not appraised of, and without US pressure it seems quite strange that Denmark and Sweden would choose to snub Germany (if not the government, then at least its public) so heavily to give a small PR edge to Ukraine. (Meanwhile, with the Assange case, we have precedent showing that the Swedish legal system is happy to engage in perversion of justice at US behest.)
yes
in similar way as they blow up long-range bombers in airfields deep in Russia
why Baltic states would need USA pressuring them to approve of Nord Stream being destroyed?
Poland and/or Baltic states outright running "lets blow up Nord Stream" is relatively reasonable, happy obstruction of German investigation is my default expectation here.
I expect that Poland was not running/helping outright but I would not be surprised if operation was detected and deliberately ignored.
Or maybe they had so low opinion of Germany that they forwarded warning expecting that Germany will fail to stop it anyway.
(or was not detected at ll by them)
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Acquiescence+aftercare from the US was reportedly that the Americans told the Germans before the attack, as well as soon after.
As for being puzzled by regional parties whose security concerns Germany dismissed and ignorred in pursuing Nord Stream, I suspect you believe they have a far greater fear and/or positive opinion of Germany than they do. Germany's Nord Stream policy was not exactly considered a benign or neutral policy by its Baltic neighbors. German politicians had not only insisted it was ridiculous to oppose Nord Stream on grounds of Russian concerns, but also that it was ridiculous to believe Nord Stream interests might sabotage Germany's willingness to support its European neighbors security if Russia did do something stupid. Both of these concerns were validated by the German response to Putin.
If anything, rather than a snub the non-cooperation was both a retaliation and a warning. Germany could not defend Nord Stream when it was warned in advance. Germany could not pursue Nord Stream saboteurs without the cooperation of its neighbors in the present. And Germany would not be able to protect any future Nord Stream in the future, if it disregarded its neighbors security concerns. The Nord Stream concept was not a German-Russia bilateral concern. It was a concern of far more people, and far more veto authorities in practice.
Germany was never so adored and/or feared that it could expect other countries to defend Germany's privileged energy relationship with Russian at their own expense. If that surprised the Germans, well it wasn't for a lack of being warned.
I knew it:
@dr_analog, you got your wish!
...no?
I may not be understanding your quote from the thread correctly, but I may not have been clear. In the quote you are citing of me, I am referring to what I believe was the WSJ account that reported that Germany was warned of the Ukrainians before the attack occurred, as well as post-incident reporting.
'We are warning you of what someone else is thinking of doing to you,' followed by 'we think the people we warned you about did what we warned they considering, which just happened,' is substantially different than 'we are warning you of what we are doing to you so you can minimize the harm we are doing to you.'
Or rather, if warning someone of third party hostile intent is evidence of responsibility, I'm not sure I can contribute anything on the subject.
Sorry, I misunderstood the contents of these warnings, but can you blame me for liking my version better?
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yes ... ha ha ha ... yes!
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Curious about where the "escalating pace" point comes from.
I'm too bubbled up on this, I think. I occasionally see videos of Russians getting mowed down by FPV drones or the Ukrainians pulling off a strike inside Russian motherland territory, and then usually Russian retaliation, but very few updates on battle line movement.
The battle lines are moving pretty fast by Ukraine war standards. Pokravsk and Konstantivka are surrounded. Bilohorovka has finally fallen, tightening the Russian cauldron around Siverisk. The result of these three sieges is that the final 2014 era Ukrainian hardened defensive line through Sloviansk-Kramantorsk-Konstantivka is on the verge of being cauldroned.
Additionally, Kupiansk on the northern end of the eastern defensive line is almost encircled. In the south there’s a slow moving but consistent Russian breakout coming from the Avdiivka-Vuhledar direction.
In far north-central Ukraine, the offensive salient into Kursk has been fully rolled back. Russian troops are beginning to push into Ukraine towards Sumy.
Taking all these things together, it means you could see a complete collapse of the front in about six months.
That sounds like a fair definition for 'escalating pace.'
Not sure what can be done for Ukrainian morale if their sole foray into Russian Territory is now completely reversed. With, allegedly, 70k casualties? the scale of this war still blows my mind sometimes.
And man, a lot of westerners who have staked so much of their personality on the belief that Ukraine can win this thing will presumably be inconsolable for a while if Ukraine throws in the towel with Russia making actual territory gains.
From a purely military perspective the invasion may have been the right move. They inflicted serious losses on the unprepared Russian defenders and diverted an impressive amount of manpower away from the main attack in Ukraine.
But from that perspective they should have cut their losses and run when the Russians brought their entire war machine to bear on the pocket. Trying to replicate attacks like the Kursk attack in other places along the Russian border would probably have been smart. But the fact of occupying Russian land was probably too much to just give up without a fight.
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Doubt it. In my bubble those are the same people that wore masks until 2023 and bend the knee for floyd. If Kiev falls - in 24 hours they will find another pet cause. And ukraine war will be memory holed.
I mean they can pivot straight over to Palestine or like a half-dozen other slightly more trivial matters.
They're probably already addled with anxiety and depression, so it'll result in a spike of therapist visits.
I'd guess they keep the Ukraine Flag in their profiles for at least a couple months.
These guys could really use a win, but it sure seems like they won't get one. They've been losing ground on abortion rights, gun control, most of their favored economic policies, climate change, affirmative action... and things ain't going well for either Ukraine or Palestine.
Genuinely hope we don't get more of them setting themselves on fire.
What if they get a win because Trump opens the spigot?
Which spigot is that?
The military gear spigot via these NATO purchases.
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Please do bear in mind that most people who wanted Ukraine to win thought they were going to lose in weeks/months, and were pleasantly surprised that the Russians proved so incompetent at modern maneuver warfare, and the Ukrainians so resilient. This includes the bulk of Western military/geopolitical analysts.
Ukraine continuing to exist as an independent state at all is a "victory" that many thought very unlikely.
If the Ukrainians deem it in their best interest to accept territorial losses then so be it. They fought way harder than was reasonable to expect when this first started.
I do distinctly remember saying at the time - not here, but to friends and coworkers - that Ukraine's best scenario (that was realistic without the US or EU doing most of the heavy lifting) was creating a Vietnam-style quagmire. In broad strokes, it seems to me that's what's happened.
More of an "Iran-Iraq War" quagmire in terms of style (trenches, not jungle), but yes.
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And, for many purposes, they established a very credible lesson about it for the future.
That is to say, even if they end up losing some eastern territory, they will have demonstrated that the cost to get it was extremely high -- both in absolute terms and relative to expectation.
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I mean... this outcome is almost the precise definition of a Pyhrric victory.
There is not a long term strategy that results in Ukraine happily returning to status as a decently prosperous second-world country. Not that they were very happy before anyway.
I don't want Russia to 'win,' but look at my comment from just over two years back.
(Russia's victory will be Pyrhrric as well, but will at least advance some of their goals)
Oh, and this comment chain from two years ago about the children being kidnapped (Russia KNOWS it needs more young blood), the Ukrainian demographic collapse, and Ukrainian women fleeing the country.
Even if all the people who fled come back there is no chance of Ukraine repopulating over the short term. And it would take hundreds of billions of dollars of investment to rebuild the country. From whence is all that money actually going to come?
All in all, the best case scenarios for Ukrainian survival (regardless of who rules the territory) were:
#1 Russia never invades.
#2 Russia invades, Kiev falls quickly, the country folds, NATO reinforces every border and contains further aggression.
#3 Russia Invades, makes a mess of it, and decides to keep at it, and the U.S. happily works to prolong the conflict to the tune of hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars of military hardware and aid.
...
...
#45 Russia deploys nukes.
We're deep in scenario 3, and whether Ukraine or Russia 'wins' does nothing to solve the demographic hole that's been blown into both countries.
For a smaller country fighting a larger one, a Pyrrhic victory is in some ways the goal. You either surrender, flee, or say, "Fuck it, everyone loses." If the deal is, "I steal everything from you, and you get to do as I say," you mash the defect button and try to make sure they're miserable. The alternative is your state exists only so long as someone else doesn't want it.
Yes, the Taliban pulled this off to massive success (by their standards/on their terms) not too long ago.
But in Ukraine's case, WHAT IS THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY.
Beat back Russia, maybe even join NATO, fine.
Your population still drops off a cliff. Protracting the war is hastening the decline there.
What sort of deal can you make that even lets you feel safe for the next couple decades?
The fertility crisis isn't going to be solved in or by Ukraine. If a solution is found, then Ukrainian wartime casualty counts will be irrelevant assuming they stay within 20th century (i.e. WWI level or less) norms, but could make the difference between Ukraine existing or not as a sovereign state in the future. Presumably the soldiers fighting are motivated by nationalism and care about such things. If a solution isn't found, then we go extinct and this discussion is moot.
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No idea. Every option for Ukraine is losing. Making a deal with Russia is pointless because the only condition they will accept is not having a military, which is the same as surrendering their country to Russia. Either they accept being taken over by Russia and enduring whatever Putin does to secure control, or they throw themselves into debt on the hopes that they barely survive. If they win, then throw themselves on the mercy of Europe and endure having nothing while they try to rebuild.
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For Russia, yeah. Ukraine has to choose between two bad scenarios for the situation imposed on them--a costly victory or a costly defeat--so they might as well win.
The Ukrainians are intimately aware of the tradeoffs between fighting Russia and being ruled by Russia; I defer to their judgment on that question.
I think you're overly concerned with demographic collapse scenarios and insufficiently concerned with the risk of a resurgence of wars of conquest.
Ideally, the Russians have overextended themselves militarily and economically such that some kind of crisis forces the Russians to back off and Ukraine survives.
But if Russia takes enormous losses in a Pyhrric victory such that they and other would-be aggressors are sufficiently deterred from further warmongering then I can only thank the brave Ukrainians and their will to fight for dying on behalf of improved regional security.
I actually think the former feeds into the latter, so my concern encompasses both.
I'm prepared to defer to Ukraine's wishes on HOW they want to go out. This war has had shockingly little direct impact on my life.
I'm just noting the dismal reality.
"Survives" is doing a lot of work here. Check out that population projection. Not enough young people to rebuild and support the older generations = Ukraine has no economic prospects to speak of.
Likewise Russia (the government) probably sees this as an existential crisis, which implies they will NEVER back off unless they run out of men.
Or the aggressors who have been able to stockpile weapons might believe they've got an opening to re-open old conflicts now that the U.S. has stretched itself thin.
One thing is certain, a lot of Ruskies and Ukes have died to develop the absolutely Bleeding edge in drone-based warfare, which has probably changed the face of any conflicts from here on out. And that's BEFORE we've figured out how to have AI guided drones produced en masse.
I have my thoughts on how conflicts will go based on what's been proven to be possible and effective
I also think conflicts have become more likely under current economic and demographic constraints, and that Ukrainian sacrifice isn't doing much to decrease that likelihood because that doesn't change the underlying incentives.
Let's not exaggerate here. The US has in almost no actual way "stretched itself thin" in supporting Ukraine. We have not even significantly altered our force posture. (Which we did for Iran recently.)
The USAF and USN would absolutely demolish their Russian counterparts given their abysmal performance against Ukraine. Tactical drones are nice and all in trench warfare, but good old-fashioned air dominance is even better when you can get it.
That's not to say drones aren't important, they are and will be, but the US military is aware of that, as is Palmer Lucky and his competitors.
If wars of conquest (not motivated by ideological commitments that aren't "rational" in the usual sense) are shown to be more costly than they are worth, even in victory, then that's a huge deterrent.
I'd also guess you're very wrong in that age is negatively correlated with aggression and violence, and so older populations would seemingly be less warlike by default.
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If the institute for the study of war is trustworthy, or at least consistently biased enough to use as a metric, it does look like the Russians are making some real pushes.
Check today's map from one on this day two years ago for comparison. They're nibbling at the edges of the northern border.
If it's just the position of the front, most available maps should be accurate enough. As biased as the reporting may be, they can't fake the front more than a few miles.
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ISW is considered mostly a joke by people who aren't pro-Ukrainian. Nakedly partisan, not that smart. E.g. they said this about the failed Ukrainian summer offensive.
"may" means "may", it's not an assertion. At least when I've looked at their stuff, they usually are clear about this kind of thing, and language like this is speculative.
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If that's the case, then isn't ISW admitting Russian advances an even stronger signal of accelerated Russian gains?
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This is kind of why I despise the inherent Pro-Ukraine bias of most western reporters/forums, they can't reliably report on Russian successes since that reads as treason to the good guys, even if its more accurate as to the situation on the ground.
That and the tendency to outright lie. I still remember the Ghost of Kyiv story, and that was just the most egregious of several from that time.
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The pro-Russians have called the slow pace of grinding village conquests by Russians an escalating pace or words to the same effect for close to three years now, the same time they've predicted the imminent collapse of the front, Zelensky getting couped and so on.
The last year and a half really have come across has a throughput increase (scaling up results to input increases, but roughly the same proportions as smaller inputs) rather than compounding advantage. Typically a compounding position of advantage decreases military casualties because you mitigate the ability of the enemy to retaliate. Throughput just increases output gains by increasing input costs, but if you later decrease the input rate the outputs will still correspondingly diminish rather than continue at a steady rate (i.e. coasting to continued success). It's going from spending 3 to 6 in order to receive 8 instead of 4 on the back end. Bigger is better, yeah, but normally success on overmatch would be compounding, such that spending 6 should get you 10 instead.
The Russians can grind on for months and even years yet, but as long as the Ukrainians can match that- and that is the implication of matching the throughput scaling as they have so far- it's not really an enduring advantage if your limiting factor is more economic-political than literal manpower. Given the role Russian recruitment costs have played in the budget, and the tapering factor of early mobilization advantages, Russia is more likely to run out of men it can afford to bribe to volunteer before it conquers the four provinces.
That still leaves mass conscription down the road, but whatever you think of the political costs that Putin demonstratably disliked more than the current system, the political costs will be likely be worse if low-fiscal-cost conscription is scaled after years of volunteers got paid oodles, thus denying the new recruits even the pretense of equivalent bains, and after a war-recession has gotten underway.
I am not the biggest fan of social contract stability theory, and I believe I've said in the past that Putin can shoot down a revolt, but the man is a notorious strategic procrastinator and has a history of deferring this exact sort of choice.
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Collapse happens first gradually, then suddenly. I have said almost 3 years ago that both sides are losing the war and it is competition which one will lose it faster.
And I am not even sure that West's best toys can turn the tide*. And I suspect that is the reason why they hadn't been delivered to Ukraine. Taurus may be a nice piece of gear. But I am fairly sure Germans doesn't want to give China opportunity to figure out counter measures.
*If you think tide exists. Although it seems that the artillery theorem starts to work in their favor lately.
My suspicion is rather that the main consideration behind non-delivery of Taurus is that it weighs heavily on one side of a mutual restraint agreement. Taurus can hit Moscow; having to evacuate the Kremlin into hardened command bunkers would certainly be a symbolic and morale hit on Russia, cause friction on its entire government apparatus and possibly destabilise the country down the line regardless of what else happens in Ukraine. However, Russia also has plenty of militarily eminently sensible moves that it has not taken yet, presumably because of Western sensibilities, such as bombing Ukraine's NPPs to actually turn off the lights or turning to indiscriminate bombing of cities to obstruct the civilian economy implicitly supporting the military one (surely Ukrainian drone innovation would be hampered if its drone innovators can no longer buy a warm meal, take a shower or have a warm bed to sleep a full night in).
Would they still not take them if countries like Germany exhausted all escalation steps short of boots-on-ground? Would Germany go boots-on-ground over bombed out NPPs? (I am skeptical that this would necessarily entail significant radiation leaks. Russia could even announce their targets in advance and demand a preemptive shutdown, leaving the offense against the West to be limited to the vague notion of "nuclear terrorism", especially toothless after the latest Iran happenings.)
Unfortunately, the Western propaganda posture requires denying this (as it must be asserted that Russia is maximising for evil, and non-manifestation of any evil outcomes is strictly due to its incompetence), and therefore prevents questions like "What could Russia do if we delivered Taurus? Would it actually be a net positive for Ukraine?" from entering the public discourse.
Yep, the number of bridges across the Dnieper is quite limited, and yet they haven't been taken out, nor have the railroad hubs in Western Ukraine been covered with petal landmines.
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Yeah, my priors are VERY high on this just being a meat grinder of men dying in droves to secure a couple square miles of additional territory.
The only viable play (for either side) seems to be to acquire as much leverage as possible when talks finally occur.
I'm not counting out a breakthrough (Prighozin's little adventure two years ago could have shifted outcomes, for example) but claiming a breakthrough is too easy without actual real territorial gain to show for it.
Hell, Syria's civil war seemed to be at standstill then all at once Assad was suddenly ousted and on a plane to Moscow. It can happen, but good luck predicting it precisely in advance unless you were one of the people planning it.
It’s not a breakthrough yet. But Ukraine’s leverage is slowly decreasing and if there ever is a major rapid breakthrough it all goes out the window.
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Fundamentally there's only one way for an invasion to stop and that's for the invaders to either win or give up (either voluntary or by force).
If Ukraine stops fighting back and lets Russia win easily, then the US just has major egg on our face, especially when we've been able to help hold back Russian forces for this long while barely even lifting a pinky. We're supposed to be this big strong global superpower, leader of the free world, and our allies in Asia are watching how we treat our allies in Europe. Taiwan is watching, South Korea is watching. This is one of the big pressures on Trump, a losing Ukraine and a winning Russia is a morale victory for anti-American demagogues and a strong sign to China that we will fold on Taiwan.
We leave the vacuum out of cowardice and fear, our enemies will gladly fill it.
The US has been exhausting reserves of hard-to-replenish weapons for Ukraine. Air defence, missile defence is possibly the most important thing for Asia. Yet Patriot batteries and interceptors have been sent to Ukraine. Not to mention the rest of the munitions shortages.
Britain fighting Germany in Europe didn't send a signal to Japan that Britain would also fight in Asia, it only weakened British strength in Asia due to forces being tied down in Europe. Japan entered the war for its own reasons which were independent of whether Britain was feeling isolationist or interventionist.
Chinese decisionmaking is mostly concerned with the balance of power in Asia, economic autarky, immediate concerns to China. They'd like the US to be tied down in Europe so the Pentagon doesn't focus all its strength against them. They'd also like the US to be embroiled in the Middle East.
It's not cowardice to assess costs and benefits of a policy and refrain from maximal engagement in a theater. There's much to learn from China's attitude overseas - trade with the Middle East is a cheap and easy way to make friends, wars are a costly and hard way of making enemies. Warfare should only be planned or pursued for key strategic goals with core relevance to national interests. For China that might be securing Taiwan, uniting the Chinese nation, securing a key base in the region. For America that could be ensuring that there are no hostile regimes in the Americas, preventing any hostile power becoming a regional hegemon like the US in the Americas or stopping any one power securing the bulk of the world's energy supplies.
The US refuses to even take on the national security threat propagandizing our children despite a literal ban passed on the books because we're too scared to actually enforce it. Either we're cowards or the Chinese propaganda is so powerful and entrenched that the security threat is even greater than we realized (and thus all the more reason we need to ban it now). And yet we aren't.
The only shows of military strength are bombing nations like Iran which are basically toddlers compared to China, when we're up against another adult we can't even do a fraction of what they do without backing down.
We have lost, we will not make any sacrifice even as they brainwash our youth. We will not stand up to them in a literal war either in the region.
Or, there never was any national security threat from TikTok, the ban was just classic bipartisanship in the "evil and stupid" sense, and Trump keeps kicking the ball down the road because he thinks doing so gives him some leverage in trade negotiations.
If the politicians across both parties are making up national security concerns as a false justification to suppress rival companies or speech, or use them in other negotiations then that also seems like a major issue of a different kind.
That being said it certainly doesn't seem fake, Tiktok is clearly a Chinese owned app with direct access to the eyes of our children.
Maybe, but it's been business-as-usual for decades.
And allowing "our children" to see things put out by the Chinese is a national security threat exactly how?
Consider that despite a literal ban being passed, two presidents have ignored it in a row. That seems pretty concerning, they must have a lot of influence in the country if we aren't even enforcing our laws.
This is facilely circular.
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I think national security threat is overselling it a little bit, but it's an extremely potent propaganda weapon. The fact China hasn't weaponized it yet has more to do with their patience for when it matters, than it does some lack of utility.
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Without fixing its manufacturing base, the US will lose any conflict with China that isn't decided in the first few days regardless of whether we're talking about 2022 or 2025 level weapon stockpiles. The fact that running out of 155 mm shells, drones, and missiles in trying to supply Ukraine has led to military and civilian leaders realizing this is a problem and working to solve it is the best thing that could have happened for American military preparedness short of not having outsourced all of those industries in the first place, even if there is a temporary shortage as a result.
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Ukraine was ruled by Russia for 300 years before independence. Eastern Ukraine and Russia are both Rus-descended cultures with a shared heritage. The invasion itself has given nationalism a shot in the arm, but it’s a rather different situation than South Korea or Taiwan.
In Ukraine, we helped the anti-Russia faction gain power in 2014. Taiwan and South Korea have been die-hard against Chinese rule for generations.
Taiwan is ethnic Chinese who literally speak the same language, and lots of Taiwanese celebrities and people visit China on vacation/tours/etc. They're arguably more linked to our adversaries.
Nice so in 2014 we got strong allies in the region, and now because of two weak and cowardly presidents in a row we might lose it. I guess the days of America growing more powerful and influential is behind us.
Er, I think "strong" is a bit optimistic - Ukraine was and remains a comparatively backward, deindustrializing, poor, and corrupt country with horrible demographics.
Strong is relative. They're holding off Russia for years so clearly they're not too far off from one of our greatest enemies.
I mean, yes, compared to the utterly defanged western europeans the Ukranians are fearsome. But I thought that the main lesson of this war has been Russia's incompetence and that their military production/procurement seems to be corrupt as hell and mostly faking their "advanced" capabilities.
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Not at all. Ukraine was still pretty divided internally between vehemently anti-Russia and pro-Russia factions, with lots of less dedicated people in the middle. It was conceivable that the pro-Russia faction could have gained the upper hand again eventually.
I think what is novel after 2014 is that US war material starts moving into the country. So maybe the pro-Russia faction would have been forcibly suppressed if it looked like they were going to win another election. But it would have been messy
Personally, I think it served US interests just fine to leave Ukraine as a border state. The war has been very costly in men and treasure, and the US seemed to be in the driver's seat in starting it.
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Ukraine was ruled by Russia for about 45 years, from the end of WWII to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Before that it was partitioned between nearby powers, Poland and Austria ruled substantial parts before WWII.
Kiev was taken by the Russians in 1667, only a little over a hundred years before the United States existed.
I imagine if New York broke away in a moment of national weakness. We might allow it. But if then China started installing military bases there and buying out the politicians, we would undoubtedly find it galling and invade.
I wish people would stop trying to make tortured analogies like this. The US doesn't have a good comparison in its history to Taiwan, nor to Ukraine, stop trying to force it.
In some respect all circumstances are unique. But gaining access to seaports on the Baltic and Black Sea were foundational to Russia’s concept of itself as a modern state. Losing its Black Sea territory would be a humiliation for them that would be setting them back to before the 1700s.
I understand that is probably the goal of US foreign policy - dismantling Russia into a pre-modern medieval rump state around Moscow. But Russia also understands that is the goal and they have 100 million people and the world’s largest nuke supply to prevent it. Personally, I think we should just trade with each other and get along. I doubt ending the modern Russian state as such will make the world a better place
Ukraine had been Russian for a very long time. Longer than the USA has existed. Much longer than Florida has been a state. These things matter. We are blessed with the world’s largest moat so we have little sympathy for other countries who are faced with the prospect of losing territory.
For us, I imagine our first realistic national humiliation will be when Hawaii is taken by China. I imagine we will fight very hard against that
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Yes, Kiev was in the Russian partition.
Calling it a partition is a little odd, since there never was a Ukrainian state until the 20th century. It’s not like the partition of Poland, where something that exists was split into pieces. And the area currently encompassed by Ukraine isn’t a coherent nation, but an agglomeration of several peoples with distinct heritages
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Ukrainians are by any measure I can think of more different from Russians than Taiwanese are from Chinese or South Koreans from North Koreans. Kiev began diverging from Moscow at the time of the Mongol invasions in the 13th century.
Kiev was part of Russia from 1667 to 1991, barring a two-year interregnum during the Bolshevik Revolution. It is also the founding city of all Rus civilizations and cultures. Personally, I can't tell the difference between the two languages.
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Come to the black sea resorts and try to figure out who is who.
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The Taiwanese are Chinese. They may be die hard against Communist rule, but they have no history as a state that wasn't thoroughly Chinese. Unless maybe you count the Japanese occupation but I don't think so.
They also have no history under the People's Republic, however.
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Incredible viewpoint. I'd advise never speaking in that manner to Ukrainians because they're going to be justifiably somewhat bitter about the half-million people who died BECAUSE Americans assured Ukraine they could help them defeat Russia.
I am personally acquainted with several dozen Ukrainians, and know several fighting. They're of the exact opposite opinion - I'm not sure how you came to meet so many that seem to support a Russian talking point? I'm genuinely curious, what's their background?
And propaganda or not, they think that Russia is taking far more causalities than they are, and no one seems to be talking about half a million deaths?
The Ukrainian narratives that I know are that they chose to stand up to Russia, are very happy with countries that helped them with equipment (very pro UK for example), and are confused why America is so hot and cold with shipments but still broadly pro US. They were going to fight with or without US/NATO weapons, at the big defeats Russia experienced at the start were mostly with Ukrainian gear, it was much later till the tanks, IFVs, aircraft and static AA started arriving, which allowed them to continue. They are also of the opinion that if Zelensky capitulates (or is seen to) he's gone next election, he was seen as soft on Russia pre war and is being outflanked by more popular warhawks.
War hawks. Tell me, when they have been grabbing people off the street like kidnappers and they're still 50% short on fighting men, do you think being hawkish has a future? They're already struggling.
Most people believe what they need to believe and live with themselves. Most people aren't capable of independent thinking, they conform to 'the room' without giving it a single thought. It's just what people do.
When the hangover of reality asserts itself, they're going to feel betrayed. Because the situation they were in was described and understood very well early on.
I'm very curious on your original assertion, that Ukrainians as a class are bitter on the US forcing them into fighting Russia, when they had no hope and it has gone so badly for them - taking half a million deaths in the process, such that suggesting Ukraine is right to fight and America is right to help them would therefore earn you their hatred. To me that sounds the same probability as "I'm Johnny Walker, from Texas Oblast, and I think that the USA is stupid to provoke the mighty Russian bear" as a being a genuine statement on US citizen's views on foreign policy - that's the inglourious basterds three fingers meme right there on every level. It's just... Russian signaling all the way through. Are you sure these are Ukrainians?
But to be fair, you also asked me a question. These warhawks have been fighting, have family fighting, and broadly support conscription when I asked them, though there was some discussions about draft dodging. Maybe they are foolish or p-zombies, but I myself am British, and so there's something very impressive about people paying a price and are willing to pay it to go fuck you to a fucked up bully even as others think you're foolish (1939-41 were our best and worst years). I do note they've done a lot better than anyone expected, aren't done yet, and have proven that even Russia can really bleed, they've done magnificently. I don't think of them as sheep or conformist, possibly to a fault - one issue of cossacks is they can be like herding cats, but they certainly have a common enemy today (even if they want Zelensky out tomorrow).
Maybe sober reality will make them regret their actions, but honestly, I think the fact Ukraine made itself into a very unwelcome meal for Russia is unlikely to be regretted, and they are proud so far of what their country has done (which includes rolling over the 4th Guards tank div, which is one of the funniest things to have happened to a power that claims to be super in a very very long time, imagine if a US armored division was routed in the Gulf war and their tanks captured to a degree that the Iraqi army could restock vs pre war, the T-80U is now on the endangered species list).
Finally, and this is utterly vital to stress, they also clearly have their own agency. Ukraine chose this, for better or for worse.
I like the fuckers, it's vibes for me, and I think while this is hard pounding, they may well pound the longest. I think it would be good if they do.
That wasn't his point at all.
His point as I understand was, 1) Ukrainians are bitter, because 2) they only fought because (stressed in all caps above) the USA assured them they would get US support and therefore defeat Russia and 3) this has proved a disaster and Ukrainians regret trusting the US and the war deaths could have been largely avoided had they known the all the above - furthermore these war deaths are half a million as Russia claims.
My point is no Ukrainian I know would express those 3, and they're extremely Russian coded. If No_one wishes to correct this misunderstanding I am all ears. Heaven knows it's hard to be clear on this forum, and I'm feeling a bit confused myself.
I worry there's a motte and bailey here - the motte being "Ukrainians would like more support from the USA, and feel that they're hot and cold which isn't helpful to the war effort" and the bailey being "Ukrainians fought the war because the USA promised them the moon and couldn't deliver, and are very bitter, and the deaths could have been avoided without the US meddling".
As far as I can tell, 4 different things are/were going on.
Post-2014, many Atlanticists and Nationalists (Banderists etc.) in Ukraine believed that trying to reach a compromise with the Russians on the status of the Donbass is pointless, because they thought ongoing military assistance from NATO would eventually ensure that, when the political opportunity arises, the swift and victorious conquest of the Donbass and the Crimea by a beefed-up Ukrainian army would become a reality, just like how the Croats united their country during Operations ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ in 1995.
Pre-2022, the same group of people and their sympathizers believed that NATO countries would send troops and weapons to aid Ukraine should it be attacked, which in turn would deter the Russians from attacking, as in reality they’re a paper bear.
None of this turned out to be true.
After the Russian blunders in the opening months of the war 2022, plus the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kherson and Kharkov regions, this same group of people were convinced that final victory can be achieved in the summer of 2023 because the demoralized orc hordes will cut and run at the sight of the first German tank, and if not, then it’ll be still possible to recapture the entire post-1954 territory of the Ukraine because the Americans and their NATO allies will provide sufficient supplies and weapons for the job whereas the orcs will run out of missiles/tanks/food/washing machines.
Again, none of this happened either, and at this point seems increasingly out of reach, although this is the only turn of events that would realistically constitute something that can be called a Ukrainian final victory.
With respect to your argument that the Ukrainians would keep fighting even without US/NATO weapons (and supplies plus money), I’d say the lessons of history prove the opposite. Look at Afghanistan, South Vietnam or Georgia for that matter (in 2008). US-aligned regimes don’t keep fighting after military aid is cut or is not forthcoming in the first place – this has been the case so far for sure. But even if you’re right after all, the main question is whether the average soldier is then willing to fight even offensively or only defensively. Because if the latter is the case, victory cannot be achieved. My argument is that to the extent Ukrainian troops keep fighting defensively, they are doing so in the belief that NATO will at least supply enough assistance to prevent the Ukrainian army from collapsing. (Whether the Russians actually want to annex the entire state is also far from clear, on a different note.)
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Two trillion dollars, 20 percent of all existing Patriot systems, several dozen western and Warsaw Pact fighter aircraft, 700 Soviet pattern tanks donated by former Warsaw Pact NATO members, 250 NATO standard tanks donated by Western European NATO members, 100 modern MLRS systems, hundreds of tube artillery pieces, and 2000 light armored vehicles isn’t a Herculean effort, but it’s not “barely lifting a pinky” either.
Yeah it's not really that much and in exchange here's one good advantage of Ukraine, it's an actual war with actual survival pressure making new strong technology for the west. The US Army is so far behind we're bragging about just being able to drop grenades from drones because there's no actual survival pressure on us to do anything.
Israel and Ukraine hold value just by being live testing grounds. If drone warfare is the future (it most likely is a pretty significant part of it) then having an ally actually expanding western drone capability for cheaper is a great return, instead of sticking with this level so bad we're bragging about being able to do things even rebels in Myanmar can manage. Here's Grok doing a comparison, it's baffling how much better the Ukrainians have gotten just by actually facing a real threat
Why assume the public-facing releases are actually the state of the force?
[reupload of video here]
I'd expect a lot of capabilities to be hidden, so that we can't guess about what the actual capabilities are...
((and to be fair to Skydio, this does look like it's intended as a scout rather than a kamikaze. And the cost comparison is probably doing an invoice vs cost-of-parts comparison.))
But I'd also had hoped that the United States military did enough that the stuff it does release looks a little more impressive; if you don't present anything it's clear you're hiding something. There should at least be some hobby-level projects around, but as a hobby-level project this is the sorta thing I'd expect to see from the CtrlPew crowd on a weekend rather than a dedicated engineer on a summer.
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.. two trillion $?
If you include economic damage to Europe from the sanctions, then easily that much or more. From a 2023 speech:
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/singapore-speech-hrvp-borrell-shangri-la-dialogue_en
Costs to the US are lower naturally but Big Guy is probably talking about the bloc as a whole.
I'm skeptical on that number, though I'm sure there are reasonable costs higher than the direct aid due to the sanctions etc you can't take all inflation as a cost and put it all due to the Ukraine war, that guy's speech in 2023 to Singapore isn't exactly a knock down argument...
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Yes
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I can't think of a worse set of arguments made by proponents of the US letting Ukraine suffer a defeat.
Ukraine is not a NATO country and more deeply integrated into the Russian culture and economy than any other country. The strategic situation is quite different and there is enough delta between the ease with which Russia could take and rule Eastern Ukraine and anywhere else that I don’t find the slippery slope arguments convincing.
Many people in Eastern Ukraine are interested in joining the western bloc for greater economic opportunity. But if they are conquered by Russia and NATO-Russia relations eventually normalize, they will learn to say mnohaja leta instead of mnohaja leeta and get on with their lives.
It would take an immense investment of manpower for Russia to occupy any other Baltic state and crush the resistance. But a good chunk of Ukraine is not just Slavic but also descended from the Rus, with a long and recent history of being ruled by Moscow. If Russia can take it, they will keep it without much trouble
Huh. [trump_RBG_meme.jpg]
Well, given the history of the USSR and Russian Empires, I'd say your priors are improperly calibrated.
Probably. Do you doubt Putin's resolve if he were to decide that was his goal?
Yeah, and the Ukrainians didn't have a great time. Which is why they're trying pretty dang hard to avoid that fate.
Maybe. I have no idea what the chances of an insurgency would be or not. But it seems relatively high, given the years of conflict before the invasion.
My main point is pretty much that the strategic situation Russia faces today is nothing like the strategic situation the Soviet Union faced in 1945 when they had overwhelming military force, favorable demographics, a vital pan-national ideology, neighboring countries which had been hollowed out by war, a neutral-to-friendly United States, and a regional power vacuum.
So yes, I did consider the Soviet Union and it is precisely that consideration that makes slippery slope arguments seem farfetched
I don’t know how you can observe the last 3 years of war and think Russia would roll over a NATO country
Some Ukrainians didn’t have a great time. Which is why some Ukrainians try pretty hard to avoid that fate. Of all its neighboring countries, Eastern Ukraine is by far the closest linked to Russia
Most NATO countries are geographically smaller and less well equipped than Ukraine, and have fewer troops.
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Point of order: You have your geopolitical metaphors out of whack. You're looking for "domino theory."
I don't know how you can observe the last 3 years of war and think Russia would roll over Ukraine, frankly. But they sure are trying!
So I don't trust Putin et al as totally rational actors for that very reason. They're bad at risk evals and self-awareness. Every day Russia's bogged down in Ukraine lessens the risk of further conflict. Had Russia taken Kyiv in weeks it would be a much worse situation.
But also you don't seem to be considering that Putin enjoys grayzone warfare and if Ukraine is removed as the primary focus for that, it would allow for more fuckery with other countries. Article 5 is tricky if you're fighting "separatists." It's not just about full invasions and take overs. Russia being able to better dominate neighbors is not a good outcome.
IMO Putin errs on the side of caution. For Russian security, he really shouldn't have let the US get 8 years to fortify Ukraine before the invasion. He's a patient leader, to a fault.
Russia projects power over its direct neighbors and a few allies in its neighborhood. We helped overthrow a democratic government on the other side of the world. Well, many actually. I think its weird that we wouldn't expect a large state like Russia to have some influence over its neighbors. And in times of peace, it is a non-issue. It's only something we trot out when the war machine needs a few $trillion and people at State are getting bored.
And for what it's worth, Russian influence seems more benevolent than US influence. It's pragmatic and non-ideological in the post-Soviet era, focusing on mutual economic benefit and security. On the other hand, I lose track of which Jihadis are the good guys that we are using to spread democracy and which are the bad Jihadis that maybe used to be the good Jihadis and etc, etc.
Why do so many countries desire NATO membership?
Seriously just go read about how the Europeans bordering Russia feel and stop pretending the US is the only actor in the world.
You could try to make the arguments of "cautious" and "beneficial" about China and I'd give you half credit. But about Russia?
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This isn't a point of order. Anyway, "domino theory" worked. First the Hungarian border fell, then the Berlin Wall, then the East German government, then the Soviet Union. I guess those weren't the dominos in the original theory...
Point of order: Yes it is. Misapplication of metaphors is against the rules.
Domino theory worked in establishing the Iron Curtain too.
I agree that, in general, people are bad at evaluating dominoes falling and the slipperiness of slopes on either side. But it's only the critics who can invoke the thought terminating cliches of "that's a logical fallacy" or "domino theory was false" without engaging with actual reality.
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Yeah it's hard to imagine a situation where giving the egotistical leaders of Russia and China free wins isn't going to empower them and encourage more war.
If you're Putin or Xi and you know America will just walk away bored if you grind out for a few years, then what's the cost of war? Like hell just look at Trump right now, he's giving China high tech AI chips from Nvidia and literally ignoring the law to allow their propaganda site to brainwash teens despite the ban.
Why would Xi have any faith this American apparatus too lazy and scared to even take down Tiktok would actually stick around for long in Taiwan? We're metaphorically bending over and begging for our enemies to fuck us with propaganda and advanced AI capabilities, and yet people are expecting a serious fight when it comes to actual war?
Same exact issue for flinching when Putin talks about nukes.
"Well if he's threatening WWIII I guess we should just let him do what he wants. It's just not worth the risk to confront him."
It's as if a large portion of the American Right has entirely forgotten the lessons of Cold War diplomatic and military strategy. Or very, very obvious game theory re: bluffs and tit for tat.
It doesn't work like that. Threats don't have unlimited range and effect.
The US can't go 'back out of Ukraine or we'll attack you'. The Russians would call that bluff. The Russians can't likewise say 'end all arms support tomorrow and Starlink too or we'll nuke X, Y and Z'. The US would call that bluff. In the Cold War, there was discussion over whether the US would really trade New York for Paris with reference to nuclear forces. It is not at all accepted that the US would trade New York for Kiev. Credibility is based on proximity of target, perceived value and the provocativeness of behaviour to be deterred. It depends on many factors.
Those who'd pat themselves on the back over 'very, very obvious game theory' should move onto merely obvious game theory.
Did I claim they did?
Or are you misreading what I wrote?
Have you not observed various rightwingers very, very concerned about calling that bluff?
I'm not making up a guy to get mad at. Very real thing.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/04/ukraine-russia-nuclear-war-fears
https://time.com/7295939/russia-iran-israel-us-war-nuclear-catastrophe-trump-putin-khamenei/
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/12/russia-ukraine-nuclear-war-putin-threat/672491/
No shit. Consider that you're trying to condescend to someone who already knows what you're trying to explain.
Wait, are you a non-American trying to lecture me about how threats and deterrence work? The very nerve.
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Trump and his people are very much tit for tat. Look at what they've done to Iran and the Houthis.
Instead what you are ignoring is that the American Right has learned from the past 30 years that if America and/or its Allies are winning a war, the left will start calling American (or other) soldiers, generals, and political leaders war criminals and start calling for disarmament, the end of fighting etc. So until Democrats have approximately the same political power nationally as Republicans currently do in San Fransisco, war is kinda pointless.
The op against the Houthis was kind of a disaster, right?
With Iran, Trump also done fucked up by not letting the Israelis finish the enemy. I suspect that equilibrium will not last.
Yeah, except for the part where I had disagreements with a number of MAGA-pilled individuals who believed that actually Hillary was a hawkish warmonger, basically John McCain in a woman's suit. Vs. Trump, the peacenik. As if liberal interventionists like Hillary were exactly the same as hawkish neocons like McCain.
The Bush Administration was retarded about invading Iraq as a war of choice based on what turned out to be false premises, and then botching the occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Luckily enough, Iraq might just turn out alright in the long run, but Afghanistan is back to being a Taliban paradise.
You're conflating going to war and diplomatic/military strategies around deterrence. The really nice thing about deterrence, is when you're good at it there's no war. And, if deterrence fails, you've already done the prep work to win the war.
You'll note that all my calls for preparation and intervention in these threads have not been: "The US should take military action against an adversary." I would say we should actually blow the fuck out of the Houthis just for being pirates, let alone allies of Iran.
How many people in Gaza should currently be alive?
Every single one that renounces Hamas and acts to end their existence.
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The US ditching Ukraine to prioritize Taiwan I think would actually spook China. The US doubling down on its commitments to Ukraine means fewer weapons in the Pacific, unless the US also slashes its social services or something else to double down on walking and chewing gum. China would prefer the US bogged down in Ukraine, and the US openly abandoning them to their fate to focus on the Pacific would demonstrate that the US "ambiguous" policy towards Taiwan is actually one of total strategic commitment to Chinese containment.
This is not an actual available option. Please try again. Trump won't even ban TikTok ffs.
Prime the Pump. If we have munitions capacity issues what better way to fix them.
What on earth does "bogged down" mean here? I'm not arguing we conduct military operations.
Why not?
Sure, if Ukraine/Europe can release funding to fund US munitions (which I do gather is happening, and that seems fine). But if the US has budget X and they can split it between the Pacific and Europe, or just spend it on the Pacific, the latter option is scarier for China.
That ship has already sailed. The US has been conducting "non-kinetic" military operations in support of Ukraine's war effort for the duration of the war.
Empirical evidence suggests strongly that it keeps not happening, even by people who claim to want it to happen. Furthermore, the Taiwanese themselves (unlike the Ukrainians) are pretty lackluster in their own efforts to build up deterrence to China.
My guess is that it's a foregone conclusion that Taiwan will be absorbed by China in the coming years, similar to Hong Kong, due to everyone recognizing the inevitable and Taiwan and the US being unwilling to go to war over it once China decides to exert significant pressure. Possibly, a future US administration that was very hardline on China might change that calculus, but both parties are pretty antiwar these days.
Don't confuse stocks and flows.
We are not, in any meaningful sense of the term, "bogged down" in Ukraine. Notably, our US Navy ships have not sailed to pressure Russia in any significant form (as we did re: Iran). Also, ships can change course if ordered to redirect. As could any of the other military assets in the region. They aren't being permanently committed or destroyed. (Note that we always have some level of military presence countering Russia and conducting ISR.)
Look, there's a difference between something not happening and something being impossible. I'm discussing how China would react in a hypothetical.
Yes.
Sure. Both are important, and which is "more" important depends a lot on your timeline.
The munitions, vehicles and weapons we sent there are. I agree that we aren't "bogged down" the way one might describe us as being "bogged down" in Afghanistan, but we are "bogged down" in the sense that it remains a large center of US governmental attention (which is not unlimited) and, for as long as we continue to support the war effort, US industrial capacity (which is also far from unlimited).
Hypothetically, the US could do a lot to increase its military pressure on China re: Taiwan without taking away from Ukraine support at all. Maybe we could try that first?
We were not even "bogged down" in Afghanistan. As a percentage of our actual military capacities, only a tiny fraction was ever committed to Afghanistan. Sure, we lit a lot of money and attention on fire, but in term of actual combat capacity it was not a big deal to run that occupation. Even with Iraq, it was primarily the Army, and even then not our major units like say armor/artillery (after the initial invasion).
The USAF and USN were either only lightly involved or, by definition, have assets that are very easy to rapidly redeploy.
Vietnam was a much, much larger and costly commitment. One of the very reasons the "forever wars" were "forever" is that it was not that costly to continue indefinitely.
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It's not about budgets.
US doesn't have the industrial capacity to counter China. The US war plan, right now, relies on a hail mary of "maybe if we spam 1000 improved Tomahawk missiles at (mobile) Chinese batteries from submarines off the coast we'll be able to kill enough of these to be able to operate carriers near Taiwan.
Mind you US Tomahawk inventory is about 1k. (Or 2k) I dunno, but in any case only a fraction can even hit mobile targets even theoretically and assuming, during a war that US would be able to observe China unmolested by laser satellite dazzlers is brave in itself.
I don't really think this is true. A lot of it depends on the specific goal the US is trying to achieve. But just generally, the US doesn't need carriers to "win" a Taiwan Strait engagement.
Frankly I'm not sure the US would bother to use a lot of Tomahawks on missile launchers, particularly since the newer ones have an antiship mode.
Achieving merely what Ukraine has in the Black Sea would be a victory for Taiwan: area denial to naval and air assets would be a victory, with the potential of blocking significant chunks of commercial traffic to all of China's ports.
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And I mean what exactly has happened to make any of that credible? Putin is not putting forces anywhere near other borders. He’s not issuing threats to anyone else. It’s just not there and as such anyone claiming that “Ze Ruzzan tanks will shortly roll across the Baltics” just isn’t dealing in the facts on the ground. It’s an excellent excuse to pour more treasure into Ukraine to the tune of trillions in weapons. The winners of this are not the Western powers, but the weapons manufacturers who made bank off of that money. And for all that, we managed to turn a six week war into a two year war that went the way it was always going to go, except with more deaths and more destruction, more ordinance buried under now useless farmland.
And as far as the West goes, tensions between the West and BRICS wouldn’t be high at all if we’d simply minded our own business. Russians didn’t have a problem with us, China didn’t, Iran only hated us over Israel and really not that much. Us propping up Ukraine and fighting that proxy war in Ukraine and trying to cut Russia off from tge world banking and market systems told those countries that those markets were merely used to reinforce Western hegemony and that anyone who didn’t play by our rules showed them not to trust our markets or banks. Had we stayed out, Russia would be just fine with the status quo.
As far as Taiwan, we gave a lot of money and weapons to Ukraine. If we keep doing that we won’t have enough in reserve to fight for Taiwan.
Please be serious. Where Putin puts his forces after taking out Ukraine is the concern.
You can argue that the Europeans should shoulder the bulk of their own defense, but you seem to be arguing they are paranoid. I would be concerned were I a Moldovan.
Personally I think that's a win-win since we have lost some key industrial capacities for munitions productions. Those are good factory jobs.
Two years, huh? At least get your defeatism timeline right please.
France does ok on agriculture despite having the Iron Harvest.
Just like Putin minded his?
Anyone pretending "BRICS" is a useful label because it represents an actual coalition is just ignorant about geopolitics. For starters, China and India don't get along very well. Who gives a fuck about Brazil or or South Africa as major geopolitical players?
Ironically, there's a far stronger natural argument for defending Ukraine against Russia than there is for defending a rogue Chinese province from its sovereign government. Given that Trump won't even ban TikTok, how on earth would he commit to a serious loss of life and risk of WWIII to defend an island where we have no formal obligation?
After the Cold War, the US and Russia have been at loggerheads way before the Ukraine invasion on a host of geopolitical issues.
Same with China. Issues with North Korea and Taiwan didn't begin yesterday.
What universe do you live in? "Only"? "Really not that much"???????????????????
"Death to America" was just for show then? Shame about all the Americans they've killed over the years. I suppose Trump et al have nothing to worry about from those assassination plots.
This is a hilarious way to compare an anti-communist Western-backed nation that has existed since 1949, versus a province that was ruled by Russia for over 300 years up to 1991 and remained a pretty neutral border state up until 2014
Losing civil wars has consequences. Both China and Taiwan have a "one China policy" I do believe.
Taiwan is in reality a rogue province that exists only because the US could keep the ChiComms from finishing out the civil war. It's doomed to being reabsorbed, if present trends continue.
In contrast, Ukraine is a sovereign nation, which was recognized by all parties at the time, and is making things very nasty for the Russians.
In both the international law sense (kinda fake) as of 1971, and the force of arms sense (ultimately the main thing), Taiwan is not much of a country as would be made immediately clear as soon as the US stops giving it strategic ambiguity as a defense.
Taiwan was never held by the People's Republic.
That's what "rogue" means here. In a civil war, the ChiComms won, but didn't quite get back the full territory of China.
The exact history of who controlled what when isn't even relevant here, strictly speaking.
I love history trivia too, but both sides believe in One China what do you think you're arguing for here?
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There's nothing valuable in the Baltics whatsoever. Nothing at all. The population would mostly flee and be happily snapped up by European union which needs wagies. Baltic sea navigation wouldn't be improved, actually seizing the Baltic state could possibly make western Europe close the Danish straits.
If you read the latter part of his post, I think it's pretty clear he means we shouldn't mind the Baltics getting invaded, but of course correct me if I'm wrong.
I kinda hold a similar opinion. I don't really want to care about the Baltics. But they are in NATO, and we (the US) are allied to them, so we do have to mind the Baltics getting invaded. If there's a politically feasible way to extricate ourselves from having to protect the Baltics, like somehow removing them from NATO, then I would support it.
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Don't tell me that tell the Russians that.
But I suspect it's Moldova that has the most to lose from a significant Russian victory in Ukraine.
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Oh, come on. The US has been the Great Satan from Day 1.
Certainly we'd get along much better with Russia if we'd done nothing at all to stop them from rolling over Ukraine. I'm fairly sure this would have soured relations with Russia's other neighbors, however. And China would be a lot happier with us if we weren't the main obstacle to them taking Taiwan, but again, I don't think allowing them to do so nets out to a win.
Taiwan is a naval battle first; I don't think we've been supplying much naval weaponry to Ukraine.
Day 1 of the revolution to oust a CIA backed dictator that was installed to thwart the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by a democratically elected Prime Minister, that is.
The Persians have plenty of legitimate historical grievance against Anglo-Americans, let's not pretend otherwise. But they could probably let it all go if their main regional rival didn't have such strong military ties with the US.
Very true but it is also true that after the good faith effort by Obama (against Israel’s wishes) to sign a deal that had a clear pathway to full integration with the Western economy / markets on trade - the main economic goal Iran has sought for decades - with the sole price being (easily cheated) checks by nuclear monitors, the Iranians continued to funnel billions into regional Shia militias in Yemen and Lebanon (as well as Syria and Iraq) that fought against US allies and whose funding was solely intended to prolong conflicts with Saudi Arabia, Israel and others as part of the ongoing plan since 1979 to make the Islamic Republic the moral and spiritual center of the Ummah’s collective consciousness and to serve Iranian foreign policy.
Much as I'll respect Obama for trying, I don't think that deal did anything to stabilize the region. Like much of the US policy vis à vis Iran since, it was just a half measure to throw the whole problem under the rug for the next POTUS to deal with. Trump's "Mission Accomplished" moment is that too.
If the US was willing to codify the spheres of influence of Iran and Israel and enforce peace on both of them, that might be something, but short of that any accord is just throwing the war between the two into the shadows, for a time.
The whole situation bears an ironic ressemblance to the Israelo-Palestinian conflict where nobody is allowed to win, so it's all spycraft and buildup broken up by effusions that GPs have to quell.
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I agree with this on the whole, but we have given Ukraine a fair amount of Patriot missiles, which would be very helpful defending against Chinese ballistic/cruise missiles, particularly for point defense around airfields.
Vulnerability, thy name is throughput.
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Isn’t that true for any Ukrainian President? How would a US replacement/puppet be accepted?
While Russia is currently winning, they are winning very very very slowly. The war can go on for a long time.
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This doesn't make sense in context. There are constant offer of peace talks, constant public praise and hit pieces, years of rumor around Zaluzhny's political future etc. Seymour Hersh is a joke with negative alpha.
I don't know why anyone take him seriously after the hilariously manufactured pipeline attack story.
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My knowledge of Ukr politics begins and ends at ‘I support whatever the UGCC wants’, so this is an honest question- does Zaluzhny have sufficient internal support to force through a peace agreement over the nationalist’s objections, or to expand the draft until Ukraine is fully staffed again? Could that be the reason?
As for Zelenskyy, making high risk maneuvers is far from unknown when leaders sense a direct threat to their power.
@Dean
I'd preface my response by noting that after Hershs' earlier farce regarding the Nord Stream Bombing, in which he favored a Russian-backed conspiracy theory of perpetrator, with his own falsifiable and falsified narrative, over the implicit and explicit attribution of the European governments including Germany itself (i.e. Ukraine did it), I'd be very, very skeptical of any claim by him for insider insight. Hersh may have his sources, but I would not trust they are sources actually inside the American administration... and if they were, they'd be exceptionally desperate- and motivated- to publicize them via Hersh rather than someone else.
Hersh is a crank when it comes to the Ukraine War. More to the point, Hersh is the sort of person that majority of Trump's Republican administration considers a crank on the Ukraine War. You don't go to the other tribe's conspiracy cranks to launder your own efforts on the subject, unless you want to discredit the premise.
Almost certainly not.
The biggest obstacle to a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement isn't the objection of 'the nationalists' to peace, but rather the 'everyone who suspects Putin would attack again' caucus to 'a peace agreement that sets conditions for Putin to attack again.' This is the reminder that the Ukraine invasion was the third, arguably fourth, continuation war by Russia against Ukraine since the invasion of Crimea. The first was the Nova Russia astroturf revolt, the second was the conventional military intervention to keep the separatist republics from falling, and the arguable third was efforts in between those, distinct from the attempts to coerce Ukraine into a state of constitutional paralysis by the inter-war negotiations.
There is no politically viable coalition of people who want to make a deal for the sake of a deal, particularly when Russia keeps claiming that a required condition of the deal is the demilitarization of Ukraine's capabilities to fight back. Just at a game theory level, such a demand requires a certain level of trust in the other player, and in this context- and for the foreseeable future- that other player is Putin.
Also almost certainly not.
For one thing, there's no particular standard of 'fully staffed.' The only time Ukraine has a meaningful manpower advantage- i.e. 'fully staffed- was pre-mobilization in the first year. This was a result of policy decisions by the Kremlin, not Ukrainian draft politics.
Ukraine has manpower challenges- though you probably look more towards Michael Koffman than anyone posting on the Motte this year for insight on that- but one dynamics of the situation is that the current issues aren't even something that forcibly conscripting more bodies would 'fix.' One of the reasons here is that the technology adaption/evolution of drones has limited the ability of both sides to actually maintain 'full' front line units. The drone dynamics are complicated, but the short end is that the Ukrainians are in some respects doing better defending longer terrain with fewer forces than would normally be considered 'full.'
But the flipside is that this is also applying to the Russians for much the same reason- drones are increasingly too common to allow maintaining massed forces on the battle line, and the more drones there are, the smaller that mass that can stand by gets. This is why the Russians have been getting increasingly effective use out of YOLO motorcycle/golf car assaults as with motorized/mechanized assalts. It's not that either is good, but both are bad, and the speed of the motorized assaults is enough to mitigate the exposure before the Ukrainian infantry can counter attack. Would more Ukrainian infantry in the trenches to resist attacks against the trenches be better? Sure. But it would also mean more exposure to the drones in those contexts.
I'm not claiming that the Ukrainian shortage is secretly an advantage, but it's a disadvantage that mitigates the cost of another significant risk factor. Which is not exactly unknown in conflicts.
Also a third almost certainly not, though I'll pivot here to choosing to interpret 'the reason' as 'motive for the story.'
Hersh aside, the motive for an anti-Zelensky story 'now'- as in, 'why now?'- would probably be the consequence of internal Trump administration politics, as the losers of the cut-all-aid-from-Ukraine caucus shake some trees in hopes something falls. The biggest change in the Ukraine situation recently isn't that the military situation has gotten worse, but rather that the Trump administration relationship got better, and so negative press is part of that 'don't just do nothing, do something' response of people trying to shape an emerging policy.
I do owe a follow-up on late last year / early this year predictions, but one of the bigger predictions I made earlier this year was that the Trump-European relationship was primed to go transactional.
From February-
Low and behold, that's begun to happen, as the recent NATO summit that expanded the NATO spending target to 5% in a yuge win for Trump, also explicitly counts aid to Ukraine as counting for that limit. In turn, and around the time Trump made his more recent 50-day demand towards Putin,* Germany announced it was going to finance Patriots from the US for Ukraine. Europeans can win points from Trump, reduce Trumpian critcism of their defense investments, support Ukraine, and secure the American material that they themselves do not have, all while getting to claim they are meeting their NATO requirements by... buying American stuff for Ukraine.
In other words, the US-European relationship towards Ukraine is shifting from where where Biden donated aid to Ukraine, to where Trump sells aid to Europe who buys for Ukraine. Remember that the Russian theory of victory since choosing to prolong the war was that Ukraine would be cut off from American-European military-economic support and thus fall victim to the greater Russian military-economic mass. Having a transition where the rich Europeans using their economic resources to continue the supply of American munitions is 'better' for Russia than the US outright donating them outright, but it's a Bad Thing for Russian sustainability in the long term (as in- more than 3 years out).
But this is also a Bad Thing, specifically, for a small subset of the anti-Ukraine trump administration caucus who didn't want any military production to go towards Ukraine, at all, in favor of supporting the China buildup (or, more pressingly, Israel and the Middle East). This line of argument is against any diversion of material capabilities, including that which is sold rather than donated, on the urgency-of-China argument.
Well, that caucus has lost the bureucratic fight, and defying Trump openly is political suicide. Therefore, how do you try to undercut a commercial diversion? Lead corruption allegation #XYZ and hope it sticks, reducing / shrinking sales on corruption grounds.
Notably, however- and more relevant for some of the potential media planting efforts- it's not just inner-Trump admin dissidents who don't like the policy change. France and Italy have signaled dislike of the US policy change, less because they don't want to support Ukraine and more that they (especially France) don't want European money going to buy American weapons for Ukraine, as opposed to European (especially French) weapons. If Zelensky is particularly happy with the Trump development- and to be fair it's probably impossible to tell a sincerely happy Zelensky to one desperate to avoid a repetition of the White House blowup conference- then perhaps an alternative to Zelensky would also be more willing to entertain alternative (and long lead time) deliveries of military aid in a context.
I doubt it- I think this is not much ado about even less- but pettier axes have been ground.
*The 50 day puts us towards the end of the fighting season... which is about the point we'd see a summer/fall offensive peter out for the year regardless before the mud and winter season reset. I'll expect pro-forma negotiations there regardless, and that'll probably be when I do a Ukraine review of predictions.
I'm not clear what high-risk maneuvers you think Zelensky is making in this context, but if this is referring to any given part of the OP, I wouldn't worry.
I would generally dismiss the objectivity the OP's framing of just about everything to do with Ukraine's negotiations, ranging from the 'surprising move' (something that has been repeatedly going on since the first Trump-Zelensky summit is not a surprise), to attribution of effort (the summer negotiations were not a result of Ukrainian 'trying,' but rather blatant coercion from the US), to even attribution of origin (the 30 day ceasefire demand did not originate from Ukraine, but was Zelensky echoing/supporting a Trump administration position on immediate cease fire).
Then again, I admittedly do have a flinch when I see someone unironically use 'regime journalist' as a way to discredit an objection to a known conspiracy theorist. Nor do I put much stock in the latest iteration of 'Ukraine is about to militarily collapse any month now' narrative that is over three years old at this point.
As far as Zelensky's political risk goes, I'd say his position has gotten stronger, not riskier, since this spring summer. Zelensky went from being 'the President who personally lost almost all American military support' to 'the President who made the American military support less generous but more stable, while offsetting the direct cost to us.' I can see a case for a palace coup against the former, but far fewer people within Ukraine will take the risks to reverse the later. Particularly if the nominal basis for removal- 'we must remove the appearance of corruption'- is to be done by...
Well, does anyone actually believe that the sort of people who think Ukraine shouldn't be given aid on account of corruption are going to be more forthcoming after an easy-to-characterize-as-corrupt palace coup?
@hydroacetylene
(Curse you for directly asking for my opinion! I've been trying to Ukraine War post less this year.)
FWIW my first thought on seeing this thread was "oh yeah, I guess it has actually been a while since the last major Ukraine discussion here" so I think you might still be on track.
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Do you think this will help? While team U has shortage of everything, I think their main issue right now is that Russia will soon be able to degrade their air defenses to levels that their drones will be able to strike the whole country. If they get to this point - you won't even be able to build new air defenses or training camps. They will be just sitting ducks.
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Elections in Ukraine are cancelled indefinitely with US State Department approval, so barring a military coup Zaluzhny can’t force anything through. The State Department might be changing its tune though. The war is going very badly for Ukraine. Budanov was supposed to be the hard-headed butcher that would fight to the last Ukrainian, so if he wants to tap out that means the situation must be very dire. A catastrophic, total Ukrainian collapse would make NATO a lot harder to defend because the Russians would be sitting right on the Polish border. The Balkans would also be at much higher risk. It would be better for NATO to force Ukraine to give up everything east of the Dneiper and freeze the conflict for another ten years. That at least gives Europe time to rearm.
Remember, the US is the hyperagent. Other countries don't make and execute their own decisions- other countries either act in accordance with American permission, or are forced to respond to American impositions.
The whole Ukrainian govt is on US and EU payroll, about half their money comes from the West vs Ukrainian taxes.
"So I'm on trial for war crimes. Where is the justice? We are all individuals, making our own decisions. I never forced anyone to do anything. This prosecution is based on spooks, naïve conceptions of conspiracy and a simplistic understanding of a complex world of interrelated cause and effect."
"Well you did pay the soldier's wages. You provided them armaments, training and intelligence. You're responsible for their actions, your support is implicit."
Thank you for demonstrating a failure mode.
Do you feel like these snarky comebacks add anything, impress or convince others?
The galaxybrained 'you're just projecting your own ignorance and whenever you point out the silliness in what I'm saying - it's actually you that's wrong and each time you point this out it only shows how wrong you are' approach was fun but it's gotten a bit tired by now. You need a new routine.
And I am sure that- in your superiority and/or boredom- you will no longer waste your time responding to any of my posts that are not directly to you ever again.
In return, I will continue to strive to do the same for you.
Your example was actually a fair skit for showing the limits of a hyperagent mentality.
The short discussion, as much of a caricature as it starts as for Agent A, is rather more damning for Agent B, the supposed reasonable party and hyperagent proxy. By literally having a discussion that does not include an intermediary Agent C who perpetrated unspecified war crimes, whose existence is acknowledged but also dismissed by Agent B in favor of prosecuting Agent A on implicit rather than even explicit responsibility, it demonstrates the hyperagent theorist failure and inclination to unjustly allocation punishments and sanctions on the basis of convenience and accessibility, rather than agency is the nominal crimes.
There are interesting angles, historical examples, and differences/hypocrisies that could easily be pointed at. After all, at no point does Agent B ever actually assert that Agent A had any knowledge of, issued any direction for, had any operational control over, or ever voiced any support for. Agent B's accusation and prosecution of Agent A as the responsible party could run word-for-word even if Agent C actively deceived, defied, circumvented, and even defected from Agent A in order to commit the war crimes. Agent A is responsible merely for having supported Agent C at some point, not for having supported Agent C for the purpose of the atrocity alluded to. There is no criminal intent required, or even awareness.
The allocation of responsibility to Agent A by Agent B is fundamentally uninterested in the agency, moral responsibility, and moral culpability of Agent C. Agent B merely treats Agent A as the hyperagent on the basis of providing support, regardless of the degree of support (A is not claimed to be the decisive supporter), the exclusivity of support (A is not claimed to be the only supporter), or the restrictions that were attempted (A is not claimed to have taken not mitigations). Agent B, in doing so, begins to validate the nominally farcical accusation by Agent A that Agent B is naive, simplistic, and ignoring cause and effect.
If it was intentional, it was well done, with multiple levels. If it was not, that was my error, and I apologize for confusing you.
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In a press conference Antony Blinkin stated that Ukraine wasn’t going to have elections until all its territory is recovered, including Crimea. In other words, Ukraine is never going to have elections again. My point is, Zelensky isn’t going to call elections and the US State Department isn’t going to lean on them to either.
Truly, Antony Blinkin's word is Ukrainian law forever into the future, and 'the State Department isn't going to lean on them' is the same as 'State Department approval.'
Opposition parties remain banned, the press is still under government control, the Verkhovna Rada re-passes the martial law declaration every 90 days with the precision of a metronome. There are no plans for an election in the near future. I’m not seeing any stunning Ukrainian rebuke of what Antony Blinkin said.
That's good! You'd probably have a vision problem if you did. One typically does not see stunning rebukes of foreign, and former, political appointees who are providing rhetorical, financial, and military support to your own side.
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Russians wouldn't settle for 'freezing the conflict', they're not idiots. They're going to demand neutrality or keep fighting.
They have said that over and over.
Yes probably, when I say freezing the conflict I was being a bit unclear. I’m including solutions like giving away the eastern half and making the remaining rump swear neutrality, not just a Korea style freeze. Anything that could stop the conflict without getting Poland encircled.
I meant that if all of Ukraine falls you have Poland abutting Russia and Belarus to the east and Russian Kaliningrad to the north.
You can be as pedantic as you like, but it’s something NATO is genuinely concerned about.
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Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link